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Thesis Abstract 
This empirically motivated doctoral thesis investigates the impact of Federal Funds 
rate (FFR) surprises on asset prices between Jun-89 to Dec-12, with a focus on the effect of 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis on this relationship. This is an important question to evaluate 
because the Fed initially responded to the crisis by using conventional monetary policy (i.e. 
target FFR cuts) to influence financial, monetary and economic conditions in the broader 
macroeconomy. This was also the primary policy tool of the Fed throughout the majority of 
the crisis period (Sep-07 to Dec-08) and non-conventional monetary policy measures were 
only used when the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound. In Chapter 1 we outline the 
thesis and in Chapter 2 we review empirical studies related to this thesis. 
 Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter of this thesis in which we investigate the 
impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns. We demonstrate that a structural shift occurred 
during the recent crisis which significantly altered the US stock market response to FFR 
shocks. In particular, stock returns were shown to be associated with non-positive or negative 
responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. The lack of a positive stock response to 
FFR shocks during the crisis implies that unexpected FFR cuts ceased to be seen as good 
news by stock market investors, and were rather interpreted as signals from the Fed of 
worsening macro-financial conditions.  
We extend our empirical analysis to the US Treasury market and gold market in 
Chapter 4. Our estimates show that very short-term maturity (3-Month), longer-term (5-Year, 
10-Year and 30-Year) maturity Treasury yields and gold returns were associated with 
significantly larger magnitude declines in response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. 
The stronger response of these securities to FFR shocks during the crisis implies that 
unexpected FFR cuts signalled worsening future economic prospects and triggered a 
rebalancing of investment portfolios away from falling equities and towards these safe-haven 
assets. These cuts prompted significantly higher demand for highly liquid securities such as 
3-Month T-Bills and gold. The stronger response of longer-term Treasuries implies that 
investors anticipated a prolonged downturn and increased demand for longer-term, lower-risk, 
safe-haven assets.  
 Finally in Chapter 5 we consider the international context, investigating the 
transmission of FFR shocks to equity indices across 43 advanced and emerging market 
countries. We find substantial cross country heterogeneity in the responses of foreign equity 
index returns to FFR shocks outside the crisis, with positive stock responses to FFR shocks 
where significant. However, we find even greater heterogeneity in the responses of foreign 
equity indices to FFR shocks during the crisis, with an unexpected 1% FFR cut being 
associated with significant 2.53%-7.50% decline across the equity indices of 12 countries, 
and 2.79%-14.04% increases across the equity indices of 19 countries. Our estimates show 
that cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis 
period can only partly be explained in terms of real bilateral integration with the US economy, 
and find that external borrowing from the rest of the world is also an important determinant. 
Overall, our estimates in this thesis highlight the severity of the 2007-2009 crisis, reveal the 
limits of conventional monetary policy at the zero lower bound and are consistent with the 
Keynesian liquidity trap theory. 
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Introduction 
The 2007-2009 crisis was global in nature and of an unprecedented magnitude 
compared to previous episodes of financial and economic unrest. The Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, characterised the period as being “the worst financial crisis 
since the 1930s” (Bernanke, 2009). For the majority of the financial crisis, from Sep-07 to 
Dec-08, the Fed employed conventional monetary policy via target Federal Funds rate (FFR) 
changes to combat declining financial and economic conditions. However, the limits of 
conventional monetary policy were realised on the 16th Dec 08 when the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) cut the target FFR by 75 basis points, effectively pushing it 
towards the zero-lower bound. This meant that there was liquidity trap which ultimately 
restricted the ability of the Fed to boost financial markets and stimulate economic growth 
using the conventional tools of monetary policy. In fact, Ben Bernanke repeatedly conceded 
that “monetary policy can be a powerful tool, but it is not a panacea for the problems 
currently faced by the U.S. economy” (Bernanke, 2011). 
As the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound in late 2008, the Fed began 
employing more non-conventional measures of monetary policy to influence financial 
markets and the broader macroeconomy. These measures included increasing and more 
explicit use of forward guidance through FOMC statements and large-scale asset purchase 
(LSAP) programmes. There is a growing empirical literature examining the impact of non-
conventional monetary policy on the prices of financial assets in the US, however there is a 
comparative dearth of studies investigating the impact of conventional monetary policy on 
domestic and international financial markets during the 2007-2009 crisis period. This is an 
important question to evaluate because the Fed initially responded to the crisis by using 
conventional monetary policy (i.e. target FFR cuts) to influence financial, monetary and 
economic conditions in the broader macroeconomy. This was also the primary policy tool of 
the Fed throughout the majority of the crisis period (Sep-07 to Dec-08). Non-conventional 
monetary policy was only utilised as a last resort measure when the limits of conventional 
monetary policy were realised in late 2008. 
 The Federal Reserve was originally mandated by the United States Congress in 1977 
to independently administer monetary policy and tasked to achieve a set of broad 
macroeconomic policy objectives such as; higher employment, sustainable economic growth 
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and stable prices (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2013)1. The Fed primarily administered 
monetary policy through open market operations, hence the extent to which it could influence 
these variables were at most indirect. The most direct and immediate effects of conventional 
monetary policy were observed in changes of financial asset prices, with lagged effects on the 
broader macroeconomy (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Financial markets therefore serve as 
the main conduit through which monetary policy operates and ultimately influences these 
macroeconomic objectives. This thesis investigates the impact of conventional monetary 
policy shocks on financial markets. 
Prior to 2007, studies widely demonstrated that expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy shocks were associated with; positive (negative) stock returns both 
domestically in the US and internationally in foreign equity markets and negative (positive) 
responses in US Treasury yield changes (see Kuttner, 2001; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2006). However, the impact of conventional monetary policy 
shocks on asset prices during the 2007-2009 crisis period is less clear cut. Whilst Krugman 
(2008) argued that “the usual tools of economic policy — above all, the Federal Reserve’s 
ability to pump up the economy by cutting interest rates — have lost all traction”, Mishkin 
(2009) argues that “that this view is just plain wrong” and explicitly states that “the fallacy 
that monetary policy is ineffective during financial crises is dangerous.” Hence, this 
empirically motivated thesis investigates the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks 
on asset prices over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period with a particular emphasis on the 
2007-2009 crisis period. In this respect we are interested in three main financial markets; the 
US stock market (see Chapter 3), the US Treasury market (see Chapter 4) and international 
stock markets (see Chapter 5).   
In Chapter 3 we investigate the impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns over the 
Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, and provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the 2007-
2009 crisis on this relationship. In line with previous literature, we find that outside the crisis 
period, US stock returns increased (decreased) in response to unexpected FFR cuts (increases) 
with a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut being associated with an almost 4% increase in 
the S&P500 index. We find that outside the crisis period, there was state-dependence of 
similar nature to that identified in previous studies. In particular, US stock prices exhibited 
                                                 
1 Section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act details the monetary policy objectives of the Federal Reserve as follows, 
“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall 
maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run 
potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, 
and moderate long-term interest rates” (Federal Reserve Website, 2013) 
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significantly larger magnitude increases when unexpected FFR cuts occurred during ‘bad 
times’ of recession, bear stock markets and tightening credit market conditions, indicating 
asymmetries in the US stock market response to conventional monetary policy shocks. 
Importantly, this chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature by 
demonstrating that a structural break occurred during the 2007-2009 crisis which 
significantly altered the US stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of 
state-dependence with respect to ‘good times’ versus ‘bad times.’ Specifically, we find that 
during the crisis, stock market participants did not respond positively to expansionary FFR 
surprises during the crisis. In fact, many of our estimates indicate that there was a statistically 
significant negative stock market response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. The lack 
of a positive stock response to FFR shocks between 2007-2009, a period characterised by 
sharply deteriorating macro-financial conditions and conventional monetary policy operating 
close to the zero-lower bound, suggests that the type of asymmetric behaviour identified in 
the previous literature for the pre-crisis period did not materialise during the recent crisis. 
This implies that throughout the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts ceased to be seen as good 
news by stock market investors and were interpreted as signals from the Fed of worsening 
financial and economic conditions. These cuts were seen as “a sign of the desperation of 
central bankers” (Coggan, 2010) and an indication that future profitability would be lower 
for some time, thereby signalling bad news for equities. Our results highlight the severity of 
the 2007-2009 crisis, reveal the limits of conventional monetary policy at the zero lower 
bound and are consistent with the Keynesian liquidity trap theory. 
 In Chapter 4 we extend our empirical investigation to the US Treasury market, 
analysing the impact of FFR shocks on US Treasury yield changes over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample, with an emphasis on the effect of the 2007-2009 crisis on this relationship. As the US 
Treasury market has been shown to be more forward looking than the US stock market, we 
also control for non-conventional monetary policy measures such as forward guidance 
through FOMC statements and LSAP programmes, both of which were designed by the Fed 
to influence US Treasury yields during the crisis when the target FFR approached the zero 
lower bound. In line with previous studies, we find that 3-Month to 10-Year maturity 
Treasuries are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks, and their 
yields are shown to decline (increase) in response to unexpected FFR cuts (increases). 
 This chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature by highlighting that there 
was an important shift in the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks during the 
crisis. In particular, we find that US Treasuries across the term structure from 3-Months to 
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30-Years are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks. We also 
demonstrate that very short-term maturity (3-Month) and much longer-term maturity (5-Year 
and 10-Year) Treasuries are associated with significantly larger magnitude responses to FFR 
shocks during the crisis, while the 30-Year Treasury responds significantly to FFR shocks 
only during the crisis. This significantly stronger response of highly liquid 3-Month Treasury 
bill and longer-term maturity Treasury yields to expansionary FFR shocks during the 2007-
2009 crisis implies that these securities were characterised by flight to quality trading.  
As unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis signalled worsening macro-financial 
conditions, they prompted investors to sell higher risk financial assets such as equities (see 
Chapter 3) and significantly increased demand for safe-haven securities. This explains the 
stronger reaction of the 3-Month T-Bill to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis, as it is one 
of the most highly liquid securities in the world and widely perceived to be a safe-haven asset. 
The stronger reaction of longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) maturity Treasuries to 
FFR shocks during the crisis implies that investors anticipated a prolonged downturn and 
increased their demand for longer-term, lower-yielding, lower-risk safe-haven assets. To 
demonstrate that unexpected FFR cuts indeed prompted flight to quality trading during the 
crisis, we extend our investigation to an alternative security which is widely perceived to be a 
safe-haven asset, a store of value and hedge against inflation; gold. In line with flight to 
quality trading arguments, we find that gold returns are associated with statistically 
significant (insignificant) positive responses to unexpected FFR cuts during (outside) the 
crisis period. Overall, we find that flight to safety trading taking place throughout the crisis 
was reinforced at FOMC meeting dates, with the price of both safe-haven assets (US 
Treasuries and  gold) significantly increasing in response to expansionary FFR shocks.  
 Finally in Chapter 5 we investigate the international transmission of Federal Funds 
rate surprises to foreign equity index returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a focus 
on the impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. We consider an extensive sample of 
foreign equity indices across 43 advanced and emerging market economies. Consistent with 
previous studies, we find substantial cross country heterogeneity in foreign equity index 
returns to FFR shocks outside the crisis. Our estimates show that foreign equity indices are 
associated with positive (negative) responses to unexpected FFR cuts (increases) in countries 
where the relationship is shown to be statistically significant. There are substantial 
differences in the responses of equity indices to FFR shocks across advanced and emerging 
market countries. 
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 However, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating that the 
relationship between foreign equity index returns and FFR shocks was characterised by a 
statistically significant structural shift attributable to the 2007-2009 crisis across 26 countries. 
Our findings indicate that during the crisis there is even greater cross country heterogeneity in 
foreign equity index responses to hypothetical 1% expansionary FFR shocks, with equity 
indices declining 2.53% to 7.50% across 12 countries, and equity indices increasing 2.79% to 
14.43% across 19 other countries. We find that this heterogeneity cannot be explained by any 
single factor, however can be partly explained by a combination of several factors. During the 
crisis, factors such as the degree of real bilateral integration with the US economy can only 
explain some of the heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks across countries 
with higher real integration, and cannot significantly explain the responses of equity markets 
in countries with a lower degree of real integration. In terms of financial linkages through the 
banking sector, we yield some evidence that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis were 
associated with negative (positive) equity market response in countries with higher (lower) 
external borrowing from the rest of the world. Our findings indicate that FOMC monetary 
policy should be considered a global risk factor outside the crisis period, however during the 
2007-2009 crisis it has a less predictable and significantly greater heterogeneous impact on 
international equity markets.   
 The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we review empirical 
studies related to this thesis. In Chapter 3 we investigate the US stock market response to 
FFR shocks over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample with a focus on the 2007-2009 crisis. In 
Chapter 4 we investigate the US Treasury market response to FFR shocks over the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample with an emphasis on the 2007-2009 crisis. In Chapter 5 we investigate the 
responses of foreign equity indices to FFR shocks with a focus on the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. We would like to point out that whilst there is significant overlap for 
researching different parts of this thesis, Chapter 5 was mostly researched in my first year of 
PhD from 2009 to 2010. Chapter 3 was largely researched in my second year of PhD from 
2010 to 2011 and most of Chapter 4 was researched in my third year of PhD from 2012 to 
2013. All the empirical estimates in this thesis were subsequently updated to the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample period in my write-up year of PhD. Many of the estimates presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 have been published in the Journal of Banking and Finance (see Kontonikas, 
MacDonald and Saggu, 2013). Another two working papers derived from Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 will be available online in early 2014. 
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Chapter 2: A Review of Empirical Studies Relating to the Reaction of Asset 
Prices (US Stocks, International Stocks and US Treasuries) to Monetary 
Policy Shocks 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between asset prices and monetary policy has been extensively 
researched studies since the early 1960s. Given the sheer volume and scope of material, it is 
important to outline how we decided which studies to include in our analysis. In Chapter 3 of 
this thesis we investigate the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on US stock 
returns, following the study by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). In Chapter 4 of this thesis we 
investigate the impact of FFR shocks on US Treasury yield changes, following the study by 
Kuttner (2001) and in Chapter 5 of this thesis we investigate the impact of FFR shocks on 
international equity index returns, following the study by Wongswan (2009). We 
subsequently use the Google Scholar citation index to construct a catalogue of all papers 
which cited these studies, and upon reading through the abstracts of these studies, we discard 
those studies which do not explicitly investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks on US 
stock returns, US Treasury yields, and foreign equity index returns2. For the review of older 
studies related to this thesis, we construct a catalogue of papers most cited by these three 
studies. This recursive approach to selecting relevant older studies allows for a fuller 
discussion to ensue, and allows for the most important studies to be included. We also follow 
a very detailed survey of older empirical studies by Sellin (2001). 
In this review of related empirical literature, we begin by evaluating early empirical 
studies which investigated the extent to which future stock returns could be predicted using 
money supply as a measure of monetary policy (see Section 2.2).  Following Sellin (2001), 
we subsequently distinguish between two branches of empirical research concerning stock 
market performance and monetary policy; studies which utilised event-study frameworks 
(Section 2.3) and studies which investigated monetary policy and the predictability of stock 
returns (Section 2.4). We furthermore evaluate studies which utilised alternative non-standard 
measures of monetary policy to examine the impact on the stock market (Section 2.5). In 
                                                 
2 In 2009 when I began my PhD, there were; 277 studies citing Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 371 studies citing 
Kuttner (2001), and 31 studies citing Wongswan (2009). This literature review was updated in 2012 during my 
write-up year, and there were an additional 412 studies citing Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), an additional 331 
studies citing Kuttner (2001) and an additional 58 studies citing Wongswan (2009). 
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Section 2.6 we undertake a more detailed survey of empirical studies which investigated 
stock market responses to conventional monetary policy shocks, unexpected FFR changes, 
which are measured by gauging expectations from CBOT futures contracts following the 
empirical methodology outlined by Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).  
In Section 2.7, we review more recent studies which examined the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on stock returns over samples which covered the 2007-2009 crisis in 
its entirety or in part. This includes studies which investigated stock responses to 
conventional and non-conventional monetary policy. In Section 2.8 we extend this analysis to 
the international context, reviewing studies which investigated the foreign stock response to 
monetary policy shocks from the US. Then, we extend our survey to studies concerning the 
US Treasury market, and review studies investigating the US Treasury response to monetary 
policy prior to the 2007-2009 crisis (Section 2.9) and during the crisis (Section 2.10). Finally, 
we very briefly review the theoretical channels of monetary policy transmission in Section 
2.11. 
 
2.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Early Studies) 
2.2.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Early Studies from the 1960s and 1970s) 
An early attempt to analyse the relationship between monetary policy and stock 
market performance was undertaken by Sprinkel (1964). This pioneering investigation 
compared turning points in the S&P 425 Industrial Index with turning points in the six-month 
moving average of the growth rate in the narrow M1 money supply. On the basis of the 
turning points, Sprinkel (1964) formulated an investment rule which postulated that bear (bull) 
markets could be predicted fifteen (two) months following peaks (troughs) in monetary 
growth. Although the investment rule had been formulated using graphical analyses and was 
inherently “statistically deficient” (Vasudevan, 2003 pp100); it nevertheless provided early 
evidence for a potential relationship between stock returns and monetary policy, measured in 
terms of the money supply. 
 This early study by Sprinkel (1964) sought to analyse the relationship between 
monetary policy and stock market performance using graphical analyses however it was also 
investigated using formal empirical analyses in later studies. Homa and Jaffee (1971) for 
example, argued that the investment rule of Sprinkel (1964) worked less favourably beyond 
their sample period. They used regression analysis to investigate the relationship between the 
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S&P 500 Index and the money supply, using quarterly data over the 1954:4-1969:4 sample 
period. Their estimates demonstrated that both the level and growth rate of money supply 
yielded significant positive effects on stock prices and explained a significant amount of its 
variation. 
 Keran (1971) and Hamburger and Kochin (1972)3 obtained similar evidence to Homa 
and Jaffee (1971) with alternative model specifications. In particular, they used out of sample 
forecasting experiments to demonstrate that past money supply data could be used to predict 
future stock prices. They furthermore observed that the money supply significantly led stock 
prices by up to two quarters. The finding of early studies (see Homa and Jaffee, 1971; Keran, 
1971; Hamburger and Kochin, 1972) that stock prices could be predicted using past money 
supply data was fundamentally inconsistent with Fama’s (1970) efficient markets hypothesis 
which implied that stock prices reflected all available information. The fact that studies had 
successfully predicted stock prices using past money supply data contradicted this hypothesis 
because it implied excess returns could be generated using a trading strategy which observed 
movements in money supply (Wiedmann, 2011). 
Later empirical studies were generally more sceptical of previous findings that stock 
prices could be predicted using past money supply data, and they set out to tentatively re-
examine these potential relationships. In particular, Pesando (1974) re-examined the models 
of Homa and Jaffee (1971), Keran (1971) and Hamburger and Kochin (1972). He argued that 
their models were inherently deficient because they exhibited structural instability over 
various sample periods, and argued that they only sought to explain stock price behaviour, 
disregarding portfolio theory which compared expected risks and returns associated with 
holding financial assets. This raised concerns regarding the analytical framework employed 
in previous these studies. Whilst these previous studies observed significant relationships 
between stock prices and money supply, Cooper (1974) and Rozeff (1974)4 demonstrated 
that past money supply changes did not contain predictive information for stock returns; 
evidence. This evidence was more consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. A later 
study by Rogalski and Vinso (1977) examined the granger-causal relationships between four 
                                                 
3 Keran (1971) examined the 1956:1 to 1970:2 sample period, and considered the impact of money supply on 
the S&P 500 Index. Hamburger and Kochin (1972) examined the 1956:1 to 1970:2, 1953:1 to 1960:4 and 
1961:1 to 1970:4 sample periods, and considered the impact of money supply on the Statistics Canada Investors 
Index (SCII). 
4 Rozeff (1974) examined the Aug-16 to Dec-72 sample period, and considered the impact of money supply on 
the S&P 500 Index and the FIS Index. Cooper (1974) examined the Jan-47 to Dec-70 sample period, and 
considered the impact of money supply on the S&P 500 Index and the FIS Index. 
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US stock market indices5 and money supply, using monthly data over the Jan-63 to Dec-74 
sample. They found that causality ran from stocks to money supply as opposed to money 
supply to stocks.  
It thus apparent that both graphical and empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between the stock market and monetary policy, measured in terms of the money 
supply, yielded mixed and inconclusive evidence for a potential relationship. This may have 
been due to the fact that these studies assumed money supply changes were exogenously 
determined by the Fed. Thus money supply changes may have been endogenously 
determined. This prompted the use of event-study analyses which sought to mitigate such 
concerns. 
 
2.3 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Early Event-Studies) 
2.3.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured in terms of the discount rate) 
Early empirical studies concerning the relationship between stock prices and 
monetary policy yielded inconclusive evidence for a potential relationship (see Section 2.2). 
These studies primarily measured monetary policy in terms of the narrow M1 money supply, 
using aggregate data, in weekly, monthly or quarterly form. These lower frequency measures 
of money supply were not purely exogenous and could equally have reflected changes in 
money demand. Thus, the failure to identify a purely exogenous measure of monetary policy 
cast doubt upon previous empirical findings concerning the relationship between stock 
market performance and monetary policy in previous studies. It furthermore helped to explain 
the inconclusive estimates concerning the relationship in earlier studies.  
 These issues prompted the use of an event-study methodology which examined the 
stock market effects of monetary policy immediately following announcements or open 
market operations. Its use proliferated due to the difficulty in isolating purely exogenous 
measures of monetary policy. It assumed that a higher-frequency measure of monetary policy 
around announcements or open market operations would be less ‘noisy’ and less likely to 
reflect changes in money demand, than lower-frequency measures. The methodology did not 
however fully consider the potentially endogenous relationship between stocks and monetary 
policy as a whole. One should however note that the critique concerning money supply 
measures being influenced by changes in money demand was equally applicable to studies 
                                                 
5 S&P500, DJIA, NYSE and Fisher Link Relative Index (FIS) 
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which measured monetary policy in terms of the discount rate which was determined in open 
markets and could have been influenced by changes in demand. 
 One of the earliest analyses to consider the relationship between stock returns and 
monetary policy using an event-study methodology was undertaken by Waud (1970). The 
study measured monetary policy in terms of Fed discount rate changes. It argued that Fed 
discount rate changes influenced market expectations of future economic conditions, and 
thereby affected market expectations of firms’ future cash flows. As stocks represented 
claims on firms’ future cash flows, this implied a relationship between stock market 
performance and monetary policy. Waud (1970) analysed movements in the S&P 500 Index 
in an event-window around discount rate changes. US stock returns were on average shown 
to be positive (negative) following discount rate decreases (increases) over the 1953 to 1967 
sample period 6 . Thus, event-study investigation provided initial evidence that monetary 
expansions (contractions) on average were associated with positive (lower or negative) stock 
returns and interpreted as good (bad) news by investors. 
 A later study by Santomero (1983) observed that the Fed’s policy concerning discount 
rate changes was generally ‘passive’ and responded to changes in open market rates with a 
lag. This implied that investigations concerning the relationship between stock returns and 
discount rate changes, such as that undertaken by Waud (1970), should also have considered 
the Fed’s motivation and intention for each discount rate change. In response to Santomero’s 
(1983) critique, Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) used published explanations of Fed discount 
rate changes7 to distinguish between regular discount rate changes which the Fed used to 
ensure consistency with market rates (technical changes) and exogenous unexpected discount 
rate changes (non-technical rates) which the Fed used to influence market rates. They 
effectively exploited the manner in which the Fed administered monetary policy as a natural 
proxy to distinguish between endogenous (technical) and exogenous (non-technical) 
components of discount rate changes. In particular, they estimated the following model 
(Equation 2.1) over two sample periods; from 1975 to 1979, and from 1979 to 1982. 
    tNTttTttt DRDRr   ** 21 ,      (2.1) 
where  tr  denoted the stock return,  tR  was the percentage discount rate change on the 
day of announcement,  TtD  was a dummy variable equal to one, when the discount rate is 
                                                 
6 Similar evidence was obtained by Baker and Meyer (1980) who demonstrated that discount rates influenced 
Treasury bill rates over the 1953 to 1978 sample period. 
7  The classifications of technical and non-technical changes were based upon the language of published 
explanations regarding the Fed’s actions. 
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defined as technical and zero otherwise, and  NtD  a dummy variable equal to one, when the 
discount rate is defined as non-technical. 
 Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) identified significant (insignificant) stock responses to 
non-technical (technical) changes for the 1979 to 1982 sample period8. Their estimates were 
consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis which implied that stocks responded only to 
unanticipated components of discount rate changes, which in this case were non-technical 
changes. Interestingly, they observed insignificant stock responses to both technical and non-
technical discount rate changes over the 1975 to 1979 sample period. An explanation 
concerning the insignificance of estimates over this sample was offered by Roley and Troll 
(1984). They contested that prior to 1979, the effects of discount rate changes on market rates 
may have been mitigated by equivalent changes in non-borrowed reserves by the Fed. This 
implied that further investigations concerning the impact of monetary policy on asset prices 
should also have considered the manner in which the Fed administered monetary policy 
throughout the sample period. 
 The failure to observe significant stock responses to both technical and non-technical 
discount rate changes prior to 1979 (see Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985) implied that a structural 
shift in the Fed’s administration of monetary policy may have occurred. A study by Gilbert 
(1985) identified 3 Fed monetary policy operating procedure regimes between 1970 and the 
late 1980s. In the first regime (between 1970 and 8th Oct 79), the Fed administered monetary 
policy by targeting market interest rates such as the FFR, combined with changes in levels of 
non-borrowed reserves. In the second regime (between 8th Oct 79 and Oct-82), the Fed 
switched to targeting monetary aggregates such as non-borrowed reserves and the FFR. In the 
third regime (Oct-82 to late 1980s9), the Fed primarily targeted borrowed reserves and the 
FFR.  
 The date when the Fed switched from targeting borrowed reserves to targeting the 
FFR is still “contentious” and unclear, however an academic consensus emerged suggesting 
that it occurred in the late 1980s (Sarno and Thornton, 2003). For completeness, we also 
mention two further regimes. In the fourth regime (late 1980s to late 2008) the Fed primarily 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) considered a small sample period of eight years from 
1975 to 1982 which may have imposed sample-bias upon estimation. Lombra and Torto (1977) further argued 
that the discount rate was above the Treasury bill rate for most of the sample period and that open market 
operations followed the ‘money market strategy’ discussed by Guttentag (1966). 
9 Gilbert (1985) considered monetary operating procedures between 1970 and 1982; hence the end of the third 
monetary regime was not known then combine his dates for monetary policy operating procedures with dates 
provided by Sarno and Thornton (2003). As the Fed began targeting the FFR exclusively from Sep-87, we also 
include this date here. 
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targeted the FFR. In the fifth regime (late 2008 to present), during the recent financial crisis, 
the Fed considered more unorthodox forms of monetary policy such as Large Scale Asset 
Purchase Programmes (LSAPs), more commonly known as Quantitative Easing (QE), and 
increasing use of forward guidance concerning future monetary stance. 
 Thus, in line with the critique of Roley and Troll (1984), the extent to which discount 
rate changes influenced stock returns may have been contingent upon the manner in which 
the Fed administered monetary policy throughout the period. As a response, Jensen and 
Johnson (1993) explicitly investigated stock responses to technical and non-technical 
discount rate changes over sub-sample periods which corresponded with monetary policy 
regimes identified by Gilbert (1985). They furthermore disaggregated their investigation to 
consider discount rate cuts and discount rate increases in separate samples, as well as 
considering the impact on pre-announcement, announcement and post-announcement stock 
returns 10 .Over three sample periods from 1962 to 1990, Jensen and Johnson (1993) 
demonstrated significant US stock responses to both technical and non-technical discount rate 
changes, with more pronounced responses to non-technical changes. In contrast to previous 
studies (see Roley and Troll, 1984; Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985; Pearce and Roley, 1985), 
they yielded similar results across all three monetary policy regimes considered. They 
attributed the peculiarity of these results to the separate treatment of discount rate cuts and 
increases in separate sample periods. Furthermore, their results indicated that technical 
discount rate changes were generally anticipated in pre-announcement responses, consistent 
with the efficient markets hypothesis. 
 As Jensen and Johnson (1993) observed significant stock responses to discount rate 
changes over sub-sample periods corresponding with monetary policy regimes; they extended 
their analysis to consider long-horizon responses of stock returns to discount rate changes. In 
particular, Jensen and Johnson (1995) partitioned their sample in to periods of monetary 
contraction (discount rate cuts) and monetary contraction (discount rate increases). Over the 
1953 to 1991 sample period, they demonstrated that long-horizon stock returns were larger 
and less volatile following discount rate cuts, compared to those following discount rate 
increases. This implied that monetary conditions may have influenced required returns 
demanded by investors; consistent with Fama and French’s (1989) argument that predictable 
                                                 
10 More specifically, they considered the response of cumulative mean adjusted returns (CMAR) however we 
simply state returns for concision. The CMAR is calculated for the pre-announcement affect (for five days 
preceding the announcement period), the announcement period (for two days, day zero and one of the 
announcement), and the post-announcement period (for five days following the announcement period) 
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stock return variation was indicative of rational variation in required returns (see Section 
2.4.1 for further discussion). 
 
2.3.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured in terms of the money supply) 
 So far, we have exclusively discussed empirical event-studies which measured 
monetary policy in terms of the discount rate. However, akin to the studies discussed in 
Section 2.3.1), the event-study methodology was also used to investigate the relationship 
between stock returns and monetary policy, measured in terms of the money supply. We now 
review such studies. Pearce and Roley (1983) measured monetary policy in terms of money 
supply announcements, and used an event-study methodology to consider the responses of 
stock returns to money supply changes. The study was guided by the premise that when 
money supply increased faster than expected, market participants revised their expectations 
of future inflation, and this resulted in lower stock price valuations. They tested the 
theoretical proposition by investigating US stock return  tr  responses to money supply 
changes, both expected  etM  and actual  atM . Weekly survey data11 concerning market 
participants’ expectations of changes in the narrow M1 money supply was used and the 
unanticipated component of the money supply change was defined as the difference between 
the actual and expected change. They estimated the following model (Equation 2.2)12 over 
three sample periods corresponding with monetary policy regimes identified by Gilbert 
(1985): 
  ti itietatt DdMMr    ,      (2.2) 
 Their estimates demonstrated that unexpected money supply increases exhibited 
negative effects on US stock prices in all three sub-sample periods. More specifically, 
responses were negative and significant for the Sep-77 to Oct-79 and Feb-80 to Jan-82 
sample periods13; however negative and insignificant for the Oct-79 to Jan-80 period. Overall, 
they found that an unexpected 1% increase in the money supply was associated with an 
average -0.35% weekly decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index.  
                                                 
11 The Money Markets Services survey for the M1 (previously M1B) money supply was utilised by Pearce and 
Roley (1985) 
12 They also included dummy variables  itD  to control for discount rate changes which occurred after the 
stock market closed and may have affected the estimation. 
13 The statistical insignificance for the Oct-79 to Jan-80 sample period may be attributed to the small sample 
bias of only fourteen observations. 
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The study by Pearce and Roley (1983) had been guided by the premise that money 
supply changes affected stock returns through changes in inflation expectations. To examine 
the response of stock returns to expected and unexpected  utM  money supply changes, 
Cornell (1983) used survey data to gauge expectations of money supply changes akin to 
Pearce and Roley (1983). The study subsequently tested the following model (Equation 2.3) 
over two sample periods from Jan-78 to Oct-79 and from Oct-79 to Dec-81. 
t
u
t
e
tt MMSP   21 ,       (2.3) 
 In both sample periods, Cornell (1983) observed statistically insignificant responses 
of the S&P500 index to expected money supply changes, consistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis. The response of unexpected money supply changes was negative and significant 
only for the latter sample period. Qualitative conclusions drawn from these estimates 
concerning significant (insignificant) stock responses to unexpected (expected) changes in 
monetary policy were similar to those obtained in studies which used discount rates as their 
measure of monetary policy. Studies which distinguished between expected (technical) and 
unexpected (non-technical) discount rate changes also yielded evidence that stocks responded 
only to unexpected changes (see Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985; Jensen and Johnson, 1993; 
Jensen and Johnson, 1995). 
 
2.3.3 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured in terms of the discount rate and 
money supply) 
Having evaluated empirical event-studies which examined the relationship between 
stock market performance and monetary policy measured in terms of the discount rate, or 
measured in terms of the discount rate; we extend our analysis to briefly consider several 
later empirical event-studies which jointly investigated the impact of both discount rate 
changes and money supply changes on stocks. Pearce and Roley (1985) investigated the 
impact of monetary policy announcements, measured in terms of both discount rate changes 
and money supply changes on US stock prices. They decomposed M1 money supply 
announcements in to expected and unexpected components using survey data akin to Pearce 
and Roley (1983) however assumed discount rate changes were purely exogenous and 
unexpected because market expectations concerning discount rate changes were unavailable14. 
They demonstrated that US stocks yielded negative and significant responses to unexpected 
                                                 
14  Despite previous evidence that discount rate changes were not always exogenous, they applied this 
simplifying assumption due to lack of survey data estimates regarding discount rate changes. 
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money supply increases in the Sep-77 to Oct-79 and Oct-79 to Oct-82 sample periods; 
however discount rate cuts exhibited significant positive effects only in the latter sample 
period. These results were consistent with the critique by Roley and Troll (1984) that prior to 
1979; effects of discount rate changes on market rates may have been mitigated by equivalent 
changes in non-borrowed reserves by the Fed. 
Previous event-studies (see Pearce and Roley, 1985; Jensen and Johnson, 1993; 
Jensen and Johnson, 1995) examined stock responses to monetary policy changes over 
separate sub-samples which corresponded to monetary policy regimes identified by Gilbert 
(1985). In contrast to these studies, Hafer (1986) used dummy variables to distinguish 
between three monetary policy regimes from Sep-77 to Dec-84 without separating the 
samples and thereby mitigating potential omitted observation bias upon estimates. Hafer 
(1986) examined the response of five US stock market indices15 to expected  etM  and 
unexpected  utM  money supply changes, discount rate changes  tR , and discount rate 
surcharge changes  tDRS  by the Fed. The following model (Equation 2.4) was tested, with 
dummy variables for the first three variables to differentiate between monetary regimes from 
Sep-77 to Oct-79, Oct-79 to Oct-82 and Oct-82 to Dec-84; however these have been omitted 
from the equation for concision: 
ttt
u
t
e
tt DRSRMMSP   4321 ,    (2.4) 
 In line with the efficient markets hypothesis, Hafer (1986) demonstrated that expected 
money supply changes exhibited insignificant effects on all five stock price indices. 
Interestingly, the effects of unexpected money supply changes were not significantly different 
across the three monetary policy regimes. Furthermore, asymmetric responses were observed 
whereby positive (negative) money supply changes exhibited significant (insignificant) 
positive (negative) effects on stock price indices. Discount rate changes were furthermore 
demonstrated to exhibit statistically significant effects only in the Oct-79 to Oct-82 sample 
period. 
 A subsequent study by McQueen and Roley (1993) examined the S&P 500 Index 
response to unexpected changes in macroeconomic announcements16. Over the Sep-77 to 
May-88 sample period; they observed significant stock market responses to unexpected 
                                                 
15 S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 500 Total Return Index, S&P 500 Utilities Index, S&P 500 Financials Index 
16 Similar to previous studies, expectations of the macroeconomic announcements were disaggregated in to 
expected and unexpected components using survey data. The Money Markets Survey was used to gauge 
expectations of money supply announcements and the discount rate was assumed to be unexpected due to the 
absence of survey data concerning expectations of future changes 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 31 of 295 
money supply changes and insignificant responses to discount rate changes, in line with 
Pearce and Roley (1985). Guided by earlier studies (see Fama and French, 1989; Schwert, 
1990) which suggested that business conditions helped to explain stock return variation, 
McQueen and Roley (1993) conditioned the unexpected macroeconomic announcements to 
the state of the economy. They demonstrated that the stock market response to money supply 
increases was negative and significant only during high and medium states of the economy17. 
In contrast, the stock response to discount rate changes was insignificant across all economic 
states; high, medium and low. 
There are several empirical conclusions which can be drawn from early event-studies 
which examined stock responses to monetary policy changes. Firstly, in line with the efficient 
markets hypothesis of Fama (1970), stocks did not respond to expected changes in monetary 
policy. Specifically, stocks did not yield significant responses to endogenous technical 
discount rate changes which were used to bring discount rates in line with market rates and 
were generally expected by market participants. They also did not yield significant responses 
to expected changes in money supply (see Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985; Cornell, 1983). 
Secondly, stocks only yielded significant announcement effects in response to unexpected 
changes in monetary policy. Thus stock returns responded to exogenous non-technical 
discount rate changes by the Fed which were designed to influence market rates and were 
generally unexpected by financial markets. They also responded to unexpected changes in 
money supply, which could be measured using expectations from survey data (see Pearce and 
Roley, 1983; Cornell, 1983; Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985; McQueen and Roley, 1993; Pearce 
and Roley, 1985; Hafer, 1986; Jensen and Johnson, 1993). Thirdly, the extent to which stocks 
could be affected by monetary announcements was contingent upon the monetary policy 
operating procedure at the time, and whether the Fed was actively using the monetary policy 
instrument in question to administer monetary policy (see Pearce and Roley, 1983; Cornell, 
1983; Pearce and Roley, 1985). Lastly, stock returns responded to asymmetrically to 
monetary conditions, with stronger responses to monetary expansion compared to monetary 
contraction (Hafer, 1986; Jensen and Johnson, 1993; Jensen and Johnson, 1995).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 This was achieved using data concerning industrial production 
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2.4 US Stock Return Predictability & Monetary Policy 
So far, we have mainly discussed the relationship between stock market performance 
and monetary policy through an evaluation of event-study analyses. These studies employed 
various empirical specifications ranging from graphical analyses to regression models. In 
comparison the empirical literature concerning monetary policy and the predictability of 
stock returns was largely motivated by antecedent studies which employed regression 
analyses and vector-autoregression (VAR) models to examine the extent to which various 
measures could be used to forecast stock returns.  We continue our survey of related studies 
in the literature by briefly evaluating seminal studies which used regression analyses to 
examine the predictability of stock returns with respect to business conditions and monetary 
conditions (Section 2.4.1) as well as studies which employed VAR analyses and VAR related 
analyses to investigate the relationship (Section 2.4.2)18.We evaluate the VAR methodology 
for defining monetary policy shocks, and the critique directed at such an approach in Section 
2.4.3. 
 
2.4.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using non-VAR models) 
The event-study literature concerning the relationship between stock market 
performance and monetary policy yielded significant evidence for a potential relationship 
between the two factors (see Sections 2.2 to 2.3). These studies demonstrated that monetary 
policy, measured in terms of Fed discount rate changes and/or changes in money supply, 
signalled monetary developments and thereby influenced stock returns. The empirical 
literature concerning monetary policy and the predictability of stock returns yielded 
comparative conclusions. In particular, Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) demonstrated that 
both business conditions and monetary conditions affected required returns demanded by 
investors, and suggested that the predictable variation in stock returns reflected risk premia 
associated with macroeconomic influences. 
Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) and Patelis (1997) both utilised regression 
methodologies to examine whether monetary policy could be used to explain some of the 
variation in excess US stock returns. The empirical framework of these studies was largely 
                                                 
18 Although Fama and French (1989) did not explicitly consider the role of monetary conditions in predicting 
stock returns, we also evaluate this study to provide a historical perspective concerning the evolution of this 
literature. We do not discuss the studies by Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Shiller (1988) because they 
yielded qualitatively similar empirical conclusions to Fama and French (1989) and did not explicitly consider 
the role of monetary conditions in predicting stock returns. 
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motivated by a previous study by Fama and French (1989). Whilst Fama and French (1989) 
did not explicitly evaluate the role monetary policy in the predictability of stock returns, they 
nonetheless demonstrated that business conditions were significant predictors of excess US 
stock returns and affected required returns demanded by investors. The methodology, 
approach and empirical conclusions of this seminal study significantly influenced subsequent 
studies in the field concerning monetary policy and stock return predictability (see Jensen, 
Mercer and Johnson, 1996; Patelis, 1997). For this reason, we review the study by Fama and 
French (1989) prior to discussing these later studies. 
 Fama and French (1989) used long-horizon regression analyses to examine the extent 
to which proxies of business conditions could help explain variation in excess US stock 
returns. They investigated the predictability of excess stock returns by regressing them at 
increasing time horizons on a vector of business conditions indicators  tx  ; such as the 
dividend yield, default spread and term spread. They defined excess US stock holding period 
returns  1,  tkte  as the difference between continuously compounded returns on a US stock 
portfolio minus the continuously compounded return on the one-month US Treasury bill. 
More specifically, the following model (Equation 2.5) was tested at increasing time horizons 
of one-month, one-quarter, and one to four years19. 
1,1,   tkttkktkt xe  ,        (2.5) 
 Fama and French (1989) demonstrated that the predictability of excess stock returns 
increased with longer time horizons considered. All three indicators of business conditions 
were furthermore shown to be significant predictors of stock returns. They argued that the 
predictable variation in stock returns was rational, and reflected short-term business cycles 
and long-term business conditions. As their evidence implied that stock returns could be 
predicted to some extent, this naturally contradicted the efficient markets hypothesis. To 
resolve this contradiction, they interpreted predictability as being indicative of a time varying 
risk premium, which was influenced by real economic activity and expectations of firms’ 
future returns. In this manner, they concluded that business conditions affected required 
returns demanded by investors, and thereby influenced stock returns. 
 From previous studies, it was apparent that business conditions (see Fama and French, 
1989) and monetary conditions (see Jensen and Johnson, 1995) may have helped to explain 
                                                 
19 We quote Patelis’ (1997) interpretation of Fama and French’s (1989) model for algebraic clarity. Fama and 
French (1989) calculated excess returns for holding periods beyond one-month through cumulating monthly 
holding period returns.  
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stock return variation, in separate studies. In response to these studies, Jensen, Mercer and 
Johnson (1996) investigated the impact of both business conditions and monetary conditions 
on US stock returns. To measure monetary conditions, they defined a broad measure using a 
dummy variable, which was equal to one (zero) when the discount rate was previously an 
increase (decrease). Using a similar empirical methodology to Fama and French (1989), they 
investigated the responses of excess stock returns to proxies of business conditions, however 
also included the broad measure of monetary conditions defined in terms of the directional 
discount rate dummy. Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) demonstrated that business 
conditions, measured in terms of the dividend yield and default premium were significant 
predictors of excess US stock returns only during periods of monetary expansion. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Fama and French (1989), the term spread20 was a statistically 
insignificant predictor of excess stock returns. These estimates were interpreted as being 
indicative of predictable variation in stock returns which was not only rational, but also 
related to business conditions and monetary conditions. 
 Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) demonstrated that monetary conditions influenced 
stock return predictability however their measure of monetary conditions, a directional 
dummy variable, was considerably narrow. A subsequent study by Patelis (1997) extended 
upon this analysis by investigating the role of monetary policy, measured by a set of 
monetary variables, in stock return predictability. Patelis (1997), akin to Fama and French 
(1989), used long-horizon regressions to investigate the predictability of excess US stock 
returns using monetary variables21 and financial variables22 as predictors. Over the 1962-1994 
sample, it was shown that a higher FFR, indicative of monetary tightening predicted lower 
expected returns initially in the short run, and higher expected returns thereafter. This was 
shown by the FFR coefficient which declined at increasing time horizons (monthly, quarterly, 
annual, bi-annual). The predictability of stock returns also increased as the time-horizon 
increased; consistent with the hypothesis that monetary conditions influenced the 
predictability of stock returns. 
 
                                                 
20 The term spread did however affect bond returns, this is consistent with evidence from previous research 
which indicates that the term spread is a good explanatory variable for bond returns compared to stock returns 
(see Fama and French, 1989). 
21 The monetary variables were; the FFR, the spread between FFR and 10-Year US Treasury Note, the spread 
between 6-Month Commercial Paper and 6-Month T-Bill, the Logged change in Non-Borrowed Reserves, the 
proportion of growth in Non-Borrowed Reserves orthogonal to growth in Total Reserves 
22 The financial variables were; the Divided Yield, the spread between 10-Year Treasury Bond and 1-Month 
Treasury Bill, the 1-Month Real Interest Rate 
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2.4.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using VAR models) 
The studies in Section 2.4.1 investigated the role of monetary policy in the 
predictability of stock returns using single equation models. These models assumed 
explanatory terms such as monetary policy were inherently exogenous and uni-directionally 
influenced stock returns. As we discussed in Section 2.3.1, lower-frequency measures of 
monetary policy were less likely to reflect exogenous changes in monetary policy by the Fed, 
and more likely to reflect a broad spectrum of factors such as macroeconomic announcements 
and changes in demand (see Sellin, 2001). Due to the difficulty in isolating purely exogenous 
measures of monetary policy, and in order to mitigate concerns of potential bi-directional 
causality between stocks and monetary policy, a number of studies followed the example of 
Sims (1980), utilising VAR methodologies to examine the role of monetary policy in the 
predictability of stock returns (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Patelis, 1997; Thorbecke, 
1997). The VAR methodology had several advantages in that it treated all variables in the 
systems considered as endogenous, hence it was not necessary to explicitly specify which 
measures were exogenous. It furthermore enabled for richer lag structures to be considered. 
Sellin (2001) further argued that forecasts from VARs outperformed traditional structural 
models. 
To alleviate concerns regarding the simultaneity causality problem and to isolate a 
measure of monetary policy which was exogenous to the state of the economy, the 
aforementioned studies measured monetary policy in terms of orthogonalised innovations 
from VAR models. This was achieved by defining a VAR model with  1n  vector of 
endogenous variables  ty , which were assumed to be covariance-stationary (Equation 2.6)23. 
The model was then inverted and expressed in terms of its moving average representation 
(Equation 2.7); and the residuals were assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with a positive definite covariance matrix   . The orthogonalised innovations 
could subsequently be obtained using a Cholesky factorisation to isolate the lower triangular 
matrix  P  such that  'PP  , allowing Equation 2.7 to be expressed as Equation 2.824 
using the lower triangular matrix. Equation 2.8 therefore represented endogenous variables as 
functions of orthogonalised residuals  it  . Although we have discussed several advantages 
                                                 
23  where   ttE '  
24 where PCii  , tt P  1 , and   IE tt '  
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of the VAR methodology, it is important not to overstate the benefits. We evaluate the 
limitations and disadvantages of this approach at the end of this section. 
tptptt YAYAy   ...11 ,        (2.6) 
...332211   ttttt CCCy  ,      (2.7) 
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 The VAR methodology was used by Thorbecke (1997) to investigate the relationship 
between stock returns and monetary policy in the US. The study estimated a recursive 
VAR(6)25 26 with seven macroeconomic variables and a constant; to examine the impulse 
responses of contemporaneous stock returns from portfolios to a one-standard deviation 
shock in the FFR. Recursive VARs are known to be highly sensitive to the ordering 
specification. Thorbecke (1997) used the following Cholesky ordering: the growth rate of 
industrial production, rate of inflation, log of a commodity price index, the FFR, log of non-
borrowed reserves, log of total reserves and stock returns for a portfolio. The 1967-1990 
sample period was used and the study measured monetary policy shocks in terms of 
orthogonalised innovations in the FFR 27 . Thorbecke (1997) found that a one-standard 
deviation positive innovation in the FFR (tightening shock) was associated with an average -
0.80% monthly decline in stock returns across 22 US industry portfolios28. Furthermore, 
amongst portfolios formed on size, smaller capitalisation stocks (-0.94%) yielded a stronger 
response as compared to larger capitalisation stocks (-0.57%). This is consistent with Gertler 
and Gilchrist’s (1994) hypothesis that monetary policy affected firms’ ability to access 
                                                 
25 A recursive VAR involves estimating a reduced form VAR and computing the Cholesky factorization of the 
reduced form VAR covariance matrix (see Lütkepohl, 1993 Chapter 2). The residual in each equation is defined 
to be uncorrelated with the residual from preceding equations. This is achieved by adding contemporaneous 
values from preceding equation as explanatory variables in subsequent equations. 
26 We would also like to point out that Sims (1980) contested that FFR innovations were correlated with 
inflation when placed first in Cholesky ordering. Following this critique, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 
(1994) later demonstrated that sensible estimates were yielded upon inclusion of a commodity price index in the 
VAR. In particular, they showed that positive FFR innovations were associated with decreased price levels. The 
identification strategy of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994) was subsequently utilised by Thorbecke 
(1997). 
27 As the Fed had primarily administered monetary policy by targeting non-borrowed reserves between 1979 and 
1982, Thorbecke (1997) repeated the analysis using a VAR(2) with two lags, and measured monetary policy in 
terms of orthogonalised innovations in non-borrowed reserves by placing it ahead of the FFR in recursive 
ordering. The study demonstrated that an initial one-standard deviation positive innovation in non-borrowed 
reserves yielded an average 1.79% monthly increase across 22 US industry portfolios 
28 A heterogeneous, yet negative response was observed across the industry portfolios 
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credit29. It was also demonstrated that across the portfolios, 3.94% (15.85%) of the 24-month 
forecast error variance of stock returns was explained by innovations in the FFR (non-
borrowed reserves). 
In contrast to Thorbecke (1997), who examined the relationship between monetary 
policy and contemporaneous stock returns, a subsequent study by Patelis (1997) investigated 
the relationship between monetary policy and future expected returns. The study adapted the 
methodology of Campbell (see Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Campbell, 1991; Campbell and 
Ammer, 1993) by deconstructing excess stock returns in to future expectations of excess 
returns, real interest rates and dividend growth. The VAR estimates of Patelis (1997) 
indicated that over the Mar-62 to Nov-94 sample, higher FFR growth (indicative of monetary 
tightening) was associated with lower short-horizon excess stock returns. Furthermore, the 
variance-decompositions presented evidence that 82.26% of the variation in unexpected stock 
returns could be explained by financial variables such as the expected excess return, real 
interest rate and dividend yield. However, only 3.14% of the variation could be explained by 
monetary policy variables such as; the FFR change and the proportion of non-borrowed 
reserve growth orthogonal to total reserves (also known as STRONGIN). 
Lastrapes (1998) used VARs to estimate the response of equity prices to money 
supply shocks in eight industrialised economies. The money supply shocks were identified 
through the imposition of infinite-horizon30 restrictions on systems considered. This included 
long-run monetary neutrality and restrictions so that permanent money supply changes 
yielded no effect on real variables at infinite-horizons. Over the Jan-59 to May-94 sample 
period, and restricting our discussion to the US, positive innovations in the money supply 
yielded significant positive effects on real equity prices. Furthermore, the variance-
decompositions demonstrated that over 50% of the US stock returns forecast error-variance 
was explained by monetary policy. 
 A more recent study by Becher, Jensen and Mercer (2008) evaluated the efficacy of 
four alternative monetary indicators in predicting stock returns. For each of four monetary 
indicators (FFR, FFR premium, commercial paper premium and term premium) a monthly 
five-variable VAR with 12 lags was estimated. The study progressed in a stepwise manner, 
beginning with two-variable VARs and increasingly adding additional variables until five-
variable VARs were estimated. The five variables considered were; a monetary stance 
dummy (see Jensen, Mercer and Johnson, 1996), one of the four monetary indicators, an 
                                                 
29 See also Kontonikas, and Kostakis, 2013 and Maio and Tavares, 2007 for more recent evidence 
30 see Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson (1988) 
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interactive term multiplying the first two variables, the default spread and the real equity 
return. Cholesky variance-decompositions were used to measure the 24-month ahead forecast 
error variance of stock returns attributable to predictive variables. Over the Jan-65 to Dec-06 
sample period, lagged stock returns explained more of the forecast error variance than the 
other four variables combined. Together, the monetary stance indicator and interactive 
variables explained more variance than the default spread. Overall, the study demonstrated 
that expected stock return variation was explained by both business and monetary conditions. 
 It is important to note that since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FFR was 
increasingly used by studies as the main indicator of monetary policy. The use of the FFR 
was primarily guided by inference from a seminal study by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
which indicated that it was a good indicator of monetary stance. The late 1980s was also a 
period characterised by a significant shift in the operating procedure of Fed, as they began 
administering monetary policy by primarily targeting the FFR (see Sarno and Thornton, 
2003). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) demonstrated that the FFR was a good measure of 
monetary policy and that innovations in the FFR were effective in forecasting real economic 
activity. They used a VAR to measure monetary policy, and through variance-
decompositions and granger-causality tests demonstrated its efficacy in forecasting future 
movements in macroeconomic variables over the Jul-59 to Dec-89 sample period. The FFR 
was furthermore argued to be a good indicator of monetary policy because it was sensitive to 
changes in the supply of bank reserves. Following this seminal study, there was a significant 
shift in many empirical studies considering monetary policy in terms of the FFR.  
Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009) used a structural VAR analysis, identifying the model 
using short-run and long-run restrictions on multipliers of shocks, in line with previous 
empirical studies (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1994). Over the Jan-83 to Dec-02 
sample period, their estimates demonstrated that a 1% FFR shock was associated with a 9% 
decrease in real stock prices. Furthermore, a 1% stock price shock was associated with a 
0.04% increase in the FFR. This implied an endogenous, simultaneous, interdependent 
relationship as the stock market responded to monetary policy, however monetary policy, via 
the Fed, also responded to the stock market. 
 As the relationship between stock market performance and monetary policy may have 
been characterised by structural change, Laopodis (2006) considered the relationship over 
sample periods which corresponded with chairmanship of the Fed. Specifically, Arthur Burns 
(1970 to 1978), Paul Volcker (1979 to 1987) and Alan Greenspan (1988 to 2002). Laopodis 
(2006) used a range of bivariate and multivariate VAR, VECM and cointegrational analyses 
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to examine the relationship, however overall the results were mixed and inconclusive. The 
estimates implied that it was not possible to conclude there was a consistent, dynamic 
relationship between real stock returns and monetary policy which varied significantly across 
the sub-sample periods. 
 In a study related to Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), Crowder (2006) initially used a 
two-variable structural VAR to investigate the bivariate relationship between S&P500 returns 
and the effective FFR. It was shown that positive FFR innovations yielded lower S&P500 
returns, however conversely and in contrast to Bjørnland and Leitemo (2009), exogenous 
innovations in the S&P500 failed to yield immediate effects on the effective FFR. The model 
was extended to also include a commodity price index, to control for the effects of inflation 
on monetary policy. This was motivated by the fact that the Fed had sought to combat 
inflation and stabilise price levels over much of the sample period from Feb-70 to Jun-03. 
The empirical conclusions from the three-variable system were much akin to those in the 
bivariate analysis and robust to the inclusion of the commodity price index. Interestingly, the 
results were sensitive to the identification strategy employed. Estimates from the Cholesky 
variance-decompositions and associated impulse response functions were rendered 
“plausible” through long-run restrictions; however when the identification strategy of 
Blanchard-Quah (1989) was applied, positive FFR innovations were associated with 
unrealistically high returns in the S&P500, for both bivariate and trivariate systems. 
 To investigate the relationship between monetary policy and the stock market, a 
hybrid model was considered by Bordo, Duecker and Wheelock (2007). They used a latent 
variable VAR(6) model (also known as Qual-VAR) as well as a dynamic factor model; with 
starting values gauged from defined rules concerning categorisation if periods of financial 
boom and bust31. It was argued that this approach mitigated subjective judgement concerning 
identification of market conditions. Over the Aug-52 to Dec-05 sample period; their estimates 
indicated that money stock growth failed to exhibit significant effects on the US financial 
market. However, long-term interest rate shocks exhibited significant and persistent negative 
effects on real stock prices, as well as negative effects on stock market conditions which were 
significant for the first three-months. After controlling for shocks to long-term interest rates, 
it was shown that short-term interest rate shocks exerted insignificant, yet negative effects on 
                                                 
31 Financial booms: periods 36 months or longer from peak to trough with annual increase in real S&P500 of 
10% or more, or periods 24 months or longer with annual increase in real S&P500 of 20% or more. Financial 
busts: periods 12 months or longer from peak to trough with annual decrease in real S&P500 of 20% or more. 
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real stock prices and positive effects on market conditions. Lastly; short-term interest rate 
shocks exhibited negative effects on both real stock prices and stock market conditions alike. 
 Finally, D’Agostino, Sala and Surico (2004) observed that the relationship between 
the S&P500 and the FFR was characterised by state-dependence. They find that between 
1983-2003, An unexpected 1% FFR cut during periods of lower (higher) volatility, yielded a 
significant (insignificant) increase in the S&P500 Index of 3.34% (8.04%). The estimates 
were obtained using a four-variable structural VAR, with a threshold variable measuring 
asset price volatility governing the shift in monetary regime. 
 
2.4.3 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Critique of VAR & VAR related monetary policy 
measures) 
In Section 2.4.2, we reviewed studies which utilised VAR related frameworks to 
investigate the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance, as well 
as the role of monetary policy in stock return predictability. The VAR methodology was 
popularised following critique that single equation models failed to acknowledge the 
potential endogenous relationship between the two variables. In particular, it sought to 
mitigate concerns regarding an endogenous relationship between the stock market and 
monetary policy through the modelling of endogenous systems. Despite the popularity of this 
empirical approach, Rudebusch (1996, 1998) offered a sharp critique of studies which 
modelled monetary policy using VAR related frameworks. 
Rudebusch (1996, 1998) questioned the empirical validity of VARs in the 
measurement of monetary policy. The argument suggested that monetary shocks, defined in 
terms of orthogonalised innovations in the FFR or other monetary instruments, were 
“structurally fragile” and “severely deficient” however the study made it clear that the 
critique did not imply that the methodology was “so deeply flawed as to be useless”. The 
study indicated that VAR measures of monetary shocks were at odds with the Fed’s 
descriptions of monetary policy actions. The study furthermore demonstrated that unexpected 
monetary policy shocks, (measured outside the VAR) using expectations from forward 
looking futures contracts tracking the FFR, were highly dissimilar to monetary policy shocks 
from recursively identified VARs. Overall, it concluded that monetary VARS “appear[ed] 
implausible and mis-specified in many respects”. Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche and O’Reilly (2009) 
summarised Rudebusch’s (1996, 1998) critique as implying that VAR based measures of 
monetary shocks were largely “artificial and meaningless.” 
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Although the VAR methodology was increasingly used to identify monetary policy 
shocks, many of these studies failed to acknowledge the critique directed at earlier studies 
concerning monetary policy and stock market performance (see Section 2.3.1). In earlier 
studies from the 1970s, 1980s and later VAR studies, lower-frequency aggregate measures of 
monetary policy were generally employed, and critique suggested that such measures were 
less likely to reflect exogenous changes in monetary policy by the Fed, and more likely to 
reflect a broad spectrum of macroeconomic factors. Given that the majority of VAR related 
studies we evaluated used weekly, monthly or quarterly data in their analyses, they were all 
subject to such critique. Interestingly, whilst VAR related studies sought to mitigate concerns 
regarding the endogenous relationship between the stock market and monetary policy, they 
largely ignored the fact that lower-frequency aggregate measures of monetary policy were in 
themselves endogenous as they may have been influenced by a plethora of other factors.  
 Finally, although the VAR methodology had several benefits beyond the single-
equation framework, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) argued that it was ‘important to 
consider the correct identification of monetary policy’. These concerns were prevalent in the 
study by Crowder (2006), which demonstrated that the structural VAR model was highly 
sensitive to the identification strategy employed. It is important to note that VAR models are 
inherently backward looking in their estimation.  
 
2.5 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Alternative Measures) 
2.5.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using heteroscedasticity based 
techniques) 
 Following the critique of Rudebusch (1996, 1998), later studies sought to develop 
alternative measures of monetary policy shocks. In particular, Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) 
developed a new estimator which was based upon the conditional heteroscedasticity present 
in higher frequency data. They considered a bivariate simultaneous equation model 
(Equations 2.9 and 2.10); where  ts  was the change in asset price,  ti  was the change in 
the short-term interest rate and  tz  represented a vector of common variables (information 
shocks). The monetary policy shocks  t  entered the monetary policy reaction function, and 
the stock market response was measured through the simultaneous model specification. 
Although the model was under-identified, to partially identify the model, they assumed 
monetary policy shocks occurred on FOMC event days. 
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tttt zsi   ,         (2.9) 
tttt zis   ,         (2.10) 
 Over the Jan-94 to Nov-01 sample period, Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) used a 
paired sample of 78 FOMC policy dates and non-policy dates, to examine the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the S&P500, WIL500, Nasdaq and DJIA indices. The nearest 
expiring eurodollar futures contract was used as the measure of the short-term interest rates. 
Contemporaneous coefficients were estimated using the instrumental variables (IV) approach 
and the generalised method of moments (GMM). Interestingly, the stock market response to 
unexpected monetary policy shocks were shown to be consistent across all four US stock 
market indices and across the IV and GMM estimation methods, however slightly more 
pronounced coefficients were estimated for the Nasdaq Index (which is generally considered 
to exhibit higher volatility compared to the S&P500). An unexpected 1% increase in the 
short-term interest rate yielded a -6.81%(-7.19%) decrease in the S&P500 using IV and 
GMM. The estimated coefficients were also very similar to those yielded using event-study 
analyses. 
 In a related study, Craine and Martin (2003) demonstrated that Rigobón and Sack’s 
(2002, 2004) simultaneous equation model in reduced form was “observationally equivalent” 
to a factor model with four systematic market-wide non-diversifiable risks. They extended 
upon the analysis of Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) by estimating a general factor model 
which examined stock return responses to various sources of systematic risks such as 
monetary policy shocks. Akin to Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004), the model was identified 
through the restriction that monetary policy shocks occurred only on event-days. In contrast 
to Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) who considered a paired-sample with around 10% of 
available data (144 event-days), Craine and Martin (2003) used all the available data (more 
than 3000 daily observations) by setting monetary policy shocks to zero on non event-days. 
Over the Oct-88 to Dec-01 sample period, they compared estimates from the factor model to 
those using the model of Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004). It was shown across various model 
specifications and alternative samples that the equity return response to monetary policy 
shocks was more negative and significant using the factor model specified in the paper. 
 The identification through the heteroscedasticity approach to measuring monetary 
policy shocks was not widely adopted in empirical studies evaluating the relationship 
between stock market performance and monetary policy shocks. As we shall see in Sections 
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2.6 onwards, this may be attributable to the development of alternative measures of monetary 
policy which were popularised in the mid 2000s. 
 
2.5.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using non-standard indicators) 
The measurement of monetary policy and monetary conditions has yielded a vast and 
voluminous literature. Many of the seminal and related studies evaluated in this thesis 
primarily measure monetary policy using the FFR, money supply and the discount rate. 
Despite the widespread use of these monetary measures, in this section we briefly evaluate 
alternative and less widely used measures of monetary policy and monetary conditions. These 
measures include; narrative expositions, monetary indices, dummy variable indicators, 
alternative money-market measures, and survey-based measures. In a highly influential book 
‘A Monetary History of the United States,’ Friedman and Schwartz (1963) collated an 
extensive archive of historical documents including Fed statements, to undertake an ex-post 
analysis of Fed monetary policy in the US. The narrative exposition argued that exogenous 
changes in monetary policy, measured in terms of the growth rate in money supply, were 
followed by real changes in macroeconomic variables. As later studies (see Fama and French, 
1989) demonstrated that business conditions and the macroeconomic environment influenced 
investor behaviour, this narrative discussion indirectly implied that stock returns were 
influenced by monetary policy. 
In a later study, Boschen and Mills (1995) sought to translate the narrative discussion 
in Fed statements in to a numerical index concerning Fed monetary stance 32 . They 
constructed a narrative-based monetary policy index, classifying Fed statements in to five 
categories; strong emphasis on cutting inflation (-2), emphasis on cutting inflation (-1), 
neutral (0), emphasis on promoting real growth (1) and strong emphasis on promoting real 
growth (2). Thorbecke (1997) estimated the response of US industry stock returns to the 
Boschen and Mills (1995) narrative-based indicator of monetary policy33 over the Jan-67 to 
Dec-90 sample period. They demonstrated that a one-unit increase in the index registered an 
average 0.83% monthly increase across the twenty-two industry portfolios. Narrative-based 
indicators of monetary policy were less widely used than money market indicators, because 
the interpretation of Fed statements imposed a subjective bias upon the construction of such 
                                                 
32  The narrative-based monetary policy indices were largely used to examine the responses of monetary 
aggregates in lieu of the stock market (see Hakes, 1990; Romer and Romer, 1994) 
33 Other control variables were also used. 
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indices (Romer and Romer, 1994). It was further argued that whilst FOMC statements were a 
record of policy intent, they may not have been indicative of actual policy action by the Fed. 
An alternative simpler measure of monetary stance was utilised by Conover, Jensen 
and Johnson (1999). They defined a dummy variable equal to one (zero) when monetary 
policy was restrictive (expansive) based on discount rate changes. Using this measure they 
demonstrated that compared to periods of monetary expansion, periods of monetary 
contraction were associated with lower stock returns34. Qualitatively similar conclusions were 
yielded by Ioannidis and Kontonikas (2008), who utilised the 3-month T-Bill rate as a 
measure of monetary policy. It is however important to note that these two studies employed 
non-standard measures of monetary policy because they investigated the impact of monetary 
policy on stock returns over various countries, and these measures ensured that comparable 
measures of monetary policy were used across the different countries. 
To examine the stock market response to monetary policy, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004) used survey-data concerning market participants’ expectations of target FFR changes 
to measure the unexpected component of target FFR change35 . As the survey poll was 
undertaken on the Friday prior to each FOMC meeting, this limited their scope of their 
analysis to scheduled FOMC meetings. They nonetheless estimated the impact of survey-
based FFR shocks on individual stocks in the S&P500 index. Over the Feb-94 to Jan-03 
sample period, on FOMC event-dates, a 1% FFR shock was associated with a 5.5% decline 
across the 500 stocks. They documented firm-level heterogeneity in the impact of survey 
based FFR shocks. Specifically, capital intensive and cyclical industries were shown to 
exhibit stronger responses compared to other industries, consistent with the credit channel of 
monetary policy transmission.  
 
2.6 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (FFR Futures Implied Measures) 
2.6.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using FFR futures) 
It is important to note that although Rudebusch (1996, 1998) offered a sharp critique 
of VAR based monetary policy shock measures, the argument was highly constructive and 
offered a potential alternative measure. The proposed measure was defined as the difference 
between the actual realised target FFR and the expected FFR gauged from the one-month 
                                                 
34 The primary focus of this study was the international dimension of monetary policy transmission; however we 
restrict our discussion here to the US. 
35 A Reuters poll was undertaken on the Friday prior to each FOMC meeting concerning the target FFR. 
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ahead 30-Day FFR futures contract (FFR futures) which tracked the underlying instrument of 
the effective FFR. The study demonstrated that this market-based measure of unexpected 
FFR changes exhibited low correlation with monetary policy shock measures derived using 
VAR related methods. Given that the two measures were inconsistent with one another, the 
study advocated the use of market-based measures in lieu of the VAR based measure due the 
overwhelming empirical advantages. 
The market-based measure of unexpected FFR changes was efficient in that it 
represented a natural proxy for the market’s expectation of future FFR changes and 
associated forecast errors. It could furthermore be defined using higher-frequency daily data 
or ultra-high frequency intra-day data, which was more likely to be exogenous and less likely 
to endogenously reflect other macroeconomic factors or news compared to lower-frequency 
monthly aggregate measures used in many VAR related studies. Furthermore, Krueger and 
Kuttner (1996) demonstrated that FFR futures provided efficient and unbiased forecasts of 
the target FFR. They observed that there was a very small risk premium in FFR futures, and 
that they were good at forecasting potential future target FFR changes by the Fed. They 
concluded that “traders, investors, or economists interested in predicting near-term Fed 
actions would be hard pressed to improve on the Fed funds futures rate.” 
 Whilst the benefits of market-based unexpected FFR measures are apparent, this 
measure proposed by Rudebusch (1996, 1998) which gauged market expectations of target 
FFR changes using FFR futures was not immune to critique. In particular, Kuttner (2001) 
identified two technical complications concerning FFR futures which had yet to be addressed 
before they could be used. Firstly, FFR futures were based upon the effective realised FFR 
and not the target FFR. Secondly, the settlement price for FFR futures was based upon the 
monthly average effective FFR and not the corresponding daily effective FFR. Rudebusch 
(1996, 1998) had also acknowledged the limitations of the approach, urging caution that prior 
to 1994 the market-based unexpected FFR measure may have been subject to simultaneity 
bias, because on several occasions, target FFR changes coincided with employment report 
releases by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Later studies (see Chernenko, Schwartz, and 
Wright, 2004; Piazessi and Swanson, 2008) had also yielded evidence that market-based 
unexpected FFR measures may have been contaminated by risk-premia present in futures 
markets. They observed that one-month ahead FFR futures contracts exhibited three basis 
point risk premia, and that risk premia increased with further ahead contracts.  
It is also important to consider the limitations of the market-based measure of 
unexpected FFR changes, as the advent of FFR futures in October 1988 constrained sample 
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estimation to this date. Furthermore, whilst the Fed targeted the effective FFR through open 
market operations, it did not entirely control the market, hence negligible discrepancies 
between the target and effective FFR may have been present in the constructed measure. 
Despite these several disadvantages, Rudebusch (1996, 1998) characterised the market-based 
measure as being “relatively unclouded by time-varying term premia or non-federal-funds-
market idiosyncratic movements.” 
In a subsequent study, Kuttner (2001) refined and popularised the methodology of 
Rudebusch (1996, 1998) through the use of an event-study analysis and by addressing many 
of the technical considerations and potential issues discussed above. The set of event-dates 
considered were those when the Fed changed the target FFR36. On each event-date, Kuttner 
(2001) measured the unexpected FFR shock  uti  as the change in the implied rate on the 
current-month FFR futures contract  0, dmff  , as traded on the CBOT, relative to the day 
before the change  0 1, dmff . The study assumed risk premia were time invariant around 
FOMC event-date intervals  1, dd  as higher-frequency daily data was used. To counteract 
the fact that the settlement price for the FFR future contract was based upon the average 
effective FFR over the month, Kuttner (2001) developed a scaling adjustment for the 
unexpected FFR measure related to the number of days in the month affected by the change37. 
This definition of the unexpected FFR shock is defined in Equation 2.11, with the expected 
component of FFR change defined in Equation 2.12. The expected interest rate change was 
calculated as the actual target FFR change minus the computed unexpected FFR change. 
 1,,  dmdmut ffffdDDi ,        (2.11) 
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Where  0, dmff  was the implied rate (100 minus the futures contract price) from the 
current-month FFR futures contract on the month  m  of the FOMC decision, on the day  d  
of the FOMC decision and  D  represented the number of days within the month  m  . This 
event-study market-based measure of unexpected FFR changes thus addressed the two 
technical complications concerning FFR futures contracts as well as concerns regarding risk-
                                                 
36 They also considered a set of event-dates which included; dates of target FFR change and dates of scheduled 
FOMC meetings without FFR changes. 
37 To minimise end of month distortions, unscaled changes were used when target rate changes occurred in the 
last three days of the calendar month, and the last day of the previous month’s FFR contract was used when 
target rate changes occurred on the first day of the month.  
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premia in further ahead FFR futures contracts. Kuttner’s (2001) pioneering methodology for 
defining unexpected FFR changes subsequently became one of the most popular measures of 
defining monetary policy shocks in the empirical literature. 
 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) extended the analysis of Kuttner (2001) to investigate 
the response of daily stock returns  tr  to expected  eti  and unexpected   uti  FFR 
changes, on FOMC event dates. The set of event-dates included scheduled FOMC meetings 
and unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes. Prior to 1994, event-dates were 
defined as dates of open market operations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Trading Desk and subsequent media announcements (see Kuttner, 2003).  
ttt ir   1 ,         (2.13) 
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 Between Jun-89 and Dec-02, CRSP Value Weighted US Equity Index (US-CRSP-Val) 
returns yielded statistically insignificant responses to raw target FFR changes  ti  (see 
Equation 2.13). Upon disaggregating the target FFR in to its constituent components 
concerning expected and unexpected FFR changes, an unexpected 1% target FFR increase 
yielded a significant one-day decline of -4.38% in the US-CRSP-Val index (see Equation 
2.14). In comparison, the US-CRSP-Val Index yielded a smaller, statistically insignificant 
response to raw target FFR changes over the period. Only 0.7% of one-day variation in equity 
returns was attributable to news concerning target FFR changes, compared to 17.1% when 
considering its disaggregated expected and unexpected components. Upon exclusion of seven 
outlier observations from the estimation, the US-CRSP-Val Index response to the unexpected 
FFR shock declined to -2.55%. Interestingly, the impact of the expected FFR coefficient was 
statistically insignificant, consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. This implied that 
the expected component of monetary policy was already priced in to the market, and thereby 
responded only to unexpected FFR changes. Zebedee, Bentzen, Hansen and Lunde (2008) 
similarly observed statistically insignificant responses of stock returns to the expected 
component of monetary policy; in particular they demonstrated that stocks responded 
significantly only to new information contained within the unexpected component of 
monetary policy. 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) furthermore used interactive dummy variables to control 
for structural change in the unexpected FFR coefficient for the post-1994 period and for 
event-dates which coincided with employment release reports by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. These robustness checks were undertaken following concerns by Rudebusch (1996, 
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1998) that market-based unexpected FFR measures may have been influenced by the fact that 
the Fed began issuing statements following target FFR changes in 1994 and concerns 
regarding endogenous responses to employment reports. The US-CRSP-Val response was 
more muted for the pre-1994 period (-2.55%). However, more pronounced for the post-1994 
period (-8.13%). On days when employment release reports coincided with unexpected FFR 
changes, the net market response was close to zero for the pre-1994 period, hence 
employment reports were interpreted as positive news by markets. Both interaction terms 
were statistically significant in the estimation. Upon exclusion of outlier observations, the 
post-1994 interaction term ceased to remain significant; however empirical conclusions 
concerning the employment report remained robust to the model specification. Interactive 
dummies were also used to control for positive surprises and positive rate changes in separate 
estimates, however significant asymmetries were not observed.  
The analysis of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) primarily focused upon a broad equity 
index (US-CRSP-Val) however they extended their investigation to also examine the 
responses of Fama-French industry portfolio returns to expected and unexpected FFR 
changes, using monthly data. An unexpected 1% FFR increase yielded a negative response 
across all ten industry portfolios, however insignificant responses were observed for Energy 
and Utilities. The strongest significant negative responses were yielded for Telecoms (-
16.10%), High Tech (-14.73%) and Durables (-12.45%). The event-study analysis of 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) assumed unilateral causality from FFR changes to equity 
returns. They explicitly acknowledged that there were “no clear examples of instances in 
which a drop in equity prices led the FOMC to cut rates.” In lieu of aggregate weekly, 
monthly or quarterly measures which were generally employed in VAR related studies, they 
utilised daily event-study data to mitigate concerns of endogeneity. They furthermore 
accounted for potential endogenous responses to employment report releases on event-dates 
using interactive dummy variables. This was predicated by the fact that between Jun-89 and 
Jul-92, on ten occasions the event-dates considered coincided with employment release 
reports. 
 Following the seminal studies of Kuttner (2001), Kuttner (2003) and Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), later empirical studies concerning the relationship between US monetary 
policy and US stock returns branched in several dimensions. In particular, Gürkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson (2002, 2005, 2007) developed these measures further to capture longer-term 
expectations of monetary policy. This prompted a branch of studies which investigated the 
impact of such measures on asset prices (see Section 2.6.2). Another branch of studies 
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investigated potential state-dependence in the relationship between monetary policy and stock 
returns, considering whether business cycle conditions, bull-bear market conditions and credit 
market conditions influenced the relationship (see Section 2.6.3). A related branch of studies 
explored potential asymmetries in market responses to monetary policy shocks, with regards 
to positive versus negative surprises (see Section 2.6.4). Guided by Bonfim’s (2003) 
argument that stock returns measures using ultra-high frequency intra-day data could increase 
precision of estimates, several of the studies in the following sections utilised such higher 
frequency measures in their studies. Furthermore, whilst the majority of these studies utilised 
regression related frameworks for examining these relationships, GARCH models as well as 
Markov-Switching models were also used to estimate the relationship. 
 
2.6.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Measured using timing and level shocks, or target 
and path factors) 
Following the studies by Krueger and Kuttner (1996) and Rudebusch (1998), a 
multitude of alternative market-based measures were proposed to derive monetary policy 
shocks. These measures included; the current-month FFR futures (see Kuttner, 2001), the 
one-month ahead FFR futures (see Bonfim, 2003), the one-month eurodollar deposit rates 
(see Cochrane and Piazessi, 2002), the three-month eurodollar futures (see Rigobón and Sack, 
2002) and three-month Treasury bill rates (see Ellingsen and Soderstrom, 2004). The 
proliferation of various competing measures motivated Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002, 
2007) to evaluate the empirical efficacy of alternative market-based monetary policy shock 
measures in predicting the future trajectory of monetary policy. They demonstrated that 
measures such as the term federal funds loans, FFR futures, eurodollar deposits, commercial 
paper, eurodollar futures and Treasury bills all yielded forecasts of the FFR which were 
superior to that of a Bayesian VAR and AR(1) process38. Interestingly, they demonstrated 
that the methodology of Kuttner (2001), using FFR futures, dominated all other measures in 
predicting the FFR at one-month to six-month horizons however very similar results were 
yielded across the measures at longer-horizons. Although FFR futures were shown to exhibit 
superior forecasting power and lower risk-premia compared to the alternative instruments, 
these instruments were nonetheless shown to be very close substitutes. 
                                                 
38 The Bayesian VAR forecast was from the 2007 published paper, whilst the AR(1) forecast was from the 2002 
working paper version 
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Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002, 2007) observed that Kuttner’s (2001) measure 
of unexpected FFR changes, using FFR futures “provided the best measures of unexpected 
changes to the immediate policy setting” however argued the measure may have been 
influenced by the timing of target FFR changes. Market participants may have anticipated 
target FFR changes in the foreseeable future however may have been uncertain whether the 
Fed would have changed the target FFR in the current FOMC meeting or the subsequent 
meeting. Consequently, they deconstructed unexpected FFR changes in to two components 
concerning the ‘timing’ surprise and the ‘level’ surprise. The timing surprise measured the 
component of unexpected FFR change which did not affect expectations beyond that of the 
“immediate policy setting” whilst the level surprise measured the component of unexpected 
FFR change which captured the “general level of policy expectations” or “changes to the 
expected near-term policy path rather to the immediate policy.” The level surprise was 
computed as follows (see Equation 2.15): 
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Where  1D  was the number of days in the month of the next meeting,  1, dmf  the one-
month ahead FFR futures contract on day  1d  of month the next FOMC meeting, and 
 1 1, dmf  the same measure the previous day. The timing surprise  uttiming  was subsequently 
calculated as the residual from the regression of the total surprise  uti  on the level surprise 
 utlevel  . Although the study derived ‘timing’ surprise and ‘level’ surprise measures of FFR 
changes, it did not explicitly examine the impact of such measures on asset prices. A later 
study by Kurov (2010) utilised such measures to examine the stock return response to such 
measures. 
In a related study, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) sought to deconstruct 
unexpected FFR changes in to two components concerning the ‘target factor’ and ‘path 
factor.’ The target factor corresponded to “surprise changes in the current federal funds rate 
target” whilst the path factor39 corresponded to “changes in futures rates out to horizons of 
one year that [were] independent of changes in the current funds rate target40.” The were 
motivated by the fact that on 28th January 2004, the target FFR was not changed however 
                                                 
39 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) also argued that as FOMC decisions concerning the target FFR became 
increasingly predictable and transparent over time, hence markets responded significantly to ‘path surprises.’ 
40 The path factor could also be expressed as “all aspects of FOMC announcements that move futures rates for 
the upcoming year without changing the current federal funds rate” (Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005) 
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financial markets responded significantly to a revision in monetary policy stance. The FOMC 
announced that “the committee believes it can be patient in removing its policy 
accommodation,” replacing their earlier stance that “policy accommodation can be 
maintained for a considerable period.” This led market participants to revise their 
expectations concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy, and whilst the unexpected 
FFR change would have been a zero-change, it failed to capture the significant shift in 
monetary policy which occurred. 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) estimated the target and path factors using 
principal components analysis. In particular they used five variables, the unexpected FFR 
change (see Equation 2.11), the level surprise (see Equation 2.15), the change in the 
Eurodollar futures contract with an average of 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5 months to expiration, on 
FOMC event-dates. The variables were normalised to have zero mean and unit variance, 
decomposed in to principal components, and linearly transformed such that one factor drove 
the unexpected FFR change (the target factor), whilst the other factor was orthogonal to the 
unexpected FFR change (the path factor) and drove longer-term expectations over the next 
year. The two factors were subsequently re-scaled such that the target factor moved the 
unexpected FFR change one-for-one, and so that both factors had the same magnitude effect 
on the one-year ahead Eurodollar futures rate. This methodology ultimately yielded the target 
factor and path factor, and the latter factor was shown to be closely associated with changes 
in FOMC statements. 
 Prior to evaluating asset price responses to target and path factors, Gürkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson (2005) evaluated the impact of unexpected FFR changes on S&P500 returns 
using narrow thirty-minute, one-hour and one-day windows around FOMC announcements41 
(see Equation 2.16). The expected component of target FFR change was excluded from 
estimation because market-efficiency implied that the anticipated component of FFR change 
was already priced in to the market. Interestingly, the study demonstrated that intra-day and 
daily measures of unexpected FFR changes were very similar and differed between one to 
two basis points in many cases, with five anomalous exceptions which corresponded with 
pre-1994 observations where employment release reports were released several hours 
following FOMC announcements concerning target FFR changes. Over the Jan-90 to Dec-04 
sample period, a hypothetical unexpected target FFR increase of 1% was associated with a 
                                                 
41 Ultra high-frequency intra-day measures were used to reduce the likelihood of data being affected by ‘noise’ 
concerning other market news. 
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significant -4.03% (-3.96%) decrease in S&P500 returns using thirty-minute (one-day) 
announcement windows42. 
t
u
tt ir   1 ,         (2.16) 
 Furthermore, upon estimating the impact of the target and path factor on S&P500 
returns over the same sample period (see Equation 2.17), the target factor yielded a 
significant -4.28% response; consistent with the unexpected FFR change. Interestingly, the 
path factor was associated with a statistically insignificant -0.96% response in S&P500 
returns. These results were counter-intuitive given that anecdotal evidence implied a potential 
relationship between financial markets and FOMC statements and changes in the future 
trajectory of monetary policy. One should however note that highly significant responses to 
the path factor were observed in the US Treasury market. 
tt PFTFr   21 ,        (2.17) 
 
2.6.3 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (State dependence) 
As we have seen, the unexpected FFR change measure of Kuttner (2001) was adapted 
by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) to also consider the role of timing and level 
surprises, or target and path factors. Given that stock returns were shown to yield statistically 
insignificant responses to path factors, many studies investigating the relationship between 
monetary policy and stock market performance utilised Kuttner’s (2001) measure of 
unexpected FFR changes in lieu of alternative measures. In this sub-section we evaluate 
studies which studied potential state-dependence in the relationship between monetary policy 
and stock returns. Basistha and Kurov (2008) utilised an equivalent dataset to Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) however extended their analysis in several dimensions, to investigate potential 
state-dependence in the relationship between S&P500 returns and unexpected FFR changes43. 
The study considered event-dates over the Jan-90 to Dec-04 sample period, however 
excluded eight event-dates which coincided with employment release reports. The study 
further excluded expected FFR changes from the analysis akin to by Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2005). 
Using OLS regressions, they observed significant S&P500 return responses to 
unexpected FFR changes (-5.51%), however upon further excluding unscheduled FOMC 
                                                 
42 A similar result was obtained for the one hour announcement window. 
43 The study was motivated by an earlier study which observed state-dependence (see McQueen and Roley, 
1993). 
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meetings from their analysis, the response ceased to remain statistically significant. These 
conclusions were robust to the Feb-94 to Dec-04 sub-sample period and to robust MM-
weighted least squares estimates of the models. Thus the finding of a significant relationship 
between stock returns and unexpected FFR changes was contingent upon the inclusion of 
unscheduled FOMC meetings. To examine whether the relationship was further contingent 
upon business cycle conditions, Basistha and Kurov (2008) conditioned the unexpected FFR 
change on three recession indicators  recI : the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) recession dummy, a dummy variable based upon the Chicago Fed National Activity 
Index (CFNAI) and the Experimental Coincident Recession Index (XRIC). By interacting 
these recession indicators with the unexpected FFR change coefficient (see Equation 2.18), 
they found a stronger stock market response to unexpected FFR changes during recessionary 
periods across all three measures. For example, an unexpected 1% FFR increase registered a 
statistically significant (insignificant) one-day decline of -6.52% (-2.73%) in S&P500 returns 
during recessions (non-recessions), using the CFNAI indicator. The study demonstrated that 
there was a significant difference in the stock market response to FFR shocks during 
recessions and expansions. 
  tutrecutrect iIiIr   121 ,      (2.18) 
 Basistha and Kurov (2008) also conditioned unexpected FFR changes on two credit 
conditions indicators: the percentage of loan officers reporting tightening credit standards, 
and the spread between higher yielding bonds and AAA rated bond yields, both normalised 
by sample mean and standard deviation. The stock response to FFR shocks was shown to 
double in magnitude when either credit conditions variable increased by one standard 
deviation. This implies that stocks are associated with larger magnitude responses to 
monetary policy shocks during periods of tightening credit market conditions. The finding 
was also shown to be in contrast to previous studies which did not find significant evidence 
of state-dependence in the relationship between stock returns and monetary policy 
attributable to credit market conditions (see Warner and Georges, 2001; Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega, 2007)44. It was argued that this was due to the fact that these studies 
measured monetary policy shocks using money-market survey indicators in lieu of market-
based indicators (i.e. FFR futures), due to the smaller sample periods considered in previous 
                                                 
44 The study also observed heterogeneity in the responses of US industry sectors to unexpected FFR changes 
over the sample. Cyclical and capital intensive industries were shown to respond more strongly to monetary 
news.  
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studies. The finding of state-dependence attributable to credit market conditions was 
interpreted as evidence for the credit channel of monetary transmission. 
 In a subsequent study, Kurov (2010) estimated S&P500 return responses to 
unexpected FFR changes45, during bull market and bear market regimes; using a bull-market 
probability indicator  bullI  . The indicator was generated by Chen (2007) using a Markov-
switching model. Akin to Basistha and Kurov (2008), the study excluded eight-event dates 
corresponding to employment release reports and further excluded expected FFR changes 
from the analysis (see Equation 2.19).  Their estimates demonstrated that over the Jan-90 to 
Nov-04 sample period, a hypothetical unexpected 1% increase in the target FFR was shown 
to be associated with a highly significant -11.85% S&P500 response during bear-markets 
compared with an insignificant -0.68% response during bull-markets. Similar results were 
obtained using robust MM-weighted least squares estimates. 
  tutbullutbullt iIiIr   121 ,      (2.19) 
 Having observed state-dependence in the relationship between monetary policy and 
stock returns, with respect to bull-market and bear market-regimes; Kurov (2010) 
subsequently estimated S&P500 return responses to level and timing surprises (see 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2002, 2007) conditioned upon these regimes (see Equation 
2.20). A more amplified significant negative response to timing surprises was yielded during 
bear-markets (-9.69%) compared to that during bull-markets (-2.89%). Interestingly, the 
stock response to level surprises in bear-markets was positive, significant, and larger in 
magnitude than the timing surprise. The estimates were rationalised as being indicative of 
market participants over-reacting to timing surprises during bear-markets. 
   tutbullutbull
u
t
bullu
t
bull
t levelIilevelI
timingIitimingI
r 



1
1
43
21 ,     (2.20) 
The majority of studies that we have reviewed so far used regression related 
methodologies for evaluating state-dependence in the stock market response to monetary 
policy shocks. In contrast to these studies, Davig and Gerlach (2006) estimated the impact of 
FFR shocks on stock returns using Markov-switching models. Instead of exogenously 
defining state-dependent regimes as in previous studies, the Markov-switching framework 
allowed the relationship between stock returns and target FFR shocks to endogenously differ 
between state-dependent regimes in the sample. Using a high-frequency (30 minute interval) 
                                                 
45 It is important to note that for these estimates Kurov (2010) used Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson’s (2002, 
2007) measure of level FFR surprises, in lieu of the measure developed by Kuttner (2001). 
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event-study methodology, and deriving target FFR shocks in line with Kuttner (2001), the 
study by Davig and Gerlach (2006) evaluated the following model (see Equation 2.21). 
  tuttt iSr   1   where   2,0~ tt SN  ,    (2.21) 
 The unobserved state variable  tS  was governed by a two-state Markov chain and 
the variance of the residual was allowed to endogenously vary between the two states: a low 
volatility regime (Feb-94 to Nov-94, Sep-98 to Sep-02) and high volatility regime (Nov-94 to 
Sep-98). In the low-volatility regime, a 1% FFR shock was associated with a significant -
1.91% decline in the S&P500 index. However an insignificant response was obtained during 
the high-volatility regime. The statistical insignificance was interpreted as being indicative of 
a more unpredictable and volatile stock return response to FFR shocks. As these estimates 
only considered scheduled FOMC meetings, the analysis was repeated using a dataset which 
also included unscheduled meetings. Interestingly all the unscheduled meetings occurred in 
the high-volatility regime, and including these observations, the statistically insignificant 
estimates previously obtained became highly significant, with a 1% FFR shock yielding a -
1.62% (-6.88%) response in the low-volatility (high-volatility) regime.  
 In a related study, Chen (2007) used the Markov-switching model framework to 
evaluate potential state-dependence in the S&P500 response to monetary policy during bull 
and bear market regimes. The study investigated various measures of monetary policy, 
including discount rate changes, FFR changes and orthogonalised innovations from VAR 
models. Over the Jan-65 to Nov-04 sample period, a monetary tightening across any of the 
measures was shown to yield more pronounced negative stock responses during bear market 
regimes compared to bull market regimes. It is however important to note that whilst 
responses in bull-markets were generally statistically significant, the more pronounced 
responses in bear-markets were largely statistically insignificant. As the aggregate measures 
considered were subject to critique concerning potential endogeneity and measurement error 
associated with aggregate monthly data, an event-study methodology was also considered. 
Akin to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) they measured FFR shocks by gauging expectations 
from survey data, and extending the linear specification of their model to a Markov-switching 
framework. Their estimates were consistent with state-dependence in the relationship 
between monetary policy and stock returns, characterised by bull-market and bear-market 
regimes, with stronger stock responses to the latter regime. 
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2.6.4 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Asymmetries & volatility) 
Having evaluated studies concerning state-dependence in the relationship between 
stock returns and market-based measures of monetary policy shocks, it is apparent that the 
relationship was characterised by asymmetric responses to recessions versus non-recessions, 
bear-markets versus bull-markets and tighter versus looser credit market conditions. In this 
sub-section we review studies which investigated potential asymmetries in stock responses to 
negative and positive FFR shocks, FFR changes and reversals of policy; as well as studies 
which evaluated stock volatility responses to FFR changes. 
Chulia, Martens and Van Dijk (2010) estimated the responses of S&P100 returns for 
individual stock to expected and unexpected FFR changes as well as a reversal dummy 
variable  revD  set equal to one on event-dates associated with FOMC reversals in monetary 
policy (see Equation 2.22) 46 . The analysis was subsequently repeated using S&P100 
volatilities, and correlations between individual S&P100 stocks as the dependent variable. By 
aggregating estimates across stocks, a hypothetical 1% FFR shock was shown to yield a 
stronger significant response (-7.17%) using daily returns compared to that using five-minute 
intra-day returns (-3.96%). This may have been indicative of initial under-reaction by 
financial markets which normalised over the course of the day. In line with previous studies, 
and consistent with market efficiency, the expected FFR coefficient was statistically 
insignificant for all the models considered. Interestingly, the stock response to the reversal 
dummy was highly significant using five-minute returns (-18.08%), but insignificant with 
daily returns. Furthermore stock volatilities and stock correlations only responded 
significantly to the surprise component of FFR changes, with a hypothetical 1% positive FFR 
shock being associated with a 4.83% increase in stock volatility.  
t
reve
t
u
tt Diir   321 ,       (2.22) 
To investigate whether stock returns, volatilities and correlations responded 
asymmetrically to negative and positive FFR shocks, the study estimated Equation 2.23 and 
made a distinction between the “mere presence of the change”  21,  and “the magnitude of 
surprise”  21,  . For each of these dependent variables, they demonstrated that for negative 
FFR shocks, the magnitude of the shock  1 was more important than its occurrence  1 . 
Conversely, for positive FFR surprises, the mere occurrence of the shock  2 was more 
                                                 
46 Chulia, Martens and Dijk (2010) estimated all their models using individual stocks from the S&P100 Index 
however aggregated the estimates from each equation to yield the ‘market’ response. The impact of FFR shocks 
on the stock correlations were shown to be non-linear due to the Fisher transformation 
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important than its actual magnitude  2 . The asymmetries in market responses to positive 
and negative unexpected FFR changes were observed in both five-minute and daily stock 
returns, stock volatilities and stock correlations. These results were indicative of market 
participants reacting more strongly to negative market news (positive FFR shocks) compared 
to positive market news (negative FFR shocks). 
    treviutiutt DDiDir utut    3022011 ,    (2.23) 
 In a related study, Andersson (2010) developed an intra-day measure of stock market 
volatility and analysed its response to target and path factors47. The volatility indicator 
measured the ratio of volatility in the S&P500 index thirty minutes prior to the FOMC 
announcement and five-minutes before on FOMC event-dates, relative to the measure on 
non-FOMC event-dates on equivalent days and times of announcement. The target and path 
factors were constructed using the framework of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) 
however expectations were gauged using survey-based measures. Upon estimating the 
volatility indicator response to absolute target and path factors (see Equation 2.24), 
Andersson (2010) observed on average a significant ‘upsurge’ in stock market volatility 
following absolute path surprises, however an insignificant response to the absolute target 
surprises. These estimates were intriguing given that Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) 
demonstrated that stock returns responded significantly to the target factor in lieu of the path 
factor.  These results were shown not to be contingent upon whether the target FFR was 
changed or not. 
    ttt PFAbsTFAbsVolratio    21,30 ,     (2.24) 
In another related study, Wang, Yang and Wu (2006) evaluated the responses of stock 
returns, volatilities, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads of two exchange traded funds (ETF); 
the S&P500 SPY fund and the S&P400 MDY fund, to monetary policy shocks. They 
considered the responses of these measures to both unexpected FFR changes (one-factor 
models), and to target and path factors (two-factor models). In the one-factor (two-factor) 
models, all the aforementioned measures yielded significant responses to unexpected FFR 
changes (the target factor). The impact of the path factor on the volatilities of the two ETFs 
was shown to be significant, evidence consistent with Anderson (2010); however the path 
                                                 
47 The study by Andersson (2010) considered the impact of European Central Bank monetary policy decisions 
on German bond markets and Euro area stock markets as well as the impact of Fed monetary policy decisions on 
US bond and stock markets, however we restrict our discussion to that concerning the impact of Fed decisions 
on US stock volatility. 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 58 of 295 
factor yielded mixed evidence for an impact on stock returns, consistent with evidence from 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005)48. 
To investigate potential asymmetries in stock responses to monetary announcements, 
Wang, Yang and Wu (2006) used dummy variables to distinguish between the effects of 
positive and negative FFR shocks (see Equation 2.25), akin to Chulia, Martens and Dijk 
(2010). The study also considered potential asymmetries in the target factor and path factor 
(see Equation 2.26). In the one-factor model, negative (positive) FFR shocks yielded 
significant (insignificant) effects on returns from the two ETFs, evidence consistent with , 
Martens and Dijk (2010). However in the two-factor model, only negative surprises in the 
target factor yielded significant effects on the two ETFs. Both positive and negative surprises 
in the path factor yielded insignificant responses, in line with Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 
(2005). 
    tiutiutt utut DiDir    022011 ,     (2.25) 
        tPFPFTFTFt DPFDPFDTFDTFr    04030201 ,  (2.26) 
Wang, Yang and Wu (2006) also investigated potential asymmetries in the direction 
of target FFR changes using dummy variables for target FFR increases and decreases (see 
Equation 2.27). In the one-factor (two-factor) models, the ETFs yielded significant responses 
to unexpected FFR changes (the target factor) only during monetary expansion. Interestingly, 
ETF response to the path factor was significant, at the 10% level, only during periods of 
monetary contraction. This implied that market participants responded more to path surprises 
than target rate surprises during periods of monetary contraction. 
        tiiiit DPFDPFDTFDTFr    04030201 ,  (2.27) 
In a more recent study, Farka (2009) investigated potential asymmetries in S&P500 
futures responses to timing and path surprises during easing and tightening cycles. Equation 
2.28 was estimated for one-minute, two-minute, three-minute, four-minute, five-minute, ten-
minute and twenty-minute windows around FOMC announcements. Stock returns were 
shown to yield larger negative responses to path surprises during easing cycles compared to 
tightening cycles. Interestingly, stocks responded positively to timing surprises during easing 
                                                 
48 The impact of path surprises on the S&P500 SPY Fund was marginally significant (10% significance) and of 
a low magnitude (-0.79%). Furthermore the S&P400 MDY Fund response to path surprises was statistically 
insignificant. 
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cycles however negatively during tightening cycles49. Furthermore, as the announcement 
window was widened from one-minute to twenty-minutes, the magnitude of responses 
monotonically increased for path surprises, as well as for timing surprises during easing 
cycles. They also demonstrated using a GARCH model that stock return volatility was 
abnormally low prior to the FOMC announcement, increased dramatically during the 
announcement, declined however remained elevated several hours following the 
announcement and decreased considerably the following day. 
        tiiiifuturest DPFDPFDTimingDTimingr    04030201 , (2.28) 
 
2.7 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (The 2007-2009 Crisis) 
2.7.1 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Background & dating) 
“The world is suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that has 
precipitated a sharp downturn in the global economy” (Bernanke, 2009) 
We have reviewed empirical studies which examined the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on stock returns prior to the 2007-2009 crisis. In this sub-section, we evaluate more 
recent studies in the field which examined the relationship between monetary policy and 
stock market performance over the crisis period in its entirety or in part. Prior to reviewing 
such studies, it is important to refine what is understood to be the crisis period, as this 
measure would refine our sample of studies. To avoid unintentionally excluding potential 
studies in our analysis which examined the relationship between stock returns and monetary 
policy over part of the crisis, we define a very broad measure of the crisis from Aug-07 to 
Jun-09.  We thus evaluate studies which examined the relationship between monetary policy 
and stock market performance over the entirety of the Aug-07 to Jun-09 sample period, or 
over part of this sample period. 
It is important to note that there is contention over the precise dating of the 2007-2009 
crisis period, and this primarily stems from the disparity between the actual initial realisation 
of a crisis in financial markets and the lagged response of the broader macroeconomy. In this 
context, we begin by distinguishing between the financial crisis period and the resulting 
economic crisis period. The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee conveniently defined 
the economic recession associated with the 2007-2009 crisis as spanning the Dec-07 to Jun-
                                                 
49 As the announcement window increased from one-minute gradually to twenty-minutes, the magnitude of 
response to path surprises during easing and tightening cycles increased, as did the response to timing surprises 
during tightening cycles; however the response to timing surprises during easing cycles declined. 
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09 sample period. Thus many macroeconomic studies have utilised these dates as their 
measure of the economic crisis period. Although these dates were widely recognised as the 
benchmark specification of the economic crisis in the US, the end-point in Jun-09 was only 
officially recognised by the NBER in Jun-10 (NBER, 2010). Prior to this announcement, 
empirical studies concerning the economic crisis generally utilised the last available 
observation date as their estimate of the end-point of the crisis. This naturally introduced 
discrepancies amongst earlier measures of the economic crisis period. 
To demonstrate the complexity in isolating a precise start date for the associated 
financial crisis period, we provide a brief exposition of events which foreshadowed the 2007-
2009 crisis. On 9th Aug 07, the investment bank BNP Paribas was one of the first banks to 
publicly acknowledge the “complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of 
the US securitization market” (BNP Paribas, 2007). As their funds managers were unable to 
value holdings, they subsequently closed two funds which were heavily exposed to sub-prime 
mortgages. In response to these events, credit market conditions deteriorated and on the same 
day, the European Central Bank (ECB) sought to reassure financial markets by pumping 
€95billion in to the banking sector to improve liquidity. As these measures proved inadequate, 
they further pumped an additional €109billion over the following days in an effort to ease 
market conditions (BBC News, 2007). 
On the 10th Aug 07, the Fed responded to these events by issuing a statement to 
reassure financial markets, “depository institutions may experience unusual funding needs 
because of dislocations in money and credit markets. As always, the discount window is 
available as a source of funding” (Fed Reserve, 2007a). Unfortunately, the positive market 
sentiment following ECB and Fed intervention was shown to be short-lived, as financial 
conditions worsened following the downgrade of Countrywide Financial Corporation’s credit 
rating (the largest mortgage lender in the US) on 16th Aug 07 (SEC, 2007)50. The Fed 
responded once again, on 17th Aug 07, with more concrete measures to ease market 
conditions, decreasing the primary credit rate 50 basis point to 5.75% (Fed Reserve, 2007b). 
 By September 2007, the financial crisis had spread internationally and the LIBOR rate 
had increased to a phenomenal 6.7975%, above the Bank of England’s (BOE) base rate 
which was set at 5.75%. This was the highest LIBOR rate since Dec-98 and indicative of 
severely tightening credit market conditions. September 2007 was further characterised by 
the first bank-run in the United Kingdom for 150 years, following leaked reports (14th Sep 07) 
                                                 
50 Countrywide Financial Corporation’s credit rating wad downgraded to BBB+ by Fitch Ratings 
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that that the British Bank Northern Rock required emergency funding from the BOE (HM 
Treasury, 2007). As liquidity dried up and market conditions worsened, the Fed intervened 
once again on 18th Sep 07. They decreased the target FFR by 50 basis points to 4.75%, the 
first target FFR cut since Jun-03. The primary credit rate was furthermore decreased by 50 
basis points to 5.25% (Fed Reserve, 2007c).  
 Given the complexity of events leading up to the crisis, one may subjectively define 
when the financial crisis began, contingent upon the weighting awarded to events which 
transpired throughout the period. Whilst the economic crisis spanned the Dec-07 to Jun-09 
sample period, the financial crisis may have been realised in financial markets significantly 
earlier in Aug-07/Sep-07. This is consistent with lags in the transmission mechanism of 
financial market changes in to the broader macroeconomy. Dating the start of the financial 
crisis to the summer of 2007 was furthermore consistent with market indicators such as the 
TED Spread, VIX Index, and Interbank-Lending Rates which soared during the period. We 
would also like to point out that whilst the NBER officially defined Dec-07 as the start of the 
economic crisis when there was a “peak in employment”, they noted that “economic activity 
measured by production was close to flat from roughly September 2007” (NBER, 2010). As 
the 2007-2009 crisis period can be disaggregated in to its constituent components of the 
financial crisis and resulting economic crisis, the overall ‘crisis’ covered a sample period 
beginning as early as Aug-07 and ending as late as Jun-09. We therefore evaluate studies in 
this section which investigated the relationship between stock returns and monetary policy 
over a sample period which covered the Aug-07 to Jun-09 sample period in its entirety, or 
only in part. 
 
2.7.2 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Overview of pre-crisis studies) 
Prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period, studies concerning the impact of monetary policy 
on stock market performance primarily utilised three alternative interrelated measures for 
defining conventional monetary policy shocks. The first employed the event-study 
methodology of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), disaggregating target FFR 
changes in to expected and unexpected FFR changes, gauging expectations from CBOT 
futures contracts tracking the underlying instrument of the effective FFR. The pre-crisis 
studies using these measures demonstrated that in line with market efficiency, stock returns 
were shown to yield statistically insignificant (significant) responses to expected (unexpected) 
FFR changes. 
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The second approach followed the event-study methodology of Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2005), disaggregating monetary policy changes in to two components concerning a 
target factor and path factor concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy. The pre-
crisis studies using these measures demonstrated that stock returns were associated with 
significant (insignificant) responses to the target (path) factor (see Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson, 2005; Wang, Yang and Wu, 2006). The third methodology followed the framework 
of Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) and Craine and Martin (2003), exploiting the conditional 
heteroscedasticity in high-frequency data to measure monetary policy shocks. These models 
were identified through the restriction that shocks occurred on FOMC announcement dates. 
Following the 2007-2009 crisis period, a growing empirical literature emerged, 
investigating the impact of non-conventional monetary policy by the Fed on asset prices. As 
Cenesizoglu, Larocque and Normandin (2012) point out, there was a comparative dearth of 
studies investigating the impact of conventional monetary policy measures by the Fed on 
asset prices during the crisis. We found this to be rather unusual, because conventional target 
FFR changes were used as the primary tool of the Fed for the majority of the crisis period 
(Sep-07 to Dec-08). Non-conventional forms of monetary policy were largely employed after 
the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound on Dec-08. Thus unusually, the majority of 
empirical studies concerning monetary policy and stock market performance during the crisis 
focused on non-conventional monetary policy with a cursory analysis of the impact of 
conventional monetary policy. 
 In this sub-section, we review studies which examined the stock return response to 
monetary policy throughout the 2007-2009 crisis period, or over a sample period which 
covered part of the crisis. Several studies we evaluate in this section measured conventional 
monetary policy using the methodology of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 
or through the framework of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). The former methodology 
was applied by Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) and Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012), whilst 
the latter methodology was utilised by Kurov (2012) and Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012). 
We further evaluate studies which extended such analysis to also examine stock return 
responses to non-conventional monetary policy. In particular, increasing use of forward 
guidance by the FOMC through statements (see Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Rosa, 2011; Rosa, 
2012) and LSAP purchases by the Fed (see Rosa, 2012). Lastly, we evaluate a study which 
defined monetary policy shocks using a methodology akin to Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004), 
over a period where the target FFR was at the zero-lower bound (see Wright, 2012). 
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 We would like to point out that the majority of the studies evaluated in this section did 
not exist at the time of writing and researching the majority of this thesis. To the best of our 
knowledge, in 2010 only two studies were available (see Demiralp and Yilmaz 2009, 2010; 
Farka and Fleissig 2010). By 2011 several new papers had emerged (Eijffinger, Mahieu and 
Raes 2011; Kurov 2011; Rosa 2011; Wright 2011). A slightly larger empirical literature was 
established by 2013 (see Rosa 2012; Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2013). 
 
2.7.3 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Conventional and non-conventional monetary 
policy) 
When the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound in late 2008, the Fed began to 
rely more heavily on non-conventional forms of monetary policy to influence financial 
markets and the broader macroeconomy. These measures primarily included “forward 
guidance and large-scale asset purchases” (Williams, 2012). The term ‘forward guidance’ 
typically refers to the increasing and more explicit use of FOMC statements to influence 
market-rates and expectations concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy during the 
crisis period. The term ‘large-scale asset purchases’ refers to what is commonly known as 
quantitative easing, a series of programmes which were designed to influence market rates, as 
well as monetary financial and economic conditions through purchases of longer-term 
maturity securities such as housing-agency debt, mortgage-backed securities, and US 
Treasuries. Due to the qualitative nature of FOMC statements, it is difficult to precisely 
quantify its information content. Several studies have simply extended the approach 
employed by pre-crisis studies, by measuring the information content of FOMC statements 
using the path factor whilst others have measured its content using subjectively defined 
statement indicators. Although forward guidance was primarily used to influence US 
Treasury yields, several studies also considered the impact of such statements on stock 
returns over the crisis period. We review each of these studies in turn, beginning with a very 
recent study which solely investigated the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks on 
US stock returns.  
In a very recent study, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) estimated the impact of 
unexpected FFR changes on S&P500 returns over the Feb-94 to Dec-09 sample period. They 
measured stock return responses using 30-minute and 60-minute windows; however the 
impact of monetary policy shocks was shown to be statistically insignificant in both cases. 
Interestingly the standard errors were lower using the wider 60-minute window. By 
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restricting the sample to a pre-crisis period, negative and statistically significant responses 
were recovered, consistent with studies covering pre-crisis sample periods. Similar 
conclusions were yielded by Kontonikas, MacDonald and Saggu (2013), a paper derived 
from Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) subsequently estimated the impact of squared FFR 
shocks on squared stock returns, over the whole sample, however the stock return responses 
were once again shown to be statistically insignificant when considering scheduled meetings 
only, or unscheduled meetings only51. Upon further interacting FFR shocks with a measure of 
the frequency of price adjustment  i  (see Equation 2.29), squared FFR shocks were shown 
to yield positive effects on squared stock returns, with a hypothetical 0.25% shock yielding a 
squared stock return of 8.03% for firms with the stickiest price52. Interestingly, the interaction 
term demonstrated that the impact upon firms with the most flexible prices was up to 
threefold lower than that of firms with most sticky prices.  
      tiiututt iir   322212 ,     (2.29) 
 As we have seen, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) examined stock return responses 
to a single measure of monetary policy shocks over a period covering the 2007-2009 crisis. In 
contrast to this single measure, Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) constructed a series of target 
FFR surprises, from one-month to six-months in the future, in an effort capture longer-term 
expectations of monetary policy. Current month monetary policy shocks were constructed 
using the methodology of Kuttner (2001), see Equation 2.11, however further j month-ahead 
FFR shocks were constructed as follows by scaling the previous monetary surprise using 
further month-ahead futures contracts, as in Equation 2.3053. 
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Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) estimated S&P500 return responses to each of the one-
month to six-month monetary surprises over the May-89 to Jun-08 sample period. The one-
month, two-month and three-month target FFR shocks were shown to yield statistically 
                                                 
51  A significant response was only recovered in very precise circumstances when both scheduled and 
unscheduled meetings, as well as squared stock returns and shocks were considered 
52 Other control variables were also used, however these are omitted for a more concise discussion. 
53 Special caveats should also be noted, specifically FFR surprises were calculated as   1 1,1,    j dmj dm ff  for the 
last five days of the month, and as  2 1,1,    j dmj dm ff  for the first day of the month. See the paper for more 
detailed discussion concerning calculation of unscheduled FOMC meeting surprises. This methodology was 
essentially an extension of ‘level surprise’ developed by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). 
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insignificant effects on S&P500 returns in each case54. After excluding outlier observations, 
the one-month (two-month) target monetary policy shocks yielded significant -2.04% (-
2.94%)55 effects on stock returns; however longer-term monetary policy shocks exhibited 
statistically insignificant effects. As the study had demonstrated that US Treasuries at various 
maturities responded significantly to one-month to six-month shocks, this implied that the 
equity market may not have been as forward looking as the US Treasury market. 
To investigate the impact of monetary policy in the foreseeable future on asset prices, 
Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) constructed an alternative measure of path revision in monetary 
policy by averaging the one-month to three-month monetary surprises. However, S&P500 
returns were shown to be associated with statistically insignificant responses to the path 
revision measure. After excluding outlier observations, the stock response to path revision 
became significant (-5.24%) and outweighed the impact of the current-month target FFR 
shock. This was in contrast to pre-crisis studies which observed highly significant negative 
stock market responses to target rate shocks and insignificant responses to path surprises (see 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Wang, Yang and Wu, 2006). One should however note 
that this measure of path surprises differed from Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson’s (2005) path 
factor. 
 In a related study, Kurov (2012) estimated the impact of the target factor and path 
factor on S&P500 returns over a period which included part of the 2007-2009 crisis; from 
Jan-94 to Sep-08. Consistent with pre-crisis studies, stock returns responded significantly (-
6.01%) to the target factor and statistically insignificantly to the path factor. Similar results 
were obtained using robust MM-Estimator regressions. To investigate whether the 
relationship was characterised by state-dependence, the model was further conditioned upon 
state of the economy using an NBER recession dummy variable (see Equation 2.31). 
        tNBERNBERNBERNBERt DPFDPFDTFDTFr   11 4321 ,  (2.31) 
Consistent with pre-crisis studies, state-dependence was further observed in the target 
factor, with a hypothetical 1% shock yielding a significant -7.25% (-4.54%) decrease in stock 
returns during recession (expansion). After conditioning the model to the state of economy, 
the stock return response to the path factor was negative and significant during expansion 
                                                 
54 These estimates were presented in the external online appendix and the Demiralp and Yilmaz (2010) working 
paper. S&P500 return responses to four-month, five-month and six-month monetary policy shocks, not 
excluding outliers, were not shown in any of these studies; hence we cannot comment on such estimates. 
55 These estimates were consistent with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who yielded a significant -2.55% US-
CRSP-Val response to a hypothetical 1% FFR shock over the Jun-89 to Dec-04 sample period after excluding 
outlier observations. 
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however positive and significant during recession. A 0.25% positive surprise in the path 
factor yielded a 2.73% (-0.75%) increase (decrease) in stock returns during recession 
(expansion)56. The positive stock response to the path factor during recession implied that 
market participants may have been more interested in the Fed’s assessment of the economy in 
the future than its monetary stance57. 
 Whilst Kurov (2012) considered a sample period which covered part of the 2007-2009 
crisis period, a very similar study by Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012) examined the 
impact of both the target and path factor on S&P500 stock returns over a sample period 
which covered the entirety of the crisis period; from Feb-94 to Dec-09. The study also 
differed in that it defined the path factor as the one-year ahead Eurodollar interest rate futures 
contract orthogonal to the target FFR shock58. Consistent with with Kurov (2012), the study 
by Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012) estimated Equation 2.31 and observed state-
dependence in the stock return response to the path factor; with a negative (positive) and 
significant response during recession (expansion)59.   
Whilst the estimates concerning the path factor were consistent across these two 
studies, this was not the case for estimates of the target factor. Kurov (2012) estimated a 
significant negative stock return response to the target factor during both recession and 
expansion, with a more amplified negative response during the former.  Eijffinger, Mahieu 
and Raes (2012) similarly estimated negative and significant stock responses to the target 
factor during expansion. However the stock return response to the target factor during 
recessions was positive and significant across individual S&P500 stocks. This was robust to a 
shorter sample period (Jun-03 to Dec-09). The coefficient became statistically insignificant 
when considering S&P500 index returns. It furthermore became negative and significant (in 
line with Kurov, 2012) upon the exclusion of outlier observations. To examine whether the 
aforementioned state-dependence in target and path factors persisted across industry sectors, 
Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012) estimated Equation 2.31 for each of thirty-three industrial 
sector returns. For each industry that yielded a negative and significant response to the target 
factor during expansion, a stronger negative response was observed during recession. 
                                                 
56 Similar results were obtained using the filtered recession probability of Chauvet and Piger (2008). 
57 Similar empirical conclusions were yielded using a GARCH model. 
58 More specifically, the path factor was the residual from a regression of one-year ahead Eurodollar interest rate 
futures on the target FFR shock. 
59 These estimates were robust to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers, to the response of individual S&P500 
stock returns or the S&P500 index returns, and to the Jun-03 to Dec-09 sub-sample period. 
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Furthermore, the path factor during recession was shown to be positive and significant in all 
but two industries. 
Whilst these studies measured the information content of FOMC statements using the 
path factor, several studies used statement indicators by interpreting media reports around 
dates of FOMC action and statements to “assess the importance of the information content of 
FOMC statements as perceived by the consensus view at the time of release” (Farka and 
Fleissig, 2012). Farka and Fleissig (2009, 2012)60 were amongst the first to examine the 
impact of both target FFR shocks and FOMC statements on stock returns over a sample 
period which covered part of the crisis. They interpreted news reports61 following FOMC 
statements to determine whether they conveyed important information to financial markets 
and constructed an FOMC statement indicator variable  statementtI . This indicator was set equal 
to one when it revealed new information concerning monetary policy or the economic 
outlook to financial markets62; and zero when it revealed information expressed in previous 
statements. The study began by estimating the impact of target FFR shocks on 20-minute 
intra-day S&P500 returns over the May-99 to Dec-07 sample period. Consistent with 
previous studies, a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR shock yielded a -5.17% decrease in the 
S&P500 index. Upon augmenting the model to include an FOMC statement indicator (see 
Equation 2.32); stocks responded significantly (-4.84%) to the statement indicator and 
outweighed the impact of unexpected FFR changes (-1.40%).  This implied that over the 
period, when FOMC statements conveyed important information to financial markets, they 
dominated the impact of the target FFR shock63 by a factor of 3.5. 
 In a related study, Rosa (2011) constructed an FOMC statement indicator  tIS  , 
which measured whether the tone of each FOMC statement was more hawkish (-1), dovish (1) 
or neutral (0). The surprise component of the statement indicator was generated using a 
                                                 
60 We refer here to the 2009 and 2012 version of the paper to highlight that the original working paper was 
available in 2009. 
61 From Reuters, Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal. 
62 Farka and Fleissig (2009, 2012) define their statement indicator as being equal to one when “the statements 
reveal: (a) important information about the near-term path of monetary policy; (b) a change in the Fed’s 
assessment of the economic outlook; or (c) changes in the wording of key phrases (such as ‘policy bias’ or 
‘balance-of-risk’) compared with a preceding release. In contrast, the indicator assumes a value of zero when a 
statement is an (almost) exact replica of a previous one.” 
63 The study also used a GARCH model to examine the impact of target FFR shocks and FOMC statements on 
the volatility of stock returns. Consistent with previous studies, they demonstrated a ‘tent’ shaped impact 
whereby volatility was abnormally low prior to FOMC announcements, increased dramatically during the 
announcement, declining however remaining high several hours following the announcement and returning to 
pre-announcement levels the following day. 
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forecasting regression which considered macroeconomic variables and other indicators to 
predict future announcements. Over the May-97 to Jun-10 sample period, S&P500 index 
returns yielded significant responses to unexpected FFR changes (-6.11%) and significant 
responses to the statement indicator (-0.78%). Similar estimates were yielded for the DJIA 
and Nasdaq 100 indices. 
t
statement
t
u
tt Iir   11 ,        (2.32) 
 During the 2007-2009 crisis period, the FOMC also utilised other non-conventional 
forms of monetary policy such as LSAP purchases. In another study, Rosa (2012) constructed 
a surprise indicator of Fed LSAP purchases  tLSAP  which measured whether LSAP 
announcements were more restrictive than expected (-1), more expansionary than expected 
(1), or largely anticipated by market participants (0). The indicator was constructed through 
the interpretation of media reports concerning such LSAP purchases around announcement 
windows. Rosa (2012) estimated S&P500 return responses to FFR shocks (see Kuttner, 2001), 
statement surprises (see Rosa, 2011) and LSAP surprises, on scheduled FOMC meetings over 
the May-99 to Jun-11 sample period (see Equation 2.33). 
tt
statement
t
u
tt LSAPISir   321 ,      (2.33) 
 A hypothetical 1% target FFR increase was shown to be associated with a -5.39% 
decrease in the S&P500 index. Furthermore, stocks responded significantly (-0.58%) to the 
unexpected component of FOMC statements which conveyed information concerning the 
future trajectory of monetary policy. Lastly, an unanticipated dovish LSAP announcement 
was shown to be associated with a significant 0.92% increase in the S&P500 index. Thus, the 
estimates were indicative of conventional and non-conventional monetary policy shocks 
exhibiting significant effects on stock returns during the crisis period. 
 It is important to recognise that the FOMC statement indicators used in these studies 
were based upon the subjective interpretation of FOMC statements and media news reports 
surrounding announcements. Farka and Fleissig (2012) explicitly outlined the limitations of 
such an approach to defining indicators, arguing that “words tend to be subjectively 
interpreted by different agents.” They acknowledged that the interpretation of news reports 
surrounding announcements in lieu of the FOMC statements themselves ensured that market 
participants incorporated conveyed information. However they conceded that “the 
classification of statements involves some measure of subjectivity since it is based on our own 
judgment of the reading of the newswire reports.” In this manner, the indicators considered in 
these studies should be considered tentatively.  
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 In lieu of subjective interpretation of non-conventional monetary policy measures 
when the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound, Wright (2012) adopted an alternative 
empirical framework, defining monetary policy shocks using an identified VAR. The 
methodology was similar to the ‘identification through heteroscedasticity’ approach 
evaluated in Section 2.5.1. By regressing S&P500 futures returns on the constructed 
monetary policy shock measure, a one-standard deviation positive monetary policy shock was 
shown to be associated with a significant 0.55% increase in stock returns. It is important to 
recognise the limitations of Wright’s (2012) approach as the study considered only 21 
observations over the Nov-08 to Dec-10 sample, a period characterised by major market 
uncertainty and risk aversion by investors.64.  
 
2.7.4 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (Overview) 
Prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period, a plethora of empirical studies documented 
highly significant stock return responses to monetary policy shocks, however stocks were 
generally shown to yield statistically insignificant responses to measures concerning the 
future trajectory of monetary policy. Having evaluated studies which investigated the 
relationship between stock returns and monetary policy over the crisis period (in its entirety 
or in part), it is apparent that the 2007-2009 crisis period may have changed the nature of this 
relationship. Several studies observed that the relationship between stock response to 
conventional monetary policy shocks ceased to remain statistically significant upon inclusion 
of the crisis period sample. Another branch of studies observed that stocks responded to non-
conventional measures of monetary policy over this period. Interestingly, these studies did 
not explicitly consider a potential structural change in the relationship between stock returns 
and monetary policy shocks over the crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 We would like to point out that the 21 observations considered over the Nov-08 to Dec-10 sample period 
considered included an observation where the target FFR was changed, observations where LSAP purchases 
occurred, and observations where previous studies identified FOMC statements which conveyed information 
concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy. 
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2.8 US Stocks & Monetary Policy (The International Transmission) 
As we have seen, there is a vast and extensive empirical literature concerned with the 
relationship between US stock returns and US monetary policy. This relationship has been 
well documented as we have pointed out in this review of related studies. However, there are 
comparatively fewer studies concerned with the foreign stock response to US monetary 
policy shocks. In this sub-section, we review more recent studies which investigate the 
international transmission of US monetary policy to foreign stock markets. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to review studies concerned with the bilateral relationship between the US 
and each individual country in the world, hence we refine our analysis to studies which 
investigate the impact of US monetary policy on more than one foreign stock market. This 
section of the literature review is motivated by Chapter 5, in which we investigate the impact 
of FFR shocks on international equity markets over a sample period which covers the 2007-
2009 crisis period. 
Studies which estimated the impact of US monetary policy on international equity 
markets widely measured US monetary policy using a variety of different approaches. These 
methodologies naturally reflected Fed monetary policy operating procedure (see Section 2.3.1) 
and econometric advancements in the field. In Section 2.8.1, we briefly review earlier studies 
which estimated foreign stock responses to US monetary policy over the 1970s and 1980s 
(see Bailey, 1990)65. This study measured US monetary policy in terms of the money supply 
because the Fed primarily targeted the growth rate of money supply over that period. We also 
review studies whose sample period extended in to the 1990s and measured US monetary 
policy using the Fed discount rate (see Johnson and Jensen, 1993) or using dummy variables 
as proxies for US monetary conditions (see Conover, Jensen and Johnson, 1999). 
In the late 1980s, the Fed began targeting the FFR and in Section 2.8.2 we review 
studies which examined the relationship between international stock markets and US 
monetary policy, measured using the target FFR. In particular, we review seminal studies 
which measured US monetary policy using the unexpected FFR change measure of Kuttner 
(2001) and Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005)’s target and path factor (see Ammer, Vega 
and Wongswan, 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; 
Wongswan, 2009). Finally in Section 2.8.3 we review several more recent studies whose 
                                                 
65 Husted and Kitchen (1985) were amongst the first to investigate the impact of US monetary policy, measured 
in terms of the money supply on foreign interest rate differentials, while Mudd (1979) was amongst the first to 
investigate the impact of Fed discount rate changes on foreign exchange rates.  
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sample periods extended in to the 2007-2009 crisis period (see Laeven and Tong, 2012; Rosa, 
2011). At the time of writing Chapter 5, the studies mentioned in Section 2.8.3 did not exist.  
 
2.8.1 International Stocks & Monetary Policy (Early studies) 
Bailey (1990) was amongst the earliest studies to establish a link between US 
monetary policy and foreign stock markets. The study investigated the impact of US money 
supply shocks on nine pacific rim stock markets, gauging money supply expectations using 
Money Market Services survey data. An unexpected 1% growth in the US money supply was 
shown to be associated with statistically insignificant responses across all nine stock markets 
over the Oct-77 to Sep-79 and Oct-79 to Sep-82 samples, however statistically significant 
stock market declines across five foreign countries over the Oct-82 to Sep-85 sample. In each 
case, the magnitude of response was shown to be larger than that of the US stock market. The 
study argued that this heterogeneity could be explained in terms of capital controls and 
exchange rate regimes. Countries with freer capital markets (Singapore, Hong, Kong, 
Malaysia) and floating currencies (Australia) responded significantly, whilst countries with 
higher capital controls (Philippines and Thailand) and pegged or heavily regulated currencies 
(Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand) yielded statistically insignificant responses. Interestingly, the 
heterogeneity was not shown to be related to the degree of exports to the US, as countries 
with a lower (higher) degree of exports to the US were shown to be associated with 
significant (insignificant) responses, such as in Australia (Korea and Taiwan). 
 In a related study, Johnson and Jensen (1993) analysed foreign stock market 
responses to discount rate changes by the Fed over the Oct-79 to Dec-91 sample. This was 
motivated by the fact that the Fed targeted monetary aggregates over that period (see Section 
2.3.1). Consistent with previous studies (see Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985); the study 
distinguished between technical and non-technical discount rate changes by the Fed. They 
found that seven (three) out of fifteen foreign stock markets were associated with statistically 
significant responses to non-technical (technical) discount rate changes. This was consistent 
with the fact that technical changes were intended to align discount rates with market rates, 
whilst non-technical rates were more informative and more unexpected, intended to influence 
market rates. Furthermore, in countries where the response was significant, discount rate 
decreases (increases) were shown to be associated with positive (negative) stock market 
responses, consistent with evidence from the US stock market. 
 Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999) in a subsequent study analysed foreign stock 
return response to the local and US monetary environment across sixteen industrialised 
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countries. For each country (i), they defined a dummy variable  localD  equal to one when the 
local monetary authority pursued restrictive monetary policy and equal to zero if expansive. 
They also defined a dummy variable  conD  equal to one when the FOMC in the US pursued 
restrictive monetary policy and zero if expansive. Using monthly data, they regressed foreign 
stock returns tr  for each country (i) on these proxies for the local and US monetary 
environment (Equation 2.39). They found that over the Jan-56 to Dec-95 sample, foreign 
stock returns were associated with statistically significant responses to both the local and US 
monetary environment in six countries. This implied that restrictive monetary conditions 
locally in each country or in the US were associated with lower stock returns in those 
countries. It also demonstrated that the US monetary environment (i.e. monetary policy) was 
an important factor in explaining foreign stock market returns across some countries.  
t
local
t
con
tt DDr   21 ,       (2.39) 
 
2.8.2 International Stocks & Monetary Policy (Pre-crisis studies) 
As Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999) used lower-frequency monthly data, Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2004) argued that the variables used were “unlikely to be exogenous” and 
may have reflected other factors. This critique prompted researchers to use higher-frequency 
intra-day or daily data to isolate monetary policy shocks. More recently, studies have 
primarily employed two alternative empirical approaches to defining conventional US 
monetary policy shocks. The first is the approach of Kuttner (2001) which gauges 
expectations from CBOT futures contracts tracking the effective FFR, to define a measure of 
unexpected FFR changes. The second is the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson 
(2005) which measures US monetary policy in terms of a target factor shown to be associated 
with the unexpected FFR change measure of Kuttner (2001) and a path factor shown to be 
associated with FOMC statements. Both of these measures of US conventional monetary 
policy shocks could be estimated at a daily or intra-day frequency and were therefore more 
likely to be exogenous. 
 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006, 2009) estimated foreign stock return responses to 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005)’s target factor  TF  controlling for day of the week 
effects  Z  (Equation 2.40). Overall, they found that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut 
(increase) was associated with a statistically significant 2-3% decline (increase) in foreign 
equity returns across 49 countries over the Feb-94 to Dec-04 sample. However, at an 
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individual country by country level, they found that stock markets in less than half of thes 
countries (22 out of 49) were associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks. 
In each case where the relationship was shown to be significant, the estimated coefficient was 
negative which implied that unexpected FFR cuts (increases) by the FOMC in the US were 
associated with positive (negative) stock market returns in those countries. Nevertheless, they 
found that there was substantial cross-country heterogeneity in stock market responses to 
FFR shocks, ranging from an unexpected 1% FFR cut being associated with a stock market 
decline of 1.1% in Chile to a 5.7% decline in Hong Kong.  
Furthermore, this cross country heterogeneity did not appear to be characterised by 
differences attributable to whether they were advanced or emerging market economies. This 
was shown by the fact that stock markets in advanced and emerging market economies 
responded significantly (UK and South Africa) or insignificantly (Germany and Peru) to FFR 
shocks. It was however shown that countries with more closed financial markets (i.e. China 
and Malaysia) did not respond significantly to FFR shocks from the US. Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2009) used a broad set of macroeconomic and financial variables to explain the 
substantial cross-country heterogeneity in stock market responses to FFR shocks from the US 
across the 49 countries. They ranked countries in to three categories (lower, medium and 
higher) based upon these variables, and estimated Equation 2.41 for each of these potential 
determinants.  
tt ZTFr   21 ,        (2.40) 
      thighitmeditlowitit XTFXTFXTFr   321 ,    (2.41) 
Where lowitX  was equal to one when the determinant X for country i at time t was 
ranked in the lowest third of countries, and similarly for  meditX  and  
med
itX . They found that 
countries with a higher degree of GDP correlation with the US yielded larger magnitude 
responses to FFR shocks than countries with a lower degree of GDP correlation. A significant 
difference in the stock market responses of countries with higher versus lower exchange rate 
volatility was also documented. Interestingly, the study contributed to the existing empirical 
literature by demonstrating that the degree of global integration with the world economy, and 
not the degree of bilateral integration with the US economy was a significant factor in 
explaining this heterogeneity. Equity markets in counties with a higher degree of trade with 
the world yielded significantly greater responses to FFR shocks compared to those with a 
lower degree of trade with the world. In line with these estimates, they found that financial 
linkages between each country and the world were more important in explaining cross 
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country heterogeneity in stock market responses to FFR shocks than financial linkages 
directly with the US. 
In a closely related study, Wongswan (2009) estimated the impact of both target and 
path surprises on foreign stock returns over the Sep-98 to Nov-04 sample, controlling for a 
set of factors  Z 66. The target surprise  TS  was similar to the unexpected FFR change 
measure of Kuttner (2001) however was constructed using intra-day data (30 minute 
windows) around announcements67. The path surprise  PS  was measured as the residual 
from a regression of four-quarter ahead Eurodollar futures rate 4EDQ  on the target factor 
over FOMC meeting dates (Equation 2.42)68. The study found that foreign stock returns (5-
minute window) were associated with statistically significant positive responses to target 
surprise cuts across most (14 of 15) of the countries considered (Equation 2.4.3). Interestingly, 
the impact of the path surprise was statistically insignificant across most countries69. This 
evidence was consistent with that concerning the US stock market which was shown to yield 
statistically insignificant responses to the path factor (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 
2005; Wang, Yang and Wu, 2006). Wongswan (2009) repeated the estimates excluding 
event-dates associated with unscheduled FOMC meetings and found that the fit of the model 
deteriorated in each case, which implied that these event-dates contained an important source 
of information concerning unexpected FFR changes for market participants. The study also 
found that financial linkages were more important than real economic integration in 
explaining cross country heterogeneity in stock market response to the target surprise. 
tut iEDQ   14 ,        (2.42) 
tit ZPSTSr   321 ,       (2.43) 
As the sample period of Wongswan (2009) covered only 53 observations over a short 
time-span with a sample of only 15 countries, in a subsequent study, Hausman and 
Wongswan (2006, 2011) extended the sample to span the Feb-94 to Mar-05 period and 
estimated Equation 2.43 for each of 49 advanced and emerging market economies. The 
foreign stock response to the target surprise was shown to be statistically significant across 27 
out of 49 countries, while the path surprise was significant only for several countries in Far 
                                                 
66 The control was the net of FOMC effect in S&P500 futures returns. 
67 The use of intra-day data constrained the sample period of study. 
68 The path factors reflected “news that market participants have learned from the FOMC’s statement about the 
expected future path of policy over and above what they have learned about the level of the target rate” 
(Wongswan, 2009). 
69 With the exception of Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, where the response was significant only at the 10% 
level. 
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East Asia. They argued that equity indices responded “mainly to the target surprise” whilst 
other assets (exchange rates, short-term and long-term Treasury yields) also responded 
significantly to the path surprise. Using a panel specification, the study interacted the target 
surprise with a series of potential determinants in an attempt to explain the cross country 
heterogeneity in stock responses to the target surprise. In contrast to Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2009), they found that real economic integration with the US economy was an important 
determinant in the international transmission of FFR shocks. They also found that financial 
linkages through the banking sector were an important factor in explaining the cross-country 
heterogeneity in response to FFR shocks. 
In a another related study, Ammer, Vega and Wongswan (2010) argued that previous 
studies did not account for non-synchronous trading as Asian and European equity markets 
typically responded to FFR shocks the following day when their equity markets opened. To 
account for this, they constructed a dataset of foreign assets on the CRSP and Compustat 
databases which traded contemporaneously with US stocks. Instead of an individual country 
by country analysis, the study investigated the aggregate foreign stock response to target 
surprises. Over the Feb-94 to Dec-06 sample, they found that foreign firms were more 
sensitive to target surprises if they were in more cyclically sensitive industries, had a higher 
degree of sales outside their home country and if the country in which they were based in 
countries with exchange rates pegged to the US dollar. 
 
2.8.3 International Stocks & Monetary Policy (Crisis studies) 
After much of this thesis was written, several studies also investigated the impact of 
conventional monetary policy shocks on foreign stock returns over sample periods which 
covered some of the 2007-2009 crisis period. As Taylor (2010) points out, in Sep-10, US and 
foreign stock returns in UK, Germany, France, Brazil and Japan were higher on the Friday 
after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy than the Friday before, however they collapsed more 
than 30% in Oct-10, a month characterised by a 50 basis point FFR cut. Whilst Taylor (2010) 
concedes this did not imply causality, it would be interesting to examine the foreign stock 
market response to conventional US monetary policy shocks during the crisis. 
 Rosa (2011) estimated the foreign stock market response to conventional monetary 
policy shocks over a sample which extended several months in to the crisis period (Feb-99 to 
Dec-07). The study employed two alternative empirical approaches to measuring monetary 
policy shocks. The first was the approach of Kuttner (2001) evaluated in Section 2.6.1 whilst 
the second was the approach of Rigobon and Sack (2004) evaluated in Section 2.5.1. Using 
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the former approach, the study documented statistically significant foreign stock responses to 
FFR shocks in less than half (23 out of 50) of the countries. In each case where the 
relationship was shown to be statistically significant, unexpected FFR cuts (increases) were 
associated with positive (negative) foreign stock responses. Very similar coefficient estimates 
were yielded for the 50 countries using the heteroscedasticity based estimator of Rigobon and 
Sack (2004) which indicated that the estimates were robust towards either model 
specification. In line with previous studies, there was substantial cross-country heterogeneity 
in foreign stock responses to FFR shocks, with a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut 
(increase) being associated with a statistically significant 1.69% (21.58%) increase in foreign 
stock returns in Luxembourg (Turkey). The study argued that the OLS estimator approach 
“outperform[ed] in an expected squared error sense” however the heteroscedasticity-based 
approach yielded “more accurate readings”, nevertheless “on the whole the event-study 
methodology should be preferred” to studying the foreign stock response to FFR shocks. 
In another study, Laeven and Tong (2012) estimated the impact of unexpected FFR 
changes measured using the approach of Kuttner (2001) on foreign stock returns across 44 
countries using a panel model specification. Over the Jul-90 to Dec-08 sample, a hypothetical 
unexpected 1% FFR cut (increase) was shown to be associated with a 4% increase (decrease) 
in foreign stock market returns across the 44 countries (Equation 2.44). The study continued 
by controlling for a measure of an industry’s financial dependence on external finance  FD  
using the financial dependence index of Rajan and Zingales (1998). By interacting the 
financial dependence variable with unexpected FFR changes, they find that the impact of 
FFR shocks is significantly higher for foreign industry sectors which rely more on external 
financing. A hypothetical unexpected 5 basis point decrease in the FFR was associated with a 
stock response which is 6 basis points higher for firms with financial dependence at the 75th 
percentile relative to firms with financial dependence at the 25th percentile. This implied that 
foreign stocks are associated with stronger responses to FFR shocks with a higher 
dependence of external financing. 
t
u
tit ir   1 ,         (2.44) 
 
2.8.4 International Stocks & Monetary Policy (Overview) 
Overall, one can conclude that pre-crisis studies widely documented statistically 
significant foreign stock responses to conventional monetary policy shocks. However the 
relationship was shown to be characterised by substantial cross-country heterogeneity. The 
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stock market response to FFR shocks was shown to be statistically significant in some 
advanced and emerging market economies whilst statistically insignificant in others. Where 
significant, an unexpected FFR cut (increase) was shown to be associated with a positive 
(negative) foreign stock return in those countries. These studies had considerably greater 
difficulty in explaining this cross-country heterogeneity in response, as stock markets in some 
advanced and emerging market economies yielded significantly larger magnitude responses 
to FFR shocks than the US stock market, whilst many other advanced and emerging market 
economies yielded statistically insignificant responses. Nevertheless, there was some 
evidence of this heterogeneity being explained in terms of real economic integration with the 
US or world economy depending on the study, and some evidence of it being explained in 
terms of financial linkages in terms of lending through the banking sector, and in terms of 
exchange rate regime. However the very few studies whose sample periods extended in to the 
2007-2009 sample period yielded similar responses. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to 
explicitly investigate the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on the relationship. 
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2.9 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy 
2.9.1 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Outline) 
In Sections 2.1 to 2.8 we reviewed empirical studies concerning the relationship 
between stock returns and monetary policy shocks. We continue our review of the literature 
by extending the survey of studies to the US Treasury market. More specifically, we evaluate 
studies which investigated the US Treasury bill (T-Bill) and Treasury bond (T-Bond) yield 
responses to monetary policy shocks. 
It is important to note that the evolving econometric methodology for investigating 
US Treasury market responses to monetary policy shocks is very similar to that concerning 
the stock market response. Many of the empirical studies we have thus so far evaluated also 
considered the impact of such measures on the US Treasury market. We therefore continue 
by briefly evaluating earlier empirical studies concerning the relationship between US 
Treasury yields and conventional monetary policy in Section 2.9.2. This is followed by a 
more detailed discussion of the empirical results yielded by Kuttner (2001) concerning the 
impact of unexpected FFR shocks on US Treasury yields in Section 2.9.3. In Section 2.10.1, 
we evaluate more recent studies which studied the impact of conventional monetary policy on 
US Treasuries over sample periods which covered the 2007-2009 crisis period in its entirety 
or in part, and subsequently evaluate studies which examined the impact of both conventional 
and non-conventional monetary policy on US T-Bill and T-Bond yields.  
 
2.9.2 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Early studies) 
The FOMC has traditionally sought to achieve macroeconomic objectives through 
monetary policy by influencing financial markets, particularly money market interest rates 
such as US Treasury yields. We begin by evaluating earlier studies concerning the 
relationship between US Treasury yields and conventional monetary policy through standard 
econometric frameworks such as single-equation models and VARs. Cook and Hahn (1989) 
were amongst the first to estimate the impact of target FFR changes on US Treasury yields. 
They regressed one day changes in US Treasury yields  ty  on target FFR changes  ti  , on 
dates of FFR change through an event-study analysis over the Sep-79 to Sep-89 sample 
period (see Equation 2.34). The study demonstrated that target FFR changes yielded larger 
one day movements in shorter term maturity treasuries compared to longer term maturity 
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treasuries. Importantly, the  1  coefficient was positive for all Treasuries which implied that 
target FFR cuts (increases) were associated with decreases (increases) in US Treasury yields.  
ttt iy   1 ,         (2.34) 
 In a related study, Roley and Sellon (1995) estimated the impact of effective FFR 
changes on the 30-Year T-Bond yield, on days of target FFR changes over the Oct-87 to Jul-
95 sample period. In contrast to Cook and Hahn (1989), the response was found to be 
statistically insignificant on days of target FFR changes, however significant on days prior to 
days of target FFR changes. This implied that a component of target FFR changes may have 
been anticipated by market participants and incorporated in to yield changes on days prior to 
actual changes by the FOMC. Similarly, Jensen and Jonhson (1995) demonstrated that in the 
fifteen days prior to a discount rate increase, there was a -5.27% (-3.24%) cumulative decline 
in returns on the 3-Month T-Bill (10-Year T-Bond Index). They furthermore yielded 
estimates which indicated that both shorter-term and longer-term maturity Treasuries 
responded significantly to discount rate changes on announcement days. The lack of a 
significant post-announcement response was also indicative of the US Treasury market being 
highly efficient in incorporating new information concerning monetary policy. 
 As we discussed in Section 2.6.1, conventional monetary policy shocks measured 
using the approach of Kuttner (2001) with FFR futures have significant advantages above 
VAR based measures. Nevertheless, studies which sought to evaluate the US Treasury 
response to monetary policy shocks using the measure of Kuttner (2001) were constrained to 
the post Oct-88 sample period, as this is when FFR futures first began trading in the open 
market. Due to this complication, longer-run analyses typically employed alternative 
measures of monetary policy shocks which were not constrained in this manner. Thus, 
despite Rudebusch’s (1996, 1998) critique of monetary policy shocks derived from VAR 
models, several studies continued to measure FFR shocks in terms of orthogonalised 
innovations. 
Edelberg and Marshall (1996) for example evaluated the relationship between US 
Treasuries and monetary policy using a VAR methodology. They defined monetary policy 
shocks in terms of orthogonalised innovations (see Section 2.4.2) from a seven-variable70 
VAR. The impulse responses demonstrated that monetary policy shocks exhibited larger 
statistically significant effects on shorter term US T-Bills, a smaller effect on T-Bonds with 
                                                 
70  Edelberg and Marshall (1996) used a seven-variable VAR with the following variables: log of non 
agricultural employment, log of price level, change in an index of sensitive materials prices, FFR, log of non 
borrowed reserves, log of total reserves and yield on zero-coupon bonds of varying maturity. 
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maturity between 3 and 15 years, and a statistically insignificant effect on T-Bonds with 
maturity beyond 15 years71.  
Berument and Froyen (2006) also estimated the impact of monetary policy shocks, 
measured in terms of innovations in the FFR from a five-variable VAR72, on 1-Year and 10-
Year US Treasuries, over the Jan-75 to Oct-02 sample period as well as the Jan-75 to Sep-79 
and Oct-87 to Oct-02 sub-sample periods. Consistent with previous studies, the impulse 
response functions showed that the 1-Year Treasury exhibited a larger magnitude response to 
FFR shocks compared to the 10-Year Treasury across all three sample periods. Interestingly, 
the impulse response functions highlighted that both Treasuries exhibited larger magnitude 
responses during the Jan-75 to Sep-79 period compared to the Jan-87 to Oct-82 sample 
periods. These estimates directly contradicted the evidence from the study by Thorbecke and 
Zhang (2008) which identified the opposite result using single equation models over 
comparable sample periods73. Nonetheless, in line with Edelberg and Marshall (1996), the 
study by Berument and Froyen (2006) found that longer-term interest rates did not respond 
significantly to monetary policy shocks. 
Due to the conflicting empirical evidence between estimates obtained using single 
equation and VAR models, a subsequent study by Berument and Froyen (2008) surveyed 
empirical studies concerning the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks using 
both approaches. Using a VAR approach, they demonstrated that FFR innovations exhibited 
small and statistically insignificant effects on longer-term US Treasuries (10-Year Treasury) 
over the Chairmanship of Alan Greenspan, from 1987 to 2005, with even smaller effects over 
the 1971 to 2005 sample period. In contrast, using the single-equation framework, they 
demonstrated that longer-term US Treasuries (10-Year Treasury) responded significantly to 
FFR shocks estimated using the approach of; Kuttner (2001), or by estimating reaction 
functions at intervals bracketing FOMC meetings. A negligible difference between the two 
approaches was observed for the pre-1979 sample period.   
Berument and Froyen (2008) argued that differences may have been attributable to the 
fact that VAR models suffered from an identification problem which was largely mitigated 
                                                 
71 As Kuttner (2001) points out, studies concerning the relationship between monetary policy and US Treasury 
yields demonstrated a significantly weaker relationship throughout the 1990s sample periods compared to that 
of Cook and Hahn (1989). 
72 Berument and Froyen (2006) used a five-variable VAR with the following variables: FFR, log of long-term 
interest rate, log of unemployment claims, log of economic activity and log of commodity prices and money 
73 Thorbecke and Zhang (2008) observed stronger responses of US Treasury yields to FFR changes from Jun-89 
to Jun-06 compared to the Sep-74 to Sep-79 period. 
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by single equation models which used daily data, and reiterated Rudebusch’s (1996, 1998) 
concerns regarding monetary policy shocks measured using VAR models74.  
 
2.9.3 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Measured using FFR futures) 
Kuttner (2001) replicated the analysis of Cook and Hahn (1989) for the Jun-89 to Feb-
00 sample period. The estimates were indicative of a uniformly weaker response of US 
Treasuries across the maturity spectrum to target FFR changes. A 1% target FFR cut was 
associated with a 26.8 (10.4) basis point decrease in the 3-Month T-Bill (5-Year T-Bond) 
yield and with statistically insignificant responses for 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries. The 
study argued the increasing transparency of FOMC monetary actions may have induced a 
significant shift in Treasury market response over the extended sample period. This argument 
was furthermore consistent with previous studies which had documented pre-announcement 
effects in the US Treasury market, with significant changes in yields prior to official dates of 
target FFR changes by the FOMC; implying that market participants may have partly or 
entirely anticipated potential target FFR changes, and such information was incorporated in 
to Treasury prices and associated yields prior to actual announcements of changes.  
Kuttner (2001) extended upon the methodology of Cook and Hahn (1989) by 
disaggregating target FFR changes in to expected and unexpected components, gauging 
expectations from futures contracts tracking the effective FFR75. The study also addressed the 
sample selection biases of previous studies which only considered event-dates with target 
FFR changes, whilst Kuttner (2001) also considered all scheduled FOMC event-dates with 
potential target FFR changes.  In lieu of raw target FFR changes, Kuttner (2001) estimated 
the impact of both expected and unexpected FFR changes on US Treasury yields across the 
maturity spectrum. The impact of expected FFR changes was shown to be statistically 
insignificant across most of the US Treasuries, consistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis. In contrast, the impact of unexpected FFR changes on US Treasuries was greater 
in magnitude compared to target FFR changes. An unexpected 1% FFR cut was associated 
with a 79.1 (22.0) basis point decrease in the 3-Month T-Bill (10-Year T-Bond) yield, with a 
statistically insignificant response for the 30-Year T-Bond.  The impact of unexpected FFR 
shocks on US Treasuries was shown to monotonically decline in magnitude and statistical 
                                                 
74 On another note, it would have been interesting if Berument and Froyen (2006) study had also evaluated 
whether very long term Treasuries such as 30-Year Treasuries responded significantly across the two alternative 
empirical models. 
75 As we discussed this approach in considerable detail in Section 2.6, we do not repeat the discussion here. 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 82 of 295 
significance as the term to maturity increased. The impact of lagged target FFR changes on 
US Treasury yields on event-dates was furthermore shown to be statistically insignificant. 
Whilst Kuttner (2001) evaluated US Treasury market responses to unexpected FFR 
changes using a daily announcement window around FOMC announcements, Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2005) compared estimates using both an hourly window and a daily 
window around FOMC announcements. They demonstrated that an unexpected 1% FFR cut 
was associated with a statistically significant 58.3 (66.9) basis point decrease in the 3-Month 
T-Bill yield, 47.5 (42.9) decrease in the 2-Year T-Bond yield and 26.7 (31.8) decrease in the 
5-Year Bond yield using hourly (daily) announcement windows. Interestingly, the response 
of the 10-Year T-Bond was shown to be statistically insignificant in both cases. These 
estimates indicated that the magnitude of response overall increased substantially using daily 
data as market participants and investors had more time to re-evaluate their positions and 
portfolio holdings over the course of the day and respond accordingly to the new information 
conveyed by the FOMC via target FFR changes.  
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) subsequently used a principal components 
analysis with Eurodollar futures of varying dates to expiration in order to deconstruct 
unexpected FFR changes in to two components concerning the target factor and path factor. 
They demonstrated that the target factor was closely associated with unexpected FFR changes 
whilst path factor was associated with FOMC statements. Although the S&P500 was shown 
to be associated with a statistically insignificant response to the path factor, US Treasuries 
were shown to respond significantly to both the target and path factor. In fact, an unexpected 
1% FFR increase was shown to be associated with a significant 48.2 (12.8) basis point 
increase in the 2-Year (10-Year) Treasury yield, whilst 1% innovation in the path factor was 
shown be associated with a significant 41.1 (28.3) basis point increase respectively. This 
implies that the impact of FOMC statements outweighed the impact of FFR shocks for 
longer-term maturity Treasuries. It is however important to consider that the study only 
assessed the impact upon 2-Year, 5-Year and 10-Year T-Bond, omitting analyses of T-Bill 
yields and longer term T-Bonds.  
 
2.9.4 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Structural instability) 
In a later study, Thornton (2009) replicated the analysis of Kuttner (2001); estimating 
the impact of expected and unexpected FFR changes on 3-Month to 20-Year US Treasuries 
over the Jun-89 to Feb-00 and Feb-00 to Jun-07 sample periods. The impact of expected FFR 
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changes on US Treasuries was shown to be statistically insignificant for all Treasuries across 
both sample periods; in line with market efficiency arguments. In the former sample period, 
the impact of FFR shocks was statistically significant across all Treasuries, and the 
magnitude of response declined monotonically as the term to maturity increased. An 
unexpected 1% FFR cut induced a 79.2, 43.0 and 29.0 basis point decline in the 3-Month, 5-
Year and 10-Year Treasuries respectively. In contrast, the impact was statistically significant 
only for the 3-Month to 1-Year Treasuries for later Feb-00 to Jun-07 sample period. These 
estimates implied that there was significant structural change in the relationship between US 
Treasuries and monetary policy shocks. Thornton (2009) argued that these estimates may 
have been yielded because Kuttner’s (2001) measure of FFR shocks may have been 
influenced by other ‘ambient news’ throughout the trading day. In response, Thornton (2009) 
augmented the econometric model of Kuttner (2001) to account for a potential joint-response 
bias, whereby US Treasury yields and market-based measures of monetary policy shocks 
may have responded simultaneously to all news rather than just to FFR shocks (see Equation 
2.35). . 
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Where  PEtD  was a dummy variable equal to one on days with monetary policy 
changes and zero otherwise. Upon estimating this model over the Jun-89 to Feb-00 sample 
period, the  2  coefficient was shown to be statistically significant across all Treasuries, 
larger in magnitude for shorter term compared to longer term Treasuries. However the  3  
coefficient was shown to be statistically insignificant for the 3-Year to 20-Year Treasuries, 
which implied that FFR shocks exhibited no effect beyond that of ambient news. Interestingly, 
upon estimating a similar model for the Feb-00 to Jun-07 sample period, the relationship was 
shown to be characterised by structural instability as, the  2  coefficient was significant 
only for the 3-Month to 1-Year Treasuries, and the  3  coefficient was shown to be 
statistically insignificant for the 3-Month and 6-Month Treasuries; implying a reversal in the 
relationship. 
In line with Thornton (2009), a study by Thorbecke and Zhang (2008) also 
demonstrated that the relationship between US Treasuries and monetary policy shocks was 
characterised by structural instability. They estimated the impact of monetary policy shocks 
on US Treasuries over the Sep-74 to Sep-79 and Jun-89 to Jun-06 sample periods. For the 
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latter sample period, monetary policy shocks were measured in line with Kuttner (2001)76. 
For the former period, FFR shocks were measured as the difference between the actual FFR 
change and that predicted by a forecasting model77. The impact of FFR shocks on 3-Month to 
5-Year Treasuries was shown to be statistically significant in both sample periods, with a 
larger magnitude response for the Jun-89 to Jun-06 period. Interestingly, in both sample 
periods the magnitude of response declined as the term to maturity increased, consistent with 
previous studies. It is thus apparent that the magnitude of US Treasury response to FFR shock 
may have changed over time. 
 
2.9.5 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Measured using alternative approaches) 
As the Fed began formally announcing target FFR changes from Feb-94, Hamilton 
(2008) argued that days of monetary policy action by the Fed prior to this date may not have 
been explicitly known. In response, the study employed a signal extraction approach to 
identifying potential dates of target FFR changes for defining monetary policy shocks. 
Interestingly, this approach yielded empirical conclusions akin to Thornton (2009); as the 
responses of shorter-term Treasuries were larger in magnitude compared to those of longer-
term Treasuries, however the impact did not monotonically decline as the term to maturity 
was increased. An alternative empirical approach to measuring monetary policy shocks was 
also developed by Rigobon and Sack (2002, 2004) as we discussed in Section 2.5.1. They 
measured FFR shocks by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity present in higher-
frequency data. Their estimates indicated that US Treasuries across the maturity spectrum 
responded significantly to shocks defined using this approach. Furthermore the impact was 
more pronounced for shorter-term Treasuries compared to longer-term Treasuries. In a study 
related to Rigobon and Sack (2002, 2004) (see Section 2.5.1), Craine and Martin (2003) 
estimated the impact using a general factor model and concluded that “The yield curve 
response to a monetary surprise displays the classical textbook pattern—short maturity yields 
rise and long maturity yields do nothing.” 
 
 
                                                 
76 The construction of Kuttner’s (2001) measure of unexpected FFR changes was restricted to the post 1989 
sample period due to the advent of FFR futures. 
77  Thorbecke and Zhang (2008) regressed FFR changes on a constant and monthly changes in the 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, three-month Treasury bill rate, log of trade-weighted nominal exchange rate 
and log of gold price two months prior to the FFR change 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 85 of 295 
2.9.6 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Overview) 
Prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period, studies which investigated the US Treasury 
response to conventional monetary policy shocks primarily employed two alternative 
empirical approaches to analysing the relationship; these include single-equation models and 
VAR models. Furthermore, empirical conclusions concerning the relationships were 
markedly different to that concerning the stock market. We discuss each of the empirical 
conclusions concerning the pre-crisis studies in turn. Firstly, pre-crisis which estimated US 
Treasury responses to expected and unexpected FFR changes demonstrated that consistent 
with market efficiency, Treasuries across the maturity spectrum exhibited statistically 
insignificant responses to expected FFR changes, with only occasional anomalous cases of 
statistical significance (see Kuttner, 2001).  
Secondly, pre-crisis studies measuring monetary policy shocks using the approach of 
Kuttner (2001), using the target factor of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), the 
difference between target FFR changes and estimates from a prediction equation or using 
VAR based models widely demonstrated that the impact of unexpected FFR changes on US 
Treasuries declined in magnitude and statistical significance as the term to maturity increased 
(see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Kuttner, 2001; Thorbecke and Zhang, 2008; 
Thornton, 2009). Thirdly, in many cases very long-term maturity Treasuries were shown to 
exhibit statistically insignificant responses to monetary policy shocks (see Berument and 
Froyen, 2006; Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Kuttner, 2001; Thornton, 2009). Lastly, 
whilst stocks were shown to exhibit statistically insignificant responses to the path factor, 
which was shown to be associated with FOMC statements, shorter-term US Treasuries were 
shown to exhibit statistically significant responses to the path factor (see Gürkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson, 2005). 
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2.10 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (The 2007-2009 Crisis) 
2.10.1 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Outline) 
In this sub-section we review more recent studies which investigated the impact of 
conventional and non-conventional monetary policy measures on US Treasury yield changes 
over sample periods which spanned the 2007-2009 crisis period in its entirety or in part. For a 
more detailed discussion of the crisis period, we refer the reader to Section 2.7 and for an in 
depth discussion of non-conventional monetary policy measures during the crisis, we refer 
the reader to Chapter 4 of this thesis, particularly Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5. We continue by 
reviewing studies which investigated the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks on 
US Treasuries using both single-equation and VAR models (see Beechey and Wright, 2009; 
Cenesizoglu, Larocque and Normandin, 2012; Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2012; Farka and 
DaSilva, 2011) in Section 7.10.2. Then in the following sections we review studies which 
investigated the impact of conventional and non-conventional monetary policy on US 
Treasuries. In particular, we review studies which considered the impact of FFR shocks and 
forward guidance by the FOMC in Section 7.10.3 (see Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Kurov, 2012; 
Lucca and Trebbi, 2009), and studies which also considered the impact of LSAP programmes 
in Section 7.10.4 (see Rosa, 2012; Szczerbowicz, 2011; Wright, 2011). 
It is important to point out, that many of these studies were evaluated during the 
write-up year of this PhD thesis, and at the time of researching this Chapter in 2011 only five 
working papers were available concerning the impact of conventional monetary policy 
shocks on US Treasury yields over sample periods which extended in to the 2007-2009 crisis 
period (see Beechey and Wright, 2009; Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2009; Farka and DaSilva, 2009; 
Lucca and Trebbi, 2009; Szczerbowicz, 2011). As many of these studies were evaluated in 
detail with regards to the stock market response in Section 2.7, we discuss only the results 
with regards to the US Treasury market response here where relevant. 
 
2.10.2 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Conventional monetary policy) 
We begin by reviewing studies which evaluated the impact of conventional monetary 
policy on US Treasuries over sample periods which covered the 2007-2009 crisis period in 
part of in its entirety. Amongst the first 78  of such studies, Farka and DaSilva (2011) 
investigated the responses of US Treasury futures to FFR shocks, defined using the approach 
                                                 
78 We refer in particular to the Farka and DaSilva (2009) working paper as the earlier study. 
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of Kuttner (2001), using both daily and intra-day announcement windows, over the Feb-94 to 
Dec-07 sample period.  Consistent with studies concerning the pre-crisis period, it was shown 
that US Treasuries across the maturity spectrum from 3-Month to 10-Years responded 
significantly to current-month FFR shocks, and the magnitude of response declined as the 
term to maturity increased. Furthermore, very similar estimates were yielded using both daily 
and intra-day announcement windows79. Interestingly, upon excluding event-dates associated 
with unscheduled FOMC meetings, the model fit was shown to deteriorate, a similar dynamic 
was observed in the stock market response to FFR shocks (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008). 
As the sample period of Farka and DaSilva (2011) covered a very small proportion of 
the 2007-2009 crisis period, their estimates may have been indicative of a largely pre-crisis 
response of US Treasuries. In contrast, Beechey and Wright (2009) investigated the impact of 
macroeconomic news announcements on 5-Year and 10-Year US Treasuries over the Feb-04 
to Jun-08 sample period. They were amongst the first to employ intra-day data for the US 
Treasury yields in their analysis. In contrast to previous studies, both Treasuries exhibited 
statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks, measured using the approach of Kuttner 
(2001). However, equivalent maturity TIPS Treasuries (Treasury Inflation Protected Security) 
were shown to exhibit significant responses to FFR shocks. This implied that US Treasuries 
responded to changes in real interest rates rather than nominal interest rates. They rationalised 
the findings as follows; unexpected monetary tightening led to upwards revisions in 
expectations of the future path of monetary policy and a downward revision in expectations 
of inflation.  
The studies by Farka and DaSilva (2011) and Beechey and Wright (2009) only 
considered current-month FFR shocks, however a subsequent study by Demiralp and Yilmaz 
(2012) estimated the impact of not only current-month FFR shocks but also up to six-month 
monetary policy shocks (see Section 2.7.3) on US Treasuries over the May-89 to Jun-08 
sample period. They demonstrated that the current-month FFR shock exhibited a statistically 
significant impact upon 3-Month to 10-Year Treasuries; however consistent with pre-crisis 
studies, the impact on the 30-Year Treasury was shown to be statistically insignificant. The 
magnitudes of responses observed were consistent with that yielded by Kuttner (2001). Upon 
estimating the impact of two-month to six-month monetary policy shocks on US Treasuries, 
it was shown that as the surprise horizon was increased, US Treasuries across the maturity 
                                                 
79 There was a 98% correlation between daily and intra-day measures of FFR shocks. 
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spectrum80 exhibited larger magnitude responses to the associated FFR shocks. This implied 
that unexpected FFR shocks beyond the current-month were interpreted by market 
participants as being indicative of further changes in monetary policy by the FOMC in the 
near future. Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) furthered their investigation by constructing a 
measure of path revision which reflected monetary policy in the foreseeable future, as 
inferred from FFR futures contracts. Interestingly, they found that US Treasuries across the 
maturity spectrum from 3-Month to 30-Years responded significantly to the measure of path 
revision; and in each case the impact was larger in magnitude than the current-month FFR 
shock. 
In contrast to these studies, Cenesizoglu, Larocque and Normandin (2012) evaluated 
the relationship over a sample period which stretched beyond the 2007-2009 crisis period, 
from Nov-82 to Sep-1081. In particular, the study investigated the relationship between the 
term structure of interest rates, as inferred from 1-Month to 5-Year US Treasuries, and 
conventional monetary policy shocks using a structural VAR model in lieu of the traditional 
single-equation framework82.The impulse response functions demonstrated that over the Nov-
82 to Dec-07 sample period, an unexpected monetary expansion led to a negative effect in the 
level of the yield curve, thereby decreasing yields across the maturity spectrum. In 
comparison, over the Nov-82 to Sep-10 sample period, whilst the yields responded negatively 
to unexpected monetary expansion, the magnitude of response was significantly weaker in 
magnitude to extent that it no longer remained economically significant. These results 
implied that the 2007-2009 crisis period reduced the effectiveness of conventional monetary 
policy in influencing the term structure of interest rates, and the study argued that this could 
have been attributable to the fact that the period was characterised by a substantial changes in 
excess returns and real rates of returns. 
 
2.10.3 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Non-conventional monetary policy: 
increasing use of forward guidance) 
As we have already discussed in great depth throughout this Chapter (2), the limits of 
conventional monetary policy were realised on 16th Dec 08, when the target FFR approached 
                                                 
80 With the exception of the 3-Month Treasury. 
81 These two sub-sample periods were selected because estimation of pre-crisis and crisis period samples may 
have exhibited small sample bias on the latter sample. 
82 Their identification strategy was based upon the conditional heteroscedasticity of structural innovations, 
which allowed the study to use an unrestricted SVAR model, thereby mitigating concerns regarding 
inconsistencies in the selection of monetary policy indicators as with traditional identification strategies. 
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the zero-lower bound, following a 75 basis point cut. In response to the impotence of 
monetary policy at this level, the Fed employed more non-conventional forms of monetary 
policy such as more explicit use of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases to 
influence financial markets, as well as financial, monetary and economic conditions in the 
broader macroeconomy. Williams (2012) argued that “these tools have been effective in 
pushing down ... Treasury yields.” In this sub-section and the next sub-section we evaluate 
studies which investigated the impact of not only conventional, but also non-conventional 
monetary policy on US Treasuries over sample periods which extended in to or beyond the 
2007-2009 crisis period. 
Farka and Fleissig (2012) estimated the impact of FFR shocks on US Treasuries over 
the May-99 to Dec-07 sample period. In line with pre-crisis studies, significant responses 
were observed for 3-Month to 10-Year Treasuries, declining in magnitude as the term to 
maturity increased. In an attempt to measure forward guidance by the Fed, they constructed 
an indicator variable for FOMC statement by assessing their information content (see Section 
2.7.4). By augmenting the model to account for the FOMC statement indicator (see Equation 
2.32), the 3-Month and 2-Year Treasuries exhibited comparatively smaller magnitude 
responses to FFR shocks, whilst the impact upon 5-Year and 10-Year Treasuries was shown 
to be statistically insignificant. In contrast, the US Treasury response to FOMC statements 
was shown to be significant across the maturity spectrum, and for 2-Year to 10-Year 
Treasuries outweighed the impact of FFR shocks. 
 In contrast to Farka and Fleissig (2012), who utilised a subjective interpretation of 
FOMC statements (see Section 2.7.4 for a critique); Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) 
constructed the target factor and path factor which were shown to be associated with FFR 
shocks and FOMC statements respectively (see Section 2.6.2). Kurov (2012) investigated the 
impact of the target factor  1Z  and path factor  2Z  measures on US Treasuries over the 
Jan-94 to Sep-08 sample period. The study employed a TGARCH model, akin to Smales 
(2012), and interacted the variables with a recession probability indicator to evaluate the 
differences in US Treasury responses during periods of recession and expansion respectively. 
The conditional mean equation (Equation 2.36) and conditional variance equations 
(Equations 2.37 and 2.38) are defined below. 
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 Where  1RP  was the filtered recession probability of Chauvet and Piger (2008), 
 FOMCtI  an indicator variable equal to one on scheduled FOMC meetings, and dummy 
variables equal to one on weekdays  itDW  , days preceding holidays  tPRE  and days 
following holidays  tPOST  . In lieu of an event-study analysis, they considered daily 
returns over the sample period. Their estimates indicated that average bond returns were 
higher (lower) at scheduled FOMC meetings during periods of economic expansion 
(recession). Furthermore, the path factor shocks positively affected the volatility of Treasury 
returns during recessionary episodes, however lowered volatility during periods of economic 
expansion. The study demonstrated that Treasury returns were not characterised by 
significant state dependence with regards to recessionary versus expansionary periods for 
both the target factor and the path factor. Interestingly, whilst the 1-Year Treasury responded 
significantly to both factors during periods of recession and expansion, the 10-Year Treasury 
exhibited significant (insignificant) responses to the target factor during recession (expansion) 
and to the path factor during expansion (recession). 
 In a related study, Lucca and Trebbi (2009) constructed indicator variables which 
scored the information content of FOMC statements using linguistic algorithms to search 
result from Google and Factiva databases. These variables compared the number of hawkish-
dovish search results before and after FOMC announcements, measuring the unexpected 
content of FOMC statements as the difference between the scores. This automated and 
computationally intensive approach partially mitigated concerns regarding subjective 
interpretation of news reports, or indirect measurement through the path factor. The study 
estimated the impact of Kuttner’s (2001) based FFR shocks and the FOMC statement 
indicator variables constructed using Google and Factiva searches over the May-99 to Dec-08 
sample. They demonstrated that whilst shorter-term US Treasuries responded significantly to 
FFR shocks, longer-term Treasuries responded more significantly to the statement indicator. 
These estimates were consistent with empirical evidence by Farka and Fleissig (2012). 
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2.10.4 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Non-conventional monetary policy: large-
scale asset purchase programmes) 
Rosa (2012) estimated the impact of unexpected FFR changes, the unexpected 
component of FOMC statements, and unexpected LSAP measures by the FOMC on US 
Treasuries over the May-99 to Jun-11 sample period (see Section 2.7.4). Upon estimating 
Equation 2.33, US Treasuries across the maturity spectrum from 3-Months to 10-Years were 
shown to exhibit statistically significant responses to FFR shocks. Although shorter-term 
maturity Treasuries yielded larger responses compared to longer-term maturity Treasuries, 
the magnitude of response did not monotonically decline as the term to maturity increased. It 
was also shown that US Treasuries of maturity beyond 3-Months responded significantly to 
the unexpected component of FOMC statements which conveyed information concerning the 
future trajectory of monetary policy. In each case, where significant, the magnitude of 
response to FOMC statements was less than a quarter of that regarding the FFR shock. For 
example, the 6-Month and 5-Year Treasury yields declined 55.5 (35.2) basis points in 
response to an unexpected 1% FFR cut however declined 2.4 (5.7) basis points in response to 
a dovish FOMC statement. The estimates concerning LSAP announcements were rather 
inconclusive, as a dovish LSAP announcement was associated with a significant 9 basis point 
decline in the 6-Month Treasury yield, a significant 85 basis point increase in the 5-Year 
Treasury yield and statistically insignificant responses for the 3-Month, 2-Year and 10-Year 
Treasuries. By expressing these measures in terms of their cumulative impact and in terms of 
FFR changes, they yielded 0 and 197 basis point responses in the 3-Month and 10-Year 
Treasuries respectively.  
In a more focused study, Szczerbowicz (2011) evaluated the impact of conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy by the Fed on the 10-Year Treasury. The study defined 
conventional monetary policy using the approach of Kuttner (2001); however unconventional 
monetary policy measures were disaggregated in to five distinct categories concerning; 
interest rate commitments, long-term Treasury bond purchases, agency debt and mortgage-
backed security purchases, provision of liquidity facilities and Fed rescue operations. Over 
the Jan-99 to Jul-10 sample period, an unexpected 1% FFR cut was associated a 22 basis 
point decline in the 10-Year Treasury yield. Interestingly, purchases of agency debt and long-
term Treasury bond purchases lowered the 10-Year Treasury yield by 17 and 22 basis points 
respectively. However, the other three measures of unconventional monetary policy yielded 
statistically insignificant responses. The estimates yielded were robust to the inclusion and 
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exclusion of Quantitative Easing II, and illustrated an off-setting effect of inflation, whereby 
Quantitative Easing I lowered long-term rates without affecting inflation whilst QE2 
increased inflation expectations without affecting long-term interest rates. 
 Lastly, as we discussed in Section 2.7.4, Wright (2011) measured monetary policy 
shocks using an identified VAR methodology akin to the ‘identification through 
heteroscedasticity’ approach we evaluated in Section 2.5.1. The sample period explicitly 
considered FOMC event-dates characterised by the zero-lower bound, and thereby monetary 
policy shocks by construction measured non-conventional measures by the Fed83. Over the 
Nov-08 to Dec-10 sample period, a one-standard deviation monetary policy shock was 
associated with a -0.06% and -0.12% decline in 2-Year and 10-Year Treasury yields 
respectively. These estimates were consistent with evidence concerning LSAP measures by 
Szczerbowizcz (2011). 
 
2.10.5 US Treasuries & Monetary Policy (Overview) 
Thus we can make several stylised observations from studies which investigated the 
impact of conventional and non-conventional monetary policy on US Treasury yields over a 
sample which covers the 2007-2009 crisis in its entirety or in part. Firstly, whilst pre-crisis 
studies yielded conflicting and contrasting empirical evidence concerning the 10-Year 
Treasury response to conventional monetary policy shocks (see Berument and Froyen, 2008), 
studies whose sample periods extended significantly in to or beyond the 2007-2009 crisis 
period widely documented statistically significant responses of the 10-Year Treasury (see 
Farka and DaSilva, 2011; Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2012; Rosa, 2012; 
Bauer and Neely, 2012). It is thus apparent that the impact of conventional monetary policy 
shocks throughout the 2007-2009 crisis period may have been markedly different from that 
prior to the crisis period. 
Secondly, whilst shorter-term maturity Treasuries were shown to yield smaller 
magnitude and/or statistically insignificant responses to various measures of forward 
guidance, longer-term Treasuries exhibit stronger responses (see Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2012; 
Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Rosa, 2012; Kurov, 2012). Thirdly, longer-term maturity Treasuries 
were shown to yield stronger responses to large-scale asset purchase programmes by the Fed 
                                                 
83 The effects of non-conventional monetary policy were observed by assuming monetary policy shocks are 
heteroscedastic and have abnormally high variance on FOMC meeting days. 
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compared to shorter-term maturity Treasuries (see Rosa, 2012; Szczerbowizcz, 2011; Wright, 
2011).  
 
2.11 The Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism Channels (Theory) 
Although this is an empirically motivated thesis, some believe it is important to 
consider the theoretical channels through which monetary policy is transmitted to financial 
markets and the broader economy. In this sub-section we briefly review the traditional 
channels of monetary policy transmission outlined by Mishkin (1996, 2001, 2007a, 2007b) 
amongst others. These include the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, Tobin’s q 
theory, the wealth effects channel, the bank lending channel, the balance sheet channel, the 
cash flow channel and the unanticipated price level channel84. 
 
2.11.1 Traditional Interest Rate Channels 
The interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission has early roots in traditional 
Keynesian economics and continues to play an important role in modern economic policy, 
demonstrated by the fact that the Fed continues to administer monetary policy primarily by 
targeting the FFR. From a Keynesian ISLM perspective, ceteris paribus if the Fed buy (sells) 
through open market operations then banks have more (less) reserves which they can lend out 
at lower (higher) interest rates. The monetary expansion (contraction) lowers (increases) real 
interest rates and the cost of capital, thereby inducing higher (lower) investment by 
businesses and consumer households 85 . This ultimately translates in to higher (lower) 
aggregate demand and output in the economy. 
 As Mishkin (1996) points out, the transmission operates through real interest rates. If 
prices are assumed to be sticky (i.e. aggregate price levels adjust slowly over time), then a 
monetary expansion would be expected to lower not only nominal short-term interest rates, 
but also real short-term interest rates. Longer-term interest rates would also be expected to 
decline, as the expectations hypothesis of the term structure implied that long-term interest 
rates represent an average of longer-term rates. 
                                                 
84 These are not the only channels of transmission; however they are cited as the main channels. The channels 
are also not independent of one another but in many cases inter-related. By convention, they are usually 
discussed in turn. 
85 Keynes originally thought this channel operated solely through changes in investment decisions by firms; 
however more recently it has been shown that this channel also operates through changes in longer-term 
investment decisions by households, such as purchases of durable goods. 
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 However, this is a rather idealised scenario and in reality short-term interest rates may 
not move by precisely the same amount of an official target FFR change. Furthermore, as 
George, King, Clementi, Budd, Buiter, Goodhart, Julius, Plenderleith and Vickers (1999) 
point out, whilst short-term interest rates move in the same direction of official FFR changes, 
the direction in which longer-term rates move is more ambiguous. This is because longer-
term rates are influenced by an average of current and expected future short-term rates, 
implying that longer-term rates also depend on expectations of the future path of interest rates. 
For example, a monetary contraction could create an expectation of lower future interest rates, 
hence longer-term rates may decline in response to a monetary contraction. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission remains 
effective during a liquidity trap when nominal interest rates approach the zero-lower bound, 
during a deflationary period. This is because a commitment by monetary authorities of future 
monetary expansion can cause price level and inflation expectations to increase, thereby 
lowering real interest rates. There is considerable academic debate regarding the strength of 
the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Whilst Taylor (1995) argues that 
this transmission channel is strong, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) contested the efficacy of this 
monetary policy transmission channel.  
 
2.11.2 Exchange Rate Channels 
In an increasingly integrated global financial economy and with more countries 
adopting flexible exchange rate regimes, monetary policy can be transmitted through the 
exchange rate channel. As the exchange rate is the price of one currency in terms of another 
foreign currency, this implies that its value depends upon both domestic and foreign 
monetary conditions. Traditional theory suggests that ceteris paribus, if the Fed buys (sells) 
through open market operations, then banks have more (less) reserves which they can lend 
out at lower (higher) interest rates. The monetary expansion (contraction) lowers (increases) 
real interest rates, and this makes assets denominated in the domestic currency more (less) 
attractive to international investors compared to assets denominated in foreign currencies. As 
the value of domestic deposits decline (increase), the resulting outflow (inflow) of 
international investment from the domestic currency translates in to a depreciation 
(appreciation) of the exchange rate. The depreciation (appreciation) makes domestic goods 
more competitive and cheaper than foreign goods, causing net exports to increase (decrease). 
This ultimately results in higher (lower) aggregate demand and output in the economy. 
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 In reality, the impact of a monetary expansion of contraction on the exchange rate is 
ambiguous. This is because the exchange also depends upon domestic and foreign interest 
rate and inflation expectations, which both in turn may be influenced by monetary policy 
decisions. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) argued that the exchange rate channel of monetary 
policy transmission was important, and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) yielded significant 
evidence for this channel in the US.  
 
2.11.3 Tobin’s q Theory & Wealth Effects Channels 
As much of this thesis investigates the stock return response to monetary policy, it is 
important to analyse the channels through this transmission may operate. Tobin’s q theory 
(Tobin and Brainard, 1968) defines q as the market value of a firms divided by the 
replacement cost of capital. When Tobin’s q is higher than one, the market value of firms is 
higher than the replacement cost of capital. This implies that the stock is overvalued and if 
firms issue new stock at the higher price to replace the capital. When Tobin’s q is lower than 
one, the market value of firms is lower than the replacement cost of capital. This implies that 
the stock is undervalued and if firms can purchase other firms at a lower price to replace the 
capital. Tobin’s q theory suggests that ceteris paribus, if the Fed buys (sells) through open 
market operations, then banks have more (less) reserves which they can lend out at lower 
(higher) interest rates. The monetary expansion (contraction) lowers (increases) interest rates, 
which encourages (discourages) borrowing by consumers and businesses. One place 
individuals can invest their money is in the stock market, thereby increasing (decreasing) 
demand and prices of stocks. The increase in stock prices results in a higher (lower) Tobin’s 
q value, which encourages (discourages) investment by firms as the cost of replacing capital 
is lower (higher) than the market value of the firm. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) yield 
significant evidence of firms with high Tobin’s q being associated with significantly larger 
magnitude responses to monetary policy shocks.  
Another channel through which stocks can be influenced by monetary policy is 
through the wealth effects channel. This theory assumes consumers smooth out their 
investment over their lifetime which implies that consumption is contingent upon the total 
lifetime of consumer’s resources and not their current level of income. Following on from 
Tobin’s q theory discussed above; if a monetary expansion (contraction) leads to a decrease 
(increase) in stock prices, then the value of a consumer’s wealth also increases (decreases). If 
this results in an increase in actual wealth, or a perceived increase in wealth, then it will result 
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in an increase in consumption. Modigliani (1971) was a major proponent of this channel, and 
later studies yielded significant evidence for this channel (see Case, Quigley and Shiller, 
2005). Whilst Tobin’s q theory and the wealth effects channel theory predict that stock 
returns increase (decrease) in response to monetary policy, these models can equally apply to 
equity in housing and land which are large components of consumer’s wealth. 
 
2.11.4 Credit Channels (Balance Sheet and Bank Lending Channels) 
The credit channel proposes two main channels of monetary policy transmission 
which arise in response to information asymmetries in the credit markets. These include the 
balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. The bank lending channel is important 
because bank loans are the main source of financing for many consumers and businesses in 
the economy. Banks overcome information asymmetries in the credit market by screening the 
credit worthiness of consumers and businesses. If the Fed buys (sells) through open market 
operations, ceteris paribus, then banks have more (less) reserves and bank deposits which 
they can lend out at lower (higher) interest rates. The monetary expansion (contraction) 
increases (decreases) the supply of loanable funds available and this leads to an increase 
(decrease) in investment. This implies that a monetary contraction reduces the supply of 
intermediated credit by banks, and firms more dependent on this source of financing may 
face more onerous credit terms, a significant decline in credit and incur greater search costs 
for securing credit from other financial intermediaries. Thus consumers and firms more 
dependent on this source of financing are likely to yield larger magnitude responses to 
monetary policy shocks (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
It has been argued that the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission has 
weakened over time. In the mid-1980s, reserve requirements for certificates of deposit (CDs) 
were removed by authorities, and this made it significantly easier for banks to bridge the 
shortfall in funds by issuing CDs at market interest rates without having to back them with 
reserve requirements (see Mishkin, 2007a). Nevertheless, banks remain exposed to an 
external financing premium reflected in the cost of raising uninsured funds. 
The balance sheet channel is more complex and there are several ways in which 
monetary policy can influence the balance sheets of businesses. It suggests that the external 
financing premium is inversely related to the net worth of the borrowers reported on balance 
sheets. Businesses with a higher (lower) net worth are more likely to use self-financing to 
fund investment, and more (less) likely to have collateral against which funds may be 
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borrowed. As higher net worth businesses are more likely to be fully collateralised than lower 
net worth businesses, this results in adverse selection because there is lower (higher) risk in 
lending to higher (lower) net worth businesses (see Mishkin, 2007a). This implies that a 
decrease (increase) in a firm’s net worth is associated in a decline (increase) in lending and 
investment. More specifically, if the Fed buys (sells) through open market operations, the 
monetary expansion (contraction) leads to an increase (decrease) in stock prices through 
Tobin’s q theory and the wealth effects channel. This results in lower (higher) adverse 
selection and moral hazard, thereby inducing an increase (decrease) in overall lending and 
investment (see Mishkin, 1996). 
 Secondly, the balance sheet channel also operates by influencing cash flows. If the 
Fed buy (sells) through open market operations, ceteris paribus, then banks have more (less) 
reserves which they can lend out at lower (higher) interest rates. The monetary expansion 
(contraction) lowers (increases) nominal interest rates and this causes an improvement 
(worsening) in the balance sheets of firms because it increases (decreases) their cash flows. 
The improvement (worsening) in the balance sheet of businesses stems from the fact that it 
increases (decreases) their liquidity and the ability of lenders to understand the ability of 
businesses in repaying loans. It has also been argued that monetary expansion can lower 
interest rates; stimulate investment and higher aggregate demand and output through the 
credit rationing phenomenon (see Mishkin, 2007b). Credit rationing is when borrowers are 
not granted loans even with higher interest rates because those willing to pay the higher rates 
are more likely to be those with riskier investment projects. This implies that higher (lower) 
interest rates are likely to increase (decrease) the degree of adverse selection in this regard. 
Therefore a monetary expansion is likely to result in a lower proportion of borrowers with 
higher-risk investment strategies (see Mishkin, 2001). 
 Thirdly, the balance sheet channel also operates by influencing the general price level 
in the economy. When firms repay their borrowing, the terms of repayment are typically tied 
to nominal interest rates. If a monetary expansion results in an unexpected price level 
increase, it increases the net worth of businesses, and decreases adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. This ultimately leads to higher investment, aggregate demand and output 
(see Mishkin, 2007a). Although the channels of monetary policy transmission discussed 
above are theoretical channels, there is varying evidence for the empirical efficacy of these 
channels, and this evidence appears to change over time as some channels become more 
significant than others. It is however important to remember that these are theoretical 
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channels and they should be treated as such. To evaluate the impact of monetary policy on 
financial markets and the economy, it is important to empirically investigate the relationship.  
 
2.11.5 Asset Pricing Channels 
Traditional asset pricing theory values financial assets as the present value of 
expected future cash flows. Providing that international financial markets have sophisticated 
financial infrastructures and assets are highly traded, we infer that traded assets are highly 
efficient in reflecting contemporaneous and future expectations of cash flows. In a rational 
expectations framework, assets of an equivalent risk class are priced to offer the same 
expected return. Thus unexpected monetary action should immediately be reflected in asset 
prices upon announcement. The discounted cash flow model is widely employed as a basis 
for valuation of financial assets and provides insights into the potential effects of monetary 
policy action on equity prices. A stock price  tS  is defined as the present value of expected 
future dividends  ktDIV   and the expected future stock price  ktS  ; both contingent upon 
available information at time  t  and discounted by the opportunity cost, such as the return 
from a risk-free asset  R  ; over the holding period horizon  k  (Equation 2.39). 
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If an investor holds a stock for perpetuity, the theoretical holding horizon approaches 
infinity and the terminal value approaches zero. The stock price is determined purely by a 
perpetual flow of future expected dividends per share as in Equation 2.40. This assumes the 
company issuing stock remains solvent and stock is not retired from acquisition. 
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To ensure computational clarity, the discounted cash flow model imposes two further 
unrealistic assumptions; it firstly assumes that discount rates are constant and secondly 
assumes expected stock returns follow a martingale process while remaining constant over 
the holding horizon. In reality, discount rates and expected stock returns are time-varying and 
the stock valuation model follows a non-linear specification. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997) propose a log-linear approximation of the classic model, which enables stock price 
valuation under any non-linear specification of expected returns and discount rates. By 
imposing the terminal condition   0lim  ititi pE   , the possibility of a permanent 
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rational stock price bubble is eliminated, yielding the log-linear stock price approximation 
defined in Equation 2.4186. 
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The discounted cash flow model of asset pricing in its classical or log-linear form has 
direct and indirect implications for the effect of monetary policy on stock price valuations. 
The direct effect operates through capitalisation rates of expected cash flows87, assuming 
investors value financial assets in terms of a rational expectations discounting framework; 
exogenous decreases (increases) in interest rates through expansionary (contractionary) 
monetary policy yield lower (higher) stock price valuations. The indirect effect operates 
through signalling by the monetary authorities: changes in monetary stance are interpreted by 
investors as revisions in expectations of economic and financial conditions. A decrease in 
interest rates may be indicative of an economic slowdown which in turn affects expectations 
of future cash flows from assets. Thus investor expectations regarding future returns from 
stocks in terms of returns from capital gains and dividend yields may be indirectly impacted 
by changes in monetary stance, independent of the discounting factor. Investor interpretation 
of monetary stance remains a pivotal issue in behavioural finance. 
Monetary policy can therefore exhibit a dual effect on stock prices through both 
discount rates and revisions in expectations. A simultaneous decrease (increase) in interest 
rates combined with expectations of improved (worsened) economic conditions results in 
higher (lower) stock price valuations through the discounting factor and expectations of 
higher dividends and capital gains, ceteris paribus. Alternatively, a combination of higher 
(lower) interest rates and improved (worsened) produces an ambiguous effect on stock prices, 
conditional upon the strength of each effect and ability to outweigh one another. Expectations 
can therefore disproportionately outweigh the asset pricing implications of changes in 
monetary policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 The lowercase letters denote logged variables and the parameters  k  and    are defined by the identities 
    


 1
1ln1ln k  and  pdive  1/1  
87 Cash flows from stocks are defined as returns from capital gains and returns from dividends over the holding 
horizon 
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Chapter 3: The Stock Market Reaction to Federal Funds Rate Surprises: 
State-dependence and the Financial Crisis (Empirical Analysis) 
 
3.1 Abstract 
This chapter investigates the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on US stock 
returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period, with a particular emphasis on the 2007-
2009 crisis. In line with previous studies we find that outside the crisis stock returns increased 
in response to unexpected FFR cuts. The relationship was furthermore shown to be 
characterised by state-dependence as stock returns as stock returns yielded more amplified 
responses to conventional monetary policy shocks during periods of recession, bear-market 
conditions and tightening credit market conditions. However we demonstrate that a 
significant shift occurred during the 2007-2009 crisis period which changed the nature of 
stock returns’ response to FFR shocks. We demonstrate that outside the crisis period, stock 
returns did not respond positively to unexpected FFR cuts and we yield some evidence which 
suggests stock returns actually responded negatively to these cuts. Throughout the crisis 
period, these cuts were interpreted by market participants as signals of worsening future 
economic conditions. Our results highlight the severity of the recent financial crisis and the 
ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero-lower bound.  
 
3.2 Introduction 
“For the bears, low rates are a sign of the desperation of central bankers, and an indication 
that economic growth will be subdued for some time to come.” (Buttonwood, 2010) 
The 2007-2009 crisis was global in nature and of an unprecedented magnitude 
compared to previous episodes of financial and economic turmoil. The chair of the Federal 
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, characterised the period as being “the worst financial crisis since the 
1930s” (Bernanke, 2009). For much of the crisis period (Sep-07 to Dec-08), the Fed 
employed conventional monetary policy measures such as target FFR changes to combat 
declining financial and economic conditions. As the target FFR approached the zero-lower 
bound in Dec-08, the Fed subsequently adopted more non-conventional measures of 
monetary policy such as increasing and more explicit use of forward guidance through 
FOMC statements and large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programmes to influence financial, 
monetary and economic conditions. However, as Cenesizoglu, Larocque and Normandin 
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(2012) point out, whilst there is a growing empirical literature concerning the efficacy of non-
conventional forms of monetary policy during the crisis period, there is a comparative dearth 
of studies concerning the impact of conventional monetary policy on financial markets and 
the broader macroeconomy. This is intriguing given that the Fed’s initial response during the 
crisis was to employ conventional monetary policy measures (ie. target FFR changes) to 
combat declining financial and economic conditions, and this monetary tool was the primary 
policy instrument  of the Fed for the majority of the financial crisis (Sep-07 to Dec-08). 
Motivated by this fact, in this chapter we investigate the relationship between US stock 
returns and FFR shocks over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period, with a particular emphasis 
on the effect of the 2007-2009 crisis on this relationship. 
In Chapter 2 we evaluated empirical studies related to this empirical chapter which 
investigated the relationship between stock market performance and monetary policy 
measures. The evolution of this empirical literature was shown to naturally reflect 
econometric advancements in the field and the development of alternative monetary policy 
indicators, and this in itself also reflected shifts in Fed operating procedures88. For example, 
when the Fed began administering monetary policy by primarily targeting the FFR in the late 
1980s, this subsequently became the primary measure of conventional monetary policy in the 
US. Prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period, studies which investigated the relationship between 
stock returns and conventional monetary policy primarily employed three alternative 
interrelated measures for defining conventional monetary policy shocks. The first 
methodology employed the event-study technique of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), disaggregating target FFR changes in to expected and unexpected 
components by gauging expectations from CBOT futures contracts tracking the underlying 
instrument of the effective FFR. Pre-crisis studies which measured conventional monetary 
policy shocks in this manner widely documented statistically significant (insignificant) stock 
return responses to unexpected (expected) FFR changes. They furthermore demonstrated that 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases) were associated with positive (negative) stock returns, and 
found that the relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks was characterised by 
                                                 
88 Before 1979, the Fed targeted the FFR by changing the supply of reserves to achieve defined FFR target 
ranges. They furthermore targeted market interest rates to influence the FFR. From 1979 to 1982, they stopped 
targeting the FFR and targeted levels of non-borrowed reserves to achieve target objectives for levels of money 
stock. From 1982 to the late 1980s, they targeted borrowed reserves (from the Fed) to a desired level. From the 
late 1980s to 2008, they targeted the FFR. From 2008 to present, they utilised non-conventional monetary policy 
measures such as forward guidance through statements and LSAP purchases. In this manner, studies which 
evaluated the impact of monetary policy on asset prices naturally reflected the changing operating procedure of 
Fed and the monetary measures they targeted over those periods respectively. 
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state-dependence, with a significantly larger magnitude response during periods of 
deteriorating financial and economic conditions (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010; 
and Section 2.6). 
A second approach to defining monetary policy shocks was developed by Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2005). They disaggregated conventional monetary policy changes in to 
two components concerning a target factor and path factor. The target factor was shown to be 
closely associated to the unexpected FFR change measure of Kuttner (2001) whilst the path 
factor was shown to reflect information concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy 
as conveyed in FOMC statements 89 . Pre-crisis studies which measured conventional 
monetary policy using this approach widely documented statistically significant (insignificant) 
stock return responses to the target (path) factor (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; 
Wang, Yang and Wu, 2006). A third, less widely used methodology for measuring monetary 
policy shocks was developed by Rigobón and Sack (2002, 2004) and Craine and Martin 
(2003). These studies exploited the conditional heteroscedasticity present in higher-frequency 
data to define monetary policy shocks. 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of these studies focused upon the pre-crisis period, and 
therefore an important question is raised concerning the nature of this relationship during the 
crisis period. It is not clear, a priori, how stock market participants may have reacted to target 
FFR cuts when the uncertainty in the macro-financial environment was heightened and 
monetary policy moved closer towards the zero-lower bound. In fact, since the onset of the 
crisis in late 2007, and up until early 2009, stock market participants faced falling stock 
prices together with sharp interest rate cuts. This implied that the classical inverse 
relationship between stock market performance and interest rates, as predicted by traditional 
asset pricing theory, may have weakened or perhaps collapsed. When this empirical chapter 
was originally researched and written in 2009-2010, there were only two empirical studies 
which investigated the relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks over a sample 
period which extended several months in to the crisis (see Demiralp and Yilmaz 2009; Farka 
and Fleissig 2010). Although, there was a significant proliferation of studies investigating the 
impact of non-conventional monetary policy on financial asset prices and the broader macro-
economy, there were significantly fewer studies concerning the relationship between US 
stock returns and conventional monetary policy shocks over the crisis period. 
                                                 
89 It was furthermore shown to be associated with FOMC statements 
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More recently, several studies have investigated the relationship between US stock 
returns and FFR shocks over a sample which covers the crisis (in its entirety or in part) 
however the empirical conclusions from these studies are mixed and inconclusive (see 
Section 2.7). For example, several studies have documented statistically insignificant stock 
return responses to FFR shocks over the crisis period (see Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2013; 
Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2012) and only managed to recover statistically significant 
relationships using alternative model specifications90. Other studies have demonstrated that 
stock returns respond to non-conventional monetary policy measures such as increasing use 
of forward guidance by the FOMC and LSAP programmes (see Farka and Fleissig, 2012; 
Rosa, 2012; Wright, 2012).  Interestingly, not one of the aforementioned studies explicitly 
evaluated a potential structural shift in the relationship between stock returns and 
conventional monetary policy shocks characterised by the 2007-2009 crisis period. 
 In this chapter we investigate the impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns over 
the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, and provide a comprehensive analysis of the global financial 
crisis’ impact on this relationship. Our results can be summarised as follows. First, in line 
with previous studies, we find that outside the crisis period, stock returns increased (declined) 
in response to expansionary (contractionary) FFR shocks, with an unexpected 1% cut in the 
FFR being associated with almost a 4% increase in the S&P 500 index. We further 
demonstrate that the relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks outside the crisis 
period was characterised by state-dependence as stock returns exhibited larger magnitude 
increases when unexpected FFR cuts occurred during ‘bad times’ of recession, bear stock 
markets, and tightening credit market conditions, indicating asymmetries in the stock market 
response to monetary policy. 
 Secondly, and most importantly this chapter contributes to the existing empirical 
literature concerning stock market performance and conventional monetary policy shocks, by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of the impact of FFR shocks on US stock returns over 
the 2007-2009 crisis period. In particular, we show that a structural break occurred during the 
financial crisis period which significantly altered the US stock market response to FFR 
                                                 
90 In the working paper version of Demiralp and Yilmaz’s (2009) study, they demonstrated that US stock returns 
were associated with statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks. Only after excluding a large number of 
outlier observations did they recover a significant relationship. This relationship was furthermore shown to only 
be marginally statistically significant at the 10% level. Gorodnichenko and Yilmaz (2013) also demonstrated 
that US stock returns were associated with statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks. They only 
managed to recover a statistically significant relationship by examining the impact of squares FFR shocks on US 
stock returns. 
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shocks, as well as the nature of state dependence with respect to ‘good times’ versus ‘bad 
times’. More specifically, we find that throughout the 2007-2009 crisis, stock market 
participants did not respond positively to expansionary FFR shocks. In fact, some of our 
estimates indicate that there was a statistically significant negative stock market response to 
unexpected FFR cuts during the financial crisis. The lack of a positive stock return response 
to expansionary FFR shocks during the crisis, a period characterised by sharply deteriorating 
macro-financial conditions and monetary policy operating close to the zero-lower bound, 
suggests that the type of asymmetric behaviour identified in the previous literature for the 
pre-crisis period, did not materialise during the recent crisis. Our results highlight the severity 
of the 2007-2009 crisis, reveal the limits of conventional monetary policy at the zero lower 
bound and are consistent with the Keynesian liquidity trap theory. 
Finally, using data from industry portfolios, we show that patterns observed in the 
aggregate US stock market response to FFR surprises are also present across the majority of 
industrial sectors. Specifically, the relationship between industry sector returns and FFR 
shocks exhibits structural change during the financial crisis, as well as state dependence with 
respect to ‘good times’ versus ‘bad times’. However, this relationship is shown to be 
characterised by significant cross sectoral heterogeneity, consistent with evidence in previous 
studies.  
 This chapter is structured as follows: in Section 3.3 we describe the dataset and 
sample period, in Section 3.4 we evaluate the econometric models and results, and finally in 
Section 3.5 we conclude the chapter. 
 
3.3 Data and sample period 
3.3.1 Measuring conventional monetary policy shocks 
As Bernanke and Mihov (1998) point out, the FFR has been the key policy instrument 
of the Fed since the late 1980s, and therefore unexpected changes in this rate should yield 
good estimates of conventional monetary policy shocks. In this chapter we define 
conventional monetary policy shocks using the event-study technique of Kuttner (2001) and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). This technique uses implied rates from Chicago Board of 
Trade 30-Day Federal Funds Futures contracts (CBOT futures) to derive expectations of 
target FFR changes by the FOMC. This market based measure of unexpected FFR changes is 
efficient in that it represents a natural proxy for the market’s expectations of future FFR 
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changes and associated forecast errors. The measure has also been shown to yield efficient 
and unbiased forecasts of the target FFR (see Krueger and Kuttner, 1996).  
Furthermore, upon evaluating the empirical efficacy of alternative market based 
measures in predicting the FFR, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002, 2007) demonstrated 
that FFR futures, hence Kuttner’s (2001) measure dominated all other measures in predicting 
the FFR at one-month to six-month horizons. It was shown to yield superior forecasting 
power and lower risk premia relative to alternative market-based measures. All of which 
helps to mitigate concerns that FFR futures contracts track the underlying instrument of the 
effective FFR and not the target FFR. Further advantages include the fact that Kuttner’s 
(2001) measure could be defined using higher-frequency daily data which is more likely to be 
exogenous and less likely to reflect other macroeconomic factors of news compared to lower 
frequency aggregate, weekly, monthly or quarterly data91. Lastly, as interest-rate futures 
represent the largest derivatives market in the world, this implies that the FFR futures 
contract is highly traded and an efficient market proxy for expectations in target FFR changes 
(Bank of International Settlements Website, 2013). Nevertheless, Wright (2012) argues that 
whilst the target FFR is a good measure of conventional monetary policy during normal times, 
things are “murkier at the zero-bound” and “there is not as clean a single measure of the 
overall stance of unconventional monetary policy.” Unlike FFR futures contracts, there are no 
direct real time measures of market expectations of  non-conventional monetary policy 
measures such as increasing use of forward guidance and the size of LSAP purchases. We 
therefore use FFR shocks as the principal explanatory term in our empirical analysis in lieu of 
measuring unconventional monetary policy shocks92. 
In this chapter, we consider a set of event-dates which include all scheduled FOMC 
meetings93 and all unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes over the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample period. The unexpected FFR change uti is defined as the change in the 
                                                 
91 Lower-frequency aggregate weekly, monthly and quarterly data is traditionally used in VAR models where 
monetary policy shocks are calculated as orthogonalised innovations in a monetary instrument, in identified 
systems. 
92 Rosa (2012) measures the unexpected component of LSAP purchases by constructing an indicator based upon 
subjective interpretations of reports from the media. However, as the study argues, this measure of 
unconventional monetary policy shocks is surrounded by considerable statistical uncertainty. 
93 Regarding the dating of the FOMC meetings, for the pre-February 1994 period, which was characterised by 
lack of press releases regarding FOMC decisions and ambiguity about the dates of open market operations, we 
use dates provided by Kuttner (2003). The FOMC started to explicitly announce rate changes on February 1994 
in a move towards greater transparency and the corresponding dates are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
website at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/2013monetary.htm 
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implied rate on the current-month FFR futures contract 0,dmff relative to the rate the day 
before the change 0 1, dmff . There is however a complication in deriving FFR shocks using this 
approach because the settlement price for CBOT futures contracts are based upon the 
arithmetic average of the daily effective FFR of the delivery month, including non-trading 
days were the previous day’s price is carried over. To counteract this complication, we use 
Kuttner’s (2001) scaling adjustment  dDD / which is related to the number of days in the 
month affected by the change. However, this introduces end of month distortions, hence we 
use unscaled changes when target FFR changes occur in the last three days of the calendar 
month, and we use the last day of the previous month’s FFR futures contract when the target 
FFR change occurs on the first day of the calendar month. This highly attenuated technique 
of calculating unexpected FFR changes is summarised in Equation 3.1. The expected 
component of target FFR changes is subsequently computed as the actual target FFR change 
minus the unexpected component (see Equation 3.2). 
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Where 0,dmff is the implied rate (100 minus the future contract price) from the current-
month FFR futures contract on month 0m and day 0d of the FOMC event-date, and 0D  
represents the number of days in the month of the FOMC event-date. 
 Thus so far we have only discussed the advantages of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke 
and Kuttner’s (2005) market-based measure of unexpected FFR changes however it is 
important to also acknowledge the limitations of this approach to defining conventional 
monetary policy shocks. Firstly, the FOMC officially began announcing target FFR changes 
from Feb-94, and target FFR changes prior to this date were primarily inferred from dates of 
open market operations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and subsequent media 
announcements. We therefore use event-dates defined by Kuttner (2003) for the Jun-89 to 
Feb-94 sample period. This study more precisely identifies when target FFR changes 
occurred using unpublished Fed manuscripts and news reports94. Due to the difficulty in 
                                                 
94 As Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) point out, there are seven minor deviations in the timing of decisions listed 
in the Kuttner (2003) study. We account for such discrepancies in this study. 
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precisely identifying when target FFR changes occurred prior to Jun-89, our sample is 
ultimately constrained to this date. Without this constraint, our sample would still have been 
constrained to after Oct-88, as this is when CBOT FFR futures first began trading in the open 
market. Further limitations of this approach were also pointed out by Rudebusch (1996, 1998) 
who argued that the market-based measure of unexpected FFR changes may have been 
subject to simultaneity bias. This is because on several occasions, target FFR changes 
occurred on the same day as employment release reports by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
and this could have contaminated the measure. We address this concern throughout the 
chapter by further excluding these observations from our estimation to ensure the results are 
robust to such critique. 
 Other studies have also argued that FFR futures contracts may have been 
contaminated by risk-premia present in futures markets (see Chernenko, Schwartz, and 
Wright, 2004; Piazessi and Swanson, 2008). They demonstrated that one-month ahead FFR 
futures contracts exhibited three basis point risk-premia, which increased with further ahead 
FFR futures contracts. Whilst we acknowledge this may be the case, and FFR futures may in 
fact have been contaminated by time-varying risk-premia, one would be hard pressed to find 
a more efficient measure of expectations in target FFR changes. Several studies have sought 
to mitigate these concerns by using survey-data; however this measure is infrequently 
quoted95 and not available at a daily frequency. Furthermore, relative to alternative market-
based measures and monetary instruments, Krueger and Kuttner (1996) demonstrated that 
FFR futures were not as contaminated by risk-premia relative to these alternative measures. 
Similarly, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002, 2007) demonstrated that FFR futures 
dominated all other measures in predicting FFR changes. However, one should also 
acknowledge that although the Fed targeted the effective FFR through open market 
operations, it did not entirely control the market; hence negligible discrepancies may have 
been present in the measure. As CBOT FFR futures track the underlying instrument of the 
effective FFR and not the target FFR, one must assume that the two measures are 
approximately equivalent to construct this measure of FFR shocks. 
 As we have discussed, a competing measure of conventional monetary policy shocks 
was constructed by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). They derived conventional 
monetary policy using the target factor, which reflected Kuttner’s (2001) measure of 
unexpected FFR changes, and a path factor which was shown to be associated with FOMC 
                                                 
95 Surveys were taken on the Friday prior to each scheduled FOMC meeting. 
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statements. Prior to the crisis, empirical studies widely documented statistically insignificant 
US stock return responses to the path factor (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Wang, 
Yang and Wu, 2006). There were also mixed conclusions concerning the impact of the path 
factor on US stock returns over sample periods which covered part (see Kurov, 2012) or all 
of the crisis period (see Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes, 2012). Given that US stock returns are 
widely shown to respond significantly only to unexpected FFR changes, we focus on this 
component of FFR shocks. 
Several previous studies have also argued that the relationship between US stock 
returns and FFR shocks may be endogenous, as monetary policy could itself be responding to 
stock market developments (see Rigobon and Sack, 2003). In this chapter we use an event-
study framework with higher-frequency daily data to help mitigate such concerns. Older 
studies used VAR frameworks to examine the potentially endogenous relationship between 
stock returns and monetary policy through the modelling of endogenous systems. However, 
the VAR approach to defining conventional monetary policy shocks has been widely 
critiqued by previous studies (see Rudebusch, 1998; Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche and O’Reilly 
2009)96. We evaluate critique of such an approach in detail in Section 2.4.3.  
Lastly, several recent studies have utilised ultra-high frequency intra-day data to 
measure stock market responses to monetary policy shocks; evaluating responses using 
intervals ranging from 1-minute to 1-hour (see Farka, 2009; Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 
2005). This approach may mitigate concerns regarding endogenous responses to other news 
during the interval considered however it introduces other potential problems. Firstly, the 
acquisition of tick-by-tick data from private sources makes it difficult for others to replicate 
research97. Secondly, although tick-by-tick data was available from Bloomberg, the data was 
only available from 1997 which would have significantly constrained the sample period of 
this study. Thirdly, according to the Stothard (2012), automated algorithmic trading by firms 
accounted for 36% of all US trading volume from 2007-2011. Much of the ultra-high 
frequency trading data reflects automated algorithmic trading of stocks which follow defined 
mathematical rules, and are less likely to reflect actual investors’ expectations and valuations 
of stocks. As Farka (2009) demonstrated (see Section 2.6.4), the magnitude of stock response 
to conventional monetary policy shocks increased in magnitude as the interval was increased 
                                                 
96 The VAR approach to defining conventional monetary policy shocks was characterised by Bredin, Hyde, 
Nitzsche and O’Reilly (2009) as being rather “artificial and meaningless.” Rudebusch (1998) also suggested that 
these measures were “structurally fragile” and “severely deficient” however made it clear that the critique did 
not imply that the methodology was “so deeply flawed as to be useless”. 
97 Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) acquired data from Genesis Financial Technologies 
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from one-minute to twenty-minutes. A similar dynamic was observed by demonstrated by 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), as the interval was increased from 30-minutes to 1-
hour. This implies that it takes time for investors to react to new information, and higher-
frequency measures are more likely to reflect the evaluation of automated trading systems. 
Furthermore, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) argued that the “average absolute 
difference between the daily and intra-day surprise measures is only about 2 bp and the 
difference is 0 bp on many days”98 which demonstrates that there are very minor differences 
in estimates using higher-frequency or daily data.  
 
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 show that there were 213 target FFR decisions 
by the Fed over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. As FOMC meetings are scheduled eight 
times a year, this corresponds to 189 scheduled FOMC meetings and 24 unscheduled FOMC 
meetings with target FFR changes. The average target FFR change is shown to range 
symmetrically, although non-normally from 75 basis point cut (min) to a 75 basis point 
increase (max), with an average target FFR change of -0.04%. There were a total of 31 
decisions to increase the target FFR ( 0 ti ) and 52 decisions to decrease the target FFR 
( 0 ti ). The FOMC decided to maintain the current target FFR on 130 occasions and such 
non-changes represent monetary inaction by the Fed in over half of the event-dates 
considered (61%). Interestingly, the unexpected component of FFR change ranges from -
0.74% to +0.17% which implies that over the sample period, there were more unexpected 
FFR cuts than unexpected FFR increases. The null hypothesis of normal distribution is 
rejected across all the measures; this is a common feature of financial data. 
 
3.3.3 Preliminary graphical analysis 
In Figure 3.1 we graph target FFR changes and plot unexpected FFR changes. The 
shaded are corresponds to periods associated with NBER recession dates. This closely 
corresponds to the dotted line which is the real time recession probability from the dynamic-
factor Markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008). We find that large unexpected 
FFR cuts typically materialise during periods of monetary expansion and periods during 
periods of economic deceleration and decline. In contrast, non-crisis periods are typically 
                                                 
98 They also identified several anomalous exceptions to this. 
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associated with target FFR increases which are largely anticipated by market participants. In 
Figure 3.2 we plot the BAA-10Year US Treasury bond spread on FOMC event-dates. The 
shaded area corresponds to when the credit spread exceeds its historical average99 . By 
comparing Figure 3.2 with Figure 3.1, periods of tighter credit market conditions typically 
overlap with recessionary episodes.  
A similar pattern emerges in Figure 3.3 where we plot the S&P500 Index on FOMC 
event-dates alongside its 3-Year moving average. The highlighted periods are associated with 
bear-market conditions100, when the S&P500 Index falls below its 3-Month moving average. 
By comparing Figure 3.3 with Figure 3.1, it is clear that periods of persistent stock market 
declines (bear-markets) typically coincide with recessionary episodes, as defined by the 
NBER. On the right-axis of Figure 3.3 we plot the Bloomberg financial conditions index on 
FOMC event-dates. This highlights the severity of the 2007-2009 crisis period as the 
financial conditions index is characterised by an unprecedented decline. 
Overall several important stylised facts emerge from this preliminary analysis. Firstly, 
recessionary episodes, bear-markets and tightening credit market conditions are typically 
associated with large unexpected FFR cuts. This fact will be taken in to account in the 
econometric analysis as stocks may yield an alternative response to FFR cuts when there is 
heightened macro-financial uncertainty and when the target FFR approaches the zero-lower 
bound. 
 
3.4 Econometric models and results 
3.4.1 Preliminary estimates 
We begin our econometric analysis by regressing S&P500 stock returns on 
unexpected FFR changes, on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period 
(see Equation 3.3). In line with previous studies, we exclude the 17th Sep 01 observation from 
all analyses and focus on the unexpected component of target FFR change (see Basistha and 
Kurov, 2008; Davig and Gerlach, 2006; Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes, 2012; Ehrmann and 
                                                 
99 The historical average is computed using all the daily observations from Jun-89 to Dec-12, as an average only 
on FOMC event-days would have imposed a selective bias. 
100 Although there is no commonly accepted definition of bear-market conditions in the empirical literature, we 
define it in line with Jansen and Tsai (2010) who characterise the periods as being associated with significant 
and sustained stock price declines. 
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Fratzscher, 2004; Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Gorodnichenko and Weber, 2013; Kurov, 
2010)101. 
t
u
tt ir   1 ,         (3.3) 
 1lnln*100  ttt SSr ,        (3.4) 
Where stock returns tr is defined as the first difference of the natural log of the 
S&P500 index tS on the close of the FOMC meeting relative to that the previous trading day 
(Equation 3.4). The OLS estimates of Equation 3.3 with Newey-West robust standard errors 
are reported in Table 3.2. The full sample estimates indicate that the US stock return response 
to unexpected FFR changes is statistically insignificant102. This finding is in contrast with 
results from previous empirical studies which widely documented statistically significant 
responses103. 
To understand why we find a statistically insignificant result, in Table 3.2 we re-
estimate Equation 3.3 utilising sample periods employed in previous studies which do not 
include the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis and recession. Interestingly across all nine 
studies, we find that the stock return response to FFR shocks is statistically significant104. For 
example, utilising the sample period of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), from Jun-89 to Dec-02, 
the 2  coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This implies that a hypothetical 
                                                 
101 The 17th Sep 01 was excluded from analyses by these studies because this target FFR decision was taken on 
the first day of trading following the 11th Sep 01 attacks, and markets may have responded to the unorthodox 
nature of the target FFR change, the backlog of trading activity as well as the attacks themselves. Market 
efficiency arguments imply that the anticipated component of conventional monetary policy action may already 
have been priced in to stocks and incorporated in to market participants’ investment decisions, in line with these 
studies, we focus upon the unexpected component of target FFR changes. We also experiment with alternative 
model specifications which include both expected and unexpected FFR changes, in line with Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), however find that the expected component tended to remain statistically insignificant in the 
baseline regression and many of the subsequent models estimated throughout this chapter. The finding of 
statistical insignificance was interpreted as being indicative of stock market efficiency (Chulia, Martens and 
Dijk, 2010). 
102  Similar evidence is obtained when FOMC meetings coinciding with employment release dates and 
unscheduled meetings are removed from the sample. Furthermore, we remove outliers identified by the 
difference in fits statistic of Welsh and Kuh (1977) and the unexpected FFR change remains statistically 
insignificant. These results can be seen in Table A3.1 in the Appendix. Table A3.2 in the Appendix presents the 
dates associated with unscheduled meetings, employment information releases and outliers. 
103 With the exception of Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) which was available online following our paper 
version of this chapter (see Kontonikas, MacDonald and Saggu, 2013). 
104 It is important to note that the estimates in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 using alternative sample periods are very 
similar, but not always identical to those reported in those studies. The differences can be attributed to the wide 
spectrum of model specifications considered by these studies. These include the inclusion (or not) of expected 
FFR changes, the inclusion (or not) of unscheduled FOMC meetings, the inclusion (or not) of event-dates which 
coincided with employment reports, and the use of daily (or intraday) data. 
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unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a 4.22% increase in US stock returns. Hence it 
appears that the inclusion of the 2007-2009 financial crisis in our sample period renders the 
relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks statistically insignificant. This 
evidence is consistent with empirical evidence concerning the UK stock market response to 
monetary policy shocks by the Bank of England (see Gregoriou, Kontonikas, MacDonald and 
Montagnoli, 2009). 
Over the course of writing this PhD thesis (2009 to 2013), several studies emerged 
which evaluated the US stock return response to FFR shocks over a sample period which 
covered the 2007-2009 in part or in its entirety. In Table 3.3 we re-estimate Equation 3.3 
using the sample periods considered in these very recent studies. We find that the stock return 
response to unexpected FFR changes is statistically insignificant in each case. This 
demonstrates that the relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks may have 
changed during the recent financial crisis.  
 
3.4.2 Dating the 2007-2009 crisis (Exogenous) 
In the previous section we demonstrated that the US stock return response to FFR 
shocks was statistically significant over sample periods which did not extend beyond the 
2007 period however extending the sample beyond 2007 rendered the relationship 
statistically insignificant. As the major part of the 2007-2012 sample period was 
characterised by the recent financial crisis, this implies that the relationship between US stock 
returns and FFR shocks may have been affected by the crisis. In this section we formally 
examine whether the statistically insignificant US stock return response to FFR shocks over 
the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period can be explained in terms of structural change 
attributable to the impact of the recent financial crisis. 
 It is important to note that there is some contention over the precise dating of the 
2007-2009 crisis period, and this contention primarily stems from the disparity between the 
actual realisation of a crisis in financial markets and the lagged response of the broader 
macroeconomy. In Section 2.7.1 we carefully outlined the distinction between the financial 
crisis and the economic crisis which followed it105. The NBER defined the economic crisis 
associated with the 2007-2009 crisis as spanning the Dec-07 to Jun-09 sample period and in 
this chapter we define the financial crisis as spanning the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample. Dating 
the start of the financial crisis to September 2007 is motivated by several defining factors. 
                                                 
105 In lieu of repeating this discussion, we briefly evaluate the conclusions. 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 124 of 295 
Firstly it corresponds to the first target FFR cut (50 basis points cut) by the FOMC since Jun-
03. As the Fed has access to private databases and sources of information concerning the 
wider macroeconomy beyond the casual investor, this target FFR decision implicitly 
represents an acknowledgement by the Fed of deteriorating financial conditions, and thereby 
conveys important information concerning the future financial and economic outlook to 
market participants.  
September 2007 also characterised by the first bank run in the United Kingdom for 
150 years at the British Bank Northern Rock. It was also marked by the highest LIBOR rate 
(6.7975%) since Dec-98, indicative of severely tightening credit market conditions and 
declining confidence in the banking sector due to counterparty risk. We date the end of the 
financial crisis period in Mar-09, when the most intense phase of the crisis in financial 
markets came to an end and the stock market began to recover. This month marks the lowest 
level of the S&P500 Index over the entire crisis period, after which the US stock market 
significantly recovered until the end of our sample in Dec-12. In Figure 3.3 we graph the 
S&P500 Index and the target FFR level. This shows that stock market participants faced 
falling stock prices in tandem with sharp target FFR cuts over the Sep-07 to Mar-09 period. 
 The dating of the financial crisis to the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample is also shown to be 
consistent with market indicators such as the TED spread which soared throughout the crisis 
period106. In Figure 3.5 we plot the TED spread on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area corresponds to periods where the TED spread 
exceeds its historical average by a factor of two; indicative of severe interbank pressures. It 
also precisely spans the Sep-07 to Mar-09 period, consistent with our definition of the 
financial crisis107. Our dating of the financial crisis to this period is also consistent with 
previous studies (see Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian, 2011; Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl, 2010). 
 
3.4.3 Dating the 2007-2009 crisis (Endogenous) 
 Having exogenously defined the financial crisis using a subjective interpretation of 
events which transpired during the crisis period, we continue by formally evaluating whether 
there is potentially significant structural change in the relationship between US stock returns 
                                                 
106 The TED spread measures the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month Treasury bill rate. 
107 The historical average is computed using all the daily observations from Jun-89 to Dec-12, as an average 
only on FOMC event-days would have imposed a selective bias. 
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and unexpected FFR changes. In particular, we use the Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint 
test (Andrews, 1993), the endogenously determined structural breakpoint tests of Bai and 
Perron (1998), and rolling regressions. Firstly, we begin by testing for parameter stability in 
Equation 3.3 using the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks which performs a Chow 
breakpoint test108 at every observation between two dates 1  and 2  (see Table 3.4). The test 
statistics (max LR F-stat, Exp LR F-Stat, Average LR F-Stat)109 all indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no structural breaks is rejected at the 1% level. The estimated breakpoint 
identified on 22nd Jan 08, is determined by the largest of the F-stats110.  
Secondly, we follow the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998) to endogenously 
identify structural breakpoints in Equation 3.3. In Table 3.5 we report test statistics for the 
Sequentially Determined 1L  versus L  Test for Structural Breaks (Panel A), the Global L  
Breaks versus None Test for Structural Breaks (Panel B), and the Global Information Criteria 
Test for Structural Breaks (Panel C). In Panel A, we reject the null hypothesis of 0 and 1 
breakpoints in favour of the alternative 1 and 2 breakpoints using the F-Stat and Scaled F-Stat 
criteria. This corresponds to the 15th Oct 98 and 22nd Jan 08 break-dates using the Sequential 
F-Stat Criteria111. In Panel B, the sequential procedure identifies five break-dates by testing 
from 1 to 5 potential breakpoints until the null is no longer rejected112 however the maxUD and 
maxWD  statistics select three break-dates. These correspond to the 15
th Oct 98, 6th Nov 02, 
and 16th Dec 08 break-dates using the maximised unweighted and weighted statistics. In 
Panel C, the Global Information Criteria and Schwartz Criterion select 2 break-dates. These 
                                                 
108 The Chow test divides a sample, and estimates two regressions then calculates whether there is a statistically 
different change between the two. 
109 The Max LR F-Stat is the largest F-stat from amongst the Chow breakpoint tests    FMaxF 21max . 
The Exp LR F-Stat is    
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 (see Andrews, 1993). 
110 The same breakpoint is identified using 5%, 10% and 15% trimming percentages and the null hypothesis of 
no breakpoints is rejected in each case. 
111 For all three Bai-Perron tests, we use a trimming percentage of 15% however the results were robust to the 
use of 10% and 5% trimming percentages. Results for the Sequentially Determined  1L versus  L Test for 
Structural Breaks were also to robust to using the sequential procedure and repartition procedure. We also allow 
the error distributions to differ across breaks, thereby allowing for error heterogeneity in the Sequentially 
Determined  1L versus  L Test and the Global Information Criteria Test for structural breaks. These results 
were however also robust to not allowing error distributions to differ across breaks. 
112 The identified breakpoints are: 18th Nov 92, 13th Nov 96, 22nd Aug 00, 16th Mar 04, 16th Dec 08. 
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correspond to the 15th Oct 98 and 22nd Jan 08 break-dates. Across all three Bai and Perron 
(1998) tests, we find that the 22nd Jan 08 event-date is a major break-date. This is also 
consistent with the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks. 
Finally in Figure 3.6 we show the unexpected FFR change coefficient from a rolling 
regression of Equation 3.3 which is estimated using OLS with Newey-West robust standard 
errors on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. We also plot the 95% 
confidence intervals. In Panel A we use a 60 observation rolling window and in Panel B we 
use an 80 observation rolling window. Both graphs are very similar and identify an abrupt 
shift in the relationship between US stock returns and FFR shocks on the 22nd Jan 08. 
We previously defined the financial crisis associated with the 2007-2009 crisis period 
as spanning the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period. This dating scheme was supported by 
narrative evidence concerning the events which transpired during the period, and furthermore 
found it to be consistent with the Ted spread, a gauge of interbank pressures. In a similar vein, 
the structural breaks tests located a highly significant structural break in stock return response 
to unexpected FFR changes, on the 22nd Jan 08. This evidence indicates that there was an 
abrupt shift in the stock market reaction to conventional monetary policy. This may help to 
explain why the stock return response to unexpected FFR changes was rendered statistically 
insignificant upon inclusion of the crisis period. It also implies that the 2007-2009 crisis 
period was characterised by a very different market response to such shocks than that 
observed prior to the crisis period.  
 
3.4.4 Structural change during the 2007-2009 crisis 
Having identified a highly significant structural break in the relationship between 
stock returns and FFR shocks, characterised by the 2007-2009 crisis period, we augment our 
model to account for such structural change during the period. In particular we interact FFR 
shocks with a crisis dummy variable crisistD equal to one during the crisis and zero otherwise 
(see Equation 3.5). 
     tutcrisistcrisistt iDDr   21 1 ,      (3.5) 
 In Section 3.4.1, we defined the financial crisis as spanning the Sep-07 to Mar-09 
sample period, hence we set the crisis dummy variable equal to one throughout this period 
and zero otherwise. Given that this measure of the financial crisis was exogenously defined 
using a subjective interpretation of events which transpired during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period, we refer to this measure as the exogenous crisis period. To ensure our estimates are 
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not sensitive to the definition of the crisis period considered, for robustness, we also consider 
an alternative definition of the crisis as spanning the Jan-08 to Mar-09 period. This 
empirically motivated measure of the crisis period is guided by evidence from endogenously 
determined tests for structural breaks; hence we refer to this measure as the endogenous crisis 
period (see Section 3.4.2). In Table 3.6, we report OLS estimates of Equation (3.5) with 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample period. In Panel A we present an estimate using the exogenous crisis and endogenous 
crisis definitions; and considering all FOMC event-dates excluding the 17th Sep 01 
observation. In Panel B, we repeat the estimation by further excluding event-dates associated 
with employment report releases by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In Panel C, we once again 
repeat the estimation by further excluding event-dates associated with unscheduled FOMC 
meetings. 
Prior to evaluating the estimates, we briefly outline the manner in which results are 
interpreted. When the crisis dummy variable crisistD  is set equal to one during the Sep-07 to 
Mar-09 period, in line with the exogenous crisis definition; the 2  coefficient measures the 
stock response to unexpected FFR changes during this measure of the crisis period. However 
the 1  coefficient measures the stock response outside the crisis period; from Jun-89 to Aug-
07 and from Apr-08 to Dec-12. We cannot refer to this period as reflecting the pre-crisis 
period, because it also reflects part of the post-crisis period in the sample. Similarly, the 2  
coefficient measures the stock response during the Jan-08 to Mar-09 period when using the 
endogenous crisis definition, while the 1  coefficient measures the response outside the 
crisis period from Jun-89 to Dec-07 and Apr-08 to Dec-12. 
Upon accounting for structural change attributable to the crisis period, the adjusted 
2R  statistic increases from 2% in Table 3.2 (without the structural break) to 6-7% in Table 
3.6 Panel A (with the structural break). Importantly, whilst we previously documented a 
statistically insignificant stock return response to unexpected FFR changes over the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample period in Table 3.3 (without the structural break); upon inclusion of the 
structural break in Table 3.6 Panel A, we now document a negative and highly significant 
response outside the crisis period. In particular, the 1  coefficient indicates that an 
hypothetical unexpected 1% target FFR cut is associated with a roughly 4% increase in the 
S&P500 index113. This estimate is robust to both the endogenous and exogenous definitions 
                                                 
113 Sep-07 to Mar-09:  %93.0%25.0*73.3  , Jan-08 to Mar-09:  %00.1%25.0*98.3  . 
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of the crisis period, and is furthermore consistent with previous studies which evaluated stock 
responses to FFR shocks over sample periods which did not extend in to or beyond the 2007-
2009 crisis period (see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). It also implies that unexpected interest 
rate easing outside the crisis period is interpreted as a good signal by stock market 
participants. However, we contribute to the existing literature by demonstrating that the stock 
response to FFR shocks ceases to be negative during the crisis period, as shown by the 2  
coefficient. Interestingly, it is positive and insignificant (significant) when using the 
exogenous (endogenous) definition of the crisis period. The Wald tests also reject the null 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients 21   , thereby supporting the hypothesis that there is a 
significant shift in the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks due to the 2007-
2009 crisis period. We undertake two robustness checks for these estimates.  
Firstly we exclude event-dates associated with employment release reports by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. This is motivated by the fact that on eight occasions between 1989 
and 1992, target FFR decisions occurred several hours following the release of these reports. 
To mitigate Rudebusch’s (1996, 1998) concerns that this may have imposed simultaneity bias 
upon estimation, in Panel B we re-estimate Equation 3.5 excluding these event-dates from 
our model. The evidence in Table 3.6 Panel B is very similar to that in Panel A which 
includes all FOMC meeting, identifying a negative and statistically significant impact of 
unexpected FFR shocks on stock returns outside the crisis. This is followed by either an 
insignificant or positive and significant response during the crisis, contingent upon the 
definition of the crisis dummy. Similarly, the Wald tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
equality of coefficients, implying that there is a statistically significant change during the 
crisis and outside the crisis period. 
Secondly, we evaluate whether the model specification behaves in a similar manner to 
that observed in previous studies. Basistha and Kurov (2008) had previously demonstrated 
that the stock response to unexpected FFR changes declined from statistical significance to 
statistical insignificance upon excluding observations associated with unscheduled FOMC 
event-dates. This implied that unscheduled FOMC event-dates contained important 
information concerning unexpected FFR changes for market participants. Given that 
unscheduled FOMC event-dates by their very nature largely unanticipated, they are more 
likely to contain important information concerning unexpected FFR changes than scheduled 
FOMC event-dates. In Table 3.6 Panel C, we re-estimate Equation 3.5 excluding event-dates 
associated with employment release dates and unscheduled FOMC target FFR changes. 
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Consistent with this evidence, the stock response to unexpected FFR changes declines in to 
statistical insignificance outside the crisis period and the Wald tests fail to reject the null of 
equality of equality of coefficients during the crisis and outside the crisis period. This implies 
that unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes contain an important source of 
information concerning unexpected FFR changes for market participants both during the 
crisis and outside the crisis. 
 
3.4.5 Robust MM-estimator weighted least squares 
Traditional ordinary least squares estimation, which we have thus so far used in this 
chapter, can be highly sensitive to the presence of potential outliers in a dataset. This can lead 
to unreliable coefficient estimates which may not accurately characterise the relationship 
between stock returns and FFR shocks. As Edgeworth (1887) argues, in the presence of 
outliers, the most objectionable feature of classical OLS estimation is the calculation of 
squared residuals which attributes disproportionately high importance to outlier observations 
with larger residuals. This bias towards outlier observations can lead to distortions in the 
generation of coefficient estimates due to the potential influence of vertical outliers and bad 
leverage point outliers in a dataset. In this chapter, we employ recent technical innovations in 
econometric analysis to model the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks in the 
presence of potential outlier observations. More specifically we use the robust MM-Estimator 
weighted least squares methodology of Yohai (1987). This approach has been shown to be 
highly robust towards outlier observations, demonstrated to have a high-breakdown point and 
exhibit high Gaussian efficiency compared to OLS estimation (Verardi and Croux, 2010). 
The MM-Estimator procedure combines S-Estimation and M-Estimation and is therefore 
addresses outliers in both the dependent and independent variables. It is computed using 
iteratively re-weighted least squares estimation. 
Given that previous studies demonstrated the relationship between stock returns and 
unexpected FFR changes was characterised by outlier observations (see Bernanke and 
Kuttner, 2005; Chulia, Martens and Dijk, 2010), it is unsurprising that we also identified 
outlier observations in Equation 3.3 using the DFITS diagnostic test for detecting outliers 
(see Table A3.1 and Table A3.2). In Table 3.7 we report robust MM-Estimator weighted least 
squares estimates of Equation 3.5 using the methodology of Yohai (1987)114. The main 
                                                 
114 The MM-Estimates procedure begins by computing S-Estimation and uses the scale estimates as the initial 
starting point for the M-Estimation. Throughout this chapter, we use a tuning value of 2.937 in the S-Estimator 
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difference between the OLS and MM-Estimator results is that in the latter, the 2 coefficient, 
which measures the stock return response to unexpected FFR changes during the crisis period, 
is statistically significant, regardless of the exogenous and endogenous dating of the 2007-
2009 crisis period. The positivity of this coefficient is contrary to that observed in previous 
studies, and indicates that during the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts were perceived as 
bad news by stock market investors. This signifies a radical shift in the perception of market 
participants to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis compared to that outside the crisis 
period. In particular, an unexpected -0.50% FFR cut during the crisis period is associated 
with a roughly 1.05% decrease in the S&P500 index. Furthermore, the 2 coefficient, which 
measures the stock response to FFR shocks outside the crisis period, is more muted in 
magnitude compared to that using OLS. An unexpected 0.50% FFR shock is associated with 
a roughly 0.88% increase in the S&P500 index. The magnitude of this response is consistent 
with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) who also measured a more muted coefficient upon 
accounting for outlier observations115. Interestingly, the stock response to FFR shocks both 
during the crisis and outside the crisis are of a very similar magnitude, however the direction 
of response has changed. 
In line with the previous table, we undertake robustness checks by excluding event-
dates associated with employment release reports. The estimates in Table 3.7 Panel B are 
very similar to those when considering all event-dates; hence the estimates are robust towards 
the argument that estimates may be influenced by employment reports. The Wald tests for 
equality of coefficients 21    are also rejected in all panels at the 1% level. This implies 
that there is a highly significant structural change in the relationship between stock returns 
and conventional monetary policy during the 2007-2009 crisis period. Lastly, the estimates in 
Panel C are consistent with the argument that upon excluding unscheduled FOMC meetings 
from estimation, the model deteriorates significantly (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008 and 
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). Our estimates are highly robust towards these various model 
specifications. These estimates demonstrate the inability of the Fed to boost stock prices 
using conventional monetary policy via target FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis period. It 
highlights the severity of the recent financial turmoil and reveals the limits of conventional 
                                                                                                                                                        
for a breakdown of 0.25, a tuning of 3.44 in the M-Estimator for relative efficiency of 0.85, and a Bisquare 
weighting function. 
115 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) measured a coefficient of -2.55 upon accounting for outlier observations, 
however their study differed in that they excluded outlier observations in lieu of using MM-estimator 
regressions. 
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monetary policy close to the zero-lower bound. 
 
3.4.6 State-dependence and the financial crisis 
The estimates in the previous section indicate that unexpected FFR cuts had a 
negative effect on stock returns during the 2007-2009 crisis period. This may appear to be a 
surprising result when seen in the context of previous studies which widely documented 
positive stock responses to unexpected FFR cuts and when reconciling with classical asset 
pricing theory which purports positive stock responses to interest rate cuts. However it is 
important to recognise that the 2007-2009 crisis period was of an unprecedented magnitude 
compared to previous episodes of financial and economic turmoil, and conventional monetary 
policy was operating close to the zero-lower bound. Bernanke himself commented that “the 
world is suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that has 
precipitated a sharp downturn in the global economy” (Bernanke, 2009). 
As we previously discussed, studies whose sample periods did not extend in to or 
beyond the 2007-2009 crisis period widely documented a state dependent response of stock 
returns to unexpected FFR changes (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010; Davig and 
Gerlach, 2006; Chen, 2007). These studies typically identified a stronger stock market 
rebound when unexpected FFR cuts coincided with bad times, such as periods of negative 
economic growth, bear stock markets and periods of tightening credit market conditions 
compared to periods of good times, such as positive economic growth, bull stock markets and 
periods of looser credit market conditions. Given that the 2007-2009 crisis period was also 
characterised by a significant decline in credit, a deterioration of credit market conditions and 
a major recession, in light of these studies one would have expected a strongly positive stock 
return response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. However, as we saw in Tables 3.9 
and 9, the stock return response to FFR shocks was statistically insignificant or positive and 
statistically significant, in contrast to that one would have expected in light of previous 
empirical evidence. This implies that an important structural shift has taken place in the 
nature of state-dependence which characterises the stock market response to conventional 
monetary policy shocks. 
In this sub-section, we investigate whether the 2007-2009 crisis period was 
characterised by state-dependence akin to that observed in the pre-crisis period. However 
prior to evaluating such a hypothesis, we constrain the sample period to the Jun-89 to Aug-07 
sample period to ensure we obtain estimates consistent with previous studies concerning the 
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pre-crisis period, then subsequently augment the estimation and extend the sample period to 
the end of Dec-12 to evaluate whether the nature of state dependence changed during the 
crisis period. 
More specifically, we estimate Equation 3.6 which includes a slope interactive 
variable statetD which intends to capture state-dependence
116 in the relationship between stock 
returns and unexpected FFR changes with respect to good times versus bad times as defined 
above. 
     tutstatetstatett iDDr   21 1 ,      (3.6) 
Where statetD  is defined as follows: (a) the real time recession probability indicator of 
Chauvet and Piger (2008) which is estimated using a dynamic factor Markov-switching 
model, (b) a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread 
exceeds its full sample historical average, (c) a dummy variable equal to one when the 
S&P500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero 
otherwise. These measures capture state dependence with regards to (a) recessionary and 
non-recessionary periods, (b) tightening credit market conditions and higher credit risk versus 
looser credit market conditions and lower credit risk, (c) bear-market conditions versus bull-
market conditions117. 
 We present MM-Estimator weighted least squares of Equation 3.6 over the Jun-89 to 
Aug-07 sample period in Table 3.8. In line with studies which evaluated stock return 
                                                 
116 In this chapter we define state-dependent regimes exogenously using pre-defined variables. We differentiate 
between two-states in each case; (a) bear and bull market states, (b) recessionary and non-recessionary states, (c) 
tightening and loosing credit market conditions states. The two exogenously defined states in each case are 
referred to as ‘state-dependence’ throughout the chapter. Previous studies in this field have typically defined 
state-dependent regimes using this approach (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010). It is important to 
recognise that this significantly differs from Heckman (1981) and Wooldridge’s (2005) definition of ‘true 
structural state dependence’ which refers to a condition whereby an individual’s state observed in a previous 
period increases the likelihood of being in that state in a another period. This type of true structural state 
dependence may also be time invariant and unobservable, in which case it is defined as spurious as the 
persistence is not contingent upon a previous period. An alternative approach to exogenously defining state-
dependent regimes would be to employ a Markov-switching model which allows the relationship to 
endogenously differ between several regimes in a sample. The unobserved state variable would thereby be 
governed by a two-state Markov chain, allowing the variance to endogenously differ between two regimes. This 
empirical approach was employed by Davig and Gerlach (2006) and has empirical advantages in that the state 
variable is not exogenously defined, however the identified regimes can often be difficult to interpret and 
rationalise (see Section 2.6.3). By exogenously defining the state-dependent regimes, as in this chapter, there is 
greater clarity in the interpretation of empirical results. 
117 While there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature, ours is consistent with Jansen and Tsai’s 
(2010) ‘common understanding’ of a bear stock market regime, that is, a period of significant and sustained 
stock price declines. 
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responses to FFR shocks over sample periods which did not extend in to or beyond the 2007-
2009 crisis period, across all three panels, the impact of unexpected FFR changes is more 
amplified during periods of (a) recession, (b) tightening credit market conditions and (c) bear-
market conditions. More specifically the stock market response to FFR shocks during bad 
times, as shown by the 2 coefficient, is statistically significant and larger in magnitude 
compared to that during periods of good times, as shown by the 1 coefficient. It is however 
important to note that the estimate of (a) probability of recession in Table 3.8 Panel A in this 
relationship is shown to be affected by event-dates which coincided with employment release 
reports, and upon excluding such event-dates in Panel B, estimates consistent with previous 
studies were obtained. Due to this concern, we focus upon estimates in Panel B. 
 Upon excluding event-dates associated with employment releases, the estimates in 
Table 3.8 Panel B indicate that an unexpected -0.50% FFR cut during is associated with a 
7.12%118 increase in the S&P500 index when the probability of recession is one while the 
corresponding increase was much smaller, a 1.47%119  response when the probability of 
recession is zero. Similarly, a -0.50% FFR shock induces a stock return response of 4.00%120 
during bear-market regimes compared to a more muted 1.05%121 response during bull-market 
regimes. Furthermore, the Wald test for equality of coefficients across good times versus bad 
times 21    is rejected at a 1% level in the panel. Thus, we can confirm that our estimates 
concerning the state-dependent relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks are 
consistent with pre-crisis studies, and in line with the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. 
 To investigate whether the 2007-2009 crisis period was characterised by state-
dependence akin to that observed in the pre-crisis period, we estimate Equation 3.7 which 
interacts unexpected FFR changes with both the state-dependence variable statetD and the crisis 
dummy variable crisistD . 
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 The MM-weighted least squares estimates of Equation 3.7 over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample period are presented in Table 3.9. In line with estimates in Table 3.8, outside the 
                                                 
118 %12.7%50.0*03.14   
119 %47.1%50.0*93.2   
120 %01.4%50.0*01.8   
121 %05.1%50.0*10.2   
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crisis period, the stock response to FFR shocks during bad times 2 dominates its good times 
1 counterpart. The magnitude and significances of these two coefficients are very similar to 
those observed for pre-crisis estimates in Table 3.8; akin to which the (a) probability of 
recession estimate in Panel A is shown to be affected by event-dates with employment release 
reports. In Table 3.9 Panel B, the finding of state-dependence outside the crisis period for 
good times versus bad times is confirmed by Wald tests 21    which reject the null 
hypothesis of equality at the 1% level. The stock response to FFR shocks is shown to be 
significant and more amplified in magnitude during bad times, as shown by the 2 coefficient, 
compared to that during bad times, as shown by the 1 coefficient. These estimates are 
consistent with pre-crisis studies concerning the state-dependent relationship between stock 
returns and FFR shocks. It also reinforces the idea that unexpected FFR shocks were seen as 
good news by stock market participants during periods of periods of (a) recession, (b) 
tightening credit market conditions and (c) bear-market conditions. 
Nonetheless, an important structural shift in the relationship between stock returns 
and FFR shocks occurred during the 2007-2009 crisis period. Interestingly, the 4 coefficient 
which measures the stock response to unexpected FFR cuts during bad times in the 2007-
2009 crisis period is positive and significant in all three panels. An unexpected -0.50% FFR 
cut during this period was associated with an -11.33%122 decrease in the S&P500 index when 
the probability of recession was equal to one, compared to a 7.27%123 increase during bad 
times outside the crisis period as shown by the 2 coefficient. Similarly during bad times, an 
unexpected -0.50% FFR cut was associated with a -1.21%124 decrease in the S&P500 index 
during the crisis period, compared to a 4.72%125 increase outside the crisis period.  
The positivity and statistical significance of the 4 coefficient is consistent with 
empirical evidence in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 where we estimated the stock return response to 
unexpected FFR changes during the crisis and outside the crisis period without considering 
potential a state-dependent relationship. It also reveals that during bad times throughout the 
2007-2009 crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts were associated with negative stock market 
responses due the sharply deteriorating macro-financial environment. These estimates are 
                                                 
122 %33.11%50.0*65.22   
123 %27.7%50.0*53.14   
124 %21.1%50.0*41.2   
125 %72.4%50.0*44.9   
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consistent across the three panels, and robust towards the exclusion of event-dates associated 
with employment reports, and interestingly also robust towards the exclusion of unscheduled 
FOMC event-dates126. Furthermore, the Wald test for equality of coefficients during bad 
times, outside the crisis and during the crisis 42   is rejected at the 1% level for all 
estimates in all three panels.  
 
3.4.7 Evidence from industrial sectors 
The empirical analysis thus so far has focused primarily on the relationship between 
conventional monetary policy shocks and broad stock market index returns, the S&P500 
index. We continue our analysis by disaggregating the broad stock market index in to ten 
industry sectors to investigate their responses to  conventional monetary policy shocks. We 
begin by estimating Equation 3.6 repeatedly using returns from Fama-French industry 
portfolios as the independent variable in each case, using MM-Estimator weighted least 
squares estimates. We focus upon these industry sectors to retain comparability with 
estimates by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
The estimates in Table 3.10 Panel A demonstrate that there is significant 
heterogeneity in the responses of different industry sector returns to FFR shocks both outside 
the crisis and throughout the crisis period. As Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) point out, the 
impact of conventional monetary policy on industry sectors is likely to be highly 
heterogeneous due to a combination of factors. Firstly, FFR shocks influence exchange rates 
and thereby tradable goods industries which are open to trade are more likely to be affected. 
Secondly, industries which produce goods and services with highly cyclical demand or 
interest rate sensitive demand are more likely to have revisions in their future expected cash 
flows due to target FFR changes. This implies that industries are likely to differ significantly 
in their responses to unexpected FFR changes, as demonstrated in Table 3.10 Panel A. 
Nevertheless, with the exception of shops, the remaining nine industries exhibit 
statistically significant responses to unexpected FFR changes either outside the crisis, during 
the crisis or during both periods. Notably, across both periods, telecommunications and 
                                                 
126 It should be noted that the crisis period is dominated by worsening financial conditions. Hence, the high 
credit risk and bear market dummy variables are active (equal to one) throughout most of the post September 
2007 period.  This implies that there are only a few instances where the interpretation of β3, as the 2007-2009 
stock market response to FFR shocks during ‘good times’, makes sense. Furthermore, the standard error of β3 is 
relatively large and this may be due to the limited number of related observations. 
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healthcare are significantly affected. We find that outside the crisis period, 
telecommunications and durables (energy) industries were most (least) affected. This is 
consistent with previous studies (see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 
2004; Basistha and Kurov, 2008) which demonstrated that the response of cyclical industries 
such as telecommunications and technology have a higher interest rate sensitivity to FFR 
shocks compared to less cyclical industries such as utilities and energy. 
In line with estimates concerning the broad stock market, the S&P500 index, the 
coefficient outside the crisis period is negative where statistically significant, shown by the 
1  coefficient, whilst positive where statistically significant during the crisis period, shown 
by the 2  coefficient. The Wald tests for equality of coefficient outside the crisis and during 
the crisis is rejected at the 10% level for all but the shops industry sector 21   . This once 
again implies a highly significant structural change in the relationship between industry 
returns and FFR shocks over the 2007-2009 crisis period. Furthermore, upon excluding 
event-dates associated with employment release reports, the estimates remain very similar 
where statistically significant (see Table 3.10 Panel B). 
It is thus apparent that the industrial sector response to FFR shocks was significantly 
affected by the 2007-2009 crisis period, akin to that observed for the broad stock market 
index, the S&P500 index. Stock returns responded positively to unexpected FFR cuts outside 
the crisis period, and negatively throughout the crisis period; albeit in a heterogeneous 
manner akin to that observed across industrial sectors in pre-crisis studies. We finally 
conclude this chapter by investigating whether the relationship between industrial sector 
returns and unexpected FFR changes is characterised by state-dependence outside the crisis 
and during the crisis period akin to that observed for the broad stock market. 
We present MM-weighted least squares estimates of Equation 3.7 using industrial 
sector returns as the dependent variable in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. The state-dependence 
variables are measured in line with Tables 3.9; however due to the size of the expanded tables, 
we consider tightening versus loosening credit market conditions in Table 3.11 and bear-
market versus bull-market conditions in Table 3.12. Overall, the estimates are consistent with 
those concerning the broad stock market index in Table 3.9. The estimates in Table 3.11 
demonstrate that the industrial sector response to FFR shocks is characterised by state-
dependence both outside the crisis, and during the crisis period. In particular, outside the 
crisis period, the impact is more negative and significant during periods of tighter credit 
market conditions 2 compared to periods of looser credit market conditions 1 . More 
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specifically, the response is statistically insignificant across all ten industry sectors during 
periods of looser credit market conditions. However during periods of tightening credit 
market conditions the response is negative and significant for all but the energy sector. 
Nevertheless, the response during tightening credit market conditions is characterised by 
heterogeneity across industrial sectors. The most affected industries include durables, high-
tech and telecoms industries whilst the least affected include energy and utilities industries. 
This is consistent with evidence from pre-crisis studies which demonstrated that cyclical 
industries exhibited higher interest rate sensitivity to FFR shocks compared to less cyclical 
industries. The Wald test for equality of coefficients 21    is rejected at the 10% level for 
all but the energy and utilities sectors, implying that outside the crisis period, the relationship 
between industrial sector returns is characterised by state-dependence.  
In agreement with estimates throughout this chapter, we find that industrial sectors 
responded negatively to unexpected FFR cuts throughout the 2007-2009 crisis period. The 
4  coefficient measures the response during periods of tightening credit market conditions 
throughout the crisis period, and is positive and statistically significant in seven industrial 
sectors. Interestingly, the energy sector and durables sectors yielded the largest magnitude 
responses. Furthermore, the Wald test for equality of coefficients 42    is rejected at the 
1% level for all industrial sectors, indicating that there was a statistically significantly 
different response of industrial sector returns to FFR shocks during periods of tightening 
credit market conditions outside the crisis and during the crisis period. We tests the 
robustness of estimates in Table 3.14 by re-estimating the models with event-dates associated 
with employment release reports excluded from estimation. These estimates are presented in 
Appendix A3.3 and demonstrate that the model is robust towards this specification as very 
similar estimates are yielded. Whilst previous studies have shown that the relationship 
between stock returns and FFR shocks significantly deteriorates upon excluding event-dates 
associated with unscheduled FOMC meetings, in Appendix A3.4 we find that the relationship 
persists for several industrial sectors which illustrates the strength and robustness of findings 
documented in this chapter. 
Interestingly, the estimates in Table 3.12 which measure state-dependence in terms of 
the bear-market versus bull-market periods are very similar to those in Table 3.11 which 
measure state-dependence in terms of looser and tighter credit market conditions. For 
example, outside the crisis period, the impact of FFR shocks on industry sectors in bull-
markets is statistically insignificant for all but the others industry sector. Furthermore outside 
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the crisis period, during bear-markets, the response is negative and significant for all but the 
energy sector. Akin to estimates in Table 3.12, the most (least) responsive industries include 
durables, high-tech and telecoms (energy). We also find that during bear-markets throughout 
the 2007-2009 crisis period, seven industrial sectors exhibited statistically significant 
negative responses to unexpected FFR cuts, as shown by the positive and significant 4  
coefficient. The Wald tests for equality of coefficients 42    is also rejected at the 5% level 
across all industry sectors, indicating that there is a significant difference in industry sector 
response to unexpected FFR changes during bear-markets outside the crisis and during the 
crisis period. These estimates are also robust to the exclusion of event-dates associated with 
employment release reports (see Appendix A3.5), however the model deteriorates upon 
excluding event-dates associated with unscheduled FOMC meetings (see Appendix A3.6).  
 
3.4.8 Further robustness checks 
We have undertaken a significant number of robustness checks for all the empirical 
models evaluated in this chapter. Nevertheless, to investigate the sensitivity of our estimates, 
we consider several additional robustness checks in this sub-section. Firstly, in Tables 3.11 
and 3.12 we defined the crisistD  variable using the exogenous crisis and exogenous crisis 
definitions; however in subsequent tables we only considered the exogenous crisis definition. 
This decision was taken to ensure a concise discussion without a multitude of robustness 
checks compounding and stifling the discussion. To reassure the reader that the estimates 
obtained are robust to the endogenous crisis definition, in Appendix A3.6 we replicate Table 
3.12 using this measure. The estimates are shown to be very similar across both tables. It is 
however important to note that by setting a dummy variable statetD equal to one when the BAA 
– 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, it becomes very 
similar to the exogenous crisis indicator crisistD ; hence we cannot estimate Equation 3.7 with 
regards to credit market conditions due to collinearity. Nevertheless, the remaining estimates 
are very similar to those in Table 3.12. 
Secondly, it is important to note that whilst the 2007-2009 crisis period is dominated 
by worsening financial and economic conditions, the dummy variables for credit market 
conditions and bear-market conditions in Tables 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12 are active (equal to one) 
throughout the majority of the crisis period. This implies that there are only a few event-dates 
where the 3 coefficient in Equation 3.7 can be adequately interpreted. Furthermore, 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 139 of 295 
compared to the other coefficients, the standard error of the 3 coefficient is relatively large 
and this may be attributable to the limited number of related event-dates. To mitigate 
concerns that positivity of the 4  was induced due to the construction of the state-dependent 
variables considered, we estimate an alternative model specification without considering 
state-dependent during the 2007-2009 crisis period in Table A3.8 with estimates of Equation 
3.8.  
      tutcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDr   321 111   (3.8) 
 The estimates in Table A3.7 demonstrate that outside the crisis period, the stock 
response to unexpected FFR changes during bad times 2 dominates its good times 
1 counterpart. In the latter the response is negative and statistically significant in all three 
panels indicative of highly robust estimate. Furthermore the 3  coefficient which measures 
the stock return response to FFR shocks during the crisis period is positive and statistically 
significant in all three panels, supporting the empirical conclusions throughout this chapter. 
 Thirdly, Jansen and Tsai (2010) point out that there is no commonly accepted 
empirical methodology for defining bear market and bull market regimes. Nevertheless, there 
is a commonly accepted understanding of these regimes, whereby bear (bull) markets 
typically refer to periods of “substantial and sustained” declines (increases) in stock prices. 
Our definition of bear and bull markets in this chapter is consistent with this definition. It is 
important to note that an alternative empirical approaches to defining bear and bull markets 
was proposed by Chen (2007). A bear (bull) market was defined when a k-period moving 
average of stock returns fell below (exceeded) zero. A more formal procedure for 
characterising periods in to bear and bull market regimes was proposed by Pagan and 
Sossounov (2003) and this has become the dominant empirical approach employed in the 
literature. This more sophisticated algorithm identifies major turning points in stock prices 
and defines bear (bull) markets as periods between peaks (troughs) and troughs (peaks). This 
approach has been agued by Jansen and Tsai (2003) as more closely resembling the ‘common 
understanding’ of bear and bull market regimes. 
 Throughout this chapter we defined a state-dependent dummy variable for bear-
market conditions as being equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index was lower than 
its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. To address concerns that this may 
not have been an adequate measure of bear-market regimes, we also use an alternative proxy 
for bear-market conditions based upon the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) dating algorithm. In 
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Tables A3.9 and A3.10 we re-estimate the models presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 using this 
alternative measure of bear and bull market regimes. We find that empirical conclusions 
drawn in this chapter are highly robust towards this alternative proxy and reinforce the main 
conclusions of our analysis, i.e. a stronger pre-crisis reaction to FFR shocks during ‘bad 
times’ (bear market) and a structural break during the financial crisis, with stocks responding 
negatively to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. 
Finally, when this chapter was first written, all the estimates were for the Jun-89 to 
Dec-09 sample period. The estimates were updated to the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period in 
the write-up year of this thesis. Surprisingly, almost identical estimates throughout the 
chapter were yielded for both sample periods. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of unexpected FFR changes by the FOMC on US 
stock returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. Previous studies widely documented 
that stocks yielded positive and statistically significant responses to unexpected FFR cuts 
over sample periods which did not extend in to or beyond the 2007-2009 crisis period. In 
contrast, we demonstrate that upon extending the sample to the Jun-89 to Dec-12 period, the 
relationship declines to statistical insignificance. We demonstrate that the finding of a 
statistically insignificant relationship between stock returns and unexpected FFR changes is 
attributable to the 2007-2009 crisis period. In particular, we undertake a comprehensive series 
of tests to show that the relationship is characterised by a significant structural change during 
the crisis period. Consistent with previous studies we find that stock responded positively to 
unexpected FFR cuts outside the crisis period. However in contrast to previous studies we 
find that stocks exhibited negative and statistically significant responses to FFR cuts 
throughout the 2007-2009 crisis period, as cuts were interpreted as signals of worsening 
future economic conditions and perceived as bad news by investors and stock market 
participants. This signifies a radical shift in the perception of market participants to 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis compared to that outside the crisis period. 
In line with previous studies, we document a state-dependent response of stock 
returns to unexpected FFR changes; with more amplified responses during periods of 
recession, tightening credit market conditions and bear-markets outside the crisis period. As 
the 2007-2009 crisis period was characterised by a significant decline in credit, a 
deterioration of credit market conditions and a major recession, one would expect a strongly 
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positive stock return response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period. However, 
contrary to that which one may expect, stock did not respond positively to FFR cuts 
throughout the crisis period. These estimates demonstrate the inability of the Fed to boost 
stock prices using conventional monetary policy via target FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 
crisis period. It highlights the severity of the recent financial turmoil and reveals the limits of 
conventional monetary policy close to the zero-lower bound. 
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CHAPTER 3 – TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for target and unexpected FFR changes 
Sample Period Obs Min Max Mean St.Dev Jarque-Bera 
All meetings       
Δi 213 -0.75 0.75 -0.04 0.22 34.54*** 
Δiu 213 -0.74 0.17 -0.03 0.10 2405.22*** 
Contractionary       
Δi  > 0 31 0.25 0.75 0.30 0.12 65.49*** 
Δiu 31 -0.05 0.14 0.02 0.05 6.27** 
 Expansionary       
Δi  < 0 52 -0.75 -0.25 -0.35 0.15 12.56*** 
Δiu 52 -0.74 0.17 -0.11 0.15 52.85*** 
No Change       
Δi  = 0 130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Δiu 130 -0.20 0.12 0.00 0.04 503.08*** 
Notes: Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for target ti  and unexpected uti  FFR changes on FOMC event-
dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. 
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Table 3.2: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes (sample periods of 
pre-crisis studies), OLS estimates 
Sample Period Obs α β Adj R2 
Full Sample 213 0.29*** -2.06 0.02 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.09) (1.88)  
     
Chulia et al. (2010) 80 0.21 -9.56*** 0.36 
May-97 to Oct-06  (0.14) (1.47)  
     
Andersson (2010) 59 0.13 -9.19* 0.39 
May-99 to May-06  (0.16) (1.65)  
     
Wang, Yang and Wu (2006) 81 0.23 -8.83* 0.33 
May-95 to Dec-04  (0.14) (1.62)  
     
Davig and Gerlach (2006) 74 0.17 -7.51* 0.29 
Feb-94 to Sep-02  (0.14) (2.26)  
     
Farka (2009) 100 0.21*** -7.10* 0.26 
Feb-94 to Dec-05  (0.11) (2.14)  
     
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 131 0.12 -4.22** 0.13 
Jun-89 to Dec-02  (0.12) (1.84)  
     
Gürkaynak et al (2005) 
Basistha & Kurov (2008) 
Kurov (2010) 
138 0.15 -3.87** 0.11 
Feb-90 to Dec-04  (0.11) (1.85)  
Notes: Table 3.2 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation 3.3 on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir   1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns 
and unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period corresponds with that used in each study listed. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded in 
all estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes (sample periods of 
crisis studies), OLS estimates 
 Sample Period Obs α β Adj R2 
Full Sample 213 0.29*** -2.06 0.02 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.09) (1.88)  
     
Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) 177 0.28* -1.87 0.02 
May-89 to Nov-09  (0.11) (1.92)  
     
Rosa (2012) 91 0.41* -2.39 0.02 
May-99 to Jan-10  (0.15) (3.40)  
     
Rosa (2012) 102 0.36** -2.47 0.02 
May-99 to Jun-11  (0.14) (3.50)  
     
Kurov (2012) 123 0.31* -2.63 0.04 
Feb-94 to Sep-08  (0.11) (2.92)  
     
Gorodnichenko and Weber (2013) 
Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012) 134 0.36* -2.72 0.04 
Feb-94 to Dec-09  (0.12) (2.90)  
Notes: Table 3.3 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation 3.3 on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir   1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns 
and unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period corresponds with that used in each study listed. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded in 
all estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Quandt-Andrews structural breakpoint tests 
 Value P-Value 
Max LR F-Stat 10.08*** 0.00 
Exp LR F-Stat 2.77*** 0.01 
Average LR F-Stat 3.61*** 0.01 
   
Break Date 22nd Jan 08 - 
Table 3.4 reports test statistics for the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks (Max F-Stat, Exp F-Stat, Ave 
F-Stat). The test considers the null hypothesis of no structural breaks versus the alternative of unknown 
structural breaks (Andrews, 1993). We use a trimming percentage of 15% and the probabilities were calculated 
using the methodology of Hansen (1997). The tests were performed on Equation 3.3 which was estimated using 
OLS with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, on FOMC event-dates. The 17th Sep 
01 event-date is excluded in the estimate prior to testing for structural breaks. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Bai-Perron structural breakpoint tests 
Panel A (Sequential L+1 
Breaks vs. L)         
Break No. F-Stat Scaled F-Stat Crit Val   
0 vs. 1 * 7.51 15.02* 11.47   
1 vs. 2 * 17.58 35.17* 12.95   
2 vs. 3 2.02 4.03 14.03   
3 vs. 4 2.00 3.99 14.85   
4 vs. 5 0.00 0.00 15.29   
      
Panel B (Global L Breaks vs. 
None)          
Break No. F-Stat Scaled F-Stat 
Weighted F-
Stat Crit Val  
1 * 7.51 15.02 15.02 11.47  
2 * 17.34 34.68 40.80 9.75  
3 * 38.19 76.37 104.79 8.36  
4 * 30.39 60.78 96.97 7.19  
5 * 22.69 45.38 88.98 5.85  
Number of Breaks Selected UD Max Stat UD Max Crit WD Max Stat 
WD Max 
Crit  
3 76.37 11.70 104.79 12.81  
      
Panel C (Global Information 
Criteria)          
Break No. No. of Coefs Sum Sqr Res Log-L 
Schwarz 
Crit  
0 2 312.41 -343.02 0.43  
1 5 284.93 -333.22 0.42  
2 8 256.16 -321.89 0.39  
3 11 242.76 -316.16 0.41  
4 14 239.66 -314.79 0.47  
5 17 240.51 -315.17 0.55  
      
 Selection Criteria No. Breaks Break Date 1 
Break Date 
2 
Break Date 
3 
Panel A (Sequential L+1 
Breaks vs. L) Seq F-Stat 2 15 Oct 98 22 Jan 08  
Panel B (Global L Breaks vs. 
None) 
UD & WD 
Max 3 15 Oct 98 06 Nov 02 16 Dec 08 
Panel C (Global Information 
Criteria) 
Schwarz 
Criterion 2 15 Oct 98 22 Jan 08  
Table 3.5 reports the Bai-Perron test statistics for three tests: the Sequentially Determined 1L  versus L  Test 
for Structural Breaks (F-Stat and Scaled F-Stat) in Panel A, the Global L  Breaks versus None Test for 
Structural Breaks (F-Stat, Scaled F-Stat, maxUD Stat and maxWD Stat) in Panel B, and the Global Information 
Criteria Test for Structural Breaks (Sum of Squared Residuals, Log-Likelihood Ratio) in Panel C. We also 
report the Bai-Perron critical values and the Schwartz Information Criterion Statistic for selecting structural 
breakpoints (see Bai, 1997; Bai and Perron, 1998). We use a trimming percentage of 15% and allow for up to 5 
breakpoints. In Panel B and C we allow error distributions to differ across breaks. The final three lines report the 
breakpoint dates selected by estimation in each Panel. The tests were performed on Equation 3.3 which was 
estimated using OLS with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, on FOMC event-
dates. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded in the estimate prior to testing for structural breaks. ** indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.6: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis, OLS estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 213 0.27*** -3.73** 1.66 [0.02] 0.06 
  (0.09) (1.75) (1.49)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 213 0.26*** -3.98** 2.40** [0.00] 0.07 
  (0.09) (1.73) (1.14)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 204 0.28*** -5.31*** 1.69 [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.09) (1.76) (1.48)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 204 0.28*** -5.60*** 2.43** [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.09) (1.72) (1.14)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 187 0.30*** -1.77 -1.62 [0.99] 0.00 
  (0.09) (1.50) (11.33)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 187 0.30*** -2.55 4.96 [0.58] 0.01 
  (0.10) (1.66) (13.45)   
Notes: Table 3.6 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation 3.5 on FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDr   21 1 , where tr  and uti  
denote S&P500 stock returns and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to 
one during the crisis period and zero otherwise. The two alternative crisis periods definitions considered are: 
Sep-07 to Mar-09 (exogenous crisis) and Jan-08 to Mar-09 (endogenous crisis). The sample period is from Jun-
89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date 
is excluded from all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC 
event-dates associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of 
coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.7: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 210 0.20*** -1.76** 2.10* [0.00] 0.03 
  (0.06) (0.82) (1.09)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 211 0.20*** -2.03** 2.45** [0.00] 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.82) (1.20)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 202 0.19*** -3.76*** 2.10* [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.06) (0.92) (1.07)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 202 0.19*** -4.42*** 2.40** [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.06) (0.91) (1.18)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
Crisis (Sep-07 to Mar-09) 184 0.25*** -1.76 18.50*** [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.06) (1.18) (3.81)   
Crisis (Jan-08 to Mar-09) 185 0.25*** -2.21* 19.25*** [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.06) (1.18) (3.83)   
Table 3.7 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.5 on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDr   21 1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 
stock returns and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the 
crisis period and zero otherwise. The two alternative crisis periods definitions considered are: Sep-07 to Mar-09 
(exogenous crisis) and Jan-08 to Mar-09 (endogenous crisis). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs 
indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from 
all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates 
associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-
Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for 
state-dependence (pre-crisis sample), robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
(a) Prob. Recession 166 0.17** -1.93** 1.79 [0.28] 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.90) (3.09)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 168 0.17*** -1.02 -8.50*** [0.00] 0.25 
  (0.07) (0.93) (1.14)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 167 0.17*** -0.81 -8.05*** [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.06) (0.82) (1.47)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
(a) Prob. Recession 159 0.15** -2.93*** -14.23*** [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.07) (1.03) (3.42)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 159 0.18*** -1.65 -9.37*** [0.00] 0.30 
  (0.06) (1.07) (1.13)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 158 0.17*** -2.10** -8.01*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.06) (0.99) (1.43)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
(a) Prob. Recession 144 0.20*** -1.00 -11.88** [0.09] 0.02 
  (0.06) (1.23) (5.96)   
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 144 0.21*** 0.39 -5.79*** [0.01] 0.05 
  (0.06) (1.33) (1.85)   
(c) S&P Bear Market 144 0.21*** -0.50 -6.82*** [0.02] 0.04 
  (0.06) (1.25) (2.45)   
Table 3.8 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.6 on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutstatetstatett iDDr   21 1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock 
returns and unexpected FFR changes respectively. statetD  is defined as follows: (a) the real time recession 
probability indicator of Chauvet and Piger (2008) which is estimated using a dynamic factor Markov-switching 
model, (b) a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full 
sample historical average, (c) a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower than 
its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Aug-07. Obs 
indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from 
all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates 
associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-
Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-dependence, robust 
MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Prob. Recession 209 0.23*** -1.76* 1.78 -4.87** 23.71*** [0.34] [0.00] [0.20] [0.00] 0.08 
  (0.06) (0.95) (3.31) (2.24) (5.97)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 211 0.20*** -0.95 -8.29*** -18.42*** 2.42** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.23 
  (0.06) (0.97) (1.18) (5.53) (1.19)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 209 0.20*** -0.70 -8.08*** 5.98 2.24** [0.00] [0.61] [0.36] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.06) (0.85) (1.55) (7.19) (1.12)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Prob. Recession 201 0.22*** -2.76** -14.53*** -4.57** 22.65*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.47] [0.00] 0.20 
  (0.06) (1.08) (3.60) (2.23) (5.93)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 202 0.20*** -1.58 -9.44*** -18.39*** 2.41** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.27 
  (0.06) (1.12) (1.19) (5.42) (1.16)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 200 0.20*** -2.00* -8.06*** 6.03 2.21** [0.00] [0.59] [0.26] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.06) (1.04) (1.52) (7.08) (1.10)      
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)            
(a) Prob. Recession 183 0.24*** -0.79 -12.93** 3.14 30.84*** [0.08] [0.11] [0.70] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.06) (1.29) (6.51) (10.20) (8.79)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 185 0.25*** 0.57 -5.84*** -18.03*** 19.11*** [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.06) (1.42) (1.98) (5.12) (3.78)      
(c) S&P Bear Market 184 0.24*** -0.30 -7.09*** 6.62 23.11*** [0.02] [0.04] [0.31] [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.06) (1.29) (2.54) (6.73) (4.11)      
Table 3.9 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns and 
unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined as follows: (a) 
the real time recession probability indicator of Chauvet and Piger (2008) which is estimated using a dynamic factor Markov-switching model, (b) a dummy variable equal to 
one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, (c) a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower 
than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in 
estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated 
with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the 
Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table 3.10: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Nondurables 209 0.12*** -1.32*** 0.39 [0.05] 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.51) (0.72)   
Durables 209 0.14** -1.61** 0.52 [0.09] 0.01 
  (0.06) (0.78) (1.04)   
Manufacturing 206 0.17*** -0.64 1.90** [0.02] 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.59) (0.88)   
Energy 210 0.19*** 0.84 4.11*** [0.03] 0.04 
  (0.07) (0.83) (1.30)   
Hi-tech 209 0.24*** -0.72 3.41*** [0.01] 0.03 
  (0.07) (0.94) (1.19)   
Telecoms 207 0.11 -1.85** 2.13* [0.01] 0.03 
  (0.07) (0.87) (1.18)   
Shops 209 0.16*** -0.39 -0.57 [0.87] -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.68) (0.91)   
Health care 211 0.14** -2.54*** 3.75*** [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.06) (0.80) (1.08)   
Utilities 207 0.18*** -0.53 3.96*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.04) (0.45) (0.62)   
Other 204 0.17*** -1.51*** 0.21 [0.04] 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.48) (0.67)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Nondurables 202 0.12*** -1.52** 0.39 [0.04] 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.59) (0.72)   
Durables 201 0.14** -3.01*** 0.54 [0.01] 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.91) (1.07)   
Manufacturing 198 0.18*** -1.01 1.97** [0.01] 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.72) (0.91)   
Energy 201 0.20*** 1.47 4.12*** [0.10] 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.97) (1.33)   
Hi-tech 200 0.24*** -1.05 3.43*** [0.01] 0.03 
  (0.07) (1.15) (1.20)   
Telecoms 198 0.12 -3.10*** 2.15* [0.00] 0.05 
  (0.07) (1.05) (1.22)   
Shops 200 0.16*** -0.81 -0.56 [0.84] 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.80) (0.92)   
Health care 202 0.15** -3.23*** 3.76*** [0.00] 0.10 
  (0.07) (0.94) (1.10)   
Utilities 198 0.18*** -0.65 3.97*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.04) (0.54) (0.63)   
Other 195 0.17*** -1.48** 0.22 [0.05] 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.57) (0.68)   
Table 3.10 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.5 on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDr   21 1 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns 
for ten industry portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs 
indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from 
all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates 
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associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-
Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3.11: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (credit market conditions), robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 210 0.12*** -0.69 -2.41*** -13.26*** 0.55 [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 0.09 
  (0.04) (0.62) (0.78) (3.61) (0.72)      
Durables 208 0.15** -0.33 -7.26*** -16.17*** 12.25*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.25 
  (0.06) (0.89) (1.05) (5.08) (3.04)      
Manufacturing 206 0.17*** 0.53 -2.73*** -19.85*** 1.94** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.05) (0.71) (0.90) (4.34) (0.88)      
Energy 208 0.19*** 0.37 1.61 -16.07** 17.41*** [0.43] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.07) (1.02) (1.20) (6.66) (3.52)      
Hi-tech 210 0.23*** 0.63 -5.07*** -12.84** 3.88*** [0.00] [0.01] [0.03] [0.00] 0.08 
  (0.07) (1.07) (1.72) (6.10) (1.29)      
Telecoms 207 0.09 -0.46 -6.59*** -16.53*** 2.43** [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.07) (1.00) (1.32) (5.90) (1.15)      
Shops 210 0.17*** 1.14 -4.18*** -21.24*** -0.49 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 0.16 
  (0.05) (0.79) (1.01) (4.45) (0.90)      
Health care 211 0.15** 0.07 -6.53*** -7.84 4.14*** [0.00] [0.03] [0.16] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.06) (0.97) (1.06) (5.50) (1.10)      
Utilities 207 0.18*** -0.50 -1.66* -14.78*** 4.00*** [0.25] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.22 
  (0.04) (0.54) (0.86) (3.71) (0.63)      
Other 206 0.17*** -0.73 -2.97*** -18.18*** 0.23 [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.18 
  (0.04) (0.59) (0.73) (3.29) (0.66)      
Table 3.11 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 
Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald 
test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Table 3.12: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (bear-markets versus bull markets), robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 210 0.12*** -0.90 -2.52** -11.12*** 0.44 [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] 0.07 
  (0.04) (0.57) (1.05) (3.35) (0.72)      
Durables 208 0.13** -0.68 -7.74*** -10.15** 14.18*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] 0.18 
  (0.06) (0.80) (1.48) (4.70) (3.36)      
Manufacturing 205 0.18*** 0.12 -3.56*** 4.85 1.78** [0.01] [0.58] [0.39] [0.00] 0.05 
  (0.05) (0.63) (1.21) (5.52) (0.85)      
Energy 208 0.17** 0.86 0.24 -9.23* 19.73*** [0.77] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] 0.10 
  (0.07) (0.91) (1.92) (5.51) (4.00)      
Hi-tech 209 0.21*** -0.33 -13.02*** -8.16 16.11*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.14] [0.00] 0.24 
  (0.07) (0.96) (1.84) (5.16) (3.98)      
Telecoms 207 0.10 -1.20 -8.89*** -8.79 2.29* [0.00] [0.06] [0.19] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.07) (0.92) (1.77) (5.77) (1.20)      
Shops 208 0.17*** 0.65 -4.92*** 0.50 -0.53 [0.00] [0.87] [0.98] [0.01] 0.06 
  (0.05) (0.71) (1.28) (6.00) (0.90)      
Health care 211 0.14** -1.16 -6.06*** -4.40 4.21*** [0.01] [0.07] [0.49] [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.06) (0.88) (1.58) (4.57) (1.17)      
Utilities 207 0.17*** -0.42 -4.95*** -11.98*** 4.00*** [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.22 
  (0.04) (0.49) (1.64) (3.05) (0.66)      
Other 203 0.17*** -0.93* -3.11*** 2.26 0.16 [0.04] [0.64] [0.47] [0.00] 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.53) (0.94) (4.40) (0.66)     0.07 
Table 3.12 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-
89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald test for 
equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Target FFR changes, unexpected FFR changes and the probability of 
recession 
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Notes: Figure 3.1 shows the target FFR change and unexpected FFR change on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-
89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area corresponds with NBER recession dates on FOMC event-dates. 
The dotted line indicates the real time recession probability of Chauvet and Piger (2008) which was constructed 
using a dynamic-factor Markov-switching model. 
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Figure 3.2: BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread 
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Notes: Figure 3.2 shows the spread between the Moody’s classified BAA generic corporate bond yield and the 
10-year US Treasury bond yield on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded 
area corresponds with FOMC event-dates when the BAA –10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample 
historical average, indicating tight credit market conditions. The historical average is for all daily observations 
over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period instead of just FOMC event-dates. 
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Figure 3.3: S&P500 stock price index and Bloomberg financial conditions index 
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Notes: Figure 3.3 shows the S&P500 index and its 3-year moving average (measured on the left vertical axis), 
and the Bloomberg financial conditions index (measured on the right vertical axis) on FOMC event-dates over 
the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area corresponds with FOMC event-dates when the S&P500 
Index moves below its 3-year moving average. The 3-year moving average was calculated for all daily 
observations over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period instead of just FOMC event-dates. 
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Figure 3.4: Target FFR level and S&P500 stock price index (Jul-07 to Dec-12) 
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Notes: Figure 3.4 shows the S&P500 index (measured on the left vertical axis), and the target FFR (measured on 
the right vertical axis) over the Jul-07 to Dec-12 sample period; using monthly data. The shaded area 
corresponds with the Sep-07 to Mar-09 financial crisis period.  We also use markers to indicate: when the target 
FFR approached the zero-lower bound following a -0.75% cut in Dec-08, and when the S&P500 index began to 
recover, and when the S&P500 reached its lowest point and began to recover in Mar-09. 
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Figure 3.5: TED spread 
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Notes: Figure 3.5 shows the Ted Spread which measures the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-
month Treasury bill rate on FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area 
corresponds with FOMC event-dates when the Ted spread exceeds its full sample historical average by a factor 
of two, indicating severe interbank pressures. The historical average is for all daily observations over the Jun-89 
to Dec-12 sample period instead of just FOMC event-dates. 
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Figure 3.6: Unexpected FFR change rolling coefficient 
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Notes: Figure 3.6 shows the unexpected FFR change coefficient from a rolling regression estimate of Equation 
(3.3) on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir   1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns and 
unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. We exclude the 17th Sep 01 
event-date from estimation. The dotted lines denote the rolling 95% confidence intervals for the unexpected 
FFR change coefficient. Panel A uses 60 observation rolling windows and Panel B uses 80 observation rolling 
windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 165 of 295 
CHAPTER 3 – APPENDIX 
 
Table A3.1: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, OLS estimates 
 Obs α β Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings) 213 0.29*** -2.06 0.02 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.09) (1.88)  
Panel B (Excl Empl) 204 0.30*** -2.71 0.03 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.09) (2.29)  
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch) 187 0.30*** -1.75 0.00 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.09) (2.11)  
Panel D (Excl Outliers) 198 0.22*** -1.18 0.00 
Jun-89 to Dec-12  (0.08) (0.95)  
Notes: Table A3.1 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors 
of Equation 3.3 on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir   1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock 
returns and unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A, 
B, C and D). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases 
and unscheduled FOMC meetings. Panel D excludes FOMC event-dates associated with high influence statistics 
identified using the Difference in Fits Statistic of Welsh and Kuh (1977). Standard errors are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.2: List of unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes, FOMC 
meetings with employment release reports and DFITS outlier event-dates 
Unscheduled Employment Outliers 
05-Jun-89   
 07-Jul-89  
26-Jul-89   
16-Oct-89  16-Oct-89 
06-Nov-89 06-Nov-89  
13-Jul-90   
29-Oct-90   
07-Dec-90 07-Dec-90 07-Dec-90 
08-Jan-91   
01-Feb-91 01-Feb-91  
08-Mar-91 08-Mar-91  
30-Apr-91   
06-Aug-91 06-Aug-91  
  21-Aug-91 
13-Sep-91   
31-Oct-91   
06-Dec-91 06-Dec-91  
20-Dec-91   
09-Apr-92   
 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 
04-Sep-92 04-Sep-92  
  04-Feb-94 
18-Apr-94   
15-Oct-98  15-Oct-98 
03-Jan-01  03-Jan-01 
  20-Mar-01 
18-Apr-01  18-Apr-01 
  18-Sep-07 
22-Jan-08  22-Jan-08 
  18-Mar-08 
08-Oct-08   
  16-Dec-08 
  09-Aug-11 
  21-Sep-11 
Notes: Table A3.2 reports; FOMC event-dates associated with employment reports by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, FOMC event-dates associated with unscheduled FOMC event-dates, and FOMC event-dates 
associated with high influence statistics in Equation (3.3) identified using the Difference in Fits Statistic of 
Welsh and Kuh (1977). 
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Table A3.3: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (credit market conditions), robust MM-estimates, excluding employment 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 202 0.12*** -0.65 -2.80*** -13.23*** 0.57 [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.04) (0.75) (0.90) (3.64) (0.73)      
Durables 199 0.15*** -0.55 -8.51*** -16.13*** 12.22*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.29 
  (0.06) (1.05) (1.12) (5.09) (3.05)      
Manufacturing 199 0.19*** 0.53 -3.75*** -19.77*** 2.08** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.05) (0.87) (1.08) (4.46) (0.95)      
Energy 200 0.20*** 1.31 1.65 -15.99** 17.43*** [0.85] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.07) (1.24) (1.42) (6.82) (3.66)      
Hi-tech 201 0.22*** 0.26 -12.10*** -12.87** 3.87*** [0.00] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00] 0.24 
  (0.07) (1.28) (1.66) (6.17) (1.30)      
Telecoms 198 0.10 -1.07 -8.23*** -16.46*** 2.47** [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.07) (1.21) (1.51) (6.00) (1.17)      
Shops 201 0.17*** 1.21 -5.35*** -21.23*** -0.47 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.05) (0.94) (1.14) (4.50) (0.91)      
Health care 202 0.15** 0.19 -7.24*** -7.82 4.15*** [0.00] [0.03] [0.16] [0.00] 0.20 
  (0.06) (1.17) (1.20) (5.55) (1.11)      
Utilities 197 0.18*** -0.33 -3.12*** -14.76*** 4.01*** [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.23 
  (0.04) (0.65) (1.12) (3.76) (0.65)      
Other 197 0.17*** -0.48 -3.16*** -18.14*** 0.23 [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.04) (0.70) (0.85) (3.30) (0.66)      
Table A3.3 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 
Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date and FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases are excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.4: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (credit market conditions), robust MM-estimates, excluding employment and unscheduled 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 185 0.15*** -0.67 -2.60* -13.03*** 12.48*** [0.24] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.04) (0.95) (1.35) (3.45) (2.65)      
Durables 182 0.18*** -1.47 -5.46** -15.95*** 10.17*** [0.12] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] 0.10 
  (0.06) (1.37) (2.17) (5.00) (3.82)      
Manufacturing 181 0.21*** 0.23 -2.58 -19.57*** 14.23*** [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.05) (1.11) (1.72) (4.27) (3.04)      
Energy 184 0.20*** 0.67 -1.59 -15.99** 17.75*** [0.45] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.07) (1.68) (2.47) (6.86) (4.47)      
Hi-tech 183 0.26*** -0.50 -4.49* -12.61** -1.23 [0.19] [0.21] [0.05] [0.65] 0.02 
  (0.07) (1.63) (2.56) (5.92) (6.79)      
Telecoms 182 0.13* -1.20 -4.20 -16.30*** -1.44 [0.33] [0.12] [0.01] [0.72] 0.04 
  (0.07) (1.59) (2.59) (5.92) (7.37)      
Shops 183 0.18*** 0.85 -3.17* -21.11*** 1.29 [0.66] [0.00] [0.00] [0.42] 0.11 
  (0.05) (1.21) (1.79) (4.38) (5.20)      
Health care 185 0.17*** -0.43 -3.82* -7.67 6.38 [0.19] [0.04] [0.20] [0.02] 0.02 
  (0.06) (1.47) (2.14) (5.40) (3.94)      
Utilities 184 0.18*** -0.10 -3.51** -14.72*** 8.87*** [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.04) (0.93) (1.37) (3.90) (2.57)      
Other 179 0.18*** -0.10 -2.50* -18.06*** 3.43 [0.14] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16] 0.15 
  (0.04) (0.90) (1.31) (3.27) (3.99)      
Table A3.4 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from 
Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date and FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings are excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.5: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (bear-markets versus bull markets), robust MM-estimates, excluding employment 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 201 0.12*** -0.97 -2.52** -11.02*** 0.44 [0.22] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] 0.07 
  (0.04) (0.70) (1.05) (3.38) (0.73)      
Durables 199 0.14** -0.99 -7.74*** -10.11 14.14*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] 0.18 
  (0.06) (1.01) (1.51) (4.76) (3.41)      
Manufacturing 196 0.19*** 0.16 -3.59*** 4.82 1.86** [0.01] [0.61] [0.42] [0.00] 0.05 
  (0.05) (0.82) (1.26) (5.74) (0.89)      
Energy 200 0.18** 1.80 0.23 -8.98 19.73*** [0.48] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.07) (1.11) (1.96) (5.63) (4.11)      
Hi-tech 200 0.22*** -0.36 -12.99*** -8.11 16.11*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.15] [0.00] 0.24 
  (0.07) (1.20) (1.87) (5.22) (4.03)      
Telecoms 198 0.11 -1.74 -8.87*** -8.54 2.31* [0.00] [0.07] [0.25] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.07) (1.15) (1.79) (5.84) (1.21)      
Shops 199 0.17*** 0.86 -4.92*** 0.49 -0.53 [0.00] [0.87] [0.95] [0.01] 0.06 
  (0.05) (0.88) (1.29) (6.01) (0.90)      
Health care 202 0.14** -0.77 -6.06*** -4.40 4.21*** [0.01] [0.07] [0.44] [0.00] 0.11 
  (0.06) (1.11) (1.61) (4.63) (1.18)      
Utilities 199 0.17*** -0.38 -4.99*** -11.56*** 4.02*** [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.21 
  (0.04) (0.61) (1.69) (3.16) (0.68)      
Other 195 0.18*** -0.53 -3.11*** 2.32 0.17 [0.03] [0.64] [0.53] [0.01] 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.67) (0.95) (4.48) (0.67)      
Table A3.5 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-
89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date and FOMC event-dates associated with employment report 
releases are excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.6: Response of US industry sector returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-
dependence (bear-markets versus bull markets), robust MM-estimates, excluding employment and unscheduled 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Nondurables 183 0.13*** -0.59 -3.94** -11.61*** 3.38 [0.07] [0.06] [0.00] [0.32] 0.08 
  (0.04) (0.86) (1.66) (3.17) (7.11)      
Durables 182 0.16*** -1.11 -6.95*** -9.87** -6.98 [0.04] [0.81] [0.08] [0.99] 0.05 
  (0.06) (1.30) (2.58) (4.75) (11.30)      
Manufacturing 180 0.20*** 0.28 -5.61*** 5.22 17.56*** [0.01] [0.05] [0.36] [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.05) (0.99) (2.09) (5.32) (3.26)      
Energy 184 0.17** 0.86 -4.28 -9.15 21.73*** [0.14] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] 0.09 
  (0.07) (1.54) (3.14) (5.58) (5.24)      
Hi-tech 185 0.26*** -0.43 -9.16*** -7.72 -30.77*** [0.01] [0.01] [0.17] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.07) (1.51) (3.20) (5.08) (6.84)      
Telecoms 182 0.15** -1.30 -9.37*** 10.41 -41.62*** [0.03] [0.00] [0.15] [0.00] 0.21 
  (0.07) (1.48) (3.39) (7.92) (6.48)      
Shops 182 0.19*** 0.72 -4.89** 0.81 1.57 [0.02] [0.95] [0.99] [0.53] 0.01 
  (0.05) (1.09) (2.18) (5.83) (10.13)      
Health care 185 0.17*** -0.48 -5.71** -4.17 -33.03*** [0.08] [0.00] [0.42] [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.06) (1.34) (2.66) (4.41) (6.01)      
Utilities 184 0.17*** -0.33 -5.10*** -11.18 2.43 [0.02] [0.08] [0.00] [0.30] 0.08 
  (0.04) (0.86) (1.75) (3.25) (7.10)      
Other 178 0.17*** -0.21 -3.57** 2.23 -40.36*** [0.06] [0.00] [0.58] [0.00] 0.38 
  (0.04) (0.81) (1.59) (4.33) (3.87)      
Table A3.6 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote stock returns for ten industry 
portfolios and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined 
as a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-
89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date and FOMC event-dates associated with employment report 
releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings are excluded from estimation. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.7: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis (Endogenous: Jan-08 to Mar-
09) and state-dependence, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1=β2 β3=β4 β1=β3 β2=β4 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Prob. Recession 210 0.22*** -2.28** 1.37 -2.39 17.33*** [0.33] [0.01] [0.96] [0.02] 0.07 
  (0.06) (0.98) (3.38) (2.34) (5.70)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread            
            
(c) S&P Bear Market 210 0.21*** -0.95 -8.08*** 8.12 2.27** [0.00] [0.44] [0.22] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.06) (0.86) (1.57) (7.41) (1.14)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Prob. Recession 201 0.21*** -3.24*** -14.09*** -2.15 16.17*** [0.01] [0.01] [0.66] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.06) (1.08) (3.59) (2.24) (5.58)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread            
            
(c) S&P Bear Market 201 0.21*** -2.34** -8.05*** 8.09 2.20** [0.00] [0.42] [0.15] [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.06) (1.03) (1.52) (7.16) (1.10)      
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)            
(a) Prob. Recession 184 0.25*** -1.30 -12.72* 7.47 28.25*** [0.10] [0.26] [0.42] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.06) (1.30) (6.64) (10.84) (9.07)      
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread            
            
(c) S&P Bear Market 185 0.24*** -0.75 -7.08*** 8.50 23.09*** [0.03] [0.07] [0.19] [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.06) (1.29) (2.56) (6.86) (4.13)      
Table A3.7 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns and 
unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Jan-08 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined as follows: (a) 
the real time recession probability indicator of Chauvet and Piger (2008) which is estimated using a dynamic factor Markov-switching model, (b) a dummy variable equal to 
one when the BAA – 10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, (c) a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower 
than its full sample 3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in 
estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated 
with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the 
Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table A3.8: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for 2007-2009 crisis period, and state dependence 
(only outside the crisis), robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β1=β2 β2=β3 (β1+β2)=β3 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)          
(a) Prob. Recession 209 0.20*** -1.86* 1.64 2.11* [0.34] [0.89] [0.49] 0.02 
  (0.06) (0.95) (3.31) (1.08)     
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 211 0.21*** -0.93 -8.27*** 2.12* [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.19 
  (0.06) (0.98) (1.19) (1.10)     
(c) S&P Bear Market 210 0.20*** -0.69 -8.08*** 2.12** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.06) (0.85) (1.54) (1.06)     
Panel B (Excl Empl)          
(a) Prob. Recession 201 0.19*** -2.87*** -14.59*** 2.09* [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] 0.16 
  (0.06) (1.08) (3.59) (1.08)     
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 202 0.21*** -1.56 -9.42*** 2.12* [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.24 
  (0.06) (1.13) (1.20) (1.08)     
(c) S&P Bear Market 201 0.20*** -2.00* -8.07*** 2.12** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.06) (1.04) (1.53) (1.05)     
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)          
(a) Prob. Recession 183 0.25*** -0.75 -12.84* 18.48*** [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] 0.12 
  (0.06) (1.29) (6.51) (3.83)     
(b) BAA-10Yr TB Spread 184 0.26*** 0.59 -5.84*** 18.50*** [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.06) (1.43) (2.00) (3.79)     
(c) S&P Bear Market 184 0.26*** -0.23 -7.12*** 18.50*** [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] 0.13 
  (0.06) (1.32) (2.60) (3.80)     
Table A3.8 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.8 on FOMC event-dates:       tutcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDr   321 111 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns and unexpected FFR changes 
respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 crisis period and zero otherwise. 
state
tD  is defined as follows: (a) the real time recession 
probability indicator of Chauvet and Piger (2008) which is estimated using a dynamic factor Markov-switching model, (b) a dummy variable equal to one when the BAA – 
10-year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, (c) a dummy variable equal to one when the S&P500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 
3-year moving average and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 
01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report 
releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of 
coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Table A3.9: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for 
state-dependence using the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) bear dummy (pre-crisis 
sample), robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 168 0.16** -0.86 -10.32*** [0.00] 0.28 
  (0.06) (0.82) (1.25)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 158 0.17*** -2.34** -5.37*** [0.17] 0.06 
  (0.06) (1.02) (1.97)   
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)       
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 143 0.18*** -1.10 -18.78*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.06) (1.17) (3.42)   
Table A3.9 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.6 on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutstatetstatett iDDr   21 1 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock 
returns and unexpected FFR changes respectively. statetD  is a dummy variable equal to one during bear markets 
using Pagan and Sossounov’s (2003) dating algorithm and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to 
Aug-07. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is 
excluded from all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC 
event-dates associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of 
coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A3.10: Response of US stock returns to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis and state-dependence using 
the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) bear dummy robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 211 0.19*** -0.78 -10.21*** -18.78*** 2.42** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.26 
  (0.06) (0.85) (1.31) (5.54) (1.16)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 202 0.21*** -2.41** -5.47*** 2.08** 39.34*** [0.19] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.20 
  (0.06) (1.05) (2.08) (1.05) (6.82)      
Panel C (Excl Empl & Unsch)            
(a) Pagan & Sossounov (2003) 184 0.23*** -0.91 -18.75*** -18.49*** 19.34*** [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 0.26 
  (0.06) (1.22) (3.61) (5.20) (3.72)      
Table A3.10 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates Yohai (1987) of Equation 3.7 on FOMC event-dates:         tutstatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisiststatetcrisistt iDDDDDDDDr   4321 1111 , where tr  and uti  denote S&P500 stock returns and 
unexpected FFR changes respectively. statetD  is a dummy variable equal to one during bear markets using Pagan and Sossounov’s (2003) dating algorithm and zero 
otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from 
all Panels (A, B, and C). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Panel C excludes FOMC 
event-dates associated with employment report releases and unscheduled FOMC meetings. P-Values from the Wald test for equality of coefficients (F-Statistic) are in square 
brackets. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Chapter 4: The US Treasury & Gold Market Reaction to Federal Funds 
Rate Surprises: Flight to Quality and the Financial Crisis (Empirical 
Analysis) 
 
4.1 Abstract 
This chapter investigates the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on US Treasury 
yield changes and spot gold returns from 1989 to 2012, with an emphasis on the effect of the 
2007-2009 crisis. We demonstrate that outside the crisis period, 3-Month to 10-Year Treasury 
yields were associated with significant negative responses to unexpected FFR cuts. However 
there was an important shift in the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks 
during the crisis. Our estimates show that US Treasury yields across the maturity spectrum 
from 3-Months to 30-Years responded significantly to FFR shocks, declining in response to 
unexpected FFR cuts. Furthermore, very short-term maturity (3-Month) and longer-term 
maturity (5-Year and 10-Year) Treasuries yielded significantly larger magnitude responses to 
FFR shocks during the crisis, while the 30-Year Treasury responded significantly to FFR 
shocks only during the crisis. This stronger reaction of the highly liquid 3-Month T-Bill and 
longer-term Treasury yields during the crisis period is indicative of flight to quality trading, 
as investors interpreted unexpected FFR cuts as FOMC signals of deteriorating financial and 
economic conditions, such cuts prompted higher demand for these safe-haven assets. To 
highlight this point, we demonstrate that gold, an alternative safe-haven asset, experienced 
significant gains following unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. Our estimates are not 
significantly influenced by LSAP announcements, however longer-term maturity Treasuries 
are shown to respond significantly to these purchases. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
“The flight to quality bid from all this subprime turmoil is likely to be ongoing and so push 
[US] Treasury yields even lower” (Finch, 2007).  
 On 11th Dec 07, three months since the onset of the 2007-2009 crisis period, 
Bloomberg News headlined “Treasuries rise most in three years as Fed rate cuts disappoint” 
(Finestone and Hernandez, 2007) and Reuters News headlined “Investors dump stocks after 
Fed’s modest rate cut” (Cooke, 2007). These headlines and the corresponding US Treasury 
and stock market reactions were prompted primarily by a 25 basis point target FFR cut by the 
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FOMC that afternoon. Following this cut, a fund manager in the US advocated that “the 
flight-to-quality, flight-to-liquidity trade is going to continue” (Finestone and Hernandez, 
2007). From these headlines, we can infer that this FFR cut during the crisis triggered a 
rebalancing of investment portfolios away from falling equities and towards safe-haven assets 
such as US Treasuries. This market behaviour is consistent with flight to quality trading, 
where investors sell higher risk assets and purchase safe-haven securities such as US 
Treasuries and gold. In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that there was a non-positive stock 
response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis, as such cuts were interpreted as Fed 
signals of deteriorating financial and economic conditions. Having already documented the 
stock market response to FFR shocks during the crisis, we extend the analysis towards the US 
Treasury market in this Chapter (4). 
 As we explained in Section 2.9 and Section 2.10 of this Thesis, there is a growing 
empirical literature which evaluates the impact of non-conventional monetary policy 
measures on US Treasury yields over the crisis period, however there is a comparative dearth 
of studies investigating the impact of conventional monetary policy127. This is an important 
question because the FOMC initially responded to the crisis by using conventional monetary 
policy, i.e. target FFR cuts, to influence financial markets and the broader macroeconomy, 
and this tool was used as the primary tool of the FOMC throughout much of the crisis period. 
Non-conventional monetary policy was only employed because conventional monetary 
policy became increasingly ineffective as it approached the zero-lower bound towards the end 
of the crisis period. 
 Previous studies which evaluated the relationship between US Treasuries and 
conventional monetary policy prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period employed a range of 
empirical approaches to measuring conventional monetary policy shocks; from single-
equation models, to VAR models and non-traditional techniques. There is significant overlap 
with the field of studies which analysed the relationship between US stock returns and 
conventional monetary policy shocks. Studies which employed single-equation models to 
investigate the relationship between US Treasuries and conventional monetary policy shocks 
widely utilised the event-study approach of Kuttner (2001) to disaggregate target FFR 
changes in to expected and unexpected components, gauging expectations from FFR futures 
contracts tracking the underlying instrument of the effective FFR. The single-equation 
framework of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) was also widely employed; whereby 
                                                 
127 A similar conclusion was yielded by Cenesizoglu, Larocque and Normandin (2012) 
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conventional monetary policy shocks were decomposed in to the target and path factor, 
shown to be associated with unexpected FFR changes and FOMC statements concerning the 
future trajectory of monetary policy. 
 As the advent of FFR futures contracts in Oct-88 constrained the sample periods of 
these studies to a period following this date, many employed alternative empirical approaches 
to measuring conventional monetary policy shocks. These included the VAR approach, 
which measured FFR shocks in terms of orthogonalised innovations in the monetary 
instrument targeted by the Fed, or using non-traditional approaches such as that employed by 
Thorbecke and Zhang (2008) which measured FFR shocks as the differences between target 
FFR changes and estimates from a prediction equation using a range of macroeconomic 
variables. Rudebusch (1998) demonstrated that VAR measures of monetary shocks were at 
odds with the Fed’s descriptions of monetary policy actions, and the prediction equation 
approach assumed that regressions of macroeconomic variables on target FFR changes were 
an adequate representation of expectations of changes in conventional monetary policy (see 
Section 2.4.3). However, as Berument and Froyen (2006) alluded to, although these measures 
were not as efficient as market-based measures of FFR shocks, they were the only main 
alternative for very long-run analyses of the relationship between US Treasuries and 
monetary policy shocks. 
Overall, it is important to note that regardless of the empirical approach employed for 
defining conventional monetary policy shocks, these pre-crisis studies widely demonstrated 
that the US Treasury market response to conventional monetary policy shocks was larger for 
shorter-term maturity Treasuries, and smaller for longer-term maturity Treasuries, with the 
impact declining monotonically in magnitude and statistical significance as the term to 
maturity increased (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Kuttner, 2001; Thorbecke and 
Zhang, 2008; Thornton, 2009). In fact, very long-term maturity Treasuries were widely 
shown to yield statistically insignificant responses to conventional monetary policy shocks 
(see Berument and Froyen, 2006; Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Kuttner, 2001; 
Thornton, 2009). Furthermore, longer-term maturity Treasuries were shown to yield 
statistically significant responses to the path factor which was shown to be associated with 
FOMC statements (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005)128. Nevertheless, different 
studies yielded contrasting evidence for a significant or insignificant reaction of 10-Year 
Treasuries to conventional monetary policy shocks. Berument and Froyen (2008) 
                                                 
128 This is in contrast to stock returns which were shown to yield statistically insignificant responses to the path 
factor 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 178 of 295 
comprehensively surveyed these studies and demonstrated that the estimates yielded were 
contingent upon the measurement of monetary policy, and the sample periods considered. 
In contrast to the pre-crisis studies, we find that more recent studies which investigate 
the impact of FFR shocks on US Treasuries over sample periods which extend in to or 
beyond the 2007-2009 crisis period uniformly document statistically significant responses for 
the 10-Year Treasury (see Farka and DaSilva, 2011; Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Demiralp and 
Yilmaz, 2012; Rosa, 2012; Bauer and Neely, 2012) 129 130 . These studies also widely 
demonstrate that longer-term maturity Treasury yields declined in response to LSAP 
purchases by the FOMC (see Rosa, 2012; Szczerbowizcz, 2011; Wright, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the focus of these studies is primarily on the impact of non-conventional monetary policy on 
US Treasuries. For a more detailed discussion of these studies, we refer the reader to Section 
2.10131. 
 In this chapter, we empirically investigate the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) 
surprises on US Treasury yield changes and spot gold returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample period, with an emphasis on the effect of the 2007-2009 crisis on this relationship. 
We also control for non-conventional monetary policy such as more explicit use of forward 
guidance by the FOMC and large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programmes.  Our results can 
be summarised as follows. Firstly, in line with Kuttner (2001), we find that US Treasury 
yields are associated with larger magnitude responses to unexpected FFR changes compared 
to raw target FFR changes. However the relationship between US Treasuries and unexpected 
FFR changes is shown to be characterised by a large number of outlier observations. We 
account for these outliers using the robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares approach of 
Yohai (1987) which has been shown to be highly robust towards large numbers of outliers 
(see Verardi and Croux, 2010). Using this approach, we find that 3-Month to 30-Year 
Treasuries respond significantly to unexpected FFR changes from 1989 to 2012. These 
                                                 
129 In Chapter 2, we review empirical studies which investigated the relationship between US Treasuries and 
conventional monetary policy shocks over sample periods which extended in to or beyond the 2007-2009 crisis 
period.  
130 The Fed began utilising more non-conventional forms of monetary policy such as forward guidance through 
FOMC statements concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy and the economy, and through LSAP 
purchases. One may therefore argue that the statistical significance of the 10-Year Treasury may have been 
attributable to these measures, however a study by Rosa (2012) constructed measures of both factor and 
demonstrated that the response of US Treasuries to FFR shocks persisted regardless.   
131 For a more detailed discussion of these studies we refer the reader to Section 2.10. We would like to point 
out that at the time of writing this empirical chapter, there were only five such working papers available (see 
Beechey and Wright, 2009; Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2009; Farka and DaSilva, 2009; Lucca and Trebbi, 2009; 
Szczerbowicz, 2011); however we evaluate empirical conclusions from studies dated up to 2012. 
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estimates are shown to be consistent with estimates yielded by Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) 
in a recent study. 
Secondly, we demonstrate that our initial estimates are biased as they do not account 
for structural change in the relationship during the 2007-2009 crisis period, and do not 
control for non-conventional monetary policy measures employed by the FOMC when the 
target FFR approached the zero-lower bound. Our estimates show that 3-Month to 10-Year 
Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks outside the crisis period. However 3-Month to 
30-Year Treasury yields respond significantly to FFR shocks during the crisis period, 
declining in response to unexpected FFR cuts. We contribute to the existing literature by 
highlighting that there was an important shift in the relationship between US Treasuries and 
FFR shocks during the crisis period. In particular, we find that very short-term maturity (3-
Month) and longer-term maturity (5-Year and 10-Year) Treasuries are associated with 
significantly larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks during the crisis, and the 30-Year 
Treasury responds to FFR shocks only during the crisis.  
This stronger reaction of the highly liquid 3-Month T-Bill and longer-term maturity 
Treasury yields to FFR shocks during the crisis is indicative of flight to quality trading, and 
consistent with our hypothesis that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis were interpreted as 
signals from the Fed of declining financial and economic conditions, ‘bad news’ for the 
economy, thereby prompting higher demand for safe-haven assets 132 . This explains the 
stronger reaction of the 3-Month T-Bill to FFR shocks during the crisis, as it is one of the 
most highly liquid financial securities in the world and widely perceived to be a safe-haven 
asset. The stronger reaction of longer-term maturity (5-Year to 30-Year) Treasuries to FFR 
shocks during the crisis implies that market participants anticipated a prolonged economic 
downturn, and invested in these longer-term, lower-yielding, lower-risk assets. 
In line with previous studies (see Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson, 2005), we find that the impact of FOMC statements dominates the impact of FFR 
shocks for 2-Year to 30-Year Treasuries. Intermediate-term (2-Year and 5-Year) Treasuries 
exhibit the largest magnitude responses to FOMC statements compared to shorter-term (3-
Month and 6-Month) and longer-term (10-Year and 30-Year) Treasuries. We also find that 
longer-term maturity Treasuries respond significantly to LSAP programmes.  
                                                 
132 It is also consistent with estimates in Chapter 3 which demonstrated that US stocks did not respond positively 
to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis, and implies that investors reallocated capital away from equities to 
safe-haven assets. 
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 Thirdly, we extend our investigation to the gold market, as this commodity is widely 
perceived to be a safe-haven asset during times of uncertainty, a hedge against inflation and a 
store of value. We find that outside the crisis, gold returns do not respond significantly to 
FFR shocks. However, an unexpected 25 basis point FFR cut during the crisis is associated 
with a roughly 3% increase in gold returns. Interestingly, gold returns are also shown to 
increase by roughly 1% following LSAP announcements by the FOMC. These estimates are 
consistent with flight to quality trading during the crisis, following unexpected FFR cuts. 
 This chapter is structured as follows: in Section 4.3 we describe the dataset and 
sample period, in Section 4.4 we evaluate the econometric models and results, and finally in 
Section 4.5 we conclude the chapter. 
 
4.3 Data and sample period 
4.3.1 Measuring conventional monetary policy shocks 
In this section we describe the dataset used in the empirical analysis. We measure 
conventional monetary policy shocks using the event-study approach of Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), decomposing target FFR changes in to expected and unexpected components 
by gauging expectations from implied rates of CBOT futures contracts tracking the 
underlying instrument of the effective FFR. Our dataset includes a set of event-dates with 189 
scheduled FOMC meetings and 24 unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes 
over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. We refer the reader to Section 3.5.1 and Section 
3.5.2 for a more detailed discussion concerning the measurement of these conventional 
monetary policy shocks, and for an analysis of the related descriptive statistics.  
 
4.3.2 Asset price data 
To evaluate the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks on US Treasuries 
across the maturity spectrum, we consider quotes for yields to maturity ty  on the most 
recently issued on the run US Treasuries on FOMC meeting dates relative to those the 
previous day 1ty  (Equation 4.1). In our analysis we include the 3-Month and 6-Month 
maturity Treasury bills; and the 2-Year, 5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year maturity Treasury 
bonds. 
1 ttt yyy ,         (4.1) 
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 The US Treasury discontinued auction of the 12-Month maturity Treasury for the 
Feb-01 to Mar-08 period, the 3-Year maturity Treasury for the May-07 to Nov-08 period, and 
the 7-Year maturity Treasury for the Jul-93 to Feb-09 period133. We do not investigate the 
impact of FFR shocks on these three Treasuries because they ceased trading on the open 
market for a significant proportion of the 2007-2009 crisis period. Although several previous 
studies have extrapolated the yields on these Treasuries using related securities, we exclude 
these Treasuries from our study, as the artificial construction of these yields may impose bias 
upon our estimation. To evaluate the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks on spot 
gold returns, we define gold returns rettg  as the first difference of the natural log of the spot 
gold price ptg on the close of each FOMC meeting, relative to the previous trading day 
p
tg 1  
(Equation 4.2). 
 ptptrett ggg 1lnln*100  ,        (4.2) 
 
4.3.3 Non-conventional monetary policy 
The primary focus of this chapter is to investigate the impact of conventional 
monetary policy shocks on US Treasuries over the 2007-2009 crisis period, however it is 
important to recognise that the FOMC also employed non-conventional monetary policy 
measures over this period. The limits of conventional monetary policy were realised on the 
16th Dec 08 when the FOMC cut the target FFR by 75 basis points, effectively pushing it 
towards the zero-lower bound. In response to the impotence of conventional monetary policy 
at this level, the Fed employed more non-conventional forms of monetary policy such as 
increasing and more explicit use of forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases to 
influence financial, monetary and economic conditions in the broader macroeconomy. Thus 
to investigate the overall influence of conventional monetary policy shocks on US Treasury 
yield changes over the crisis period, one must control for the potential effects of alternative 
non-conventional monetary policy measures. 
 
4.3.4 Controlling for non-conventional monetary policy: forward guidance 
The term ‘forward guidance’ traditionally refers to FOMC statements concerning the 
future trajectory of monetary policy and the future economic outlook. These statements have 
                                                 
133 Hence there is a gap in the data for the 12-Month (3-Year) Treasury for the Aug-01 to Jun-08 (Nov-07 to 
Nov-08) period. 
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significantly evolved over time; hence it is important to understand the history of this 
measure to understand how it came to be a non-conventional form of monetary policy in its 
own right. Prior to Feb-94, target FFR changes by the FOMC were primarily inferred by 
market participants through open market operations of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Trading Desk as well as subsequent news reports in the financial media and press (see 
Kuttner, 2003). After Feb-94, the FOMC began issuing press-release statements, explicitly 
outlining the target FFR change undertaken in each meeting. These statements provided 
financial markets with a clear indication of the target FFR level, allowed for greater 
transparency of central bank action, and increased communication with financial markets and 
the broader public. They adopted a procedure whereby statements were released at around 
2:15pm Eastern Time Zone 134  following target FFR changes, hence market participants 
widely followed these early FOMC statements. 
From May-99, the FOMC began issuing statements following all monetary policy 
meetings, regardless of whether the target FFR changed. The character of these statements 
also changed, as they not only conveyed the rationale behind decisions, but also commented 
on the likely future path of monetary policy; known as the ‘policy tilt’ (Rasche and Thornton, 
2002). These statements were widely interpreted by market participants as being firm 
commitments on future monetary policy, and this created confusion when actual target FFR 
changes and non-changes occurred at FOMC meetings (see Farka and Fleissig, 2012). The 
future monetary policy comments were subsequently replaced by comments concerning Fed 
macroeconomic objectives concerning output and inflation; known as the ‘balance of risk 
assessment’ (see Rasche and Thornton, 2002). These comments indirectly indicated the 
future trajectory of monetary policy without explicitly referring to potential future monetary 
policy changes by the FOMC. By Aug-03, the statements had become increasingly 
characterised by ‘forward looking language’ which more directly conveyed information 
concerning the likely future trajectory of monetary policy (see Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2005). 
It is thus apparent that FOMC statements had evolved over time to encompass several 
important features; they explicitly outlined the rationale behind monetary policy decisions, 
they contained language which evaluated economic risks and the economic outlook, and 
often included an evaluation of the likely future trajectory of monetary policy. The 
information contained within these statements collectively became known as forward 
guidance. By 2008, when the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound, the FOMC 
                                                 
134 In practice the FOMC issued statements within several minutes of this target, however many unscheduled 
target FFR changes occurred outside this time period. 
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increasingly used forward guidance through statements to influence market-rates and 
expectations concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy. 
For example, surveys of professional forecasters in Aug-11 indicated that private 
sector economists expected the target FFR to be increased within the next year (Williams, 
2012). As the target FFR was at the zero-lower bound, the FOMC issued the following 
statement following a scheduled meeting on 9th Aug 11: “The Committee currently 
anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a 
subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low 
levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013” (Federal Reserve Website, 2011). 
This statement explicitly stated the intention of the FOMC to maintain the target FFR at the 
zero-lower bound until mid-2013. It led to revisions in expectations of economists and market 
expectations, resulting in a significant decline in US Treasury yields, between 10-20 basis 
point (see Williams, 2012). Thus, the FOMC effectively used forward guidance through an 
FOMC statement to influence financial markets and thus the broader macroeconomy. 
To measure forward guidance by the FOMC, studies have employed a range of 
empirical approaches. Farka and Fleissig (2012) interpreted news reports from Reuters, 
Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal following FOMC statements to “assess the 
importance of the information content of FOMC statements as perceived by the consensus 
view at the time of release.” They subsequently constructed a dummy variable equal to one 
when the consensus view from news reports indicated that the statement revealed new 
information concerning monetary policy or the economic outlook, or equal to zero when it 
revealed information expressed in previous statements135. In a related study, Rosa (2012) also 
interpreted news reports following FOMC statements however constructed an indicator 
variable which measured whether the tone of each statement was more hawkish, dovish or 
neutral compared to previous statements. This yielded an alternative indicator of forward 
guidance by the FOMC. It is important to note that Farka and Fleissig (2012) and Rosa (2012) 
employed a subjective interpretation of news reports following each FOMC statement (see 
Section 2.7.3 for a more detailed discussion). These studies explicitly acknowledged the 
limitations of this approach to measuring forward guidance by the FOMC and characterised it 
                                                 
135 Farka and Fleissig (2012) define their statement indicator as being equal to one when “the statements reveal: 
(a) important information about the near-term path of monetary policy; (b) a change in the Fed’s assessment of 
the economic outlook; or (c) changes in the wording of key phrases (such as ‘policy bias’ or ‘balance-of-risk’) 
compared with a preceding release. In contrast, the indicator assumes a value of zero when a statement is an 
(almost) exact replica of a previous one.” 
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as involving a “measure of subjectivity since it is based on our own judgment of the reading 
of the newswire reports” (Farka and Fleissig, 2012). 
An alternative approach 136  to measuring forward guidance was developed by 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). In lieu of subjectively interpreting news reports 
following FOMC meetings, they used a principal components analysis to construct target and 
path factor measures (see Section 2.6.2). They demonstrated that the target factor reflected 
conventional monetary policy shocks, unexpected FFR changes, akin to the measure of 
Kuttner (2001). The path factor was structurally interpreted as reflecting the future path of 
monetary policy, and was shown to be closely associated with the impact of FOMC 
statements137. More recently, Wongswan (2009) adapted the approach of Gürkaynak, Sack 
and Swanson (2005) to measuring forward guidance by the FOMC. In this chapter, we define 
the path factor using this approach. Wongswan (2009) amongst others138, defined the path 
factor as the component of the change in the implied rate of the four quarter ahead Eurodollar 
futures contract 4EDQ  on FOMC meeting dates, orthogonal to Kuttner’s (2001) measure of 
unexpected FFR changes ui  (Equation 4.3). 
tut iEDQ   14 ,        (4.3) 
The path factor is thus estimated as the residual from a regression of Equation 4.3. 
This measure of forward guidance reflects all news which moves implied Eurodollar futures 
rates for the upcoming year on FOMC meeting dates without affecting conventional 
monetary policy shocks. In particular, it corresponds to “news that market participants have 
learned from the FOMC’s statement about the expected future path of policy over and above 
what they have learned about the level of the target rate” (Wongswan, 2009). More recent 
                                                 
136 A range of empirical approaches have been employed by studies to measure non-conventional monetary 
policy. Gertler and Karadi (2011) defined non-conventional monetary policy in terms of the amount of direct 
lending by the Fed to private markets. However, Gambacorta, Hofman and Peersman (2012) argued that the 
total amount of central bank assets were a more appropriate measure for non-conventional monetary policy. 
Although the Fed’s balance sheet was widely used as a measure of non-conventional monetary policy, Wright 
(2012) concedes that there is difficulty in distinguishing between anticipated and unanticipated components of 
forward guidance and LSAP announcements by the FOMC. In contrast to these studies, Hanson and Stein (2012) 
measured non-conventional monetary policy using one-day changes in 2-Year Treasury yields and a similar 
approach is employed by Gilchrist, López-Salido and Zakrajšek (2013). Given that the Fed aimed to influence 
longer-term Treasury yields, one could also measure non-conventional monetary policy in terms of the total 
reduction in the 10-Year Treasury yield over the year. 
137 As Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) made their dataset available online in a data appendix, the majority 
of studies directly used their dataset which spanned the Feb-90 to Dec-04 sample period. To the best of our 
knowledge, Kurov (2012) was the only study to replicate the principal components analysis approach to 
measuring the target and path factors. 
138 See Hausman and Wongswan (2011) and Eijffinger, Mahieu and Raes (2012) 
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studies which have employed this approach to measuring the path factor have argued that it is 
more intuitive to interpret and econometrically more concise in its construction. 
 
4.3.5 Controlling for non-conventional monetary policy: large-scale asset purchase 
programmes (QE1, QE2, Operation Twist and QE3) 
As conventional monetary policy approached the zero-lower bound in 2008, the Fed 
not only increasingly used forward guidance through FOMC statements, but also began a 
series of large-scale asset purchase programmes to stimulate the economy. This non-
conventional monetary policy tool was designed to influence market rates, as well as 
monetary, financial and economic conditions. The Fed conducted these LSAP programmes 
by purchasing longer-term maturity securities such as housing-agency debt, mortgage-backed 
securities, and US Treasuries directly from the open market in an effort to reduce supply, 
increase prices and thereby lower market inferred rates and yields. The investors which sold 
their securities to the Fed would then invest their money elsewhere, thereby stimulating 
investor demand for alternative securities. Furthermore, the lower market inferred rates were 
also intended to lower mortgage-rates and borrowing rates of households, thereby boosting 
economic activity (see Williams, 2012). 
On the 25th Nov 08, the Fed announced QE1, a plan to purchase $500billion in agency 
mortgage backed securities (AMBS) and $100billion in agency-debt, and on 15th Dec 08, this 
was officially implemented. The FOMC announced their plan to extend QE1 by purchasing a 
further $750billion in AMBS, $100billion in agency-debt and $300billion in longer-term 
maturity Treasuries on 18th Mar 09. At a meeting in Jackson Hole on 27th Aug 10, Bernanke 
indicated that a programme of QE2 may be implemented and on 3rd Nov 10 the FOMC 
announced their plan to purchase $600billion in longer-term maturity Treasuries. On 21st Sep 
11, the FOMC announced ‘Operation Twist,’ an intention to purchase $400billion in longer-
term maturity Treasuries, financed by selling shorter-term maturity Treasuries. They 
announced their intention to extend this programme by $267billion on 20th Jun 12. Finally, on 
the 13th Sep 12, the FOMC announced a programme of QE3, a plan to purchase $40billion a 
month in AMBS. They extended this programme by purchasing $40billion in AMBS and 
$45billion in longer-term maturity Treasuries on 12th Dec 12. To control for the impact of 
LSAP announcements on our estimates, we construct a dummy variable LSAPtD  equal to one 
when announcements relating to QE1, QE2, Operation Twist and QE3 purchases coincide 
with FOMC event-dates in our dataset. These dates are outlined in detail in Table 4.1. 
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4.3.6 Descriptive statistics 
We report descriptive statistics for US Treasury yield changes and spot gold returns 
on FOMC event-dates in Table 4.2. The average yield change is negative across all 
Treasuries, and declines monotonically in magnitude as the term to maturity is increased, 
from -2.13 basis points with the 3-Month Treasury to -0.55 basis points with the 30-Year 
Treasury. The range of yield changes is also non-symmetric, with the largest yield declines 
(min) being of greater magnitude than the largest yield increases (max). For gold returns, the 
average changes on FOMC event-dates is 0.17% and ranges from a minimum of -2.73% to 
3.45%. 
 
4.3.7 Preliminary graphical analysis 
In Figure 4.1, we plot US Treasury yields and the target FFR using daily data over the 
Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area corresponds to periods associated with 
NBER recession dates. We find that US Treasury yields across the maturity typically decline 
during recessionary periods. There is a significant degree of co-movement between US 
Treasuries of varying maturity, and the shorter-term maturity 3-Month and 6-Month Treasury 
bill yields (shown in blue and red respectively) very closely follow the target FFR. At first 
glance, one may therefore expect that if there is an unexpected change in the target FFR, then 
shorter-term maturity Treasuries would also respond, with a less pronounced effect on 
Treasuries of longer-term maturity. 
 
4.4 Econometric models and results 
4.4.1 Preliminary estimates 
Throughout this section we empirically investigate the relationship between US 
Treasury yield changes and FFR shocks over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a particular 
emphasis on the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis period. In the spirit of earlier research by 
Cook and Hahn (1989), we begin by estimating the impact of raw target FFR changes ti  on 
US Treasury yield changes over FOMC event-dates (Equation 4.4). Consistent with previous 
studies, we utilise all scheduled FOMC meetings (189) and unscheduled FOMC meetings 
with target FFR changes (24). Our sample covers the Jun-89 to Dec-12 period and excludes 
the 17th Sep 01 observation from all estimates. 
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ttt iy   1          (4.4) 
 We present OLS estimates of Equation 4.4 with Newey-West robust standard errors in 
Table 4.3. The full sample estimates in Panel A show that 3-Month to 5-Year Treasury yields 
are associated with statistically significant negative (positive) responses to target FFR cuts 
(increases). However longer-term maturity 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries are associated 
with statistically insignificant responses to target FFR changes. The magnitude of response as 
shown by the 1  coefficient is shown to monotonically decline in magnitude and statistical 
significance as the term to maturity is increased. The magnitude of each coefficient is very 
similar that documented by Kuttner (2001) for the Jun-89 to Feb-00 sample period. 
 In Table 4.3 Panel B, we re-estimate Equation 4.4 with Newey-West robust standard 
errors however we exclude event-dates associated with employment release reports. This is 
motivated by the fact that on eight occasions between 1989 and 1992, target FFR decisions 
occurred several hours following employment release reports by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Rudebusch (1998) argued that target FFR decisions on these dates may in fact have 
reflected endogenous responses by the FOMC to these reports. To determine the sensitivity of 
our estimates to these observations, we exclude these event-dates from estimation in Panel B 
of each table in this chapter. In Table 4.3 Panel B we find that our estimates are indeed 
sensitive to this model specification. We now find that 3-Month to 2-Year Treasury yields 
associated with statistically significant negative (positive) responses to target FFR changes, 
whilst 5-Year to 30-Year Treasuries are associated with statistically insignificant responses. 
 Having evaluated the impact of raw target FFR changes on US Treasury yields over 
FOMC event-dates, we continue to decompose this broad measure of conventional monetary 
policy in to its constituent components concerning expected and unexpected FFR changes 
using the technique of Kuttner (2001). We subsequently estimate the impact of unexpected 
FFR changes uti  on US Treasury yield changes (Equation 4.5). In line with previous studies 
we focus on the unanticipated component of FFR changes (see Farka and DaSilva, 2011; 
Farka and Fleissig, 2012; Rosa, 2012; Szczerbowicz, 2011; Thorbecke and Zhang, 2008; 
Thornton, 2009)139. 
t
u
tt iy   1 ,         (4.5) 
 In Table 4.4 we report OLS estimates of Equation 4.4 with Newey-West robust 
standard errors. The 1  coefficient now measures the US Treasury yield response to 
                                                 
139 This is motivated by the premise that asset prices respond to the unanticipated component of FFR changes, as 
the anticipated component would already be factored in to asset prices in efficient markets. 
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unexpected FFR changes for each Treasury. We find that 3-Month to 10-Year Treasuries are 
associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks however the 30-Year 
Treasury is associated with a statistically insignificant response. In particular, a hypothetical 
unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a 58.64 (19.72) basis point decline in the yield of 
the 3-Month (10-Year) Treasury. This evidence is consistent with Kuttner (2001) who 
similarly demonstrates that 3-Month to 10-Year Treasuries respond significantly to FFR 
shocks whilst the 30-Year Treasury does not 140 .  We also find that these empirical 
conclusions are not qualitatively changed in Panel B when excluding event-dates associated 
with employment release reports. Overall we find that unexpected FFR changes explain 
significantly more variation in US Treasury yield changes compared to raw target FFR 
changes. Furthermore, across all US Treasuries, the magnitude of response to unexpected 
FFR changes is shown to be greater in magnitude than the response to raw target FFR 
changes by more than a factor of two. 
 At first glance, the estimates presented in Table 4.4 appear to be well specified as they 
are consistent with estimates by Kuttner (2001) and robust to excluding event-dates 
associated with employment release reports. Nevertheless, previous studies have 
demonstrated that the relationship between asset prices and FFR shocks is characterised by 
influential outlier observations (see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Basistha and Kurov, 2008), 
and we similarly demonstrated in Chapter 3 that the relationship between US stock returns 
and FFR shocks was characterised by outlier observations. In Table 4.5 we list large outlier 
observations in estimates of Equation 4.4 using the Difference in Fits statistic of Welsh and 
Kuh (1977). As we expected, the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks is 
characterised by a large number of outlier observations. For example, the relationship 
between the 3-Month (2-Year) Treasury and FFR shocks is characterised by 11 (18) large 
outliers. 
In light of these concerns, to account for potential outliers in the relationship between 
US Treasuries and FFR shocks, we use the robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares 
methodology of Yohai (1987). This approach has been shown to be highly robust towards 
vertical outliers and leverage point outliers, as well as clusters of outliers. It has also been 
shown to be exhibit a high-breakdown point with higher Gaussian efficiency compared to 
classical OLS models (see Verardi and Croux, 2010). Thus in Table 4.6 we report robust 
MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Equation 4.4 over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
                                                 
140 See Table 5 in Kuttner (2001). 
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sample period. Interestingly we now find that US Treasuries across the term structure from 3-
Months to 30-Years are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks. In 
contrast to previous studies, the US Treasury response to FFR shocks 1 , is shown be highly 
significant at the 1% level for each Treasury across the maturity spectrum. Furthermore, the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the 1  coefficient is shown to monotonically decline 
in magnitude as the term to maturity is increased. We find that a hypothetical unexpected 1% 
FFR cut is associated with a 73.48 (14.96) basis point decline in the 3-Month (30-Year) 
Treasury yield.   
Upon accounting for outlier observations using robust MM-Estimator weighted least 
squares, we now find that unexpected FFR changes explain 76% (7%) of the one-day 
variation in 3-Month (30-Year) Treasury yield changes on FOMC event-dates, however only 
explained 44% (2%) of the variation when using OLS estimation in Table 4.4. This is a 
significant improvement in the overall fit of each estimated model. Furthermore, the 
estimates presented in Panel A are highly robust to the exclusion of event-dates associated 
with employment release reports as shown in Panel B, as we continue to find that 3-Month to 
30-Year Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks at the 1% level in each case. The 
coefficient estimates in Panel A and Panel B are also shown to differ by only 1 to 5 basis 
points in each case which demonstrates the robustness of the estimates presented. 
 
4.4.2 Flight to quality during the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
Previous studies which evaluated the relationship between US Treasuries and 
conventional monetary shocks prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period widely yielded conflicting 
evidence for a statistically significant or insignificant response for the 10-Year Treasury (see 
Berument and Froyen, 2008). In contrast, more recent studies which estimated the 
relationship over a sample period which extended in to or beyond the crisis period widely 
documented a statistically significant response for the 10-Year Treasury to conventional 
monetary policy shocks (see Bauer and Neely, 2012; Demiralp and Yilmaz, 2012; Farka and 
DaSilva, 2011; Rosa, 2012; Szczerbowicz, 2011). Furthermore, whilst Kuttner (2001) found 
that the relationship between the 30-Year Treasury and FFR shocks was statistically 
insignificant for the Jun-89 to Feb-00 period,  a more recent study by Demiralp and Yilmaz 
(2012) yielded stronger evidence for a significant relationship between the 30-Year Treasury 
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and FFR shocks over the Jun-89 to Nov-09 period141. Thus, whilst pre-crisis studies widely 
demonstrated that the relationship between longer-term maturity Treasuries and FFR shocks 
was statistically insignificant, studies which considered sample periods which extended in to 
or beyond the 2007-2009 crisis documented significant relationships. However these previous 
studies did not differentiate between the US Treasury response to FFR shocks during and 
outside the crisis period. 
 In light of this evidence, we continue our analysis by investigating whether the 
relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks was markedly different during the 2007-
2009 crisis period. We show in Figure 4.2 the unexpected FFR change coefficient from 
rolling regressions of Equation 4.4 which is estimated using robust MM-Estimator weighted 
least squares on FOMC event-dates, for each of the US Treasuries. The graphs use a 60 
observation rolling window and we also plot the 95% confidence intervals and highlight the 
crisis period142 . It is immediately apparent that there is markedly larger magnitude US 
Treasury response to FFR shocks during the crisis period for most Treasuries. In fact, we find 
a markedly larger magnitude response to FFR shocks for 3-Month, 2-Year, 5-Year, 10-Year 
and 30-Year Treasuries during the crisis period however we see a less clear cut shift for the 
6-Month Treasury. For example, the graph shows that the 3-Month Treasury yield declines 
around 60 basis points in response to a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut, however during 
the crisis period it declined around 70 basis points. The magnitude of the coefficient is also in 
line with pre-crisis and crisis studies (see Kuttner, 2001; Rosa, 2012). 
 These preliminary estimates are indicative of flight to quality trading during the 2007-
2009 crisis period. Flight to quality is when investors move capital away from riskier 
financial assets towards safe-haven securities such as US Treasuries and gold, typically 
during periods of significant financial and economic uncertainty. Flight to quality would 
therefore imply a stronger US Treasury yield response to FFR shocks as investors flee riskier 
assets and increase their demand for these safe-haven assets143. The graphs in Figure 4.2 
indeed demonstrate that US Treasuries exhibit a larger magnitude response to FFR shocks 
during the crisis period compared to outside the crisis (non-crisis) period. Nevertheless, this 
does not imply there is a statistically significant difference in US Treasury response to FFR 
                                                 
141 Demiralp and Yilmaz (2012) found that the 30-Year Treasury did not respond significantly to current month 
FFR shocks however responded significantly at the 10% level to one-month ahead FFR shocks using OLS 
estimation with Newey-West robust standard errors. 
142 We highlight the crisis period for Sep-07 to Mar-09, and this definition will be outlined in more detail later. 
143 For example when financial markets in the US opened following the 11th Sep 01 attacks, gold prices jumped 
from $215 an ounce to $287 an ounce as investors sold riskier assets in favour of safe-haven securities. 
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shocks during the crisis compared to that outside the crisis period, for which we need to 
estimate another model. 
 Having gained some preliminary insights in to the relationship between US Treasuries 
and FFR shocks during the crisis period, we continue to evaluate whether the relationship 
between US Treasuries and conventional monetary policy shocks was markedly different 
during the 2007-2009 crisis period compared to that outside the crisis (non-crisis) period. 
More specifically, we interact unexpected FFR changes with a crisis dummy variable  crisistD  
set equal to one during the crisis period and zero otherwise (Equation 4.6). This allows us to 
compare the response of US Treasuries to FFR shocks during the crisis period 2  and outside 
the crisis period 1 . 
     tutcrisistcrisistt iDDy   21 1 ,      (4.6) 
 Before we estimate the model outlined in Equation 4.6, it is important to define how 
we date the financial crisis period. In Chapter 3 we dated the financial crisis to the Sep-07 to 
Mar-09 sample period, motivated by several monetary, financial and economic events which 
transpired during the crisis. The dating of the financial crisis to September 2007 is primarily 
motivated by the fact that it was the characterised by the first target FFR cut by the FOMC 
since Jun-03. The -0.50% target FFR cut was also less ‘gradualist’ than previous target FFR 
changes, and this uncharacteristically large cut in response to the crisis implicitly represented 
an acknowledgement by the Fed that financial and economic conditions were significantly 
deteriorating. This is further reflected by comments made by Alan Greenspan in September 
2007 that there was “froth” in the US housing sector, which he revealed to the Financial 
Times as being a euphemism for a bubble. He also added that housing market declines would 
be in “double digits” and indicated that the crisis would be “larger than most people 
expect[ed]” (Guha, 2007). In terms of market interest rates, the LIBOR rate reached 6.7975% 
in Sep-07, the highest rate since Dec-98, indicative of significant interbank stress. We date 
the end of the financial crisis to Mar-09, when the S&P500 Index reached its lowest level 
throughout the crisis period and began its recovery. The dating of the crisis period to the Sep-
07 to Mar-09 sample period is also consistent with market indicators as we find that the TED 
spread exceeded its historical average over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period by a factor of 
two over this period144. As a robustness check we also consider an alternative definition for 
the economic crisis associated with the financial crisis using dates from the NBER. 
                                                 
144 It is important to reiterate that this chapter seeks to evaluate whether there was a stronger US Treasury 
reaction to FFR shocks during the crisis period, in line with flight to quality trading arguments. In Chapter 3 we 
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 In Table 4.7 Panel A we estimate Equation 4.6 using robust MM-Estimator weighted 
least squares over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample. The 2  coefficient measures the US 
Treasury yield response to FFR shocks during the crisis period, from Sep-07 to Mar-09, and 
the 1  coefficient measures the response outside the crisis (non-crisis). Interestingly, we find 
that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a statistically significant 67.30 
basis point decline in the 3-Month Treasury yield outside the crisis period 1 , and a 78.04 
basis point decline during the crisis period 2 . We reject the Wald test for equality of 
coefficients 21    for the 3-Month Treasury at the 5% significance level. This implies that 
there is significant difference in response of the 3-Month Treasury to FFR shocks during the 
crisis compared to outside the crisis period. To test the robustness of our estimates, we 
exclude event-dates associated with employment release reports in Table 4.6 Panel B. We 
find that the 1  coefficient is indeed sensitive to this model specification, however upon 
excluding these event-dates; we find there is a significantly greater response of the 3-Month 
Treasury to FFR shocks during the crisis period145. In fact we reject the null hypothesis for 
equality of coefficients 21    at the 1% significance level. 
 Flight to quality during the crisis would imply a stronger US Treasury response to 
FFR shocks, as investors sell higher risk assets and increase their demand for safe-haven 
securities. We indeed find a stronger response of the 3-Month Treasury to FFR shocks during 
the crisis period and this is consistent with flight to quality trading. This is shown in Table 
4.7 Panel B as we find that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a 78.22 
(64.03) basis point decline in the 3-Month T-Bill yield during (outside) the crisis. This 
demonstrates that there is a significant 14 basis point difference in response attributable to the 
crisis period. Our estimates imply that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis were interpreted 
by market participants as being signals from the Fed of significantly deteriorating financial 
and economic conditions, thereby reinforcing flight to quality trading which was taking place, 
and prompting a sell of higher risk assets and higher demand for safe-haven securities such as 
3-Month Treasury Bills. Previous studies have shown that lower risk and highly liquid 
financial assets typically benefit from flight to quality trading (see McCauley and McGuire, 
                                                                                                                                                        
demonstrated that unexpected FFR cuts were associated with non-positive or negative stock responses. To 
investigate the remaining channel of flight to quality phenomenon, we retain this dating of the crisis period for 
comparability with the previous chapter. 
145 The 1  coefficient is more sensitive to event-dates associated with employment release reports because 
these event-dates occurred between 1989 and 1992. 
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2009) and given that 3-Month Treasury Bills are amongst the most highly liquid financial 
securities in the world, and widely perceived to be safe-haven securities (see Amihud, 
Mendelson and Pederse, 2012), it is unsurprising that we find this security as being 
characterised by flight to quality trading in response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis 
period. 
 Nevertheless, although we find that there is a highly significant structural shift in the 
relationship between 3-Month Treasury bills and FFR shocks characterised by the 2007-2009 
crisis period, in Table 4.7 Panel B we do not yield significant evidence for flight to quality 
trading across any other maturity US Treasuries. Furthermore, we unexpectedly find that US 
Treasuries across the term structure, from 3-Months to 30-Years respond significantly to FFR 
shocks both outside and during the crisis period. This evidence is inconsistent with previous 
studies which have demonstrated that very long-term maturity Treasuries do not respond 
significantly to FFR shocks over pre-crisis sample periods (see Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson, 2005; Kuttner, 2001). To explain this dilemma, we point out that the US Treasury 
market is significantly more forward looking than the US stock market. Previous studies have 
shown that the US stock market does not respond significantly to the path factor, which is 
associated with FOMC statements, however longer-term maturity Treasuries do respond 
significantly to this measure (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Wang, Yang and Wu, 
2006). 
As we explained in Section 4.3.4, the FOMC increasingly used forward guidance 
through FOMC statements to influence financial, monetary and economic conditions when 
the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound. These statements typically occurred 
following FOMC meetings and outlined the rationale behind target FFR decisions, outlined 
economic risks and the economic outlook, and often included an indication of the likely 
future trajectory of monetary policy. As target FFR decisions and FOMC statements occurred 
concurrently, our estimates in Table 4.7 may have been biased as they did not account for the 
impact of increasing use of forward guidance by the FOMC during the crisis. This has greater 
implications for longer-term maturity Treasuries which have been shown to be more forward 
looking and more likely to respond to these measures. Thus in the next section, we control for 
this measure to determine the robustness of our findings and to correct this omitted variable 
bias. 
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4.4.3 Controlling for non-conventional monetary policy: forward guidance 
In the previous section we demonstrated that 3-Month Treasury bills were 
characterised by flight to quality trading during the 2007-2009 crisis period as they yielded 
significantly larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks. However, we did not find significant 
evidence of flight to quality trading in other US Treasury securities. This may be explained 
by the fact that we did not control for the impact of non-conventional monetary policy by the 
Fed during the crisis146. As the target FFR approached the zero-lower bound in late 2008, the 
FOMC increasingly used forward guidance through statements and large-scale asset 
purchase programmes to influence financial monetary and economic conditions. These non-
conventional monetary policy measures were primarily intended to influence longer-term 
maturity Treasury yields, and given that we did not control for these measures, this may 
explain why we did not observe flight to quality trading in Treasuries of maturity beyond 3-
Months147. Thus we continue our investigation in a stepwise manner, by augmenting the 
previous model to control for forward guidance by the Fed through FOMC statements using 
the path factor  tPath  of Wongswan (2009), which is shown to be associated with FOMC 
statements (see Section 4.3.4). 
In Table 4.8 we estimate Equation 4.7 using robust MM-Estimator weighted least 
squares over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample148. The 1  coefficient measures the US Treasury 
response to FFR shocks outside the crisis period, whilst the 2  coefficient measures the 
response throughout the 2007-2009 crisis period. The 3  measures the US Treasury response 
to news from FOMC statements concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy and the 
economic outlook beyond that which they were aware of concerning the current level of the 
target FFR. 
                                                 
146 A study by Farka and Fleissig (2012) demonstrated that over the May-99 to Dec-07 sample period, 3-Month 
to 10-Year Treasuries yielded highly significant responses to FFR shocks however upon controlling for FOMC 
statements. 
147 The Fed has described non-conventional monetary policy in terms of more explicit use of forward guidance 
as follows: “The target for the federal funds rate, is already effectively as low as it can go ... [and] through 
"forward guidance," the Federal Open Market Committee provides an indication to households, businesses, and 
investors about the stance of monetary policy expected to prevail in the future ... [and] forward guidance 
language can put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and thereby lower the cost of credit for 
households and businesses, and also help improve broader financial conditions” (Federal Reserve Website, 
2013a). 
148 In Appendix A4.1 we also consider the impact of the path factor on US Treasuries outside the crisis and 
during the crisis period. The primary focus of this investigation is on the impact of conventional monetary 
policy shocks, and we only include non-conventional monetary policy as a control variable, hence we do not 
discuss the results here but relegate them to the robustness checks section. 
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     ttutcrisistcrisistt PathiDDy   321 1 ,     (4.7) 
 In Table 4.8 Panel A, we find that outside the crisis period, 3-Month to 10-Year 
maturity Treasuries are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks 1 , 
however the 30-Year Treasury is associated with a statistically insignificant response. The 
magnitude and statistical significance of the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR 
shocks is generally shown to decline in magnitude and statistical significance as the term to 
maturity is increased. These estimates are consistent with previous studies concerning the 
pre-crisis period which find that longer-term maturity Treasuries such as the 30-Year 
Treasury do not respond significantly to FFR shocks. In contrast, we find that US Treasuries 
across the term structure from 3-Months to 30-Years are associated with statistically 
significant responses to FFR shocks during the 2007-2009 crisis period 2 . As the 30-Year 
Treasury is associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks only during the 
crisis period, this stronger response is consistent with flight to quality trading. It implies that 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis increased investor demand for safe-haven securities 
such as very long-term maturity Treasuries. 
Upon excluding event-dates associated with employment release reports in Table 4.8 
Panel B, we find that these overall empirical conclusions remain relatively similar149. In 
Panel B we continue to find that 3-Month to 10-Year Treasuries respond significantly to FFR 
shocks outside the crisis period, whilst the 30-Year Treasury does not. Furthermore, we 
continue to find that 3-Month to 30-Year Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks 
during the crisis period. Our estimates demonstrate that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR 
cut is associated with a 78.23 (69.52) basis point decline in the 3-Month Treasury yield 
during (outside) the crisis period. We also reject the Wald test for equality of coefficients 
21    at the 5% significance level for the 3-Month Treasury which demonstrates that there 
is a significantly larger magnitude response to FFR shocks during the crisis period. This is 
consistent with estimates in the previous section (see Table 4.7), and demonstrates that 3-
Month Treasuries were characterised by flight to quality trading during the crisis, in response 
to unexpected FFR cuts. 
 Interestingly, after controlling for the impact of forward guidance by the FOMC on 
our estimates, we now find that longer-term maturity 5-Year and 10-Year Treasuries are 
characterised by significantly larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks during the crisis 
                                                 
149 Consistent with empirical evidence in previous tables, we find that our estimates are sensitive to event-dates 
associated with employment release reports (see Panel B). 
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period 2 . Our estimates show that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with 
a 47.05 (26.60) basis point decline in the 5-Year Treasury yield, and a 28.04 (11.75) basis 
point decline in the 10-Year Treasury yield during 2  (outside 1 ) the crisis period. In both 
cases, we reject the Wald test for equality of coefficients 21   , at the 5% significance level 
for the 5-Year Treasury and at the 1% significance level for the 10-Year Treasury. This 
demonstrates that there is a significantly larger magnitude response of 5-Year and 10-Year 
Treasuries to FFR shocks during the crisis period 2 , with an almost two-fold increase in the 
magnitude of response for both Treasuries. This stronger response to FFR shocks during the 
crisis period is consistent with flight to quality trading during the crisis period as investors 
sold higher risk financial assets and increased their demand for safe-haven securities such as 
longer-term maturity Treasuries. 
 In line with previous studies we find that the 3  coefficient is positive for US 
Treasuries across the maturity spectrum. This implies that FOMC statements which indicate a 
downward (upward) revision in the future path of monetary policy have a negative (positive) 
effect on US Treasury yields. The impact is shown to be tent-shaped, with a smaller 
magnitude impact on shorter-term (3-Month and 6-Month) and longer-term (10-Year and 30-
Year) maturity Treasuries, with the largest responses for intermediate-term (2-Year and 5-
Year) maturity Treasuries. In the case of 2-Year to 30-Year Treasuries, the magnitude of 
response is greater than that of conventional FFR shocks. Overall, we find that longer-term 
maturity Treasuries exhibit larger magnitude responses to FOMC statements. These estimates 
are robust towards excluding event-dates associated with employment release reports (see 
Panel B). 
 Due to the complexity of these results, in Figure 4.3 we plot the 1 , 2  and 3  
coefficients shown in Table 4.8 Panel B for each of the six Treasuries. This allows us to 
compare the US Treasury response to a hypothetical 1% FFR shock outside the crisis and 
during the crisis period, and also compare it against the impact of the path factor. Overall, 
these results indicate an important shift in the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR 
shocks characterised by the 2007-2009 crisis period. Firstly, we find that there is a 
significantly larger magnitude response of the 3-Month Treasury to FFR shocks during the 
crisis period. This is shown to be consistent with flight to quality trading during the crisis 
period as the 3-Month Treasury is one of the most liquid financial assets in the world. 
Secondly, we find that longer-term maturity 5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries yield 
larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period. In the case of the 5-Year 
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and 10-Year Treasuries, the magnitude of response is shown to be greater during the crisis by 
almost a factor of two. To complement this, the 30-Year Treasury is shown to respond 
significantly to FFR shocks only during the crisis period. This strengthening of the longer end 
of the maturity spectrum implies that investors increased their demand for longer-term 
maturity Treasuries during the crisis in response to unexpected FFR cuts. These empirical 
results demonstrate that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period were interpreted by 
market participants as signals from the Fed of deteriorating financial and economic 
conditions, and thereby prompted investors to rebalance their portfolios by selling higher risk 
asset such as equities (see Chapter 3) and increasing their demand for highly liquid financial 
assets such as the 3-Month Treasury, and safe-haven assets such as longer-term maturity (5-
Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) Treasuries.  
 
4.4.4 Controlling for non-conventional monetary policy: LSAP programmes 
In the previous section we demonstrated that the 3-Month Treasury was associated 
with a significantly larger magnitude response to FFR shocks during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period. Interestingly, upon controlling for increasing use of forward guidance by the FOMC, 
we yielded similar empirical conclusions for longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) 
maturity Treasuries. As we discussed in Section 4.3.5, the crisis period was characterised by 
several large-scale asset purchase programmes such as QE1, QE2, Operation Twist and QE3, 
and many of these programmes were announced on FOMC event-dates. One may therefore 
argue that our estimates in the previous section were influenced by these announcements. To 
control for the effects of LSAP announcements on our estimates, we use a dummy variable 
equal to one when these announcements coincide with event-dates in our dataset as detailed 
in Table 4.1. We subsequently augment the previous model to control for this measure of 
non-conventional monetary policy (Equation 4.8). 
     tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDy   4321 1 ,   (4.8) 
We present robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Equation 4.8 on 
FOMC event-dates in Table 4.9. Upon controlling for LSAP announcements, we find that our 
estimates are highly robust towards this model specification. More specifically, the 1 , 2  
and 3  coefficients in Table 4.9 Panel A and Panel B differ from those in Table 4.8 Panel A 
and Panel B by less than 2.5 basis points in each case. This is a strong indication that our 
estimates are not significantly influenced by LSAP announcements by the Fed over the 
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sample. In Figure 4.4 we plot the 1 , 2  and 3  coefficients shown in Table 4.9 Panel B for 
each of the six Treasuries to demonstrate the similarities with the estimates yielded in the 
previous model (see Table 4.8). In Table 4.9 Panel B, we once again find that 3-Month to 10-
Year Treasuries are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks outside 
the crisis period however 3-Month to 30-Year Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks 
during the crisis. We find that shorter-term (3-Month) and longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year and 
30-Year) Treasuries yield larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks during the crisis. In the 
case of the 3-Month, 5-Year and 10-Year Treasuries, this is shown by the fact that we reject 
the Wald test for equality of coefficients 21    at the 5% significance level, while the 30-
Year Treasury responds significantly to FFR shocks only during the crisis period. 
Our estimates concerning the impact of LSAP programme announcements on US 
Treasuries are quite revealing. In particular we find that 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries are 
associated with statistically significant responses to LSAP programme announcements during 
the crisis. The 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries are associated with roughly 17 and 18 basis 
point yield decreases on FOMC event-dates associated with LSAP announcements. The 
magnitude of this coefficient is in line with previous studies (see Hamilton and Wu, 2012; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Swanson, 2011). This evidence is also 
consistent with the fact that the QE1, QE2, Operation Twist and QE3 programmes by the Fed 
were primarily geared towards lowering long-term borrowing costs for business and 
households, and the fact that Treasury purchases in each of these programmes primarily 
included significant purchases of longer-term maturity Treasuries. As the Fed points out “the 
overall effect of the Fed's LSAPs is to put downward pressure on yields of a wide range of 
longer-term securities, support mortgage markets, and promote a stronger economic 
recovery” (Federal Reserve Website, 2013b) and our estimate demonstrate that longer-term 
maturity Treasury yields declined in response to these announcements. Overall, we find that 
our estimates are not sensitive to large-scale asset purchase announcements.  
 
4.4.5 Flight to quality in the gold market 
Having evaluated the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks during the 
2007-2009 crisis period in considerable depth, we have found significant evidence of flight to 
quality trading in response to FFR shocks during the crisis period, particularly for shorter-
term (3-Month) and longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year, 30-Year) maturity Treasuries. As a 
robustness check, we extend our analysis towards gold, an alternative safe-haven security. 
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This is motivated by several factors. Firstly on the 18th Sep 07, at the onset of the financial 
crisis, CNBC News reported “U.S. Gold ... Hit 28-year High After Fed Cut” (CNBC News, 
2007). This implies that the 50 basis point target FFR cut prompted investors to significantly 
increase their demand for this safe-haven security. Secondly, Baur and Lucey (2009) 
demonstrated that gold was a good safe-haven asset for most developed countries throughout 
the recent financial crisis. Thirdly, throughout this chapter we argue that unexpected FFR 
cuts during the crisis prompted flight to quality trading in the US Treasury market. If this 
argument is to hold, then it should also hold for alternative safe-haven securities such as gold. 
In this manner, it serves an robustness check for our argument. In Table 4.10 we re-estimate 
the empirical models used in this chapter using spot gold returns  tg  as the dependent 
variable in each case. In particular, we estimate Equations 4.9 to 4.13 using robust MM-
Estimator weighted least squares.  
ttt ig   ,         (4.9) 
t
u
tt ig   ,         (4.10) 
     tutcrisistcrisistt iDDg   21 1 ,      (4.11) 
     ttutcrisistcrisistt PathiDDg   321 1 ,     (4.12) 
     tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDg   4321 1 ,   (4.13) 
 The estimates for Equation 4.9 show that gold returns are associated with statistically 
insignificant responses to target FFR cuts 1  over the sample. However by disaggregating 
target FFR cuts in to expected and unexpected components using the technique of Kuttner 
(2001), we estimate Equation 4.10 and find that gold returns are associated with statistically 
significant positive (negative) responses to unexpected FFR cuts (increases) 1 . Interestingly, 
when we extend this analysis to investigate if the relationship between gold returns and FFR 
shocks is influenced by the 2007-2009 crisis period, by estimating Equation 4.11 we find that 
gold returns are associated with statistically significant positive (negative) responses to 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases) during the crisis 2 , and statistically insignificant responses 
to FFR shocks outside the crisis period 1 . The Wald test for equality of coefficients 21    
is also rejected at the 1% level which demonstrates that there is a highly significant structural 
shift in the relationship between gold returns and FFR shocks characterised by the crisis 
period. In particular, a hypothetical unexpected -0.50% FFR cut is associated with a 
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statistically significant gold return of 6.33% during the crisis 2  and a statistically 
insignificant response outside the crisis 1 . 
 When we estimate Equation 4.12, we yield very similar 1  and 2  coefficients to 
those previously observed (in Equation 4.11), which demonstrates that our estimates are 
highly robust towards this model specification. The impact of forward guidance through 
FOMC statements 3  is shown to be statistically insignificant which implies that upward or 
downward revisions in the future trajectory of monetary policy have no effect on spot gold 
returns, which is a sensible conclusion. Finally, we estimate Equation 4.13 and once again 
yield very similar 1  and 2  coefficients to those previously observed (in Equation 4.11 and 
Equation 4.12). However, we find that spot gold returns have statistically significant positive 
responses to LSAP announcements 4 . An LSAP announcement is shown to be associated 
with a 1.02% increase in gold returns. Across Equations 4.11 to 4.13, we find that there is a 
highly significant structural shift in the relationship between gold returns and FFR shocks 
characterised by the financial crisis. In each case gold returns do not respond significantly to 
FFR shocks outside the crisis period, however are associated with highly significant 
responses to FFR shocks during the crisis. Furthermore, we reject the Wald test for equality 
of coefficients 21    at the 1% level in each case. These models are all shown to be highly 
robust towards excluding event-dates associated with employment release reports and change 
by less than half a basis point in each case in Panel B. This significantly stronger response of 
gold returns to FFR shocks during the crisis period is consistent with flight to quality trading 
in response to unexpected FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis period. 
 The estimates in Table 4.10 concerning the gold market complement our findings 
concerning the US Treasury market, as we demonstrate that unexpected FFR cuts during the 
2007-2009 crisis period were associated with higher returns in the gold market and lower 
yields in the US Treasury market. In both cases, this implies that unexpected FFR cuts during 
the crisis prompted significantly higher demand for safe-haven securities such as gold and 
shorter-term (3-Month) maturity Treasuries, however risk aversion was so significant that it 
also prompted significantly higher demand for longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) 
maturity Treasuries. The stronger response of these safe-haven securities to FFR shocks 
during the crisis period is consistent with flight to quality trading in response to unexpected 
FFR cuts during the crisis, as investors rebalance their portfolios during times of economic 
and financial distress by selling higher risk securities such as equities (see Chapter 3) in 
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favour of lower-risk securities and safe-haven assets (see Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam, 
2005; Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). 
 
4.4.6 Further robustness checks 
Throughout this chapter we have undertaken a number of robustness checks for each 
of the estimated models however we undertake several further robustness checks in this sub-
section to determine the sensitivity of our estimates. Firstly, the primary focus of this 
investigation was to investigate the relationship between US Treasuries and conventional 
monetary policy shocks over the crisis period. As the latter part of the crisis was characterised 
by non-conventional monetary policy measures, it was important to control for these 
alternative measures to adequately model the relationship between US Treasuries and FFR 
shocks. In Table 4.9 we estimated the impact of FFR shocks on US Treasuries both outside 
and during the crisis period, and controlled for forward guidance through FOMC statements 
using the path factor of Wongswan (2009), as well as LSAP announcements. As the path 
factor was used purely as a control variable, we did not consider potential structural change in 
the US Treasury response to the path factor during the crisis and outside the crisis. To 
reassure the reader that this did not significantly influence our estimates, we consider this 
here as a robustness check. 
          tLSAPttcrisistcrisistutcrisistcrisistt DPathDDiDDy   54321 11 , (4.14) 
In Table A4.1 we present robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of 
Equation 4.14 on FOMC event-dates. In both Panels A and B, we find outside the crisis 
period that an FOMC statement which indicates a downward (upward) revision in the future 
trajectory of monetary policy is associated with a statistically significant decline (increase) in 
US Treasuries across the term structure from 3-Months to 30-Years outside the crisis period, 
however a statistically significant decline (increase) in longer-term 2-Year to 30-Year 
Treasuries during the crisis period. This evidence is rather revealing in that it demonstrates 
how only longer-term maturity Treasuries responded significantly to FOMC statements 
concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy during the crisis period. For the 10-Year 
Treasury in particular, the magnitude of response during the crisis is more than twice that 
observed outside the crisis period.  
These results are very interesting; however they do not change the empirical 
conclusions yielded throughout this chapter, as they are highly consistent with estimates 
presented in Table 4.8 and 4.9. In Table A4.1 Panel A we find that outside the crisis period, 
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3-Month to 10-Year maturity Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks however during 
the crisis 3-Month to 30-Year Treasuries are associated with significant responses to FFR 
shocks. In Panel B, we reject the Wald test for equality of coefficients 21    for the short-
term (3-Month) and longer-term maturity (5-Year and 10-Year) Treasuries, while the 30-Year 
Treasury is shown to respond significantly to FFR shocks only during the crisis period. We 
also continue to find that 10-Year and 30-Year Treasuries are associated with significant 
responses to LSAP announcements. 
Secondly, to demonstrate that our estimates for the gold market are not influenced by 
this model specification, we estimate Equation 4.15 in Table A4.2 using robust MM-
Estimator weighted least squares. In line with the estimates in Table 4.10, we find that gold 
returns are associated with statistically significant (insignificant) responses to FFR shocks 
during (outside) the crisis period. We find that FOMC states indicating a downward (upward) 
revision in the future trajectory of monetary policy does not have a significant effect on gold 
respects, which is sensible. Nevertheless, we continue to find that spot gold returns increase 
in response to LSAP announcements. 
          tLSAPttcrisistcrisistutcrisistcrisistt DPathDDiDDg   54321 11 , (4.15) 
 Thirdly, we defined the financial crisis as spanning the Sep-07 to Mar-09 period, 
motivated by events which transpired during the period. As an additional robustness check, to 
demonstrate that our estimates are not sensitive to the dating of the crisis, we use the NBER 
definition of the economic crisis. In Table A4.3 we estimate Equation 4.8 using robust MM-
Estimator weighted least squares however we define the  crisistD  variable as being equal to 
one for the Dec-07 to Jun-09 sample period. We continue to find that 3-Month to 10-Year 
Treasuries respond significantly to FFR shocks outside the crisis period while US Treasuries 
across the term structure from 3-Months to 30-Years are associated with significant negative 
responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. Our estimates also show that FOMC 
statements indicating a downward (upward) revision in the future trajectory of monetary 
policy is associated with a significant decline in yields across the maturity spectrum from 3-
Months to 30-Years. Interestingly, although we continue to find that the 3-Month, 5-Year and 
10-Year Treasuries are associated with significantly larger magnitude responses to FFR 
shocks during the crisis, each of the Wald tests 21    is rejected at the 1% level. We also 
yield some evidence that the 2-Year Treasury is associated with a significantly larger 
magnitude response to FFR shocks during the crisis. 
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 Lastly, to demonstrate that our estimates for gold returns were not significantly 
influenced by the dating of the crisis period, in Table A4.4 we estimate Equation 4.8 using 
robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares however we define the  crisistD  variable as being 
equal to one for the Dec-07 to Jun-09 sample period. We find that the estimates are highly 
consistent with those yielded in Table 4.10. In particular, we continue to find that gold returns 
respond significantly to FFR shocks only during the crisis period. A hypothetical unexpected 
0.50% FFR cut is associated with a 6.48% increase in gold returns during the crisis period. 
The estimates also indicate that gold returns do not respond significantly to FOMC 
statements concerning the future trajectory of monetary policy however do respond positively 
to LSAP announcements. Finally, when this chapter was first written, all the estimates were 
for the Jun-89 to Dec-10 sample period. The estimates were updated to the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample period in the write-up year of this thesis. Comparable empirical estimates were 
yielded in both cases. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Overall our findings indicate that conventional monetary policy shocks constituted an 
important source of variation in US Treasury yield changes and gold returns on FOMC event-
dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 period. We demonstrate that highly liquid financial assets 
such as gold, short-term (3-Month) and longer-term (5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) maturity 
Treasuries were characterised by flight to quality trading in response to unexpected FFR cuts 
during the 2007-2009 crisis period. This is demonstrated by the fact that we find a 
significantly larger magnitude response to FFR shocks during the crisis period. We show that 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period were perceived by market participants as being 
signals from the Fed that financial and economic conditions were rapidly deteriorating, and 
thereby prompted investors to sell higher risk securities such as equities (see Chapter 3) and 
increase their demand for safe-haven securities such as gold, and US Treasuries. We also 
control non-conventional monetary policy measures such as increasing use of forward 
guidance through FOMC statements and LSAP announcements on FOMC event-dates.  
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CHAPTER 4 – TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 4.1: Dates of LSAP announcements 
Date FOMC Meeting LSAP Programme Details 
25-Nov-08 No Quantitative Easing I The FOMC announces their plan to purchase $600billion in MBS and Agency Debt 
15-Dec-08 Yes Quantitative Easing I 
The FOMC implements QE1, a plan to purchase 
$500billion in AMBS and $100billion in Agency 
Debt 
18-Mar-09 Yes Quantitative Easing I 
The FOMC announces their plan to extend QE1 by 
purchasing a further $750billion in AMBS, 
$100billion in Agency Debt and $300billion in 
longer-term maturity Treasuries 
27-Aug-10 No Quantitative Easing II At a meeting in Jackson Hole, Bernanke indicates that a programme of QE2 may be implemented 
03-Nov-10 Yes Quantitative Easing II The FOMC announces their plan to purchase $600billion in longer-term maturity Treasuries 
21-Sep-11 Yes Operation Twist 
The FOMC announces ‘Operation Twist,’ a plan to 
purchase $400billion in longer-term maturity 
Treasuries, financed by selling shorter-term 
maturity Treasuries 
20-Jun-12 Yes Operation Twist The FOMC announce their plan to extend Operation Twist by $267billion 
13-Sep-12 Yes Quantitative Easing III The FOMC announce a programme of QE3, a plan to purchase $40billion a month in AMBS 
12-Dec-12 Yes Quantitative Easing III 
The FOMC announce their plan to extend QE3 by 
purchasing $40billion in AMBS and $45billion in 
longer-term maturity Treasuries 
Notes: Table 4.1 reports lists LSAP announcement dates, reports whether the announcement occurred on an on 
an FOMC meeting, details the common term for the LSAP measure and outlines the details of each LSAP 
announcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 210 of 295 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for gold returns and US Treasury yield changes 
Sample Period Obs Min Max Mean St.Dev 
Gold (Spot) 213 -2.73 3.45 0.17 0.97 
3-Month T-Bill 213 -57.61 37.60 -2.13 8.56 
6-Month T-Bill 213 -47.95 26.10 -2.45 8.26 
2-Year T-Bond 213 -35.14 28.60 -1.44 8.94 
5-Year T-Bond 213 -40.62 25.24 -1.23 9.09 
10-Year T-Bond 213 -47.36 24.30 -0.94 8.16 
30-Year T-Bond 213 -29.29 17.97 -0.55 6.47 
Notes: Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for spot gold and Treasury yield changes over the Jun-89 to Dec-
12 sample period. 
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Table 4.3: Response of US Treasuries to target FFR changes, OLS estimates 
 Obs α β1 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)     
3-Month T-Bill 213 -1.18*** 22.31*** 0.33 
  (0.42) (3.51)  
6-Month T-Bill 213 -1.65*** 19.02*** 0.26 
  (0.38) (3.48)  
2-Year T-Bond 213 -0.91** 12.49*** 0.09 
  (0.41) (3.46)  
5-Year T-Bond 213 -0.94** 6.87** 0.02 
  (0.42) (3.28)  
10-Year T-Bond 213 -0.81* 3.20 0.00 
  (0.42) (2.80)  
30-Year T-Bond 213 -0.51 0.93 0.00 
  (0.39) (2.40)  
Panel B (Excl Empl)     
3-Month T-Bill 204 -1.10*** 22.14*** 0.33 
  (0.42) (3.72)  
6-Month T-Bill 204 -1.53*** 18.43*** 0.25 
  (0.37) (3.60)  
2-Year T-Bond 204 -0.63 9.95*** 0.06 
  (0.40) (3.26)  
5-Year T-Bond 204 -0.74* 5.00 0.01 
  (0.42) (3.24)  
10-Year T-Bond 204 -0.66 1.76 0.00 
  (0.42) (2.84)  
30-Year T-Bond 204 -0.36 -0.50 0.00 
  (0.38) (2.42)  
Notes: Table 4.3 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation 4.4 on FOMC event-dates: ttt iy   1 , where ty  and ti  denote US Treasury yield 
changes and target FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A 
and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, OLS estimates 
 Obs α β1 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)     
3-Month T-Bill 213 -0.54 58.64*** 0.44 
  (0.42) (7.98)  
6-Month T-Bill 213 -0.88*** 58.25*** 0.46 
  (0.32) (6.67)  
2-Year T-Bond 213 -0.12 48.50*** 0.27 
  (0.39) (8.34)  
5-Year T-Bond 213 -0.34 32.68*** 0.12 
  (0.44) (9.74)  
10-Year T-Bond 213 -0.41 19.72** 0.05 
  (0.44) (8.55)  
30-Year T-Bond 213 -0.29 9.65 0.02 
  (0.40) (6.30)  
Panel B (Excl Empl)     
3-Month T-Bill 204 -0.47 62.79*** 0.46 
  (0.43) (7.88)  
6-Month T-Bill 204 -0.82** 60.88*** 0.48 
  (0.32) (6.58)  
2-Year T-Bond 204 -0.01 44.00*** 0.21 
  (0.39) (9.07)  
5-Year T-Bond 204 -0.30 28.55** 0.08 
  (0.44) (11.14)  
10-Year T-Bond 204 -0.38 16.01* 0.03 
  (0.45) (9.64)  
30-Year T-Bond 204 -0.24 5.13 0.00 
  (0.40) (6.39)  
Notes: Table 4.4 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of 
Equation 4.5 on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt iy   1 , where ty  and uti  denote US Treasury yield 
changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate 
the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels 
(A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.5: List of DFITs outlier event-dates 
3-Month 6-Month 2-Year 5-Year 10-Year 30-Year 
16-Oct-89 16-Oct-89 16-Oct-89 16-Oct-89 16-Oct-89 16-Oct-89 
    07-Dec-90 07-Dec-90 
01-Feb-91 01-Feb-91 01-Feb-91   01-Feb-91 
     08-Mar-91 
21-Aug-91      
20-Dec-91 20-Dec-91 20-Dec-91    
  09-Apr-92    
02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 02-Jul-92 
04-Sep-92 04-Sep-92 04-Sep-92 04-Sep-92   
 18-Apr-94 18-Apr-94 18-Apr-94 18-Apr-94 18-Apr-94 
 17-May-94 17-May-94 17-May-94 17-May-94 17-May-94 
16-Aug-94  16-Aug-94 16-Aug-94 16-Aug-94 16-Aug-94 
 27-Sep-94     
  06-Jul-95    
 15-Oct-98 15-Oct-98 15-Oct-98 15-Oct-98  
  03-Jan-01 03-Jan-01 03-Jan-01 03-Jan-01 
18-Apr-01      
  06-Nov-02 06-Nov-02   
  25-Jun-03 25-Jun-03 25-Jun-03 25-Jun-03 
 18-Sep-07     
  11-Dec-07 11-Dec-07   
22-Jan-08 22-Jan-08  22-Jan-08 22-Jan-08  
18-Mar-08 18-Mar-08 18-Mar-08 18-Mar-08 18-Mar-08  
16-Sep-08      
  08-Oct-08 08-Oct-08 08-Oct-08  
    16-Dec-08 16-Dec-08 
     28-Jan-09 
  18-Mar-09 18-Mar-09 18-Mar-09 18-Mar-09 
     21-Sep-11 
Notes: Table 4.5 reports FOMC event-dates associated with high influence statistics in Equation 4.5 identified 
using the Difference in Fits Statistic of Welsh and Kuh (1977). 
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Table 4.6: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, robust MM-
estimates 
 Obs α β1 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)     
3-Month T-Bill 210 -0.14 73.48*** 0.76 
  (0.26) (2.82)  
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.63** 66.78*** 0.71 
  (0.27) (2.92)  
2-Year T-Bond 210 0.20 62.93*** 0.51 
  (0.38) (4.28)  
5-Year T-Bond 210 -0.04 45.41*** 0.31 
  (0.44) (4.62)  
10-Year T-Bond 211 -0.01 29.30*** 0.18 
  (0.41) (4.23)  
30-Year T-Bond 212 0.11 14.96*** 0.07 
  (0.36) (3.70)  
Panel B (Excl Empl)     
3-Month T-Bill 202 -0.07 72.30*** 0.74 
  (0.26) (2.99)  
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.53** 64.98*** 0.72 
  (0.26) (2.87)  
2-Year T-Bond 202 0.24 57.13*** 0.43 
  (0.39) (4.60)  
5-Year T-Bond 202 -0.03 42.23*** 0.25 
  (0.46) (5.14)  
10-Year T-Bond 202 0.01 25.99*** 0.13 
  (0.41) (4.63)  
30-Year T-Bond 203 0.17 10.29*** 0.03 
  (0.36) (3.93)  
Notes: Table 4.6 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.5 
on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt iy   1 , where ty  and uti  denote US Treasury yield changes and 
unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of 
FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A and B). 
Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment 
report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
3-Month T-Bill 210 -0.16 67.30*** 78.04*** [0.04] 0.77 
  (0.25) (3.45) (4.30)   
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.60** 71.38*** 62.52*** [0.14] 0.72 
  (0.28) (3.72) (4.74)   
2-Year T-Bond 210 0.22 66.67*** 51.90*** [0.08] 0.53 
  (0.38) (4.90) (6.98)   
5-Year T-Bond 210 -0.04 45.85*** 44.64*** [0.90] 0.30 
  (0.45) (5.75) (8.03)   
10-Year T-Bond 211 0.00 30.58*** 26.88*** [0.67] 0.18 
  (0.42) (5.28) (7.10)   
30-Year T-Bond 212 0.16 18.63*** 11.12* [0.31] 0.08 
  (0.36) (4.51) (5.98)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
3-Month T-Bill 201 -0.06 64.03*** 78.22*** [0.01] 0.76 
  (0.25) (3.65) (4.16)   
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.55** 68.05*** 62.55*** [0.36] 0.70 
  (0.27) (3.94) (4.61)   
2-Year T-Bond 201 0.29 62.57*** 52.09*** [0.25] 0.45 
  (0.38) (5.81) (7.01)   
5-Year T-Bond 202 -0.05 40.08*** 44.60*** [0.67] 0.23 
  (0.46) (6.84) (8.11)   
10-Year T-Bond 202 0.00 25.12*** 26.79*** [0.86] 0.12 
  (0.42) (6.13) (7.03)   
30-Year T-Bond 203 0.15 9.41* 11.18* [0.82] 0.02 
  (0.36) (5.15) (6.03)   
Notes: Table 4.7 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.6 
on FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDy   21 1 , where ty  and uti  denote US 
Treasury yield changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded 
from all Panels (A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates 
associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis and forward guidance, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)        
3-Month T-Bill 209 -0.27 69.52*** 78.23*** 9.45*** [0.12] 0.77 
  (0.26) (3.51) (4.41) (2.24)   
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.65*** 70.27*** 66.21*** 22.65*** [0.44] 0.79 
  (0.24) (3.27) (4.11) (2.31)   
2-Year T-Bond 202 0.89*** 44.39*** 51.19*** 68.79*** [0.11] 0.88 
  (0.20) (2.51) (3.43) (2.30)   
5-Year T-Bond 203 0.70*** 25.71*** 47.01*** 76.17*** [0.00] 0.82 
  (0.25) (3.12) (4.14) (2.89)   
10-Year T-Bond 206 0.49* 13.02*** 27.97*** 59.90*** [0.02] 0.65 
  (0.29) (3.70) (5.11) (3.32)   
30-Year T-Bond 210 0.16 5.58 11.09** 34.36*** [0.38] 0.41 
  (0.29) (3.59) (5.14) (2.95)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)        
3-Month T-Bill 201 -0.19 67.10*** 78.35*** 8.54*** [0.04] 0.76 
  (0.25) (3.78) (4.26) (2.21)   
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.63*** 67.96*** 65.97*** 21.16*** [0.71] 0.77 
  (0.23) (3.57) (4.03) (2.30)   
2-Year T-Bond 193 0.96*** 45.06*** 51.30*** 69.56*** [0.16] 0.88 
  (0.20) (2.88) (3.38) (2.33)   
5-Year T-Bond 195 0.69*** 26.60*** 47.05*** 77.14*** [0.00] 0.82 
  (0.25) (3.64) (4.08) (2.94)   
10-Year T-Bond 197 0.50* 11.75*** 28.04*** 60.30*** [0.02] 0.64 
  (0.29) (4.34) (5.09) (3.40)   
30-Year T-Bond 201 0.17 0.95 11.08** 32.90*** [0.12] 0.38 
  (0.29) (4.05) (5.13) (3.00)   
Notes: Table 4.8 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.7 
on FOMC event-dates:      ttutcrisistcrisistt PathiDDy   321 1 , where ty  and uti  
denote US Treasury yield changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal 
to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is the component 
of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR changes. The 
sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. 
The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. 
Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 217 of 295 
Table 4.9: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis, forward guidance and LSAP announcements, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)         
3-Month T-Bill 209 -0.29 69.44*** 78.28*** 9.48*** 0.41 [0.11] 0.77 
  (0.26) (3.52) (4.40) (2.24) (1.36)   
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.65*** 70.30*** 66.38*** 22.73*** -0.28 [0.46] 0.79 
  (0.24) (3.29) (4.18) (2.32) (1.33)   
2-Year T-Bond 203 0.85*** 44.23*** 51.16*** 68.76*** 0.84 [0.11] 0.88 
  (0.21) (2.56) (3.50) (2.35) (1.14)   
5-Year T-Bond 204 0.74*** 25.93*** 46.90*** 76.24*** -1.74 [0.00] 0.83 
  (0.25) (3.10) (4.08) (2.86) (1.52)   
10-Year T-Bond 206 0.51* 13.10*** 26.84*** 59.97*** -16.97*** [0.04] 0.69 
  (0.30) (3.73) (5.44) (3.20) (2.17)   
30-Year T-Bond 208 0.17 4.52 10.42** 36.96*** -17.54*** [0.34] 0.58 
  (0.28) (3.47) (5.19) (2.76) (1.92)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)         
3-Month T-Bill 201 -0.20 67.05*** 78.41*** 8.59*** 0.28 [0.04] 0.76 
  (0.26) (3.79) (4.27) (2.22) (1.32)   
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.63*** 67.96*** 66.21*** 21.37*** -0.35 [0.75] 0.77 
  (0.24) (3.57) (4.07) (2.31) (1.30)   
2-Year T-Bond 193 0.93*** 44.88*** 51.36*** 69.82*** 0.84 [0.15] 0.87 
  (0.21) (2.90) (3.39) (2.37) (1.10)   
5-Year T-Bond 194 0.73*** 26.90*** 46.95*** 77.26*** -1.73 [0.00] 0.82 
  (0.25) (3.63) (4.04) (2.93) (1.51)   
10-Year T-Bond 197 0.50 11.57*** 27.68*** 59.38*** -16.69*** [0.02] 0.63 
  (0.30) (4.42) (5.26) (3.45) (2.14)   
30-Year T-Bond 200 0.18 0.43 10.35** 35.21*** -17.67*** [0.13] 0.56 
  (0.29) (3.96) (5.23) (2.83) (1.95)   
Notes: Table 4.9 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.8 
on FOMC event-dates:      tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDy   4321 1 , where ty  
and uti  denote US Treasury yield changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy 
variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is 
the component of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR 
changes. LSAPtD  is a dummy variable equal to one on FOMC event-dates associated with large-scale asset 
purchase announcements and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A 
and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.10: Flight to quality in the gold market, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)         
(i) Equation 4.9 213 0.09* -0.30 - - - - 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.22)      
(ii) Equation 4.10 213 0.07 -1.53*** - - - - 0.03 
  (0.05) (0.54)      
(iii) Equation 4.11 211 0.06 -0.65 -12.65*** - - [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.05) (0.55) (2.07)     
(iv) Equation 4.12 212 0.06 -0.66 -12.55*** -0.14 - [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.05) (0.56) (2.10) (0.41)    
(v) Equation 4.13 212 0.06 -0.68 -11.19*** -0.23 1.02***  0.18 
  (0.05)  (0.56)  (2.11)  (0.40) (0.30)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)         
(i) Equation 4.9 204 0.09* -0.27 - - - - 0.00 
  (0.05) (0.24)      
(ii) Equation 4.10 204 0.07 -1.42** - - - - 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.62)      
(iii) Equation 4.11 202 0.06 -0.34 -12.65*** - - [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.05) (0.64) (2.09)     
(iv) Equation 4.12 203 0.06 -0.35 -12.61*** -0.05 - [0.00] 0.14 
  (0.05) (0.64) (2.11) (0.42)    
(v) Equation 4.13 203 0.06 -0.38 -11.29*** -0.15 0.99***  0.17 
  (0.05)  (0.65)  (2.14)  (0.42) (0.30)   
Notes: Table 4.10 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equations 
4.9 to 4.13 on FOMC event dates:  
ttt ig   1  (4.9),  
t
u
tt ig   1  (4.10),       tutcrisistcrisistt iDDg   21 1  (4.11),      ttutcrisistcrisistt PathiDDg   321 1  (4.12),      tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDg   4321 1  (4.13),  
where tg  denotes the spot gold return.  ti  and uti  denote target and unexpected FFR changes respectively. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The 
path factor tPath  is the component of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future 
orthogonal to unexpected FFR changes. LSAPtD  is a dummy variable equal to one on FOMC event-dates 
associated with large-scale asset purchase announcements and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 
to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is 
excluded from all Panels (A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-
dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Figure 4.1: US Treasury yield level and target FFR level 
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Notes: Figure 4.1 shows the yields on 3-Month, 6-Month, 2-Year, 5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year on the run 
Treasuries and the target FFR over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The shaded area corresponds to NBER 
recession dates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 220 of 295 
Figure 4.2: Unexpected FFR change rolling coefficient 
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Notes: Figure 4.2 shows the unexpected FFR change coefficient from rolling robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Equation (36) on FOMC event-dates: 
t
u
tt iy   , where ty  and uti  denote US Treasury yield changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. We 
exclude the 17th Sep 01 event-date from estimation. The dotted lines denote the rolling 95% confidence intervals for the unexpected FFR change coefficient. We use a rolling 
window of 60 observations. In Panel A we use the 3-Month Treasury as the dependent variable, in Panel B we use the 6-Month Treasury as the dependent variable, in Panel C 
we use the 2-Year Treasury as the dependent variable, in Panel D we use the 5-Year Treasury as the dependent variable, in Panel E we use the 10-Year Treasury as the 
dependent variable, in Panel F we use the 30-Year Treasury as the dependent variable. 
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Figure 4.3: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis and forward guidance, robust MM-estimates, excluding employment 
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Notes: Figure 4.3 shows the coefficient estimates from Table 4.8 Panel B. The blue line corresponds to the 1  
coefficient which measures the response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes outside the crisis. The red 
line corresponds to the 2  coefficient which measures the response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR 
changes during the 2007-2009 crisis period.  
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Figure 4.4: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis, forward guidance and LSAP announcements, robust MM-estimates, 
excluding employment 
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Notes: Figure 4.4 shows the coefficient estimates from Table 4.9 Panel B. The blue line corresponds to the 1  
coefficient which measures the response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes outside the crisis. The red 
line corresponds to the 2  coefficient which measures the response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR 
changes during the 2007-2009 crisis period.  
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CHAPTER 4 – APPENDIX 
Table A4.1: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis, forward guidance and LSAP 
announcements, robust MM-estimates, structural change in the path factor 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)          
3-Month T-Bill 210 -0.29 69.65*** 77.64*** 10.51*** -4.75 -0.28 [0.16] 0.77 
  (0.26) (3.52) (4.44) (2.35) (9.36) (1.47)   
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.63** 69.98*** 64.78*** 23.82*** 12.46 -0.80 [0.32] 0.79 
  (0.24) (3.30) (4.11) (2.48) (7.64) (1.40)   
2-Year T-Bond 203 0.86*** 44.22*** 51.37*** 68.94*** 70.24*** 0.94 [0.10] 0.88 
  (0.21) (2.56) (3.50) (2.51) (6.78) (1.23)   
5-Year T-Bond 204 0.60** 25.42*** 46.77*** 75.33*** 119.15*** -0.77 [0.00] 0.85 
  (0.25) (3.16) (4.23) (3.01) (8.44) (1.54)   
10-Year T-Bond 206 0.43 12.68*** 31.33*** 60.53*** 125.06*** -3.80** [0.00] 0.74 
  (0.29) (3.63) (5.09) (3.40) (10.00) (1.92)   
30-Year T-Bond 208 0.25 4.11 10.59** 39.04*** 28.10*** -18.89*** [0.29] 0.59 
  (0.28) (3.44) (5.04) (3.01) (8.11) (2.15)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)          
3-Month T-Bill 200 -0.18 66.95*** 77.86*** 9.48*** -5.95 -0.44 [0.04] 0.77 
  (0.25) (3.73) (4.17) (2.28) (9.03) (1.38)   
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.56** 66.56*** 64.93*** 23.23*** 12.12 -0.95 [0.75] 0.78 
  (0.23) (3.50) (3.89) (2.44) (7.36) (1.32)   
2-Year T-Bond 194 0.94*** 44.87*** 51.54*** 70.01*** 71.02*** 0.92 [0.13] 0.87 
  (0.21) (2.89) (3.38) (2.53) (6.59) (1.19)   
5-Year T-Bond 194 0.58** 26.64*** 47.03*** 76.72*** 119.31*** -0.75 [0.00] 0.85 
  (0.25) (3.63) (4.05) (3.02) (8.21) (1.49)   
10-Year T-Bond 197 0.42 11.42*** 31.31*** 60.64*** 124.95*** -3.80** [0.00] 0.74 
  (0.30) (4.28) (5.12) (3.51) (10.04) (1.92)   
30-Year T-Bond 199 0.24 0.23 10.54** 36.98*** 28.51*** -18.70*** [0.11] 0.57 
  (0.29) (3.92) (5.11) (3.09) (8.21) (2.18)   
Notes: Table A4.1 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.14 on FOMC event-dates:           tLSAPttcrisistcrisistutcrisistcrisistt DPathDDiDDy   54321 11 , where ty  and uti  denote US Treasury yield changes and unexpected 
FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is the component 
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of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR changes. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B 
excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table A4.2: Flight to quality in the gold market, robust MM-estimates, structural change in the path factor 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)          
(i) Equation 4.14 211 0.05 -0.71 -13.68*** -0.22 2.86 0.55* [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.05) (0.56) (2.36) (0.42) (1.82) (0.31)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)          
(i) Equation 4.14 202 0.05 -0.41 -13.69*** -0.14 2.86 0.54* [0.00] 0.15 
  (0.05) (0.65) (2.38) (0.44) (1.84) (0.32)   
Notes: Table A4.2 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 4.15 on FOMC event-dates:           tLSAPttcrisistcrisistutcrisistcrisistt DPathDDiDDg   54321 11 , where tg  and uti  denotes the spot gold return and unexpected FFR 
changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is the component of 
change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR changes. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number 
of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes 
FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Table A4.3: Response of US Treasuries to unexpected FFR changes, controlling for the 
2007-2009 crisis (NBER Crisis: Dec-08 to Jun-09), forward guidance and LSAP 
announcements, robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)         
3-Month T-Bill 208 -0.23 69.05*** 118.28*** 9.97*** -0.18 [0.01] 0.68 
  (0.26) (3.45) (18.36) (2.23) (1.40)   
6-Month T-Bill 211 -0.64*** 72.13*** 65.59*** 22.57*** -0.32 [0.20] 0.80 
  (0.24) (3.26) (4.05) (2.30) (1.31)   
2-Year T-Bond 202 0.86*** 43.56*** 52.34*** 69.36*** 0.89 [0.04] 0.89 
  (0.21) (2.49) (3.38) (2.31) (1.11)   
5-Year T-Bond 205 0.74*** 24.90*** 48.20*** 76.17*** -1.70 [0.00] 0.82 
  (0.25) (3.09) (4.41) (2.87) (1.53)   
10-Year T-Bond 206 0.51* 12.04*** 28.65*** 60.36*** -16.90*** [0.01] 0.70 
  (0.29) (3.69) (5.05) (3.18) (2.16)   
30-Year T-Bond 208 0.17 3.63 11.88** 37.06*** -17.48*** [0.17] 0.58 
  (0.28) (3.46) (4.90) (2.75) (1.92)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)         
3-Month T-Bill 200 -0.11 66.18*** 121.68*** 8.85*** -0.45 [0.00] 0.66 
  (0.25) (3.60) (17.38) (2.14) (1.31)   
6-Month T-Bill 203 -0.62*** 69.96*** 65.47*** 21.07*** -0.38 [0.40] 0.78 
  (0.24) (3.55) (3.97) (2.28) (1.28)   
2-Year T-Bond 192 0.93*** 44.15*** 52.51*** 70.40*** 0.88 [0.05] 0.88 
  (0.20) (2.80) (3.27) (2.32) (1.07)   
5-Year T-Bond 196 0.74*** 25.07*** 48.16*** 76.84*** -1.70 [0.00] 0.82 
  (0.25) (3.62) (4.37) (2.94) (1.52)   
10-Year T-Bond 197 0.51* 10.20** 29.20*** 60.50*** -16.05*** [0.00] 0.65 
  (0.29) (4.28) (4.94) (3.38) (2.12)   
30-Year T-Bond 200 0.18 -0.64 11.94** 35.09*** -17.60*** [0.05] 0.56 
  (0.29) (3.94) (4.95) (2.83) (1.96)   
Notes: Table A4.3 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 
4.8 on FOMC event-dates:      tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDy  4321 1  , where ty  
and uti  denote US Treasury yield changes and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy 
variable equal to one during the Dec-07 to Jun-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is 
the component of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR 
changes. LSAPtD  is a dummy variable equal to one on FOMC event-dates associated with large-scale asset 
purchase announcements and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A 
and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A4.4: Flight to quality in the gold market (NBER Crisis: Dec-08 to Jun-09), 
robust MM-estimates 
 Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 β1 = β2 Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)         
(i) Equation 4.8 212 0.06 -0.73 -12.95*** -0.26 0.85*** [0.00] 0.18 
  (0.05) (0.55) (2.32) (0.40) (0.30)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)         
(i) Equation 4.8 203 0.06 -0.48 -13.04*** -0.19 0.82*** [0.00] 0.17 
  (0.05) (0.64) (2.36) (0.42) (0.30)   
Notes: Table A4.4 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 
4.8 on FOMC event-dates:      tLSAPttutcrisistcrisistt DPathiDDg   4321 1 , where tg  
and uti  denotes the spot gold return and unexpected FFR changes respectively. crisistD  is a dummy variable 
equal to one during the Dec-07 to Jun-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The path factor tPath  is the 
component of change in the four quarter ahead Eurodollar interest rate future orthogonal to unexpected FFR 
changes. LSAPtD  is a dummy variable equal to one on FOMC event-dates associated with large-scale asset 
purchase announcements and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all Panels (A 
and B). Panel A includes all FOMC event-dates. Panel B excludes FOMC event-dates associated with 
employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Chapter 5: The International Stock Market Reaction to Federal Funds 
Rate Surprises: Transmission during the Financial Crisis (Empirical 
Analysis) 
 
5.1 Abstract 
This chapter investigates the transmission of Federal Funds rate surprises to 43 international 
equity index returns over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a focus on the effect of the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis. In line with previous studies, we find that outside the crisis 
period, there is significant cross country heterogeneity in the responses of foreign equity 
indices to FFR shocks, increasing on average 2.80% in response to an unexpected 1% FFR 
cut. However, we find that during the crisis period, there is even greater heterogeneity in the 
responses of foreign equity indices to FFR shocks, with an unexpected 1% FFR cut being 
associated with significant 2.53%-7.50% decline across the equity indices of 12 countries, 
and 2.79%-14.04% increases across the equity indices of 19 countries. We find that cross 
country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period can 
only partly be explained in terms of real bilateral integration with the US economy, and find 
that external borrowing from the rest of the world is also an important determinant. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
“World stock markets were mixed today after the U.S. Federal Reserve slashed its key 
interest rate to historic lows and as worries lingered about the world's largest economy” 
(Watt, 2008) 
 On the 29th Oct 08, amidst the turmoil of the financial crisis, the FOMC sought to 
ease credit market conditions and stock market fears by cutting the target FFR by 50 basis 
points, after their scheduled FOMC meeting. Following the meeting, Reuters reported 
“S&P500 slip after Fed cuts rates” (Cooke, 2008) and later in the day, the Wall Street 
Journal reported “U.S. stocks end mostly lower after Fed cuts rates” (Gibson, 2008). 
However, when European equity markets opened the following day, the British press reported 
“FTSE 100 rises after US cuts rates” (Moore, 2008). This demonstrates that during the crisis 
period, target FFR cuts by the FOMC were interpreted differently both domestically and 
internationally. Furthermore, at the onset of the financial crisis, on 19th Sep 07, Reuters 
reported “FTSE rises 2.8% on Fed rate cut” (Lau, 2007) following a scheduled FOMC 
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meeting, however several months later on 11th Dec 07, they reported “FTSE falls after Fed 
rate cut” (Taylor, 2007). This demonstrates that the market participants in the UK may 
initially have seen target FFR cuts in the US as good news, however amidst the financial 
crisis, such cuts were interpreted as bad news, signals by the Fed of worsening financial and 
economic conditions. 
As we demonstrated in Chapter 2, there is an extensive empirical literature which 
examines the relationship between conventional FOMC monetary policy shocks and asset 
prices in the US. However, there are comparatively fewer studies which analyse the 
transmission of FFR shocks from the US to international equity markets. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly investigate the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis 
on this relationship. It is important to evaluate this relationship for a variety of reasons.  
Firstly, from an asset pricing perspective, if FFR shocks from the US influence foreign asset 
prices, then FOMC monetary policy should be considered to be a global risk factor, and this 
has important implications for pricing assets both domestically and internationally. Secondly, 
from a policy maker’s standpoint, if FOMC monetary policy has global asset pricing 
implications, then it could be used to insulate the US economy from foreign economic and 
financial crises150. Thirdly, from an investor’s perspective, if both domestic and international 
asset prices respond to FOMC monetary policy, there are limited opportunities for portfolio 
diversification against this global risk factor. 
 Previous studies which estimated the impact of FFR shocks on international equity 
markets prior to the 2007-2009 crisis period employed several empirical approaches to 
defining monetary policy shocks. The literature largely echoed that concerning the domestic 
US stock market, and emerged as a natural extension to the studies by Kuttner (2001) and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). More recent studies in this field have principally measured 
conventional monetary policy shocks in terms of expected and unexpected FFR changes, 
decomposing raw target FFR changes in to these components using the approach of Kuttner 
(2001). This market-based measure of unexpected FFR changes has been shown to be 
efficient as it represents a natural proxy for the market’s expectations of future FFR changes 
and associated forecast errors. It can also be defined using higher-frequency daily or intra-day 
data which is more likely to be exogenous and less likely to endogenously reflect other 
macroeconomic factors and news, compared to lower-frequency aggregate measures used in 
                                                 
150 For example, as Wongswan (2009) points out, the FOMC cut the target FFR three times in late 1998 to 
protect the US economy from the lasting effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
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many VAR related studies151. Furthermore, this measure has been shown to yield efficient 
and unbiased forecasts of the target FFR with a very small risk premium compared to 
alternative market instruments152. 
 Recent studies153 which measured conventional monetary policy shocks using the 
approach of Kuttner (2001) have demonstrated that unexpected FFR changes yield 
statistically significant responses in equity markets both domestically in the US and 
internationally in foreign equity markets (see Ehrmann and Fratzsher, 2009; Hausman and 
Wongswan, 2011). Furthermore, it has been shown that equity markets in both advanced and 
emerging market economies respond significantly to FFR shocks. However, there is an 
important caveat, as the impact across equity markets in different countries has been shown 
to be characterised by significant heterogeneity, with some yielding greater magnitude 
responses to FFR shocks than the US stock market, and other yielding lower magnitude or 
statistically insignificant responses. Nevertheless, in each country where the response is 
shown to be statistically significant, the estimated coefficient is negative, which implies that 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with positive (negative) returns in the equity 
market of that country. 
 In an earlier study, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) demonstrated that US 
Treasuries responded significantly to the ‘path factor’ measure which was shown to be 
associated with FOMC statements, however they found that US stock returns did not respond 
significantly to the measure. This finding was subsequently confirmed in another study by 
Wang, Yang and Wu (2006) which implied that equity markets were not as forward looking 
as US Treasury markets. In a more recent study, Wongswan (2009) developed a related ‘path 
factor’ measure and demonstrated that foreign equity indices did not respond significantly to 
this proxy of FOMC statements across a sample of 15 countries. This shows that both 
                                                 
151  Studies which measure FFR shocks using VAR approaches typically employ lower-frequency weekly, 
monthly, quarterly or annual data which is more likely to reflect a range of factors, and less likely to reflect a 
clean exogenous measure of FFR shocks. These studies also require a subjective interpretation of which 
variables to include in their model which can influence the outcome of estimates. For earlier studies which use 
this approach, see Thorbecke (1997) and Patelis (1997), for more recent studies see Bonfim (2003) and Rigobon 
and Sack (2004). 
152 Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2002, 2007) demonstrated that alternative monetary instruments such as the 
term federal funds loans, FFR futures, eurodollar deposits, commercial paper, eurodollar futures and Treasury 
bills all yielded forecasts of the FFR which were superior to that of a Bayesian VAR and AR(1) process. 
However the methodology of Kuttner (2001) which used FFR futures dominated all other measures in predicting 
the FFR at one-month to six-month horizons. 
153  For earlier studies which evaluate the relationship between international equity returns and conventional 
monetary policy shocks from the US, see Mudd (1979), Husted and Kitchen (1985), Johnson and Jensen (1993), 
Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), Anderssen (2003). 
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domestic and international equity markets are not as forward looking as other asset classes 
(see also Hausman and Wongswan, 2011). 
 Having found that foreign equity indices yielded highly heterogeneous responses to 
FFR shocks, and statistically insignificant responses to the path factor, these studies sought to 
investigate potential determinants for this relationship. In particular, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2009) analysed whether the heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR 
shocks could be explained in terms of real and financial integration with the US economy. 
They were motivated by the hypothesis that equity markets in countries with higher bilateral 
integration with the US economy in terms of trade and financial linkages would yield larger 
magnitude responses to FFR shocks. Interestingly, they concluded that the degree of global 
integration with the world economy, and not the degree of bilateral integration with the US 
economy was a significant factor in explaining this heterogeneity154 . Equity markets in 
counties with a higher degree of trade with the world yielded significantly greater responses 
to FFR shocks compared to those with a lower degree of trade with the world. They also 
found that equity markets in countries with higher business cycle correlation with the US 
yielded larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks. 
 In contrast to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006), a related study by Hausman and 
Wongswan (2006) found that real and financial integration with the US economy was more 
important than integration with the rest of the world in explaining cross country heterogeneity 
in the responses of international equity indices to FFR shocks155. A later study by Ammer, 
Vega and Wongswan (2010) argued that these two previous studies did not account for non-
synchronous trading as Asian and European equity markets typically responded to FFR 
shocks the following day when their equity markets opened. To account for this concern, they 
constructed a dataset of foreign assets which responded contemporaneously to FOMC 
announcements concerning the target FFR. They found that equities in countries with higher 
levels of external financing were more sensitive to FFR shocks, consistent with the credit 
channel. Furthermore, foreign equity markets where stocks were largely held by US investors 
were shown to yield larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks, consistent with the portfolio 
balance effect.  
                                                 
154 It was shown that equity markets in countries with a higher degree of bilateral trade with the world did not 
yield significantly greater responses to FFR shocks than those in countries with a lower degree of trade. 
155 This notable difference was pointed out in an earlier working paper by Hausman and Wongswan (2006) 
which was referring to the working paper by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) which was later published as 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009). 
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In this chapter, we investigate the transmission of Federal Funds rate surprises to 
international equity indices, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a particular emphasis on 
the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on this relationship. Our sample of foreign equity indices 
covers 43 advanced and emerging market economies 156 . We contribute to the existing 
empirical literature concerning this relationship in several important dimensions. Firstly, we 
demonstrate that a significant structural shift occurred during the crisis period which changed 
the nature of the relationship between foreign equity markets and FFR shocks across 26 
countries. We find that outside the crisis period there is significant cross country 
heterogeneity in the responses of foreign equity indices to FFR shocks, increasing 
(decreasing) on average 2.80% in response to hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut (increase). 
In line with previous studies, we find that countries in which the equity market responds 
significantly to FFR shocks outside the crisis period, the coefficient estimate is negative, 
which implies that unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with significant positive 
(negative) returns in the equity markets of those countries. However, our findings indicate 
that during the crisis period, there is even greater heterogeneity in the responses of foreign 
equity indices to FFR shocks, as the estimated coefficient is negative for some countries 
whilst positive for others. Our results indicate that a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cuts 
during the crisis is associated with significant 2.53%-7.50% declines in the equity indices of 
12 countries, and significant 2.79%-14.04% increases in the equity indices of 19 countries. 
 Secondly, this chapter attempts to understand why there is significant heterogeneity in 
the responses of foreign equity indices to FFR shocks during the crisis period. In particular, 
we seek to offer some explanations for why equity returns in some countries were positive 
and others were negative, following unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis. We find that this 
heterogeneity cannot be entirely explained by any single factor, but rather a combination of 
various factors. In particular, during the crisis period, factors such as the degree of bilateral 
integration with the US economy, and the degree of real integration with the world economy, 
can only significantly explain the responses of equity markets in countries with a higher 
degree of real integration with the US or world economy, and cannot significantly explain the 
responses of equity markets in countries with a lower degree of real integration157. In terms of 
financial linkages through the banking sector, we yield some evidence that during the crisis 
                                                 
156 The selection of countries was solely guided by availability of data. 
157  Previous studies have shown that real bilateral integration with the US economy (see Hausman and 
Wongswan, 2011), or real integration with the world economy (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009) are 
important determinants in explaining heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks outside the crisis 
period. 
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period, unexpected FFR cuts (increases) were associated with negative (positive) equity 
market returns in countries with higher external borrowing from the rest of the world158. 
 This chapter is structured as follows: in Section 5.3 we describe the dataset and 
sample period, in Section 5.4 we evaluate the econometric models and results, and finally in 
Section 5.5 we conclude the chapter. 
 
5.3 Data and sample period 
5.3.1 Measuring conventional monetary policy shocks 
In this section, we describe the dataset used in the empirical analysis. To measure 
conventional monetary policy shocks we use the event-study approach of Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005), disaggregating target FFR changes in to expected and unexpected 
components by gauging expectations from implied rates of CBOT futures contracts which 
track the underlying instrument of the effective FFR. Our dataset includes a set of event-dates 
of 189 scheduled FOMC meetings and 24 unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR 
changes, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. We refer the reader to Section 3.5.1 and 
Section 3.5.2 for a more detailed exposition concerning the measurement of conventional 
monetary policy shocks and for an analysis of the related descriptive statistics. 
 
5.3.2 Asset price data and timing discrepancies 
To investigate the relationship between international indices and unexpected FFR 
changes, we construct a dataset consisting of 43 equity index returns for a sample of 43 
emerging market and advanced economies using data from Datastream. For each of these 
countries, we consider the benchmark equity index for several important reasons. Firstly, they 
are closely followed by market participants and are widely quoted in academic studies and 
the financial press. Secondly, each benchmark equity index is representative of aggregate 
equity market index performance in that country and these measures are widely used by 
market participants, academic researchers and policy markers as national benchmarks against 
which the performance of alternative financial assets can be compared (see Christopherson, 
Cariño and Ferson, 2009; Taylor, 2010). In the context of investment analysis, the benchmark 
equity indices represent a diversified portfolio of stocks which respond to non-diversifiable 
                                                 
158 The negative response of equity markets in countries with higher degree of borrowing from the rest of the 
world is shown to be significant only at the 10% significance level. 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 234 of 295 
systemic risks such as FFR shocks. Thirdly, the benchmark equity indices typically represent 
the highest market capitalisation companies in a country, and thereby are more likely to be 
efficient in incorporating new information as they are more likely to consist of highly traded 
and liquid securities watched by market participants159. 
In Table 5.1 we list the main benchmark equity index associated with each country in 
our dataset. These indices are defined as benchmarks by Datastream however there is 
significant overlap with indices quoted by Bloomberg and the Financial Times Newspaper160 
as being indicative of benchmark equity market performance in each respective country. The 
selection of 43 countries is restricted only by data availability for all the variables and 
measures used in this chapter 161 . For each country (i) we calculate the stock market 
return  intitr  as the first difference of the natural log of the equity index  indextS  on the close of 
the FOMC meeting relative to that the previous day (see Equation 5.1).  
 indextindextit SSr 1int lnln*100  ,        (5.1) 
 Prior to discussing more technical nuances in the calculation of foreign equity index 
returns around FOMC announcements, it is important to outline how financial markets 
typically became aware of target FFR changes and non-changes over the sample period. From 
Feb-94, the FOMC began releasing press-release statements which outlined the current level 
of the target FFR and any changes of non-changes to the rate. The statement often contained 
further information concerning the rationale behind target FFR changes and non-changes, an 
evaluation of economic risks and an indication of the future trajectory of monetary policy162 
(see Section 4.5.3). These statements were typically issues at around 2:15pm Eastern 
Standard Time (EST) following scheduled FOMC meetings and unscheduled FOMC 
meetings with target FFR changes. Prior to Feb-94, market participants inferred target FFR 
                                                 
159 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) estimated the impact of FFR shocks on equally weighted foreign equity 
indices however they found that their estimates were “similar to whether or not value-weighted or unweighted 
return indices are used.” 
160 We refer here to the UK edition of the Financial Times newspaper. 
161 There was no data available for one or more of the real integration, macroeconomic or financial variables 
used later in this study for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Romania and Taiwan. This meant these countries 
could not be ranked in the later analysis and for this reason these countries were omitted from the dataset. For 
Cyprus and Slovenia, the benchmark equity indices cover less than one third of the sample period, hence these 
two countries are also omitted from the analysis to avoid significant sub-sample bias on estimation. 
162 Previous studies have shown that the US stock market only responds to target FFR shocks and not to other 
information contained within these statements (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005; Wang, Yang and Wu, 
2006). It has also been demonstrated the foreign equity indices only respond significantly to the unexpected 
component of target FFR changes and not to FOMC statements (see Wongswan, 2009; Hausman and 
Wongswan, 2011). 
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changes through open market operations by the Federal Reserve Ban of New York Trading 
Desk and subsequent news reports in the financial press (see Kuttner, 2003). These 
operations typically occurred at around 11:30am EST. On seven occasions prior to Feb-94 
and on eleven occasions following this date, announcements or observed open market 
operations significantly deviated from the above detailed timing schedule. We list these 
nineteen deviations in Table 5.2. 
 We raise this important point because the timing of FOMC announcements 
concerning the target FFR can have significant implications for the calculation of equity 
index returns in foreign equity markets. At 2:15pm EST when most announcements occurred, 
the equity markets in Brazil, Canada, Mexico and USA were typically open and therefore the 
markets responded to contemporaneously in real time to this news. However, equity markets 
in Asia-Pacific, Europe, Africa and the Middle East were closed and reacted to this news 
when markets opened the next trading day, hence we calculate equity market returns for these 
countries using the day following each FOMC announcement, relative to the day prior. In 
Figure 5.1 we standardise the trading hours for each of the 43 counties to EST to demonstrate 
that when the majority of announcements occurred at 2:15pm EST, few equity markets were 
open internationally. Throughout this chapter, we have made relevant adjustments to the 
calculation of equity index returns on FOMC event-days to account for the trading hours of 
each country, changes in summer time, and changes in actual trading hours over time as they 
were adjusted by exchanges.  The details of trading hours are from Bloomberg and Market 
Clocks (2013). 
It is also important to note that CBOT futures trade in the open market from 8.20am 
to 3.00pm EST. Thus the FOMC announcements on 18th Dec 90 and 15th Oct 98 detailed in 
Table 5.2 occurred after this time. For this reason we use the following day’s futures prices to 
calculate unexpected FFR changes for these dates. In line with previous studies (see 
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Kurov, 2010), we omit the 17th Sep 01 event-date from the 
analysis. This is due to the fact that the FOMC, Bank of England and European Central Bank 
co-ordinated monetary action on this date following the first day of trading in the US 
following the 11th Sep 01 attacks. 
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5.3.3 Proxies for real economic integration with the US economy, financial linkages 
and macroeconomic factors 
Following the initial empirical analysis in this chapter, we investigate whether 
heterogeneity in the responses of international equity indices to FFR shocks during the 2007-
2009 crisis period can be explained in terms of real integration with the US economy or in 
terms of other financial and macroeconomic factors. To measure the degree of each country’s 
real economic integration with the US economy, we use three proxies. Firstly, we use the 
ratio of each country’s trade with the US, that it is its exports plus imports, relative to its GDP. 
This is motivated by the fact that previous studies have shown it is a significant factor in 
explaining cross country heterogeneity in the response of equity returns to FFR shocks (see 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009). Secondly, we measure real integration 
with the US as the ratio of US imports from each country relative to its GDP. This is 
motivated by the fact that US demand for foreign goods may influence the relationship. 
Thirdly, we use the ratio of US exports to each country relative to its GDP. The trade data is 
from the International Trade Administration US Department of Commerce and GDP data is 
from the World Bank Development Indicators Database. 
To consider the role of financial and macroeconomic linkages in the transmission 
mechanism, we consider several other factors which may explain heterogeneity in 
international equity index responses to FFR shocks. Firstly, to consider the role of financial 
linkages through the banking sector, we use the ratio of each country’s external lending from 
the world relative to its GDP163. The data is from the Bank of International Settlements 
International Banking Statistics. Secondly, to consider the role of business cycle correlation 
in the relationship, we use the correlation of GDP growth rates in the US with each country. 
The data is from the WDI database. Thirdly we consider the role of time zone differences in 
the relationship. As Figure 5.1 shows, equity markets in some countries were open when the 
majority of FOMC announcements concerning the target FFR occurred, however Asian-
Pacific, European, African and Middle Eastern equity markets responded the next day. A 
study by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) demonstrated that the US stock market 
response to FFR shocks increased in magnitude as the announcement window was increased 
from intra-day to a daily frequency. In this manner, as Asian and European markets 
                                                 
163 As Wongswan (2009) points out, an extensive empirical literature has sought to measure the degree of 
financial integration of different countries however there is no academic consensus as to which variables are 
most appropriate for measuring these factors. 
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responded the following day, they may have responded differently to FFR shocks as they had 
more time to incorporate the new information. To account for this factor, we define a dummy 
variable equal to one for each country (i) if it was open or closed at the time of FOMC 
announcements using information from Bloomberg and Market Clocks (2013). 
 
5.3.4 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 5.3 we report descriptive statistics for international equity index returns in 
the 43 emerging market and advanced economies, on FOMC event-dates, over the Jun-89 to 
Dec-12 sample period. These returns are all adjusted for whether the equity market responded 
to FFR shocks contemporaneously in real time or the next day, and accordingly adjusted for 
timing discrepancies in the traditional FOMC announcement schedule as detailed in Section 
5.3.2 and Table 5.2. Overall, the summary statistics demonstrate that there is significant 
heterogeneity in international equity index returns on FOMC event-dates. The average 
change on FOMC event-dates is shown to be positive for 39 countries and negative for 4 
countries. We find that New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Philippines and Canada have 
the highest correlations of returns with US stock returns on FOMC event-dates, while 
Singapore, Pakistan, Russia and Poland have the lowest correlations.   
 
5.4 Econometric models and results 
5.4.1 Preliminary estimates 
In this section, we empirically investigate the transmission of Federal Funds rate 
surprises to international equity indices, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a particular 
emphasis on the impact of the 2007-2009 crisis on this relationship. We subsequently extend 
the analysis to investigate potential factors which explain the strength of transmission and 
magnitude of equity market response across countries to FFR shocks both outside and during 
the crisis period. As we demonstrated in Chapter 3, the relationship between US stock returns 
and FFR shocks was characterised by outlier observations which influenced estimation. This 
finding was consistent with previous studies which also found that the relationship was 
characterised by outliers (see Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). As we 
extend our investigation towards international equity markets, analysing the extent to which 
they respond to unexpected FFR changes by the FOMC, these relationships are highly likely 
to also be characterised by outlier observations akin to that observed for the domestic US 
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stock market in Chapter 3. To account for potential outliers in the international transmission 
of FFR shocks, we use the robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares methodology of 
Yohai (1987) throughout this chapter. This approach has been shown to be highly robust 
towards vertical outliers and leverage point outliers, as well as clusters of outliers. It has also 
been shown to be exhibit a high-breakdown point with higher Gaussian efficiency compared 
to classical OLS models (see Verardi and Croux, 2010). 
Our analysis begins in a stepwise manner, beginning with a simpler model 
specification and gradually augmenting and adapting the model to suit the characteristic of 
the dataset. We begin the econometric investigation by investigating the relationships 
individually, country by country to explore the depth the dataset. In particular, we estimate 
the impact of raw target FFR changes  ti on each foreign equity index  inttr  on FOMC 
event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period (see Equation 5.2). In line with previous 
studies, we use both scheduled (189) FOMC meeting and unscheduled FOMC meetings (24) 
with target FFR changes, and further exclude the 17th Sep 01 observation from all estimates. 
ttt ir  int ,         (5.2) 
 The robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Equation 5.2 are 
reported in Table 5.4, and each model is repeatedly estimated using equity index returns for 
each of the 43 countries in our sample. We specifically begin the investigation using this very 
simple model specification to demonstrate the inefficacy of this models in capturing the 
relationship between international equity index returns and conventional US monetary policy 
shocks. We find that equity market returns in Hong Kong are associated with significant 
positive (negative) responses to target FFR cuts (increases) over the sample period. Although 
this is in line with previous studies, unusually across 9 countries we find that the equity 
market response to target FFR cuts (increases) is negative (positive) and statistically 
significant. The estimates for these 9 countries not only contradict classical asset pricing 
theory but also contradict empirical conclusions yielded in previous studies concerning the 
pre-crisis sample period. One may argue that this unusual finding was rendered due to the 
fact that our sample period covers the 2007-2009 crisis period in its entirety, however our 
estimates in the next Table (5.5) demonstrate that these models are severely mis-specified 
because they consider a rather broad measure of conventional FOMC monetary policy. 
 Having yielded rather unusual estimates in Table 5.4, we continue our investigation 
by decomposing the broad measure of conventional monetary policy, i.e. raw target FFR 
changes, in to its constituent components concerning expected and unexpected FFR changes 
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using the technique of Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). In Table 5.5 we 
estimate the impact of unexpected FFR changes  uti on each foreign equity index  inttr  on 
FOMC event-dates over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period (see Equation 5.3). Our focus is 
primarily on the unanticipated component of FFR change, and this is motivated by the 
assumption that asset prices in efficient markets have already factored in and incorporated 
information concerning the anticipated component of target FFR change164.  
t
u
tt ir  int ,         (5.3) 
Table 5.5 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Equation 
5.3 which is estimated repeatedly using equity index returns for each of the 43 countries in 
our sample. We now find that unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with 
statistically significant positive (negative) returns in equity markets across 18 emerging 
market and advanced economies. Our estimates demonstrate that there is significant cross 
country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR shocks. The largest 
magnitude responses are observed in South Africa, Russia, Singapore, Brazil and Hong Kong. 
The equity market returns in these countries are shown to increase (decline) 5-7% in response 
to a hypothetical 1% FFR cut (increase).  
Furthermore, there is significant variation in the reactions of equity markets in both 
emerging market and advanced economies. Across the advanced economies, we find that 
equity markets in Singapore, Hong Kong and Italy exhibit significant larger magnitude 
responses to FFR shocks compared to Japan, Canada and the UK by a factor of two. Across 
emerging market economies, we find that equity markets in South Africa and Brazil exhibit 
larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks than many other advanced economies. This 
implies that heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks cannot be entirely 
explained by differences attributable to classification of advanced or emerging market 
economies. We also find that equity markets in more closed capital markets such as China, 
and Sri Lanka yield statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks, however equity 
markets in more open capital markets such as Denmark, France, and Germany also yield 
statistically insignificant responses. 
Overall, we find significant cross country heterogeneity in international equity index 
responses to FFR shocks from the US, ranging from statistically insignificant responses 
across 25 countries, to statistically significant responses in the remaining 18 countries. Our 
                                                 
164 Consistent with previous studies (see Ammer, Vega, and Wongswan, 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009 
Wongswan, 2009), we focus upon the unexpected component of target FFR changes. 
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estimates are highly consistent with those yielded by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) for the 
Feb-94 to Dec-04 sample period. They similarly documented statistically significant equity 
market responses to FFR shocks in less than half of the countries surveyed165. In line with 
their study, we also find significant cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to 
FFR shocks, with stronger responses for equity markets in Hong Kong, South Africa and 
Brazil. 
To evaluate the robustness of the estimates in Table 5.5 we re-estimate the models 
excluding event-dates associated with employment release reports. This robustness check is 
motivated by the fact that on eight occasions between 1989 and 1992, decisions by the 
FOMC concerning target FFR changes occurred several hours following employment release 
reports by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Rudebusch (1996, 1998) in particular argued that 
these decisions may in fact have reflected endogenous responses by the FOMC to these 
employment release reports. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we further excluded event-dates 
associated with employment release reports from estimation to determine the sensitivity of 
our estimates to this critique. Due to the size of tables concerning the international 
transmission of FFR shocks to international equity markets, robustness checks for estimates 
excluding event-dates associated with employment release reports are relegated to the 
Appendix. In Table A5.1 we report estimates akin to those in Table 5.5 excluding event-dates 
associated with employment release reports. 
We find that equity markets across the 18 countries which were shown to yield 
statistically significant responses to FFR shocks in Table 5.5 continue to exhibit statistically 
significant responses to FFR shocks in Table A5.1. This demonstrates that the estimates are 
highly robust towards this model specification. In each case where the response is statistically 
significant in Table 5.5, the coefficient estimate remains negative and statistically significant 
in Table A5.1166. However in Table A5.1 we also find that equity markets in Turkey and the 
Netherlands exhibit statistically significant responses to FFR shocks. Hence in these two 
cases, the estimates are shown to be sensitive to this model specification. 
 
 
                                                 
165 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) found that equity markets in 22 out of 49 countries yielded statistically 
significant responses to FFR shocks.  
166 In Table 5.5 we find that equity markets across 18 countries yield statistically significant responses to FFR 
shocks. Upon comparing the coefficient estimates for these countries with those in Table A5.1, we find that they 
are exactly the same for 7 countries. For the remaining 13 countries, they are shown to differ by less than 3 basis 
points in each case. 
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5.4.2 Structural change during the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that the relationship between US stock returns and FFR 
shocks was characterised by a highly significant structural shift attributable to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. More specifically, we found that US stock returns were not characterised by 
positive responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period, and in some cases they 
were shown to respond negatively. This implied that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis 
period ceased to be good news for stock market investors, and rather were interpreted by 
market participants as signals from the FOMC of worsening financial and economic 
conditions. We now extend our empirical investigation towards the international context. In 
particular, we seek to investigate whether international equity returns were characterised by a 
significantly different response to FFR shocks during the crisis period compared to that 
outside the crisis. Thus we interact unexpected FFR changes with a dummy variable 
 crisistD equal to one during the crisis period and zero otherwise; which allows us to separate 
the effects of equity return responses to FFR shocks outside the crisis period 1  and during 
the crisis period 2 . 
     tutcrisistcrisistt iDDr   21int 1 ,      (5.4) 
 Prior to estimating the model outlined in Equation 5.4, it is important to define how 
we date the financial crisis period. In Chapter 3 and in Chapter 4, we dated the financial 
crisis to the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period (see Section 2.7.1). This dating was motivated 
by monetary, financial and economic events which transpired both domestically and 
internationally during the crisis period. Dating the start of the financial crisis to the 
September 2007 month is motivated by a number of factors. Firstly, it corresponds to the first 
target FFR cut (-0.50%) by the FOMC since Jun-03 and thereby implicitly represents an 
acknowledgement by the Fed of declining financial and economic conditions. This is further 
reflected in the magnitude of the cut which was less ‘gradualist’ than previous target FFR 
changes and is clearly reflected in their accompanying statement which modestly stated that 
“developments in financial markets since the Committee’s last regular meeting have 
increased the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook.” 
 September 2007 was also characterised by the first bank-run in the United Kingdom 
for 150 years following leaked reports that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had authorised 
liquidity support from the Bank of England (BOE) for the British Bank Northern Rock. This 
demonstrates that the financial crisis which originated in the US had spread internationally to 
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the United Kingdom by this time. We also highlight that in Sep-07; the LIBOR rate reached 
6.7975%, the highest rate since Dec-98, and this was significantly higher than the BOE base 
rate which was set at 5.75%. The financial crisis had also been recognised by central banks 
internationally and this is demonstrated by the fact that the BOE had initially declined to 
pump liquidity in to financial markets however in Sep-07, however as the crisis escalated, 
they changed their monetary stance and announced the auction of £10billion167. 
 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 we dated the end of the financial crisis in Mar-09 when 
the S&P500 index reached its lowest level throughout the crisis period and began its recovery 
and this date was also consistent with the TED spread which was shown to be higher than 
historical average by a factor of two for the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period. As the financial 
crisis originated in the US and spread internationally through financial markets, and given 
that this chapter seeks to evaluate the impact of FFR shocks from the US to foreign equity 
markets, the dating of the financial crisis to the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period is equally 
applicable in the international context in this chapter. Thus we can adequately retain the Sep-
07 to Mar-09 dating of the global financial crisis in this chapter and accordingly define the 
dummy variable  crisistD . 
We also formally test for parameter stability in the relationship between international 
equity indices and FFR shocks using the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks. In Table 
5.6 we present the results for these tests which are applied to robust MM-Estimator weighted 
least squares estimates of Equation 5.3 for each of the 43 countries in our sample. We find 
there is significant cross country heterogeneity in structural breakpoints identified using this 
test for different countries168. As our estimates in Table 5.5 and estimates by previous studies 
demonstrate that international equity market responses to FFR shocks vary significantly in 
magnitude and statistical significance across different countries, this observation is similarly 
conveyed in the distribution of statistically significant and statistically insignificant structural 
breakpoints identified in Table 5.6 for different countries. Nevertheless, we find that the 
majority of break-dates identified in Table 5.6 cluster around the 2007-2009 crisis period. As 
a robustness check, we repeat the Quandt-Andrews tests for estimates of Equation 5.3 which 
                                                 
167 We primarily discuss events in the United Kingdom for clarity of expression as financial markets worldwide 
were characterised by financial, monetary and macroeconomic events which were of significant note, and 
discussion of all these events across 43 countries is beyond the scope of this chapter. We do not seek to identify 
all the possible events which occurred internationally during the crisis period, but rather seek to evaluate 
whether international equity markets responded differently to FFR shocks on FOMC event-dates during the 
crisis period.  
168 This is not surprising given that our estimates in Table 5.5 indicated that equity markets across 18 (25) 
countries yielded statistically significant (insignificant) responses to FFR shocks. 
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exclude event-date associated with employment release reports and come to a very similar 
conclusion. 
It is important to note that there is no general academic consensus regarding the 
precise dating of the global financial crisis period. To ensure our estimates in the following 
section are not sensitive to the dating of the financial crisis period, we also consider an 
alternative definition as a robustness check. The NBER dated the economic crisis associated 
with the financial crisis as spanning the Dec-08 to Jun-09 sample period. This dating lags 
behind the dating of the financial crisis due to lags in the transmission of financial market 
changes to the broader macroeconomy169. As this definition of the economic crisis is widely 
used in academic studies, we use this alternative dating of the general crisis period in the 
appendix as a robustness check170. 
 In Table 5.7 we report robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of 
Equation 5.4 which is estimated repeatedly using equity index returns for each of the 43 
countries in our sample. In each case the crisis dummy variable  crisistD  is defined as being 
equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. For each country, 
the 2  coefficient measures the response of equity index returns in that country to FFR 
shocks during the 2007-2009 crisis period, while the 1  coefficient measures the response 
outside the crisis. 
 Our estimates indicate that outside the crisis period 1 , foreign equity index returns 
are associated with statistically significant responses to FFR shocks across 15 advanced and 
emerging market countries171. In each case where the response is shown to be statistically 
significant outside the crisis period, the 1  coefficient is negative which indicates that outside 
the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with statistically significant 
                                                 
169 One may argue that economies across different countries responded to the financial crisis at different times, 
as the OECD dated the economic crisis in Japan to the Feb-08 to Mar-09 sample period. However it is important 
to recognise that these definitions of the crisis typically refer to the economic crisis and differ by country due to 
lags in the transmission mechanism from financial markets to the broader macroeconomy. The focus of this 
chapter is on the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the relationship between international equity 
returns and FFR shocks, and not the impact of the economic crisis. In the context of the modern, highly 
integrated, globalised financial market, crises can quickly spread through capital markets and have lagged 
effects on the economy of each economy; hence we retain the Sep-07 to Mar-09 dating of the financial crisis for 
this chapter. 
170 We find that our estimates in the following section are not significantly changed using this alternative 
definition of the crisis period.  
171 In line with previous studies concerning the pre-crisis period see (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009), equity 
markets across less than half of the countries surveyed yield statistically significant responses to FFR shocks 
outside the crisis period. 
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positive (negative) stock returns across these countries. The largest magnitude responses are 
observed in New Zealand, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, Italy and South Africa, with a 
hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cuts (increases) outside the crisis period being associated 
with 4-5% increases (declines) in equity returns in each case. 
 Overall, we find significant cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to 
FFR shocks outside the crisis period172. In Figure 5.2, we demonstrate this cross country 
heterogeneity in international equity return responses to FFR shocks graphically using a 
world map. The areas highlighted in green correspond to equity markets across countries 
which are shown to exhibit statistically significant positive (negative) responses to FFR cuts 
(increases) outside the crisis period173. We find that equity markets across both emerging 
markets (e.g. Phillipines and South Africa) and advanced economies (e.g. Canada and UK) 
respond significantly to FFR shocks outside the crisis period. In line with previous studies 
concerning the pre-crisis period see (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009), equity markets across 
less than half of the countries surveyed yield statistically significant responses to FFR shocks 
outside the crisis period174. Interestingly our estimates indicate that during the 2007-2009 
crisis period 2 , foreign equity index returns are associated with statistically significant 
responses to FFR shocks across 31 advanced and emerging market countries. This is more 
than twice the number of countries in which equity markets responded significantly to FFR 
shocks outside the crisis period. However, we find that the 2  coefficient is negative and 
significant for 19 countries, positive and significant for 12 countries and statistically 
insignificant for 12 countries.  
 Across the 19 countries where the 2  coefficient shown to be negative and 
statistically significant, this implies that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period are 
associated with positive stock returns in the benchmark equity indices of these countries. In 
each case, the magnitude of equity market response ranges from a 2.79% stock return 
increase in the Philippines to a 14.40% stock return increase in South Africa. In contrast, 
across the 12 countries where the 2  coefficient shown to be positive and statistically 
significant, this implies that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period are associated with 
                                                 
172 This is consistent with the evidence yielded in Table 5 without the structural break.  
173 We also include the response of the US stock market response to FFR shocks in the figures. The estimates 
correspond to those presented in Chapter 3. 
174 In line with previous studies (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011), equity 
markets across countries with more closed financial markets yield statistically insignificant responses to FFR 
shocks (e.g. China and Sri Lanka). 
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negative stock returns in the benchmark equity indices of these countries. In each case, the 
magnitude of equity market response ranges from a 2.53% stock return decline in Switzerland 
to a 7.50% stock return decline in Peru. This shows that regardless of the sign of the 2  
coefficient, a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut during the crisis is associated with 
comparatively larger magnitude above 2.50% stock return increase or decrease in the equity 
market of that country. The adjusted r-squared statistics also show that up to 34% of one-day 
variation in equity index returns can be explained in terms of FFR shocks from the US. 
 Overall, our estimates demonstrate that there is considerably greater cross country 
heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period compared to 
that outside the crisis. The standard deviation of the 2  coefficient across the 43 countries in 
Table 5.7 is more than three times greater than that of the 1  coefficient175. Whilst outside 
the crisis period the 1  coefficient is negative where statistically significant, during the crisis 
period, the 2  coefficient is either positive or negative where statistically significant. In 
Figure 5.3 we demonstrate the significant cross country heterogeneity in international equity 
market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis graphically using a world map. The areas 
highlighted in green (red) correspond to equity markets across countries in which stock 
returns responded positively (negatively) to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis, i.e. a 
negative (positive) and statistically significant 2  coefficient. It is immediately apparent that 
heterogeneity in international equity market response to FFR shocks during the crisis period 
cannot be entirely explained in terms of regional or geographical location176. Nor does the 
heterogeneity appear to be characterised by differences attributable to different responses 
across advanced and emerging market economies, in which equity markets are shown to be 
associated with positive (e.g. Canada and Indonesia) or negative (e.g. France and Peru) stock 
returns in response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis177. For a more complete picture 
of the international equity market response to FFR shocks during the crisis, we also highlight 
countries associated with statistically insignificant responses in Figure 5.4. 
 The estimates in Table 5.7 demonstrate that the relationship between international 
equity index returns and conventional monetary policy shocks from the FOMC is 
                                                 
175 The standard deviation of the 1  coefficient across the 43 countries is 1.71, and the standard deviation of the 
2  coefficient across the 43 countries is 3.55.  
176 For example, we find that equity markets in South America and Europe are associated with statistically 
significant positive (e.g. Brazil and Peru) or negative stock returns (e.g. France and UK). 
177  
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characterised by a structural shift attributable to the 2007-2009 crisis period. The Wald tests 
for equality of coefficients 21    also support this empirical conclusion, as we reject the 
null hypothesis of equality across 26 countries which are indicative of a highly statistically 
significant structural change across the majority of countries. This may be attributable to the 
fact that in equity markets across 19 countries, the response to FFR shocks outside the crisis 
period is statistically insignificant, however significant during the crisis period. Interestingly, 
equity markets in more closed capital markets such as those in India, Indonesia, and Sri 
Lanka also respond significantly to FFR shocks during the crisis period. As a robustness 
check for Table 5.7, we re-estimate the models excluding event-dates associated with 
employment release reports in Table A5.2. In every case where the 2  coefficient is 
significant in Table 5.7, it remains significant in Table A5.2. However, in Table A5.2, the 2  
ceases to remain significant for Netherlands and Philippines and becomes significant for 
Poland and Turkey. With these minor exceptions, the estimates presented in Table 5.7 are 
shown to be highly robust towards this model specification.  
As a further robustness check for Table 5.7, we re-estimate the models defining the 
crisis dummy variable  crisistD as being equal to one over the Dec-08 to Jun-09 sample period 
and zero otherwise in line with the NBER definition of the economic crisis. We find that the 
1  coefficient becomes significant for Netherlands, Portugal, Russia and Turkey. In the case 
of the 2  coefficient it ceases to remain significant for Australia, Luxembourg, Finland, India, 
Philippines and Portugal however becomes significant for China, Italy and Russia. As we 
would expect, our models are more sensitive to this model specification as it defines an 
entirely different interpretation of the economic crisis which followed the financial crisis.  
 
5.4.3 Fixed-effects panel estimation with robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares 
Thus so far, we have investigated the relationship between international equity index 
returns and FFR shocks over the crisis period using an individual country by country analysis, 
to demonstrate the significant cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR 
shocks, and to explore the depth of the dataset178. To evaluate the average responses of 
international equity indices to FFR shocks over the crisis period, we used fixed-effects panel 
estimation with robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares. We use the newly developed 
                                                 
178 This approach was also employed by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009), however they demonstrated that 
equivalent results could be obtained using fixed-effects panel techniques.  
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code of Verardi and Croux (2009) to estimate these models. This approach not only allows us 
to account for cross-country heterogeneity across coefficients, but also increase estimation 
efficiency through the estimation of fewer coefficients whilst simultaneously accounting for 
outliers in estimation. 
 In Table 5.8 Panel A, we estimate the response of international equity returns across 
all 43 countries to target FFR changes on FOMC event-dates, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 
sample period; using fixed-effects panel estimation with robust MM-Estimator weighted least 
squares (Equation 5.5). We find that on average, equity returns across countries are 
associated statistically insignificant responses to target FFR changes. This is consistent with 
empirical evidence presented in Table 5.4 with the individual country by country analysis. 
Upon disaggregating target FFR changes in to expected and unexpected FFR components, we 
find a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut (increase) is associated with an average 1.50% 
increase (decrease) in stock returns across international equity markets (Equation 5.6). 
ititit ir  int          (5.5) 
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itit ir  int          (5.6) 
We also estimate the impact of FFR shocks on international equity markets outside 
and during the 2007-2009 crisis period, akin to that in Table 5.7, however using fixed-effects 
panel estimation with robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares (Equation 5.7). The 
estimates in Table 5.8 Panel A demonstrate that outside the crisis period, a hypothetical 
unexpected 1% FFR cut (increase) is associated with an average 2.04% increase in stock 
returns across equity markets in the 43 countries. However the response to FFR shocks 
during the crisis period 2 is shown to be statistically insignificant across countries. Guided 
by empirical evidence from the country by country analysis in Table 5.7, it is immediately 
apparent that the statistical insignificance of the 2  coefficient is induced by the fact that 
equity markets in some countries were associated with positive stock returns whilst others 
were associated with negative stock returns in response to unexpected FFR cuts during the 
crisis. The 2  coefficient is thereby unable to capture the full nature and complexity of 
equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period across 43 countries. 
Nevertheless, we reject the null hypothesis for equality of coefficients using a Wald 
test 21   , which indicates that a highly significant structural shift occurred. In Table 5.8 
Panel B we re-estimate the three models excluding event-dates associated with employment 
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release reports and find that the estimated coefficient are larger in magnitude in each case 
where statistically significant.  
     ituitcrisisitcrisisitit iDDr   21int 1 ,      (5.7) 
 
5.4.4 Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks 
Several important observations can be made from the estimates in Section 5.4.2 and in 
Table 5.7 in particular. Firstly, we demonstrated that there is considerable cross country 
heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR shocks outside the crisis period 
and that this heterogeneity is comparatively greater during the 2007-2009 crisis. Secondly, 
we found that in countries where the equity market response to FFR shocks was statistically 
significant outside the crisis period, a hypothetical unexpected FFR cut (increase) was 
associated with positive (negative) stock return responses in the equity markets of those 
countries. Thirdly, we found that in countries where the equity market' response to FFR 
shocks is statistically significant during the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts were 
associated with positive stock return responses in equity markets of some countries and 
negative stock return responses in others. Fourthly, and most importantly, we found that there 
was a highly significant structural shift in the relationship between international equity 
returns and FFR shocks characterised by the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
We now turn to the more difficult question of why unexpected FFR cuts during the 
2007-2009 crisis period were associated with positive stock returns in some countries and 
negative stock returns in others. In particular, we augment the previous model (Equation 5.7) 
to account for potential factors which may explain differences in international equity market 
responses to FFR shocks. The complexity of this task is adequately presented in Figures 5.3 
and 5.4 which demonstrate the considerable cross country heterogeneity in international 
equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period. Upon closer examination of 
these maps, it is apparent that differences in equity market reactions cannot be entirely 
explained in terms of geographical location or in terms of differences attributable to 
responses of emerging market and advanced economies. Thus we continue our investigation 
by exploring other potential determinants in the international transmission of FFR shocks. In 
particular, we consider the role of real bilateral integration with the US economy and other 
macroeconomic, financial and geographic factors.  
To evaluate whether differences in the responses of international equity markets to 
FFR shocks during the 2007-2009 crisis period can be explained by these factors, we 
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augment the model outlined in Equation 5.7 to account for potential determinants in the 
transmission mechanism, extending upon the empirical methodology of Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher (2009). We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for 
each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across all countries over the 
Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable 
high
itX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the highest half 
of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero 
otherwise179. We interact each of these terms with the crisis dummy variable  crisistD  which is 
set equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise as well as the 
unexpected FFR change (Equation 5.8).   
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 Due to the complexity of this model, it is important to briefly outline how to interpret 
the coefficient estimates. In each case we assume X  refers to an arbitrary determinant such 
as the degree of real integration with the US economy. The 1  coefficient measure the 
average response of international equity markets, ranked in the bottom half of countries for a 
given determinant itX , outside the crisis period; while the 2  coefficient measures this 
response for the top half of countries. The 3  coefficient measure the average response of 
international equity markets, ranked in the bottom half of countries for a given 
determinant itX , during the 2007-2009 crisis period; while the 4  coefficient measures this 
response for the top half of countries. 
Our investigation begins by analysing the role of real bilateral integration with the US 
economy in the relationship between international equity returns and FFR shocks outside and 
during the crisis period. This is motivated by previous studies which have demonstrated that 
countries which are highly integrated with the US in terms of the real economy are likely to 
yield larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks compared to countries with a lower degree of 
real integration with the US (see Glick and Rose, 1999; Eichengreen, Barry and Rose, 1999; 
Forbes and Chinn, 2004). In this manner, conventional monetary policy shocks are more 
likely to influence stock returns in countries with higher real US trade links. This is because 
                                                 
179 As we are estimating the impact of FFR shocks on international equity returns both outside and during the 
crisis period, and including potential determinants in the relationship, we do not use the low, med and high 
definition of Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) to preserve degrees of freedom, and to avoid estimating excessive 
numbers of coefficients. 
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FFR shocks affect not only the financing costs of internationally trading companies, but also 
signal the Fed’s economic outlook, and therefore future economic prospects for these 
companies. For example, during the 2007-2009 crisis, unexpected FFR cuts not only reduced 
costs of international financing, but also signalled worsening economic and financial 
conditions in the US to domestic and international market participants. Hence, equity markets 
in countries with stronger macroeconomic ties with the US in terms of trade are more likely 
to respond to FFR shocks.  
To evaluate whether differences in the responses of foreign equity indices to FFR 
shocks during the crisis period can be explained in terms of real bilateral integration with the 
US economy, we measure the determinant itX  using three proxies. As detailed in Section 
5.3.3, we consider the ratio of US trade (imports plus exports) with each country relative to 
each country’s GDP, the ratio of US imports from each country relative to each country’s 
GDP and the ratio of US exports to each country relative to each country’s GDP180. In Table 
5.9 we report fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation 5.8 with robust MM-Estimator 
weighted least squares, in each case estimating the model defining the determinant itX  using 
one of the three proxies for real bilateral integration with the US. 
In the first line of Table 9 Panel A, we find that outside the crisis period, a 
hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with an average 1.78% (2.31%) increase in 
returns across international equity markets with a lower 1  (higher 2 ) degree of real 
bilateral integration with the US, in terms of trade. At first glance there appears to be a 
marked difference between these two coefficients however we find that the difference 
between them is not shown to be statistically significant different using the Wald test for 
equality of coefficients 21   . Nevertheless, both coefficients individually are shown to be 
statistically significant which implies that outside the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts 
(increases) are on average associated with positive (negative) stock returns across 
international equity markets, regardless of each country’s degree of real bilateral integration 
with the US in terms of trade. In Panel B we exclude event-dates associated with employment 
release reports as a robustness check, and yield very similar empirical conclusions however 
there is a markedly smaller difference between the 1  (2.78) and 2  (2.89) coefficients. 
Interestingly, this response is not characterised during the 2007-2009 crisis period, as 
we find that equity markets across countries with a higher degree of real bilateral integration 
                                                 
180 As Wongswan (2009) points out, this approach to measuring real bilateral integration with the US economy 
is common in the empirical literature. 
Mr Aman Saggu., B.S., M.S., 
Page 251 of 295 
with the US in terms of trade 4  respond significantly to FFR shocks, while equity markets 
across countries with a lower degree of real bilateral integration with the US in terms of trade 
3  yield statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks. This implies that real bilateral 
integration with the US economy can only explain cross country heterogeneity in 
international equity market responses to FFR shocks across countries with a higher degree of 
trade with the US. This evidence is also consistent with that presented in Table 5.7 and Figure 
5.3 in the country by country analysis as we show that equity markets in Canada, Singapore 
and Mexico respond positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period. These 
countries have the highest degree of trade with the US relative to the other countries in our 
sample. Our results can also be explained in terms of the trade linkages literature (see 
Eichengreen, Barry and Rose, 1999; Forbes and Chinn, 2004) as countries with stronger 
macroeconomic ties with the US in terms of trading links are more likely to respond to 
respond to macroeconomic events in the US such as conventional monetary policy shocks. It 
is however important to note that this response is not shown to be significantly different from 
that outside the crisis 2  using a Wald test 42   . As the 3  coefficient is shown to be 
statistically insignificant, this implies that this coefficient is unable to fully explain the cross 
country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period for 
countries with a lower degree of real bilateral integration with the US181. 
 These results are shown to be highly robust towards the definition of real bilateral 
integration with the US economy, as we obtain very similar empirical conclusions when 
using the ratio of US exports to each country relative to its GDP and the ratio of US imports 
from each country relative to its GDP as shown in Table 5.9. In both cases, we find that 
outside the crisis period there is no significant difference in equity market response to FFR 
shocks depending on the degree of real bilateral integration with the US in terms of exports or 
imports, as we do not reject the Wald test in either case 21   . Similarly, we find that during 
the crisis period, equity markets across countries with a higher 4  (lower 3 ) degree of real 
                                                 
181 Unexpectedly, the 3  coefficient is positive in its sign, and although it is statistically insignificant across the 
three models, it is shown to be significantly different from that outside the crisis period 31   . It is also 
shown to be significantly different from that during the crisis for equity markets across countries with higher 
degree of real bilateral integration with the US 42   . The statistical significance of this coefficient would 
imply that equity markets in countries degree of trade, exports or imports with the US respond negatively to 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period. As the coefficient is statistically insignificant, we do not continue 
this line of enquiry in the investigation. 
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bilateral integration with the US economy in terms of exports or imports yield statistically 
significant (insignificant) responses to FFR shocks. 
 Thus real bilateral integration with the US economy can explain some of the cross 
country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR shocks during the 
crisis period, particularly for countries with a higher degree of real bilateral integration with 
the US economy. However, it does not fully address why in Table 5.7, equity markets across 
some countries were shown to respond negatively to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis 
period 182 . We therefore continue our analysis by analysing a broader set of potential 
determinants in the international transmission of FFR shocks. More specifically, we 
investigate whether cross country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to 
FFR shocks can be explained in terms of financial and macroeconomic linkages, or in terms 
of geographical factors such as time zones. In Table 5.10 we report fixed-effects panel 
estimates of Equation 5.8 using robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares, and in each 
case defining the determinant using four measures of financial, macroeconomic and 
geographic linkages. As detailed in Section 5.3.3, these include the role of financial linkages 
through the banking sector, the role of business cycle correlation with the US and the role of 
international time zones and equity market opening times183. 
We begin our analysis by investigating the role of business cycle correlation with the 
US in explaining cross country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR 
shocks during the crisis period. This is motivated by previous studies which have sought to 
measure cross country co-movement in business cycles and real economic variables (see 
Frankel and Rose, 1998; Kose, Ahyan and Otrok, 2008). In Table 5.10 we find that outside 
the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with statistically significant 
positive (negative) equity market responses across countries regardless of their higher 2  or 
lower 1  degree of business cycle correlation with the US. The difference in equity market 
response is not shown to significantly depend on whether countries have higher or lower 
business cycle correlation with the US outside the crisis period, as we do not reject the Wald 
test 21   . However, during the crisis period we find that unexpected FFR cuts are 
associated with positive equity market responses across countries with a lower degree of 
business cycle correlation with the US 3 , and a statistically insignificant response across 
                                                 
182 In the robustness checks section (Section 5.4.5), we demonstrate that equivalent results can be yielded when 
considering real integration with the world economy akin to Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009). 
183 We also tested the role of exchange rate regime, exchange rate volatility; geographic distance and financial 
sector liberalisation however did not obtain economically meaningful results. 
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countries with a higher degree of business cycle correlation with the US 4 . This implies that 
cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks cannot be entirely 
explained in terms of business cycle correlation. In particular, whilst it can explain why 
equity markets across some countries responded positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the 
crisis period, it cannot adequately explain why others were shown to respond negatively.  
These conclusions are shown to be robust towards excluding event-dates associated with 
employment release reports in Panel B, although we find a markedly smaller difference 
between the 1  and 2  coefficients. 
 We continue our analysis by investigating the role of financial linkages through the 
banking sector in the international transmission of FFR shocks. This is motivated by the fact 
that previous studies in the financial linkages literature have argued this is an important 
channel through which macroeconomic announcements in the US can influence asset markets 
internationally (see Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, 2003; Forbes and Chinn, 2004). As 
Forbes and Chinn (2004) argue, a priori there is an indeterminate effect of macroeconomic 
announcements in a large economy on the asset markets of another country and the effects 
need to be estimated empirically. To simplify terminology, we refer to countries with a lower 
(higher) degree of bank lending from the rest of the world simply as lower (higher) external 
borrowing. In the first line of Table 5.10, we find that outside the crisis period, a hypothetical 
1% unexpected FFR cut is associated with a statistically significant average 1.69% (2.42%) 
increase in returns across equity markets with a lower 1  (higher 2 ) degree of external 
borrowing. The difference between these two coefficients is not shown to be significantly 
different using a Wald test 21   , and this implies that unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are 
associated with significant positive (negative) international equity market responses across 
countries regardless of their degree of external borrowing. Similarly, during the crisis period, 
a hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is shown to be associated with a statistically 
significant average 2.14% increase in equity market returns across countries with a lower 3  
degree of external borrowing. This response is not shown to be significantly different from 
that outside the crisis period 3  using a Wald test 31    which implies that equity markets 
across countries with a lower degree of external borrowing respond positively to unexpected 
cuts both outside and during the crisis period. 
 Interestingly, during the 2007-2009 crisis period, we find that a hypothetical 1% 
unexpected FFR cut is associated with a statistically significant average 0.95% decrease in 
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equity market returns across countries with a higher 4  degree of external borrowing. 
Although the 4  coefficient is only shown to be statistically significant at the 10% level, it is 
shown to be significantly different from the response outside the crisis period 2  using a 
Wald test 31   , and significantly different from the 3  coefficient using another Wald test 
43   . This is a first step towards explaining why equity markets across some countries 
were shown to respond positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis while others were 
shown to respond negatively as in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.3. Our estimates show that 
unexpected FFR cuts by the FOMC were interpreted as good (bad) news in equity markets 
across countries with a lower (higher) degree of external borrowing as they responded 
positively (negatively) to these shocks. These results require further explanation, and can be 
best explained using in the context of the financial linkages literature.  
Forbes and Chinn (2004) for example argue that negative macroeconomic news 
concerning the future economic outlook of a large economy can have negative effects in their 
equity market and in the equity markets of countries with strong financial linkages to the 
large economy through the banking sector. This is because banks in the large economy would 
strengthen their balance sheets and increase reserves for the economic downturn, and this 
sharp decline in credit would have negative effects in the equity markets of countries more 
dependent on external borrowing. In the context of our results, this implies that unexpected 
FFR cuts during the crisis period were interpreted by market participants as signals from the 
Fed of deteriorating economic and financial conditions, thereby resulting in negative response 
in the US stock market, as documented in Chapter 3. As US banks sought to strengthen their 
balance sheets and increase reserves for the economic downturn, this resulted in a sharp 
decline in lending by US banks, as we witnessed during the credit crunch. The sharp decline 
in lending by US banks would thereby have significant negative repercussions for countries 
with a higher degree of external borrowing, and this is why we found that equity markets 
across countries with a higher degree of external borrowing responded negatively to 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period 4 . In comparison, this significant decline in 
lending by US banks did not have as marked an impact on countries with a lower degree of 
external borrowing, hence equity markets across these countries continued to respond 
positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis 3 , as they did outside the crisis period 1 . 
This helps to explain the cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to 
unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period shown in Figure 3, as equity markets across 
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countries responded positively (negatively) partly due to their degree of higher (lower) 
external borrowing. 
Lastly, having demonstrated that financial linkages through the banking sector is an 
important determinant in explaining the transmission of FFR shocks during the crisis period, 
we now consider a geographical factor in the relationship. We already established from 
Figure 3, that cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks could 
not be entirely explained in terms of geographical location, however now we formally test 
whether this is the case. In particular, we consider the role of time zones and equity market 
opening hours in the relationship. This is motivated by the fact that some equity markets were 
open when the majority of FOMC announcements concerning the target FFR occurred and 
responded contemporaneously in real time to these announcements. However, countries in 
Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East and Africa responded to these announcements the 
following day when their equity markets were open. To simplify the terminology, we refer to 
countries which respond contemporaneously (the next day) to FOMC announcements 
concerning the target FFR simply as countries which respond contemporaneously (the next 
day) to FFR shocks. 
In Table 5.10, we find that outside period, unexpected FFR cuts are associated with 
statistically insignificant responses to FFR shocks across countries which respond 
contemporaneously to FOMC announcements 1 . At first glance this result appears to be 
rather unusual, however in Panel B we show that this model is sensitive to event-dates 
associated with employment release reports. Upon excluding event-dates associated with 
employment reports in Panel B, we find that outside the crisis period, a hypothetical 
unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a statistically significant average 4.31% (2.67%) 
increase in returns across equity markets which respond contemporaneously 1  (the next day 
2 ) to the shocks. This implies that there is a larger magnitude equity market response across 
countries which respond in real time to these announcements184. However, during the crisis 
period, we find that FFR shocks are associated with statistically significant (insignificant) 
responses across equity markets which respond contemporaneously 3  (the next day 4 ). To 
explain why the 4  coefficient is statistically insignificant, we turn to Figure 3 which shows 
the country by country analysis. As this coefficient represents the response of equity markets 
                                                 
184 This is a large and marked difference between the 1  and 2  coefficients however we do not reject the 
Wald test for equality of coefficients 31   . 
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to FFR shocks outside the crisis period, it clearly cannot capture the full diversity of reaction 
across Asia-Pacific, Europe, Middle East and Africa in the way it was able to outside the 
crisis period.  
 
5.4.5 Further robustness checks 
Throughout this chapter we have examined the robustness of our findings in a number 
of ways; however we also consider several further robustness checks in this section. Firstly, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) demonstrated that real integration with the world economy 
was more important than bilateral integration with the US economy in explaining cross 
country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR shocks. However 
Wongswan (2009) found that bilateral integration with the US economy was significant in 
explaining cross country heterogeneity in international equity market responses to FFR 
shocks. Thus in Table A5.6, we report fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation 5.8 using 
robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares and in each case defining the determinant as the 
ratio of each country’s trade (imports plus exports) to the rest of the world relative to its GDP. 
In Table A5.6 Panel A, we find that outside the crisis period, a hypothetical 
unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with an average 1.79% (2.31%) increase in returns 
across international equity markets with a lower 1  (higher 2 ) degree of real integration 
with the world in terms of trade. These estimates are in line with those yielded by Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2009), however the magnitude of each coefficient is lower as we consider a 
longer sample period. During the crisis period, we find that unexpected FFR cuts are 
associated with statistically insignificant responses across equity markets with 4  higher or 
lower 2  degree of real integration with the world economy. This implies that during the 
crisis period, real integration with the world economy is not a significant factor in explaining 
cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks. In Panel B we find 
that conclusions are not significantly changes when we exclude event-dates associated with 
employment release reports. 
Secondly, it is important to note that as the target FFR approached the zero-lower 
bound in late 2008, the FOMC began more non-conventional measures of monetary policy 
such as increasing forward guidance and large-scale asset purchase programmes. On the 25th 
Nov 08, the Fed announced the first round of Quantitative Easing, a plan to purchase 
$500billion in agency mortgage backed securities and $100billion in agency-debt. 
Furthermore on 16th Dec 08, the FOMC cut the target FFR by 75 basis points, effectively 
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pushing it towards the zero lower bound. To demonstrate that our estimates are not 
significantly influenced by the use of non-conventional monetary policy, in Table A5.6 we 
re-estimate the models presented in Table A5.9 and Table A5.10 for the Jun-89 to Nov-08 
sample period. We find that the empirical conclusions yielded in this chapter robust towards 
this alternative model specification185. Interestingly, during the 2007-2009 crisis period, we 
now find that a hypothetical 1% unexpected FFR cut is associated with a statistically 
significant average 1.13% decrease in equity market returns across countries with a higher 
4  degree of external borrowing. This response is also shown to be statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  
Thirdly, we deviate from previous empirical literature by examining a broader set of 
variables which could explain the significant heterogeneity in stock market responses to FFR 
shocks across 43 countries outside and during the crisis period. In particular we use a series 
of measures which include financial development, governance and liquidity indicators. We 
rank countries in to higher and lower categories using; the total stock market capitalisation as 
a percentage of GDP as a proxy for the depth and liquidity of the market in each country, a 
measure concerning the percentage of people in a country who use electronic payments to 
make payments as a proxy of the financial development and financial infrastructure of each 
country, the Chinn-Ito index which measures the degree of a country’s capital account 
openness as a proxy for financial development and governance in each country, the World 
Bank indicator for people’s perception of the rule of law in each country as a proxy for 
governance in each country, and finally the World Bank indicator for people’s perception of 
the quality of regulation in each country as a proxy for development and governance in each 
country186. 
In Table A5.6 Panels A, we find that outside the crisis period, an unexpected FFR cut 
is associated with greater positive stock return responses across countries with a higher 
degree of electronic payments, higher degree of capital account openness, higher market 
capitalisation relative to GDP, stronger regulatory framework and stronger rule of law. 
                                                 
185 The estimates for time-zones are not reported as the model could not be estimated due to collinearity across 
coefficients.  
186 The Chinn-Ito index is obtained from http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm and the corresponding 
paper is Chinn and Ito (2006). The remaining variables were obtained from the World Bank Indicators database. 
The ‘rule of law’ and ‘regulatory quality’ variables ranged from weak government (-2.5) to strong government 
(2.5) in each case. The former indicator ‘reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’ whilst the latter indicator ‘reflects perceptions of 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development’. 
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However, the difference in response is only shown to be significantly different between 
countries with a higher (2.61%) or lower (1.45) market capitalisation relative to GDP. During 
the crisis, we find that across countries with a lower degree of electronic payments, lower 
degree of capital account openness, higher market capitalisation relative to GDP, weaker 
regulatory framework and weaker rule of law, responded positively to unexpected FFR cuts 
throughout the 2007-2009 period.  Whilst this enriches the discussion concerning countries in 
which stock markets responded positively to unexpected FFR during the crisis, it does not 
significantly help to explain why stock markets in other countries responded negatively to 
these cuts during the crisis. These estimates are qualitatively similar upon excluding event-
dates associated with employment release reports in Panel B. 
Lastly, it is important to point out that other variables may also play an important role 
in the international transmission of FFR shocks, particularly during the crisis period, however 
as Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) point out, it is clearly impossible to capture all potential 
omitted variables across 43 countries in this relationship. This chapter nevertheless makes a 
vigorous first attempt at explaining the considerable cross country heterogeneity in equity 
market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period187.   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the transmission of Federal Funds rate surprises to 43 
foreign equity markets over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period, with an emphasis on the 
impact of the 2007-2009 crisis. We demonstrate that a significant structural shift occurred 
during the crisis period which changes the nature of the relationship between foreign equity 
markets and FFR shocks across 26 countries.  Our estimates confirm findings by previous 
studies by showing that outside the crisis period, there was significant cross country 
heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks. Nevertheless, unexpected FFR cut 
by the FOMC (increases) were shown to be associated with positive (negative) equity market 
responses across countries where the relationship was shown to be significant outside the 
crisis. In contrast, we demonstrate that during the crisis period, a hypothetical unexpected 1% 
FFR cuts during the crisis was associated with significant declines in the equity indices of 12 
countries, and significant increases in the equity indices of 19 countries. 
                                                 
187 We also recognise that during the 2007-2009 crisis period, financial markets globally were characterised by 
considerable uncertainty and the significant increase in cross country heterogeneity in equity market responses 
to FFR shocks may be characteristic of financial turmoil which ensued. It may therefore not be possible to 
clearly demonstrate which factors explain this relationship.  
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 We make a first attempt to explain the significant cross country heterogeneity in 
equity market responses to FFR shocks during the crisis period, and therefore consider a 
broad set of variable including proxies for real bilateral integration with the US economy, 
financial linkages through the banking sector, business cycle correlation with the US 
economy and geographical factors such as time zones. Overall we find that cross country 
heterogeneity in equity market responses to FFR shocks cannot be entirely explained by a 
single factor, but rather several factors. In particular, we find that equity markets across 
countries with a higher degree of trade with the US economy on average responded positively 
to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis, whilst on average countries with a higher degree of 
borrowing from the rest of the world on average responded negatively to unexpected FFR 
cuts during the crisis. Furthermore, we find that this heterogeneity in international equity 
market response to FFR shocks cannot be fully explained by trade and financial linkages. The 
responses are characteristic of greater investor uncertainty during the crisis period and this 
opens up an avenue for future research in the field.  
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CHAPTER 5 – TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 5.1: List of international equity indices 
Country Equity Index Name Start-Date Obs 
Australia  S&P/ASX 200 Jul-92 172 
Austria  Austrian Traded Index (ATI) Jun-89 213 
Belgium  BEL 20 Feb-90 204 
Brazil  Brazil Bovespa Feb-90 204 
Bulgaria  Bulgaria SE Sofix Nov-00 102 
Canada  S&P/TSX Composite Index Jun-89 213 
China  Shanghai SE A Share Feb-92 176 
Czech Republic  Prague SE PX Apr-94 156 
Denmark  OMX Copenhagen (OMXC20) Dec-89 205 
Egypt  Egypt Hermes Financial Feb-95 149 
Finland  OMX Helsinki (OMXH) Jun-89 213 
France  France CAC 40 Jun-89 213 
Germany  DAX 30 Performance Jun-89 213 
Greece  Athex Composite Jun-89 213 
Hong Kong  Hang Seng Jun-89 213 
Hungary  Budapest (BUX) Jan-91 193 
India  S&P BSE (100) National Jun-89 213 
Indonesia  IDX Composite Jun-89 213 
Ireland  Ireland SE Overall (ISEQ) Jun-89 213 
Italy  FTSE MIB Index Feb-98 125 
Japan  Nikkei 225 Stock Average Jun-89 213 
Luxembourg  Luxembourg SE General Feb-99 116 
Malaysia  FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Jun-89 213 
Mexico  Mexico IPC (Bolsa) Jun-89 213 
Netherlands  AEX Index (Aex) Jun-89 213 
New Zealand  NZX 50 Jan-01 100 
Norway  Oslo Exchange All Share Jun-89 213 
Pakistan  Karachi SE 100 Jun-89 213 
Peru  Lima Se General (IGBL) Jan-91 193 
Philippines  Philippine SE I (PSEI) Jun-89 213 
Poland  Warsaw General Index May-91 188 
Portugal  Portugal PSI-20 Feb-93 166 
Russia  Russia RTS Index Sep-95 144 
Singapore  Straits Times Index Oct-99 111 
South Africa  FTSE/JSE All Share Jul-95 146 
South Korea  Korea Se Composite (KOSPI) Jun-89 213 
Spain  Madrid Se General (IGBM) Jun-89 213 
Sri Lanka  Colombo Se All Share Jun-89 213 
Sweden  Omx Stockholm (OMXS) Jun-89 213 
Switzerland  Swiss Market (SMI) Jun-89 213 
Thailand  Bangkok S.E.T. Jun-89 213 
Turkey  Bist National 100 Jun-89 213 
UK  FTSE 100 Jun-89 213 
Notes: Table 5.1 reports the country and name of each of the 43 international equity indices in our sample. The 
third column reports the first available data-point and the fourth column denotes the number of observation 
dates available.  
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Table 5.2: List of timing discrepancies 
Date Time 
18-Dec-90 3.30pm 
01-Feb-91 9.15am 
30-Apr-91 9.30am 
13-Sep-91 9.10am 
06-Nov-91 8.45am 
20-Dec-91 8.30am 
02-Jul-92 9.15am 
04-Feb-94  11.05am  
18-Apr-94  10.06am  
16-Aug-94  1.18pm  
26-Mar-96  11.39am  
15-Oct-98  3:15pm  
18-Apr-01 10.54am  
17-Sep-01 8.20am  
22-Jan-08 8.21am  
08-Oct-08 7.00am  
27-Apr-11 12.33pm  
22-Jun-11 12.27pm  
Notes: From Feb-94, the FOMC has typically released a statement following scheduled FOMC meetings and 
unscheduled FOMC meetings with target FFR changes at around 2.15pm EST. Prior to Feb-94, target FFR 
changes were inferred by market participants through open market operations by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Trading Desk as well as subsequent news reports in the financial media and press (see Kuttner, 2003) 
at around 11:30am EST (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005). Table 5.2 lists significant deviations from 
this timing schedule over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. The timestamps for these event-dates are from 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005), Rosa (2012), and through searches of Reuters and Bloomberg News 
reports following FOMC meetings. 
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for international equity index returns 
Country  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev. Corr. with USA 
Australia  -2.66 4.26 0.30 1.07 0.50 
Austria  -9.34 7.61 0.23 1.69 0.31 
Belgium  -5.49 3.48 0.09 1.24 0.30 
Brazil  -4.55 12.68 0.36 4.91 0.56 
Bulgaria  -20.90 7.12 -0.02 2.83 0.17 
Canada  -2.51 4.68 0.27 1.07 0.43 
China  -7.92 7.52 0.41 5.95 0.19 
Czech -4.09 8.77 0.27 1.61 0.22 
Denmark  -4.17 3.18 0.09 1.17 0.15 
Egypt  -10.23 7.01 0.29 1.77 0.24 
Finland  -8.97 8.60 0.08 1.90 0.21 
France  -5.61 3.35 0.03 1.52 0.24 
Germany  -5.27 6.27 0.11 1.60 0.22 
Greece  -4.30 9.05 0.23 1.72 0.19 
Hong Kong  -6.31 12.06 0.47 2.02 0.21 
Hungary  -13.61 7.18 0.01 2.06 0.29 
India  -5.23 6.14 0.24 1.43 0.09 
Indonesia  -9.30 10.20 0.38 1.74 0.33 
Ireland  -5.76 4.75 0.17 1.45 0.18 
Italy  -6.88 3.18 -0.13 1.71 0.19 
Japan  -6.02 9.49 0.37 1.74 0.18 
Luxembourg  -30.05 5.75 -0.05 3.30 0.12 
Malaysia  -7.70 8.44 0.31 1.44 0.39 
Mexico  -8.40 6.35 0.45 1.70 0.55 
Netherlands  -4.54 3.55 0.06 1.30 0.28 
New Zealand  -1.51 3.22 0.16 0.79 0.58 
Norway  -4.52 5.85 0.09 1.36 0.24 
Pakistan  -8.91 6.17 -0.06 1.44 0.04 
Peru  -9.18 5.48 0.21 1.83 0.22 
Philippines  -6.85 6.81 0.34 1.66 0.46 
Poland  -6.24 8.84 0.32 1.95 0.08 
Portugal  -5.36 4.49 0.05 1.28 0.36 
Russia  -9.90 16.39 0.25 3.24 0.07 
Singapore  -2.68 7.53 0.26 1.45 0.03 
South Africa  -3.21 5.60 0.40 1.34 0.27 
South Korea  -5.27 11.28 0.31 1.78 0.16 
Spain  -5.77 4.20 0.00 1.56 0.21 
Sri Lanka  -3.84 2.97 0.02 0.92 0.08 
Sweden  -4.82 8.82 0.16 1.58 0.18 
Switzerland  -4.89 4.93 0.08 1.21 0.22 
Thailand  -7.84 8.66 0.32 2.01 0.11 
Turkey  -8.23 11.79 0.41 2.94 0.16 
UK  -4.78 5.44 0.05 1.16 0.22 
Notes: Table 5.3 reports descriptive statistics for one-day returns of equity indices associated with each of the 43 
countries in our sample on FOMC event-dates, over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period. 
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Table 5.4: Response of international equity index returns to target FFR changes, robust 
MM-estimates 
Country Obs α β1 Adj R2 s.e (α) s.e (β1) 
Australia  169  0.21***  0.32  0.00 (0.06) (0.29) 
Austria  210  0.28***  0.25  0.00 (0.07) (0.33) 
Belgium  202  0.18***  0.63**  0.02 (0.06) (0.26) 
Brazil  199  0.74*** -0.69  0.00 (0.13) (0.60) 
Bulgaria  93  0.12 -0.37  0.01 (0.07) (0.28) 
Canada  207  0.14*** -0.25  0.00 (0.05) (0.24) 
China  171 -0.03 -0.53  0.00 (0.09) (0.42) 
Czech 155  0.17** -0.03 -0.01 (0.08) (0.37) 
Denmark  205  0.14**  0.49  0.01 (0.07) (0.30) 
Egypt  145  0.14* -0.26  0.00 (0.07) (0.35) 
Finland  210  0.18*  1.07**  0.02 (0.09) (0.43) 
France  213  0.17*  0.42  0.00 (0.09) (0.39) 
Germany  212  0.21**  0.22  0.00 (0.09) (0.40) 
Greece  211  0.18**  0.77**  0.01 (0.09) (0.39) 
Hong Kong  209  0.21** -0.84**  0.02 (0.09) (0.41) 
Hungary  186  0.14  0.51  0.00 (0.08) (0.38) 
India  211  0.22***  0.15  0.00 (0.08) (0.36) 
Indonesia  208  0.28***  0.45  0.00 (0.07) (0.34) 
Ireland  212  0.25***  1.06***  0.04 (0.07) (0.32) 
Italy  124  0.05  0.63  0.00 (0.13) (0.55) 
Japan  209  0.24*** -0.47  0.00 (0.08) (0.37) 
Luxembourg  115  0.22*  0.25 -0.01 (0.11) (0.48) 
Malaysia  207  0.17*** -0.18  0.00 (0.05) (0.22) 
Mexico  209  0.40***  0.28  0.00 (0.07) (0.35) 
Netherlands  213  0.18**  0.58*  0.01 (0.08) (0.34) 
New Zealand  98  0.07 -0.03 -0.01 (0.06) (0.25) 
Norway  209  0.08  0.69**  0.02 (0.06) (0.29) 
Pakistan  210  0.02  0.04  0.00 (0.06) (0.29) 
Peru  191  0.14 -0.40  0.00 (0.09) (0.40) 
Philippines  210  0.27*** -0.35  0.00 (0.08) (0.38) 
Poland  180  0.29***  0.60*  0.01 (0.08) (0.36) 
Portugal  164  0.10 -0.03 -0.01 (0.07) (0.32) 
Russia  141  0.14  1.55*  0.02 (0.17) (0.80) 
Singapore  110  0.06  0.36  0.00 (0.09) (0.42) 
South Africa  143  0.27*** -0.34  0.00 (0.08) (0.37) 
South Korea  210  0.23***  0.19  0.00 (0.08) (0.39) 
Spain  211  0.16** -0.28  0.00 (0.08) (0.35) 
Sri Lanka  212 -0.01  0.20  0.00 (0.05) (0.2) 
Sweden  211  0.16**  0.33  0.00 (0.08) (0.35) 
Switzerland  208  0.19***  0.57**  0.02 (0.06) (0.27) 
Thailand  207  0.26*** -0.19  0.00 (0.09) (0.38) 
Turkey  212  0.30*  0.20  0.00 (0.16) (0.76) 
UK  211  0.08 -0.02  0.00 (0.06) (0.29) 
Notes: Table 5.4 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 
(5.2) on FOMC event-dates: ttt ir  int , where ti  denotes target FFR changes and inttr  denotes 
the equity index return for each country (i). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the 
number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all estimates. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Table 5.5: Response of international equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
robust MM-estimates 
Country Obs α β1 Adj R2 s.e (α) s.e (β1) 
Australia  171  0.19*** -2.57***  0.06 (0.06) (0.77) 
Austria  210  0.25*** -1.93**  0.02 (0.07) (0.87) 
Belgium  202  0.18***  0.36  0.00 (0.06) (0.64) 
Brazil  199  0.67*** -5.11***  0.06 (0.13) (1.37) 
Bulgaria  93  0.13* -0.05 -0.01 (0.07) (0.63) 
Canada  210  0.10** -1.81***  0.04 (0.05) (0.61) 
China  171 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 (0.10) (1.11) 
Czech  154  0.15* -2.19*  0.01 (0.08) (1.20) 
Denmark  205  0.13* -0.18  0.00 (0.07) (0.71) 
Egypt  144  0.12 -0.66  0.00 (0.07) (1.12) 
Finland  210  0.15  0.03  0.00 (0.10) (1.04) 
France  213  0.13 -1.17  0.00 (0.09) (1.01) 
Germany  212  0.18** -0.65  0.00 (0.09) (1.03) 
Greece  210  0.16*  0.00  0.00 (0.09) (0.99) 
Hong Kong  208  0.11 -4.61***  0.08 (0.09) (1.05) 
Hungary  186  0.14  0.68  0.00 (0.08) (0.86) 
India  211  0.19** -1.20  0.00 (0.08) (0.96) 
Indonesia  209  0.30***  0.78  0.00 (0.08) (0.87) 
Ireland  210  0.21*** -0.08  0.00 (0.07) (0.74) 
Italy  123  0.01 -4.12**  0.03 (0.13) (1.86) 
Japan  208  0.20** -1.53*  0.01 (0.08) (0.82) 
Luxembourg  115  0.17 -3.28**  0.04 (0.12) (1.34) 
Malaysia  207  0.16*** -0.79  0.01 (0.05) (0.53) 
Mexico  210  0.39*** -0.28  0.00 (0.07) (0.91) 
Netherlands  212  0.14* -1.37  0.01 (0.08) (0.87) 
New Zealand  98  0.07 -0.23 -0.01 (0.06) (0.64) 
Norway  212  0.07  0.27  0.00 (0.07) (0.72) 
Pakistan  210  0.03  0.32  0.00 (0.06) (0.62) 
Peru  191  0.10 -1.90*  0.01 (0.09) (1.02) 
Philippines  210  0.22*** -2.19**  0.03 (0.09) (0.86) 
Poland  181  0.25*** -0.93  0.00 (0.08) (0.82) 
Portugal  164  0.09 -2.37**  0.02 (0.07) (1.07) 
Russia  141  0.10 -6.12**  0.03 (0.17) (2.78) 
Singapore  110  0.06 -5.34***  0.22 (0.10) (0.95) 
South Africa  143  0.21*** -6.81***  0.17 (0.08) (1.25) 
South Korea  210  0.21** -0.37  0.00 (0.08) (0.90) 
Spain  211  0.09 -3.79***  0.07 (0.08) (0.94) 
Sri Lanka  212 -0.02 -0.14  0.00 (0.05) (0.52) 
Sweden  211  0.11 -2.44**  0.02 (0.08) (1.01) 
Switzerland  208  0.18***  0.37  0.00 (0.06) (0.63) 
Thailand  207  0.23*** -0.96  0.00 (0.09) (0.87) 
Turkey  213  0.30* -0.35  0.00 (0.17) (1.87) 
UK  211  0.04 -2.05***  0.03 (0.06) (0.75) 
Notes: Table 5.5 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 
(5.3) on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir  int , where uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes and inttr  
denotes the equity index return for each country (i). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate 
the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from all 
estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table 5.6: Quandt-Andrews structural breakpoint tests 
 Excl 911 Excl 911 & Empl 
Country Max F Exp F Ave F Break-Date Max F Exp F Ave F Break-Date 
Australia  2.71 0.75 1.38 Sep-98 2.02 0.58 1.09 Jun-03 
Austria  1.39 0.22 0.41 Jan-01 2.16 0.38 0.66 Dec-99 
Belgium  3.96 0.69 1.29 Oct-07 3.94 0.68 1.25 Oct-07 
Brazil  2.68 0.31 0.55 Jan-09 2.74 0.48 0.80 Apr-09 
Bulgaria  0.97 0.20 0.38 May-07 0.97 0.20 0.38 May-07 
Canada  3.98 1.15 2.18* Sep-08 7.66*** 2.65*** 4.26*** Mar-99 
China  0.88 0.16 0.31 Sep-09 0.83 0.07 0.13 Sep-09 
Czech  3.68 0.71 1.26 Jan-08 3.68 0.71 1.26 Jan-08 
Denmark  2.96 0.30 0.55 Mar-08 2.76 0.33 0.61 Mar-08 
Egypt  1.70 0.44 0.84 Oct-01 1.70 0.44 0.84 Oct-01 
Finland  1.62 0.33 0.63 Oct-07 1.89 0.35 0.65 Apr-92 
France  3.71 0.56 0.94 Oct-07 3.97 0.63 1.04 Oct-07 
Germany  2.75 0.44 0.79 Oct-07 2.98 0.50 0.89 Oct-07 
Greece  2.49 0.67 1.24 Nov-00 2.67 0.61 1.12 Aug-07 
Hong Kong  4.53 1.35* 2.14* Feb-95 3.49 0.67 1.19 Jun-08 
Hungary  2.28 0.39 0.71 Jun-99 2.55 0.44 0.78 Jun-99 
India  2.53 0.65 1.21 Dec-95 2.95 0.71 1.28 Dec-95 
Indonesia  4.56 1.43* 2.66** Nov-94 5.24* 1.56* 2.83** Nov-94 
Ireland  2.34 0.40 0.73 Oct-08 2.33 0.43 0.79 Jan-01 
Italy  3.21 0.66 1.04 Aug-09 3.21 0.66 1.04 Aug-09 
Japan  5.45* 1.36* 2.40** Sep-05 5.09* 1.25 2.21* Nov-05 
Luxembourg  2.79 0.55 0.93 Nov-01 2.79 0.55 0.93 Nov-01 
Malaysia  4.00 0.57 0.94 Apr-92 3.90 0.53 0.93 Apr-92 
Mexico  2.14 0.40 0.74 Aug-08 2.17 0.37 0.69 Aug-08 
Netherlands  3.51 0.57 0.98 Oct-07 4.07 0.61 1.01 Oct-07 
New Zealand  2.13 0.49 0.93 Jan-08 2.13 0.49 0.93 Jan-08 
Norway  5.46* 1.10 1.67 Oct-92 5.90** 1.11 1.57 Oct-92 
Pakistan  0.89 0.15 0.28 Jan-01 1.23 0.17 0.33 Mar-94 
Peru  2.66 0.65 1.17 Sep-07 2.72 0.69 1.23 Sep-07 
Philippines  1.81 0.37 0.70 Oct-08 2.22 0.51 0.95 Sep-94 
Poland  2.98 0.35 0.63 Apr-08 2.94 0.38 0.70 Apr-08 
Portugal  6.92** 1.28* 1.92* Nov-09 6.92** 1.28* 1.92* Nov-09 
Russia  2.07 0.26 0.46 Mar-01 2.07 0.26 0.46 Mar-01 
Singapore  1.23 0.31 0.59 Jan-09 1.23 0.31 0.59 Jan-09 
South Africa  3.15 0.83 1.55 Sep-98 3.15 0.83 1.55 Sep-98 
South Korea  5.66* 1.47* 2.59** Sep-92 4.91 1.44* 2.49** Nov-92 
Spain  2.17 0.34 0.61 Oct-92 2.58 0.33 0.59 Apr-92 
Sri Lanka  2.50 0.37 0.66 Apr-01 2.35 0.31 0.55 Apr-01 
Sweden  2.74 0.53 0.98 Sep-07 3.39 0.55 0.97 Sep-07 
Switzerland  6.72** 1.54* 2.54** Jun-07 6.61** 1.61** 2.67** Jun-07 
Taiwan  2.26 0.47 0.76 Aug-05 1.89 0.41 0.71 Nov-05 
Thailand  1.88 0.28 0.49 Feb-98 1.66 0.21 0.38 Feb-98 
Turkey  1.82 0.32 0.59 Oct-07 1.14 0.24 0.47 Aug-93 
UK  3.06 0.63 1.15 Dec-08 3.78 0.68 1.25 Mar-09 
Table 5.6 reports test statistics for the Quandt-Andrews test for structural breaks (Max F-Stat, Exp F-Stat, Ave 
F-Stat). The test considers the null hypothesis of no structural breaks versus the alternative of unknown 
structural breaks (Andrews, 1993). We use a trimming percentage of 15% and the probabilities are calculated 
using the methodology of Hansen (1997). The tests are performed on Equation (5.3) which is estimated using 
robust MM-weighted least squares on FOMC event-dates. For columns 2-5, we exclude the 17th Sep 01 event-
date in estimation, and in columns 6-9 we further exclude event-dates associated with employment release 
reports. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5.7: Response of international equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis, robust MM-estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 Adj R2 [β1 = β2] s.e (α) s.e (β1) s.e (β2) 
Australia  171  0.19*** -1.70** -5.55***  0.17 [0.00] (0.06) (0.84) (0.97) 
Austria  209  0.24*** -2.04**  3.16**  0.05 [0.00] (0.07) (0.89) (1.25) 
Belgium  202  0.18***  0.12  3.33***  0.04 [0.01] (0.06) (0.70) (1.03) 
Brazil  199  0.67*** -5.00*** -5.16**  0.05 [0.95] (0.13) (1.73) (2.20) 
Bulgaria  93  0.13* -1.00  0.31 -0.01 [0.31] (0.07) (1.04) (0.77) 
Canada  209  0.10** -1.64*** -5.68***  0.20 [0.00] (0.05) (0.63) (0.82) 
China  170  0.00  0.73  5.00  0.00 [0.27] (0.09) (1.26) (3.70) 
Czech  155  0.16* -3.37**  5.47***  0.14 [0.00] (0.08) (1.30) (1.24) 
Denmark  204  0.11 -0.50 -9.08***  0.04 [0.01] (0.07) (0.82) (2.99) 
Egypt  145  0.12*  1.17 -4.77***  0.13 [0.00] (0.07) (1.32) (0.99) 
Finland  209  0.11 -0.78 -11.74***  0.03 [0.02] (0.10) (1.22) (4.37) 
France  213  0.13 -1.14  5.14***  0.04 [0.00] (0.09) (1.05) (1.60) 
Germany  213  0.19** -0.66  6.27***  0.06 [0.00] (0.09) (1.07) (1.58) 
Greece  211  0.16* -0.48  4.49***  0.03 [0.01] (0.09) (1.07) (1.55) 
Hong Kong  210  0.08 -4.29*** -14.04***  0.34 [0.00] (0.08) (1.06) (1.43) 
Hungary  186  0.13  0.13  1.55  0.00 [0.43] (0.09) (1.09) (1.49) 
India  212  0.19** -1.33 -7.27***  0.10 [0.00] (0.08) (1.00) (1.45) 
Indonesia  210  0.29***  1.17 -9.48***  0.22 [0.00] (0.07) (0.88) (1.25) 
Ireland  210  0.21*** -0.23  0.21 -0.01 [0.77] (0.07) (0.89) (1.25) 
Italy  123  0.01 -3.97* -5.69  0.03 [0.72] (0.13) (2.07) (4.35) 
Japan  208  0.21** -1.21 -2.18  0.01 [0.57] (0.08) (0.99) (1.41) 
Luxembourg  115  0.17 -1.61 -5.33***  0.08 [0.12] (0.12) (1.78) (1.56) 
Malaysia  207  0.15*** -1.17* -0.16  0.01 [0.33] (0.05) (0.62) (0.86) 
Mexico  211  0.38*** -0.33 -7.35***  0.13 [0.00] (0.08) (0.95) (1.30) 
Netherlands  213  0.15* -1.46  4.86***  0.07 [0.00] (0.08) (0.88) (1.29) 
New Zealand  100  0.11* -5.20***  0.11  0.20 [0.00] (0.06) (1.01) (0.74) 
Norway  211  0.07 -0.01 -13.82***  0.08 [0.00] (0.07) (0.81) (3.09) 
Pakistan  210  0.04  0.59 -0.16 -0.01 [0.56] (0.06) (0.75) (1.05) 
Peru  192  0.11 -1.29  7.50***  0.11 [0.00] (0.09) (1.02) (1.54) 
Philippines  210  0.22** -1.89* -2.79*  0.02 [0.60] (0.08) (1.03) (1.42) 
Poland  181  0.24*** -1.44 -0.22  0.00 [0.47] (0.08) (1.05) (1.33) 
Portugal  162  0.09 -1.69 -6.23**  0.03 [0.15] (0.07) (1.14) (2.89) 
Russia  142  0.10 -4.48 -9.84  0.01 [0.49] (0.18) (3.12) (7.13) 
Singapore  110  0.06 -4.90*** -5.59***  0.21 [0.73] (0.10) (1.54) (1.24) 
South Africa  142  0.21*** -3.88*** -14.43***  0.19 [0.00] (0.08) (1.36) (2.75) 
South Korea  210  0.22***  0.69 -1.40  0.00 [0.24] (0.08) (1.13) (1.39) 
Spain  212  0.09 -3.65***  4.92***  0.10 [0.00] (0.08) (0.99) (1.48) 
Sri Lanka  211 -0.02 -0.15 -3.32***  0.07 [0.00] (0.05) (0.54) (0.78) 
Sweden  212  0.12 -2.23**  3.56**  0.04 [0.00] (0.08) (1.04) (1.39) 
Switzerland  208  0.17*** -0.40  2.53**  0.02 [0.02] (0.06) (0.72) (1.02) 
Thailand  206  0.22** -1.17 -7.55**  0.02 [0.09] (0.09) (1.06) (3.73) 
Turkey  213  0.27 -2.92  5.41*  0.02 [0.02] (0.17) (2.16) (2.93) 
UK  210  0.04 -1.83** -6.38**  0.04 [0.13] (0.06) (0.77) (2.94) 
Notes: Table 5.7 reports robust MM-weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation (5.4) on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDy   21 1 , where uti  denotes unexpected FFR 
changes and inttr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i). 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded 
from all estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5.8: Fixed-effects panel estimates, robust MM-estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 [β1 = β2] Adj R2 
Panel A (All Meetings)       
Equation (5.5) 8316 0.19*** -0.16   0.00 
  (0.02) (0.10)    
Equation (5.6) 8316 0.16*** -1.50***   0.00 
  (0.02) (0.23)    
Equation (5.7) 8316 0.15*** -2.04*** -0.53 [0.00] 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.29) (0.38)   
Panel B (Excl Empl)       
Equation (5.5) 8050 0.20*** -0.21**   0.00 
  (0.02) (0.10)    
Equation (5.6) 8050 0.17*** -1.86***   0.01 
  (0.02) (0.24)    
Equation (5.7) 8050 0.17*** -2.80*** -0.50 [0.00] 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.31) (0.37)   
Notes: Table 5.8 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation 
(5.5), Equation (5.6) and Equation (5.7) on FOMC event-dates, allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity: 
ititit ir  int  (5.5), ituitit ir  int  (5.6),      ituitcrisisitcrisisitit iDDr   21int 1  
(5.7), where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) 
across our sample of 43 countries. crisistD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. These models are estimated using the codes of Verardi and Croux (2009). The 
sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. 
The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from both Panels (A and B). Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates 
associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5.9: Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks: real integration with the US economy, robust MM-estimator 
weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj R2 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) US Trade 8175 0.16*** -1.78*** -2.31*** 0.90 -1.95*** 0.01 [0.35] [0.00] [0.00] [0.59] 
  (0.02)  (0.42)  (0.39) (0.55)  (0.54)      
(b) US Exports 8175 0.16*** -1.90*** -2.22*** 0.82 -1.87*** 0.01 [0.56] [0.00] [0.00] [0.60] 
  (0.02)  (0.40)  (0.40) (0.55)  (0.54)      
(c) US Imports 8175 0.16*** -2.00*** -2.11*** 0.56 -1.63*** 0.01 [0.84] [0.00] [0.00] [0.46] 
  (0.02)  (0.42)  (0.39) (0.55)  (0.54)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) US Trade 7909 0.17*** -2.78*** -2.89*** 0.92 -1.93*** 0.01 [0.86] [0.00] [0.00] [0.16] 
  (0.02)  (0.46)  (0.43) (0.56)  (0.53)      
(b) US Exports 7909 0.17*** -2.35*** -3.33*** 0.84 -1.85*** 0.01 [0.12] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] 
  (0.02)  (0.44)  (0.44) (0.54)  (0.53)      
(c) US Imports 7909 0.17*** -3.02*** -2.69*** 0.58 -1.60*** 0.01 [0.59] [0.00] [0.00] [0.11] 
  (0.02)  (0.46)  (0.43) (0.54)  (0.53)      
Notes: Table 5.9 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation (5.8) on FOMC event-dates:             tuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistit iXDiXDiXDiXDr   4321int 11 . Where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes 
and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) across our sample of 43 countries. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across 
all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable highitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country 
(i) at time (t) is in the highest half of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. The determinant X  is measured using: 
(a) the ratio of each country’s trade with the US (imports plus exports) relative to each country’ GDP, (b) the ratio of US exports to each country relative to each country’s 
GDP, (c) the ratio of US imports from each country relative to each country’s GDP. These models are estimated using the codes of Verardi and Croux (2009). The sample 
period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from both Panels (A and B). 
Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5.10: Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks: other macroeconomic and financial factors, robust MM-
Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj R2 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) GDP Growth Corr 8175 0.16*** -1.87*** -2.24*** -1.97***  0.79 0.01 [0.51] [0.00] [0.89] [0.00] 
  (0.02)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.55)  (0.54)      
(b) Borrower GDP World 8175 0.16*** -1.69*** -2.42*** -2.14***  0.95* 0.01 [0.20] [0.00] [0.51] [0.00] 
  (0.02)  (0.41)  (0.40)  (0.55)  (0.54)      
(c) Time Zone 8175 0.15*** -0.77 -2.16*** -6.39*** -0.10 0.01 [0.17] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.96) (0.30) (1.45) (0.39)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) GDP Growth Corr 7909 0.17*** -2.82*** -2.86*** -1.95***  0.81 0.01 [0.94] [0.00] [0.21] [0.00] 
  (0.02)  (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.53)      
(b) Borrower GDP World 7909 0.17*** -2.59*** -3.08*** -2.12***  0.98* 0.01 [0.43] [0.00] [0.50] [0.00] 
  (0.02)  (0.45)  (0.44)  (0.54)  (0.53)      
(c) Time Zone 7909 0.15*** -4.31*** -2.67*** -6.37*** -0.08 0.01 [0.15] [0.00] [0.25] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.32) (1.41) (0.38)      
Notes: Table 5.10 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation (5.8) on FOMC event-dates:             tuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistit iXDiXDiXDiXDr   4321int 11 . Where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes 
and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) across our sample of 43 countries. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across 
all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable highitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country 
(i) at time (t) is in the highest half of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. The determinant X  is measured using: 
(a) the correlation of GDP growth rates in the US with each country (i), (b) the ratio of each country’s (i) total level of bank lending from the rest of world relative to each 
country’s GDP, (c) time zones and opening times, countries which respond contemporaneously in real time, and countries which respond the next trading day. These models 
are estimated using the codes of Verardi and Croux (2009). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in 
estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from both Panels (A and B). Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Figure 5.1: International equity market time zones 
 
 
Notes: Figure 5.1 shows trading times for stocks in the benchmark equity index in each country. The data is 
obtained from Bloomberg and the Market Clocks Website (2013) 
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Figure 5.2: International equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes outside the 2007-2009 crisis,  1  coefficient in Table 5.7 
 
Notes: Figure 5.2 shows a world map which corresponds to Table 5.7. The countries highlighted in green correspond to equity markets which are associated with positive and 
statistically significant responses to unexpected FFR cuts outside the 2007-2009 crisis period; when the 1  coefficient in Equation 5.4 is negative and statistically significant. 
The chart is constructed using amMAP software.  
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Figure 5.3: International equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes during the 2007-2009 crisis, significant 2  coefficient in Table 
5.7 
 
 
Notes: Figure 5.3 shows a world map which corresponds to Table 7. The countries highlighted in green (red) correspond to equity markets which are associated with positive 
(negative) and statistically significant responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis periods; when the 2  coefficient in Equation 5.4 is negative (positive) 
and statistically significant. The chart is constructed using amMAP software.  
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Figure 5.4: International equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes during the 2007-2009 crisis, significant and insignificant  2  
coefficient in Table 5.7 
 
 
Notes: Figure 5.4 shows a world map which corresponds to Table 7. The countries highlighted in green (red) correspond to equity markets which are associated with positive 
(negative) and statistically significant responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis periods; when the 2  coefficient in Equation 5.4 is negative (positive) 
and statistically significant. The countries highlighted in light green (light red) correspond to equity markets which are associated with positive (negative) and statistically 
insignificant responses to unexpected FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis periods; when the 2  coefficient in Equation 5.4 is negative (positive) and statistically 
insignificant. 
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CHAPTER 5 – APPENDIX 
Table A5.1: Response of international equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
excluding employment 
Country Obs α β1 Adj R2 s.e (α) s.e (β1) 
Australia  168  0.20*** -3.88***  0.15 (0.06) (0.71) 
Austria  201  0.27*** -2.85***  0.03 (0.07) (1.01) 
Belgium  195  0.18***  0.12 -0.01 (0.06) (0.77) 
Brazil  194  0.67*** -4.69***  0.05 (0.13) (1.43) 
Bulgaria  93  0.13* -0.05 -0.01 (0.07) (0.63) 
Canada  200  0.08 -4.50***  0.22 (0.05) (0.59) 
China  170 -0.02  0.92  0.00 (0.09) (1.25) 
Czech 154  0.15* -2.19*  0.01 (0.08) (1.20) 
Denmark  198  0.12* -0.65  0.00 (0.07) (0.82) 
Egypt  144  0.12 -0.66  0.00 (0.07) (1.12) 
Finland  201  0.14 -1.48  0.00 (0.10) (1.27) 
France  203  0.15* -1.88  0.01 (0.09) (1.15) 
Germany  203  0.20** -0.91  0.00 (0.09) (1.19) 
Greece  201  0.20**  0.97  0.00 (0.09) (1.06) 
Hong Kong  201  0.10 -6.98***  0.15 (0.09) (1.17) 
Hungary  180  0.14  0.67  0.00 (0.09) (0.99) 
India  202  0.21*** -0.65  0.00 (0.08) (1.07) 
Indonesia  199  0.30***  1.07  0.00 (0.08) (0.98) 
Ireland  201  0.21*** -0.15  0.00 (0.08) (0.83) 
Italy  123  0.01 -4.12**  0.03 (0.13) (1.86) 
Japan  200  0.22** -1.82**  0.01 (0.09) (0.92) 
Luxembourg  115  0.17 -3.28**  0.04 (0.12) (1.34) 
Malaysia  198  0.16*** -0.72  0.00 (0.05) (0.56) 
Mexico  201  0.39*** -0.61  0.00 (0.07) (1.04) 
Netherlands  203  0.15* -2.28**  0.02 (0.08) (1.00) 
New Zealand  98  0.07 -0.23 -0.01 (0.06) (0.64) 
Norway  201  0.07 -0.19  0.00 (0.07) (0.82) 
Pakistan  201  0.02  0.15  0.00 (0.07) (0.68) 
Peru  185  0.11 -2.01*  0.01 (0.09) (1.15) 
Philippines  201  0.21** -1.93**  0.02 (0.08) (0.90) 
Poland  177  0.26*** -1.25  0.01 (0.09) (0.89) 
Portugal  164  0.09 -2.37**  0.02 (0.07) (1.07) 
Russia  141  0.10 -6.12**  0.03 (0.17) (2.78) 
Singapore  110  0.06 -5.34***  0.22 (0.10) (0.95) 
South Africa  143  0.21*** -6.81***  0.17 (0.08) (1.25) 
South Korea  202  0.23*** -0.41  0.00 (0.09) (1.00) 
Spain  202  0.10 -3.73***  0.05 (0.08) (1.10) 
Sri Lanka  202 -0.01  0.04  0.00 (0.05) (0.61) 
Sweden  202  0.13 -4.43***  0.06 (0.08) (1.20) 
Switzerland  199  0.19***  0.61  0.00 (0.06) (0.69) 
Thailand  198  0.22** -0.84  0.00 (0.09) (0.96) 
Turkey  204  0.31* -3.91*  0.01 (0.17) (2.34) 
UK  202  0.02 -2.26**  0.03 (0.07) (0.89) 
Notes: Table A5.1 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation 
(5.3) on FOMC event-dates: t
u
tt ir  int , where uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes and inttr  
denotes the equity index return for each country (i). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate 
the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. We exclude the 17th Sep 01 event-date, and event-
dates associated with employment release reports from all estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A5.2: Response of international equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis, excluding employment 
Country Obs α β1 β2 Adj R2 [β1 = β2] s.e (α) s.e (β1) s.e (β2) 
Australia  169  0.20*** -2.62*** -5.55***  0.19 [0.03] (0.06) (0.90) (0.95) 
Austria  201  0.26*** -2.99***  3.18**  0.06 [0.00] (0.07) (1.05) (1.24) 
Belgium  195  0.18*** -0.10  3.31***  0.04 [0.01] (0.06) (0.85) (1.08) 
Brazil  194  0.67*** -4.02** -5.17**  0.04 [0.69] (0.13) (1.90) (2.17) 
Bulgaria  93  0.13* -1.00 0.31 -0.01 [0.31] (0.07) (1.04) (0.77) 
Canada  201  0.10** -2.28*** -5.67***  0.21 [0.00] (0.05) (0.77) (0.83) 
China  169  0.00  1.08  4.97  0.00 [0.33] (0.10) (1.39) (3.75) 
Czech  155  0.16* -3.37**  5.47***  0.14 [0.00] (0.08) (1.30) (1.24) 
Denmark  197  0.11 -1.00 -9.08***  0.04 [0.01] (0.07) (0.95) (3.02) 
Egypt  145  0.12*  1.17 -4.77***  0.13 [0.00] (0.07) (1.32) (0.99) 
Finland  200  0.11 -2.35 -11.85**  0.03 [0.05] (0.10) (1.49) (4.56) 
France  204  0.15* -1.88  5.24***  0.05 [0.00] (0.09) (1.20) (1.58) 
Germany  204  0.21** -0.96  6.30***  0.07 [0.00] (0.09) (1.24) (1.58) 
Greece  201  0.19**  0.07  4.56***  0.03 [0.02] (0.09) (1.22) (1.53) 
Hong Kong  202  0.08 -6.63*** -14.04***  0.38 [0.00] (0.09) (1.19) (1.42) 
Hungary  181  0.14 -0.08  1.54 -0.01 [0.42] (0.09) (1.30) (1.52) 
India  203  0.21*** -0.82 -7.29***  0.11 [0.00] (0.08) (1.13) (1.40) 
Indonesia  201  0.29***  1.64 -9.48***  0.23 [0.00] (0.08) (1.01) (1.25) 
Ireland  202  0.21*** -0.52  0.17 -0.01 [0.68] (0.08) (1.07) (1.30) 
Italy  123  0.01 -3.97* -5.69  0.03 [0.72] (0.13) (2.07) (4.35) 
Japan  200  0.22** -1.57 -2.17  0.01 [0.75] (0.09) (1.17) (1.45) 
Luxembourg  115  0.17 -1.61 -5.33***  0.08 [0.12] (0.12) (1.78) (1.56) 
Malaysia  139 -0.01 -1.15**  0.35  0.02 [0.36] (0.03) (0.53) (0.44) 
Mexico  202  0.39*** -0.69 -7.34***  0.13 [0.00] (0.08) (1.10) (1.28) 
Netherlands  204  0.16** -2.52** 4.86***  0.08 [0.00] (0.08) (1.04) (1.32) 
New Zealand  100  0.11* -5.20***  0.11  0.20 [0.00] (0.06) (1.01) (0.74) 
Norway  202  0.07 -0.48 -13.83***  0.08 [0.00] (0.07) (0.93) (3.08) 
Pakistan  201  0.03  0.40 -0.18 -0.01 [0.67] (0.06) (0.86) (1.06) 
Peru  186  0.12 -1.18  7.53***  0.12 [0.00] (0.08) (1.15) (1.51) 
Philippines  201  0.22** -1.28 -2.79*  0.01 [0.41] (0.09) (1.15) (1.43) 
Poland  177  0.25*** -2.14* -0.21  0.01 [0.28] (0.09) (1.18) (1.36) 
Portugal  162  0.09 -1.69 -6.23**  0.03 [0.15] (0.07) (1.14) (2.89) 
Russia  142  0.10 -4.48 -9.84  0.01 [0.49] (0.18) (3.12) (7.13) 
Singapore  110  0.06 -4.90*** -5.59***  0.21 [0.73] (0.10) (1.54) (1.24) 
South Africa  142  0.21*** -3.88*** -14.43***  0.19 [0.00] (0.08) (1.36) (2.75) 
South Korea  201  0.25***  1.37 -1.36  0.00 [0.16] (0.09) (1.38) (1.39) 
Spain  203  0.09 -3.53***  4.93***  0.08 [0.00] (0.08) (1.17) (1.49) 
Sri Lanka  203 -0.02  0.03 -3.31***  0.07 [0.00] (0.05) (0.63) (0.79) 
Sweden  203  0.14* -4.11***  3.64***  0.07 [0.00] (0.08) (1.24) (1.38) 
Switzerland  199  0.18*** -0.33  2.54**  0.02 [0.03] (0.06) (0.82) (1.02) 
Thailand  197  0.21** -0.97 -7.65**  0.01 [0.09] (0.09) (1.23) (3.76) 
Turkey  204  0.30* -5.32**  5.43*  0.03 [0.01] (0.17) (2.54) (2.98) 
UK  202  0.03 -1.95** -6.27**  0.03 [0.17] (0.07) (0.93) (3.02) 
Notes: Table A5.2 reports robust MM-weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation (5.4) on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDy   21 1 , where uti  denotes unexpected FFR 
changes and inttr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i). 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. We exclude the 17th Sep 01 event-date, 
and event-dates associated with employment release reports from all estimates. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A5.3: Response of international equity index returns to unexpected FFR changes, 
controlling for the 2007-2009 crisis (NBER Crisis: Dec-08 to Jun-09) 
Country Obs α β1 β2 Adj R2 [β1 = β2] s.e (α) s.e (β1) s.e (β2) 
Australia  171  0.20*** -1.94**  0.58  0.02 [0.50] (0.06) (0.85) (3.67) 
Austria  209  0.24*** -2.20**  3.25***  0.05 [0.00] (0.07) (0.89) (1.24) 
Belgium  202  0.18***  0.02  3.49***  0.05 [0.00] (0.06) (0.69) (1.01) 
Brazil  199  0.67*** -5.62*** -4.51**  0.06 [0.63] (0.13) (1.71) (2.25) 
Bulgaria  93  0.12* -1.49  0.49  0.01 [0.12] (0.07) (1.01) (0.77) 
Canada  209  0.10** -1.78*** -5.56***  0.19 [0.00] (0.05) (0.63) (0.83) 
China  171 -0.03  0.77 -3.32**  0.02 [0.05] (0.10) (1.27) (1.62) 
Czech  155  0.15* -3.86***  5.87***  0.17 [0.00] (0.08) (1.26) (1.21) 
Denmark  204  0.11 -0.67 -7.29**  0.02 [0.06] (0.07) (0.82) (3.43) 
Egypt  145  0.13* -0.20 -4.65***  0.11 [0.01] (0.07) (1.23) (1.05) 
Finland  210  0.14 -0.96  2.11  0.00 [0.15] (0.10) (1.22) (1.78) 
France  213  0.13 -1.34  5.59***  0.06 [0.00] (0.09) (1.04) (1.54) 
Germany  213  0.19** -0.86  6.73***  0.08 [0.00] (0.09) (1.06) (1.52) 
Greece  210  0.15* -0.59  4.88***  0.04 [0.00] (0.09) (1.06) (1.51) 
Hong Kong  209  0.08 -4.57*** -13.73***  0.34 [0.00] (0.08) (1.06) (1.43) 
Hungary  187  0.13 -0.14  2.04  0.00 [0.22] (0.09) (1.08) (1.43) 
India  211  0.19** -1.59  4.74  0.01 [0.12] (0.08) (0.99) (3.96) 
Indonesia  210  0.29***  1.01 -8.97***  0.15 [0.00] (0.08) (0.88) (1.44) 
Ireland  210  0.21*** -0.27  0.25 -0.01 [0.73] (0.07) (0.89) (1.25) 
Italy  125  0.03 -4.63**  4.68***  0.08 [0.00] (0.13) (2.05) (1.78) 
Japan  209  0.20** -1.38 -1.78  0.01 [0.82] (0.08) (0.99) (1.49) 
Luxembourg  114  0.20 -2.04  4.88  0.01 [0.14] (0.12) (1.77) (4.35) 
Malaysia  206  0.14*** -1.30**  0.03  0.01 [0.17] (0.05) (0.58) (0.79) 
Mexico  211  0.38*** -0.52 -7.01***  0.10 [0.00] (0.08) (0.95) (1.42) 
Netherlands  213  0.15 -1.62*  5.19***  0.08 [0.00] (0.07) (0.87) (1.26) 
New Zealand  100  0.10* -5.44***  0.39  0.24 [0.00] (0.06) (0.95) (0.82) 
Norway  211  0.07 -0.17 -11.33***  0.04 [0.00] (0.07) (0.81) (3.56) 
Pakistan  210  0.03  0.46  0.04 -0.01 [0.75] (0.06) (0.75) (1.09) 
Peru  191  0.11 -1.48  13.08***  0.04 [0.02] (0.09) (1.04) (4.81) 
Philippines  210  0.22*** -2.01* -2.42  0.02 [0.82] (0.09) (1.04) (1.56) 
Poland  181  0.24*** -1.73  0.22  0.00 [0.26] (0.09) (1.05) (1.42) 
Portugal  164  0.09 -2.17* -3.76  0.02 [0.64] (0.07) (1.14) (3.18) 
Russia  141  0.11 -6.63**  5.06**  0.05 [0.00] (0.17) (2.99) (2.48) 
Singapore  110  0.06 -5.47*** -5.26***  0.21 [0.91] (0.10) (1.50) (1.24) 
South Africa  142  0.21*** -4.47*** -12.03***  0.15 [0.02] (0.07) (1.35) (3.04) 
South Korea  210  0.22**  0.43 -1.14 -0.01 [0.38] (0.09) (1.14) (1.42) 
Spain  212  0.08 -3.95***  5.24***  0.12 [0.00] (0.08) (0.99) (1.44) 
Sri Lanka  211 -0.02 -0.07 -3.50***  0.08 [0.00] (0.05) (0.53) (0.76) 
Sweden  212  0.12 -2.46**  3.89***  0.06 [0.00] (0.08) (1.03) (1.34) 
Switzerland  208  0.17*** -0.56  2.73***  0.03 [0.01] (0.06) (0.71) (1.02) 
Thailand  206  0.22** -1.22 -8.78**  0.02 [0.09] (0.09) (1.06) (4.26) 
Turkey  213  0.27 -3.60*  6.09**  0.03 [0.01] (0.17) (2.15) (2.88) 
UK  211  0.04 -1.98** -2.53**  0.04 [0.10] (0.06) (0.78) (1.19) 
Notes: Table A5.3 reports robust MM-weighted least squares estimates of Yohai (1987) of Equation (5.4) on 
FOMC event-dates:      tutcrisistcrisistt iDDy   21 1 , where uti  denotes unexpected FFR 
changes and inttr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i). 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one 
during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample period and zero otherwise. The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. 
Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded 
from all estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A5.4: Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks: real integration with the world economy, robust MM-estimator 
weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj R2 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Trade 8175 0.16*** -1.79*** -2.30*** -0.49 -0.63 0.01 [0.37] [0.86] [0.06] [0.01] 
  (0.02)  (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.55)  (0.54)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Trade 7909 0.17*** -2.75*** -2.92*** -0.47 -0.61 0.01 [0.78] [0.85] [0.00] [0.00] 
  (0.02)  (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.54)  (0.53)      
Notes: Table A5.4 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation (5.8) on FOMC event-dates:             tuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistit iXDiXDiXDiXDr   4321int 11 . Where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes 
and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) across our sample of 43 countries. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across 
all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable highitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country 
(i) at time (t) is in the highest half of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. The determinant X  is measured using: 
(a) the ratio of each country’s trade with the world (imports plus exports) relative to each country’ GDP. These models are estimated using the codes of Verardi and Croux 
(2009). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from both 
Panels (A and B). Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A5.5: Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks: other macroeconomic and financial factors (Jun-89 to Nov-08), 
robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj R2 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) US Trade 6756 0.19*** -1.69*** -2.19***  1.04 -1.80*** 0.01 [0.39] [0.00] [0.00] [0.57] 
  (0.03)  (0.43)  (0.40)  (0.64)  (0.56)      
(b) US Exports 6756 0.19*** -1.80*** -2.11***  0.91 -1.67*** 0.01 [0.59] [0.00] [0.00] [0.53] 
  (0.03)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.57)  (0.56)      
(c) US Imports 6756 0.19*** -1.91*** -1.99***   0.68 -1.46*** 0.01 [0.88] [0.01] [0.00] [0.43] 
  (0.03)  (0.43)  (0.40)  (0.57)  (0.56)      
(d) GDP Growth Corr 6756 0.19*** -1.75*** -2.15*** -1.88***  0.98 0.01 [0.48] [0.00] [0.86] [0.00] 
  (0.03)  (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.57)  (0.60)      
(e) Borrower GDP World 6756 0.19*** -1.57*** -2.32*** -2.03***  1.13** 0.01 [0.19] [0.00] [0.52] [0.00] 
  (0.03)  (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.57)  (0.56)      
Notes: Table A5.5 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation (5.8) on FOMC event-dates:             tuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistit iXDiXDiXDiXDr   4321int 11 . Where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes 
and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) across our sample of 43 countries. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across 
all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable highitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country 
(i) at time (t) is in the highest half of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. The determinant X  is measured using: 
(a) the ratio of each country’s trade with the US (imports plus exports) relative to each country’ GDP, (b) the ratio of US exports to each country relative to each country’s 
GDP, (c) the ratio of US imports from each country relative to each country’s GDP, (d) the correlation of GDP growth rates in the US with each country (i), (e) the ratio of 
each country’s (i) total level of bank lending from the rest of world relative to each country’s GDP, (f) time zones and opening times, countries which respond 
contemporaneously in real time, and countries which respond the next trading day. These models are estimated using the codes of Verardi and Croux (2009). The sample 
period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded from both Panels (A and B). 
Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table A5.6: Determinants of international transmission of FFR shocks: financial development, governance and liquidity measures, 
robust MM-estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates 
Country Obs α β1 β2 β3 β4 Adj R2 β1 = β2 β3 = β4 β1 = β3 β2 = β4 
Panel A (All Meetings)            
(a) Electronic Payment 8175 0.16*** -1.78*** -2.33*** -1.21** 0.12 0.01 [0.33] [0.08] [0.40] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.41) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55)      
(b) Financial Openness 8175 0.16*** -1.71*** -2.41*** -1.41*** 0.33 0.01 [0.21] [0.02] [0.65] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.40) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55)      
(c) Market Capitalisation 8175 0.16*** -1.45*** -2.61*** -0.13 -1.01* 0.01 [0.04] [0.26] [0.05] [0.02] 
  (0.02) (0.41) (0.39) (0.54) (0.55)      
(d) Regulatory Framework 8175 0.16*** -1.66*** -2.46*** -1.34** 0.26 0.01 [0.15] [0.04] [0.63] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.40) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55)      
(e) Rule of Law 8175 0.16*** -1.73*** -2.39*** -1.02* -0.07 0.01 [0.24] [0.22] [0.30] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.41) (0.40) (0.54) (0.55)      
Panel B (Excl Empl)            
(a) Electronic Payment 7909 0.17*** -2.59*** -3.08*** -1.19** 0.15 0.01 [0.43] [0.08] [0.04] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.45) (0.44) (0.53) (0.54)      
(b) Financial Openness 7909 0.17*** -2.58*** -3.10*** -1.39 0.35 0.01 [0.41] [0.02] [0.08] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.44) (0.45) (0.53) (0.54)      
(c) Market Capitalisation 7909 0.17*** -2.34*** -3.31*** -0.11 -0.99* 0.01 [0.12] [0.25] [0.00] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.45) (0.44) (0.53) (0.54)      
(d) Regulatory Framework 7909 0.17*** -2.48*** -3.20*** -1.32** 0.28 0.01 [0.25] [0.03] [0.09] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.44) (0.44) (0.53) (0.54)      
(e) Rule of Law 7909 0.17*** -2.59*** -3.09*** -1.00* -0.05 0.01 [0.42] [0.21] [0.02] [0.00] 
  (0.02) (0.44) (0.44) (0.53) (0.54)      
Notes: Table A5.6 reports robust MM-Estimator weighted least squares fixed-effects panel estimates of Equation (5.8) on FOMC event-dates:             tuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistuthighitcrisistutlowitcrisistit iXDiXDiXDiXDr   4321int 11 . Where  uti  denotes unexpected FFR changes 
and intitr  denotes the equity index return for each country (i) across our sample of 43 countries. 
crisis
tD  is a dummy variable equal to one during the Sep-07 to Mar-09 sample 
period and zero otherwise. We define a dummy variable lowitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country (i) at time (t) is in the lowest half of the distribution across 
all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy variable highitX  equal to one if the determinant X  for each country 
(i) at time (t) is in the highest half of the distribution across all countries over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample period and zero otherwise. The determinant X  is measured using:  
(a) the value of all traded shares in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP, (b) the percentage of people aged 15 years or older in each country who used electronic 
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payments in the past year to make payments, pay bills or make purchases from their accounts, (c) the Chinn-Ito index which measures each country’s degree of capital 
account openness, (d) the Rule of Law index by the World Bank, (e) the Regulatory Quality index by the World Bank. These models are estimated using the codes of Verardi 
and Croux (2009). The sample period is from Jun-89 to Dec-12. Obs indicate the number of FOMC event-dates included in estimation. The 17th Sep 01 event-date is excluded 
from both Panels (A and B). Panel B further excludes FOMC event-dates associated with employment report releases. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Chapter 6: Thesis Conclusion 
 
6.1 Outline 
This thesis investigates the impact of conventional monetary policy shocks, i.e. 
Federal Funds rate surprises on asset prices over the Jun-89 to Dec-12 sample, with a 
particular emphasis on the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The thesis primarily focuses upon three 
main financial markets; the US stock market (see Chapter 3), the US Treasury market (see 
Chapter 4) and international stock markets (see Chapter 5). We conclude this thesis by 
outlining in detail the specific contribution of each chapter to the empirical literature, and 
subsequently outline the stakeholders to whom this research has important implications. We 
finally summarise potential avenues for future research. 
 
6.2 Contribution of each chapter to the empirical literature 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3) investigates the relationship 
between US stock returns and FFR shocks over the financial crisis period. We find that over 
sample periods used in pre-crisis studies (i.e. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005), US stock returns 
respond significantly to unexpected FFR changes. In each case, we observe an inverse 
relationship whereby unexpected FFR cuts (increases) are associated with positive (negative) 
stock returns. We firstly contribute to the existing empirical literature by demonstrating that 
extending the sample period beyond 2007 renders the relationship between US stock returns 
and FFR shocks statistically insignificant. The relationship is shown to remain statistically 
insignificant upon controlling for outliers, employment release reports, and unscheduled 
FOMC meetings. 
Secondly, we explain this result by demonstrating that the relationship between US 
stock returns and FFR shocks is affected by a highly significant structural shift characterised 
by the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. Using a series of endogenous tests for structural 
breaks and rolling robust mm-estimator regressions, we identify a highly significant abrupt 
discrete shift in the relationship in lieu of a time-varying shift. This is the first study to 
conclusively demonstrate a marked shift in the relationship between US stock returns and 
FFR shocks characterised by the financial crisis. 
 Thirdly, and most importantly, we find that stock market participants did not respond 
positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the financial crisis. These estimates are yielded by 
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controlling for both broader (Sep-07 to Mar-09) and narrower (Jan-08 to Mar-09) measures 
of the crisis period, the former being motivated by financial events which transpired during 
the crisis and the latter being motivated by endogenous structural break tests. In either case, 
upon controlling for the crisis, we replicate pre-crisis findings from existing studies, that an 
unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with a 4% increase in US stock returns outside the 
crisis period. This implies that outside the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts are seen as 
‘good news’ by investors. Interestingly, many of our estimates indicate a statistically 
significant negative stock market response to unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis period. 
This implies that during the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts were seen as ‘bad news’ by 
investors. 
 Fourthly, we demonstrate that the type of state-dependence in the relationship 
between US stock returns and FFR shocks observed outside the crisis period did not 
materialise during the financial crisis. Previous pre-crisis studies had widely documented 
stronger positive stock market responses to unexpected FFR cuts during ‘bad times’ of 
recession, tightening credit market conditions and during bear markets. Given that the 2007-
2009 financial crisis was characterised by all three simultaneously, one would expect a 
stronger positive stock market response to expansionary FFR shocks during the crisis. Whilst 
we confirm that outside the crisis period, US stock returns yielded stronger responses to FFR 
shocks during ‘bad times,’ this state-dependence does not persist during the crisis period. In 
fact, we find that US stock returns responded negatively to unexpected FFR cuts during the 
crisis. These estimates imply that during the crisis, investors ceased seeing expansionary FFR 
shocks as good news and rather interpreted them as signals from the Fed of rapidly declining 
financial and economic conditions, thereby prompting investors to sell stocks. 
 Lastly, we show that patterns observed in the broad stock market index (S&P500) are 
also present across the majority of industrial sectors. In line with estimates for the broad stock 
market, we find that industry sectors are also characterised by a state-dependent response, 
with the majority of industry sectors yielding larger responses to FFR shocks during ‘bad 
times’ outside the crisis. In line with previous pre-crisis studies, we find that outside the crisis 
period, cyclical and capital intensive industries (durables & technology) are most responsive 
to FFR shocks compared to non-cyclical and less capital intensive industries (energy & 
utilities). In contrast, during the crisis period, industry sectors which respond significantly to 
expansionary FFR shocks, respond negatively to these announcements in each case. 
 Overall, Chapter 3 contributes to the existing empirical literature in several ways. We 
demonstrate that the 2007-2009 financial crisis was characterised by tightening credit market 
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conditions, a bear-market and a recession; and unexpected FFR cuts by the FOMC were 
associated with non-positive or negative stock return responses, while pre-crisis studies 
predicted euphoric positive stock responses.  This implies that during the crisis period, 
unexpected FFR cuts ceased to be seen as good news by stock market investors and were 
rather interpreted as signals from the Fed of worsening financial and economic conditions. 
The cuts were seen as a sign of “desperation of central bankers” (Coggan, 2010) and 
signalled an indication that future profitability would be lower for some time.  This in turn 
signalled bad news for equities. 
 The second empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4) investigates the relationship 
between US Treasuries and FFR shocks over the financial crisis period. We begin by 
confirming the findings of previous studies and find that US Treasuries across the maturity 
spectrum have larger responses to FFR shocks than to raw target FFR changes. For each 
Treasury, from 3-Months to 30-Years, the relationship was shown to be positive, with 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases) being associated with negative (positive) changes in US 
Treasury yields. Consistent with pre-crisis studies, shorter-term maturity Treasuries were 
shown to exhibit greater responses to FFR shocks than longer-term maturity Treasuries. The 
magnitude and significance of the US Treasury response to FFR shocks was shown to decline 
as the term to maturity increased. 
 We firstly contribute to the existing empirical literature by demonstrating that US 
Treasuries have larger magnitude responses to FFR shocks during the financial crisis. Using 
rolling regression with robust mm-estimator models, we identify a discrete shift in the 
relationship between US Treasuries and FFR shocks rather than a time-varying shift for each 
Treasury (3-Month, 6-Month, 2-Year, 5-Year, 10-Year and 30-Year) with a slightly weaker 
shift for the 6-Month and 2-Year Treasuries. 
Secondly, we show that flight to quality trading which was taking place during the 
financial crisis was reinforced following unexpected FFR cuts on FOMC event-dates during 
the crisis. As the US Treasury market was shown to be more forward looking than the US 
stock market, we controlled for forward guidance through FOMC statements188 using the path 
factor of Wongswan (2009) and also controlled for the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Upon 
controlling for these measures, we found that outside the crisis period, 3-Month to 10-Year 
Treasuries responded negatively (positively) to unexpected FFR cuts (increases). This was 
                                                 
188 FOMC statement typically outlined the rationale behind monetary policy decisions, contained language 
which evaluated economic risks and the economic outlook, and often included an evaluation of the likely future 
trajectory of monetary policy. 
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consistent with pre-crisis studies which also widely documented statistically insignificant 
responses of the 30-Year Treasury to FFR shocks. Interestingly, we find that US Treasuries 
across the maturity spectrum from 3-Months to 30-Years respond significantly to the path 
factor. This implies that the US Treasury market is indeed forward looking and responds to 
“news that market participants have learned from the FOMC’s statement about the expected 
future path of policy over and above what they have learned about the level of the target 
rate” (Wongswan, 2009). 
More importantly, we show that almost all US Treasuries have larger responses to 
expansionary FFR shocks during the financial crisis. The difference in response is shown to 
be significantly greater for very short-term (3-Month) and very long-term (5-Year and 10-
Year) maturity Treasuries. The 30-Year Treasury was shown to respond significantly to FFR 
shocks only during the crisis period, in contrast to all pre-crisis studies which widely 
documented statistically insignificant responses. Overall, these estimates are consistent with 
flight to quality trading during the crisis. The stronger reaction of these Treasuries to 
expansionary FFR shocks during the crisis implies that investors interpreted these cuts as 
signals from the Fed of a prolonged downturn, thereby prompting market participants to sell 
higher risk financial assets such as equities (see Chapter 3) to lock away capital in longer-
term maturity, lower-yielding, safe-haven assets. The significantly greater demand for the 
shorter-term 3-Month Treasury can be rationalised because it is one of the most highly liquid 
financial assets in the world. 
Thirdly, in the latter part of the financial crisis (from Dec-08 onwards), the Fed began 
using more non-conventional monetary policy measures such as large-scale asset purchases 
to influence financial and economic conditions in the broader macroeconomy. We show that 
the aforementioned empirical conclusions were not significantly altered upon controlling for 
LSAP announcements by the Fed. In fact, we find that LSAP announcements by the Fed are 
associated with 17 to 18 basis point declines in 10-Year and 30-Year Treasury yields. 
Fourthly, to illustrate that unexpected FFR cuts during the crisis indeed prompted 
flight to quality trading by investors, we extend our investigation to an alternative security 
which is widely perceived to be a safe-haven asset, a store of value, and a hedge against 
inflation; gold. We find a highly significant structural shift in the relationship between gold 
returns and FFR shocks characterised by the financial crisis. In fact, we find that gold returns 
respond significantly to FFR shocks only during the crisis period. A hypothetical unexpected 
1% expansionary FFR shock is shown to be associated with a 6% one-day increase in gold 
returns. As one would expect, gold returns were not shown to respond significantly to the 
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path factor which is concerned with the future trajectory of monetary policy, however an 
LSAP announcement by the Fed is shown to be associated with a 1% increase in gold returns. 
These estimates are consistent with flight to quality trading in the gold market during the 
crisis, as unexpected FFR cuts prompted significantly greater demand for safe-haven assets 
such as gold. 
Overall, Chapter 4 contributes to the existing empirical literature in several ways. We 
demonstrate that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, unexpected FFR cuts reinforced flight 
to quality trading which was taking place, with the prices of safe-haven assets such as US 
Treasuries and gold significantly increasing in response to these expansionary FFR shocks. In 
particular, the longer-end of the maturity spectrum (5-Year, 10-Year, and 30-Year) and 
highly liquid 3-Month Treasury and gold assets were shown to be most responsive. 
 The third and final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 5) investigates the international 
transmission of FFR shocks to foreign equity index returns over the financial crisis period. 
We consider an extensive sample of foreign equity indices across 43 advanced and emerging 
market economies. We begin by confirming the findings of previous studies and find that 
foreign equity indices exhibit greater responses to FFR shocks than to raw target FFR 
changes. Our estimates show that foreign equity indices respond positively (negatively) to 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases) in countries where the relationship is found to be 
statistically significant. Consistent with pre-crisis studies, we observe substantial differences 
in the responses of foreign equity indices to FFR shocks across both advanced and emerging 
market economies (see Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009). We firstly contribute to the existing 
empirical literature by demonstrating that the relationship between foreign equity index 
returns and FFR shocks is characterised by a significant structural shift characterised by the 
2007-2009 crisis, across 26 countries. The structural break-tests confirm that break-dates 
cluster around the crisis period for the majority of countries. 
 Secondly, upon accounting for structural change in the relationship between foreign 
equity index returns and FFR shocks during the financial crisis, we find that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the responses of foreign equity index returns to FFR shocks 
outside the crisis period, and this heterogeneity in significantly greater during the financial 
crisis. Our estimate show that foreign equity market across 15 countries responded 
significantly to FFR shocks, and in each case they responded positively (negatively) to 
unexpected FFR cuts (increases). Furthermore, equity markets across both emerging market 
and advanced economies responded significantly (UK & Philippines) or insignificantly 
(Japan & Indonesia) to FFR shocks. 
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 More importantly, we demonstrate that during the financial crisis there is even greater 
cross country heterogeneity in foreign equity index responses to FFR shocks. In particular, a 
hypothetical unexpected 1% FFR cut is associated with significant positive stock responses 
across 19 countries, significant negative stock responses across 12 countries and statistically 
insignificant responses across 12 countries. There is a significant range of response, from 3% 
increases in the Philippines to a 14% increase in South Africa. Across countries where the 
equity index responded negatively, it ranged from a 3% decline in Switzerland to an 8% 
decline in Peru. Consistent with pre-crisis estimates, this heterogeneity in foreign equity 
index response to FFR shocks cannot be entirely explained in terms of differences between 
emerging market and advanced economies, as both responded positively (Canada & 
Indonesia) or negatively (France & Peru) to expansionary FFR shocks during the crisis. 
Given that equity markets in Canada and Mexico responded positively to these cuts, whilst 
the US responded negatively (see Chapter 3), this implies that geographical proximity and the 
degree of trade may not entirely explain the heterogeneity in response. 
 Thirdly, we show that the heterogeneity in foreign equity index response to FFR 
shocks cannot be explained by any single factor however can be partly explained by a 
combination of inter-related factors. Outside the crisis period, foreign equity indices 
responded positively to FFR shocks regardless of whether there was; higher or lower degree 
of integration with the US economy, higher or lower GDP correlation with the US, equity 
markets open at the time of announcement and higher or lower degree of borrowing from the 
rest of the world. However, during the 2007-2009 crisis period, foreign equity indices 
responded positively to expansionary FFR shocks if they had higher real integration with the 
US economy, lower GDP correlation with the US economy, and lower external borrowing 
from the rest of the world. We therefore provide important insights in to why equity markets 
across some countries may have responded positively to unexpected FFR cuts during the 
crisis, however this does not explain why equity markets across many other countries 
responded negatively to the same information by the FOMC. 
 Fourthly, we yield some evidence that countries with a higher degree of external 
borrowing from the rest of the world responded negatively to unexpected FFR cuts during the 
crisis. This implies that during the crisis, unexpected FFR cuts signalled deteriorating 
financial and economic condition in the US, and international banks strengthened their 
balance sheets by increasing reserves to prepare for the prolonged downturn. The subsequent 
decline in credit thereby had negative consequences for countries with higher levels of 
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external borrowing from the rest of the world, thereby causing negative responses in the stock 
markets of those countries. 
 Overall, Chapter 5 contributes to the existing empirical literature in several ways. We 
demonstrate that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, there was substantially greater 
heterogeneity in the responses of foreign equity index returns to FFR shocks compared to 
outside the crisis. During the crisis period, unexpected FFR cuts by the FOMC were met with 
positive equity market responses in some countries and negative stock market responses in 
others. The positive stock responses across some countries could be explained in terms of 
higher real integration with the US, higher business cycle correlation with the US, and lower 
external borrowing from the rest of the world. However, we yielded some evidence that 
countries with higher levels of borrowing from the rest of the world responded negatively to 
these cuts through the bank-lending channel. This implies that FOMC monetary policy 
should be classed as global risk factor outside the crisis period, however during the crisis it 
has less predictable and greater heterogeneous effects on international equity markets.  
 
6.3 Implications of research 
Thus so far, we have evaluated the contribution of each empirical chapter in this 
thesis to the existing literature in considerable detail. We continue by outlining the 
stakeholders to whom the research presented in this thesis has important implications. This 
includes; monetary authorities, financial market participants, economists and the general 
public. For policy makers such as the Federal Reserve, this is important because they are 
mandated by US Congress to achieve a broad set of macroeconomic objectives such as higher 
economic growth, stable inflation and maximum employment. The Fed primarily enacts 
monetary policy through open market operations at the New York trading desk, and the 
impact will be immediately observed in financial markets with a lagged effect on the broader 
macroeconomy. In this regard, the research in this thesis has important implications for the 
Fed because it helps them understand the first stage in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism to financial markets. It is therefore important for policy makers to understand 
how financial markets respond to Fed decisions during ‘normal times’ and during periods of 
rapidly declining financial and economic conditions, with monetary policy operating close to 
the zero-lower bound.  
The research presented in this thesis also has important implications for financial 
market investors. Bernanke (2009) characterised the financial crisis as being “the worst 
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financial crisis since the 1930s.” Given that the majority of market participants were not 
around during the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression, they are unlikely to have 
experience of financial market responses to FFR shocks during periods of heightened 
uncertainty, tightening credit market conditions, and severely declining financial and 
economic conditions. Pre-crisis studies widely predicted positive stock market responses to 
unexpected FFR cuts under conditions of recession, tightening credit conditions and bear-
markets; however we documented negative US stock responses. This research therefore has 
important implications for investors investing during such times. 
There has been considerable debate amongst economists concerning the efficacy of 
conventional monetary policy in influencing financial and economic conditions during 
financial crises. Krugman (2008) argued that “the usual tools of economic policy — above all, 
the Federal Reserve’s ability to pump up the economy by cutting interest rates — have lost all 
traction” however Mishkin (2009) contends that “the fallacy that monetary policy is 
ineffective during financial crises is dangerous.” This thesis does not investigate the impact 
of FFR shocks on the broader macroeconomy; however it serves as preliminary discussion 
for economists concerning the efficacy of conventional monetary policy in influencing 
financial markets in the first stage of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
research presented in this thesis provides detailed evidence concerning asset price responses 
to FFR shocks during ‘normal times’ and during the financial crisis, and makes some inroads 
in to addressing part of the question. 
Lastly, this thesis has important implications for the general public. The impact of 
conventional monetary policy shocks on asset prices during the financial crisis has direct 
implications for borrowing costs, pensions, mortgage rates, and savings rates for firms and 
the general public. It is important for firms and the general public to understand how financial 
markets respond to announcements by the FOMC to more fully understand the implications 
for their finances both present and future. 
 
6.4 Avenues for future research 
I originally embarked upon research for this PhD thesis in September 2009. At this 
time, conventional monetary policy, i.e. the target FFR, was at the zero-lower bound. There 
had been several announcements concerning large-scale asset purchase announcements and 
the language of forward guidance had not significantly changed since December 2008. At this 
time there was very little data to undertake detailed research upon the impact of non-
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conventional monetary policy on asset prices during the crisis. Interestingly, whilst non-
conventional monetary policy became an increasingly popular avenue of research, there was 
also a significant dearth of studies concerned with the impact of conventional monetary 
policy shocks on asset prices. A similar observation was made by Cenesizoglu, Larocque and 
Normandin (2012). We found this to be rather unusual because conventional monetary policy 
via the target FFR was the primary tool of the Fed for the majority of the crisis period (from 
Sep-07 to Dec-08). Non-conventional monetary policy was only used as a last resort when 
this primary tool had been exhausted. This partly explains the motivation behind the focus on 
conventional monetary policy shocks throughout the thesis. 
There are several potential avenues for future research following this thesis. In 
Chapters 3 and 4 we demonstrated that unexpected FFR cuts during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period were associated with non-positive or negative US stock returns, and increases in US 
Treasury and gold prices. This was shown to be indicative of flight to quality trading as 
investors moved capital away from riskier assets towards safe-haven securities such as US 
Treasuries and gold. Each of these phenomena were examined separately in the thesis, 
beginning with US stocks in Chapter 3 and moving on to US Treasuries and gold in Chapter 
4. For future research it would be interesting to investigate the dynamic relationship between 
US stock, US Treasuries and gold during the financial crisis, in lieu of a separate analysis of 
each. 
Previous pre-crisis studies have demonstrated that US stock returns (see Hausman and 
Wongswan, 2011) and foreign stock returns (see Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005) are 
generally associated with statistically insignificant responses to FOMC statements concerning 
the future trajectory of monetary policy. The US Treasury market in contrast was shown to 
respond significantly to such measures because it was more forward looking than the 
domestic and international equity market. As Chapter 4 was the last chapter of the thesis to be 
written (from 2011 to 2012), there was sufficient data at this time to control for non-
conventional monetary policy measures on the estimates yielded. It would however be 
interesting for future studies to investigate the impact of non-conventional monetary policy 
measures such as increasing and more explicit use of forward guidance through FOMC 
statements and LSAP announcements on the US and foreign equity markets during the 
financial crisis. 
Additionally, in Chapter 4 we controlled for forward guidance through FOMC 
statements using the path factor of Wongswan (2009). However from 2011, the FOMC 
became increasingly explicit with commitments to maintain exceptionally low levels of the 
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FFR at least through mid-2013 (9th Aug 11), at least through late-2014 (25th Jan 12), at least 
through mid-2015 (13th Sep 12), as long as the unemployment rate exceeded 6.5%, inflation 
1-2 years ahead not exceed the longer-run 2% goal by 50 basis points, and have well 
anchored inflation expectations (12th Dec 12). It would be interesting to control for these 
interest rate commitments and investigate the impact upon asset prices not only during the 
financial crisis, but also over a longer-run period. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 5 we found that unexpected FFR cuts during the financial 
crisis were associated with positive stock returns in some countries and negative stock returns 
in others. Although great effort was taken in to explaining these results, a deeper analysis 
would require a more complex dataset which controls for monetary policy shocks both 
conventional and non-conventional, both domestically in the US and internationally in other 
countries. For example, on the 8th Oct 08 the FOMC undertook co-ordinated monetary policy 
action with foreign central banks such as the Bank of England, European Central Bank and 
Bank of Japan; hence these event-dates should be controlled for in the analysis. Similarly, 
monetary policy decisions by monetary authorities across the 43 countries may also have 
coincided with event-dates in our analysis and it would be important to control for such 
events as well as significant macroeconomic events across these countries which may have 
influenced estimation. However this is a significantly greater project to undertake. 
Lastly, the empirical approach to defining unexpected FFR changes outlined by 
Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) using CBOT futures contracts considered a 
set of event-dates which included scheduled FOMC meetings and unscheduled FOMC 
meetings with target FFR changes. This event-study approach has become the accepted 
convention in the empirical literature and is adequate for the pre-crisis literature however it 
misses important events which occurred on unscheduled FOMC meetings without target FFR 
changes during the crisis and thereafter. For example, on the 10th Aug 07 the FOMC 
announced it would provide further liquidity facilities, on the 11th Mar 08 they announced a 
new Term Securities Lending Facility and on 9th May 10 they released US dollar liquidity 
swap facilities in coordination with foreign central banks. These important events were 
effectively omitted from the analysis to the exclusion of unscheduled FOMC event dates 
without target FFR changes. A future investigation may consider expanding the dataset to 
also include such event-dates. There are therefore several avenues of additional research 
which could be undertaken following this thesis. 
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6.5 Publications 
Finally we would like to point out that many of the estimates presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
have been published in the Journal of Banking Finance (see Kontonikas, MacDonald and 
Saggu, 2013). We expect to also release working papers derived from the remainder of the 
thesis in due course. 
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